

THE
FOUNDATION OF
MUSLIM RULE IN INDIA

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*A History of the Establishment and Progress of the
Turkish Sultanate of Delhi : 1206-1290 A.D.*

Second Revised Edition

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CENTRAL BOOK DEPOT
ALLAHABAD

1961

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First published, Lahore, September 1945.
Second revised edition, Allahabad 1961

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PRINTED AT VANGUARD PRESS, ALLAHABAD.

To
Kaniz Fatema Sughra Latif,
my mother, now a memory

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

This book was first published under conditions which left their mark on its printing. Even so, need for a second printing was felt within a couple of years. But because of the situation which developed on the British transfer of power in India and Pakistan the work could not be taken in hand immediately. This delay has however, enabled me to revise the text thoroughly and to incorporate the new materials and studies that have appeared over these years. As a result, some chapters have been rewritten and expanded, certain problems re-examined and the annotations and appendices made fuller and brought uptodate. The original appendix on the architectural monuments has been expanded into a chapter and an attempt made to relate the Jam Minaret, recently discovered by the French Archaeological Mission in Afghanistan, to the evolving Mamluk style. A few points made by the reviewers have been thankfully incorporated. The maps have been prepared afresh according to scale and a new one added. The original plates have been replaced by photographs of monuments and miniatures, one of which is being published here for the first time. Although it is futile to claim error-free printing, it is yet hoped that the present edition will have a more presentable appearance.

Despite some reviewers' insistence on the use of diacritics I am not convinced that any informed or serious reader of this book can feel disturbed by their absence. There is yet no one universally accepted system of transliteration. To use one of the many systems of notation, either modified or whole, has

no more logic in it than to use instead the simpler system of 'sound-approximation', without cluttering up the type-face with additional signs. Over insistence on diacriticization can make it into a fetish and already there are signs that it is being practised almost as a ritual, thus tending to reduce scholarship to a mere set of externals.

For place-names I have adopted the spelling now in official use in India and Pakistan. For certain terms like *Mamluk*, *Abbasid* etc. a simpler form has been used.

Of those whom I had gratefully mentioned in the earlier edition Professor H. C. Roychowdhury and Abu Taher are no longer with us. My debt to them has all the more increased on that account. To those names I must add that of Professor S.N. Sen, of the Calcutta and Delhi Universities, who is happily still with us and whose kindly interest in his erstwhile pupil's work has been a source of strength to me. My colleagues, Dr. S. M. Imamuddin and Dr. M. R. Tarafdar, very kindly helped me in reading the proofs, but I am of course responsible for any mistakes that still remain. My little daughter Shirin deserves congratulation for compiling the index, a tedious work done with patience and care.

Behind all my efforts in preparing this edition has been the unfailing encouragement of Minu whose fastidious demands and radical comments, made with no mincing of words, provided a constant incentive to rethink the problems and make a better job of it. I only hope the result comes up to her expectations.

Dacca University,
June, 1961

A. B. M. HABIBULLAH

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

For the history of India the importance of the century following the destruction of the Chauhana kingdom in 1192 needs little stressing. After the Arab and Ghaznawid preliminaries the Ghoride conquest planted the Muslim Turks in North India, firmly determined to rule and settle in the country. They became instrumental in the diffusion of those cultural elements of Islam which were to dominate Indian life for several centuries. And yet, underlying the new values, was the continuity of Indian institutions and ways of life which the new rulers had little capacity or desire to alter drastically. The vanquished Hindu powers never forgave them and sorely tried their resources at a time when the Mongol barbarian consumed all their energy and equipment. Their empiricism, however, proved a great asset and by compromise and improvisation they brought the foundation-process to a successful close. But in so doing they lost their trans-Indian affiliations, and environment entered to outline the culture-pattern that is India of today and of yesterday. As initiating the medieval age of India the 13th century of the Christian era, therefore, holds the key to her history.

In the following pages is presented a study of this age of transition. My source-materials had of necessity to be mainly those of the conquerors but I can claim to have neglected or failed to co-ordinate no Indian evidence, either, epigraphic, numismatic or literary.

A common term for the Delhi sultans I have substituted by the word 'Mamluk', for, while it correctly conveys their original status it is yet free from the inexactitude implied by the term 'slave'.

To critics I owe an explanation for what may be called unscientific method of transcribing non-English names and words. My defence is convenience, convenience for the reader and for the printer. Besides, the use of diacritical marks has always seemed to me to smack of pedantry for, to the scholar familiar with the original language of the word they are unnecessary, and to one unacquainted with that language diacritization is equally useless except to show off the author's learning. Except for the philologist and the literal-minded precisian phonetic approximation, I feel, must remain the easiest, because it is the most natural, means of rendering foreign words. For place-names, which, with their admittedly phonetic inaccuracies, have almost become part of the English language I have retained the spelling used in the gazetteers except for Mathurah and Awadh whose anglicised pronunciations are too atrocious to be used.

There has occurred a rather irritatingly large number of printing errors. For this my faulty proof-reading is as much responsible as wartime congestion in the press where metals have to be speedily released, sometimes at the cost of accuracy.

Among those whose valued help I have to acknowledge I must mention Dr. C. C. Davies of Oxford, formerly of London University, whose unfailing courtesy and expert advice greatly eased what at the beginning appeared a forbiddingly difficult task.

I am also grateful to the late Sir E. Denison Ross and Mr. W. H. Moreland for providing facilities and helping me solve problems. Mr. Nelson Wright very kindly read through my chapter on the coinage and made important corrections. I must also thankfully acknowledge the courtesy of Mr. Hasan Barni, advocate of Bulandshahr, in allowing me to see and make use of Muizzuddin's *Farman*. To my teachers, Dr. N. K. Dutt and Professor H. C. Raychowdhury I am equally indebted for advice and suggestions. For many acts of kindness in the various stages of the work I must also render thanks to my friends Dr. Mahdi Husain and Mr. Muhibbul Hasan Khan. I am under deep obligation to my pupil and friend Abdul Majed M.A. who cheerfully and at a great cost of time and comfort, underwent the tedium of preparing the index.

Finally, and above all, I must record my sense of obligation to M, to Abu Taher and the late Abul Muhsin, for all they have been to me, an obligation too deep for elaboration.

Calcutta University,
September, 15, 1945

A. B. M. HABIBULLAH

Abbreviations

<i>Add</i>	Additional manuscripts in the British Museum, London
<i>ASR</i>	Reports of the Archaeological Survey of India
<i>BSOAS</i>	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
<i>BMC</i>	British Museum Catalogue of Coins
<i>CCIM</i>	Catalogue of Coins in the Indian Museum
<i>CHI</i>	Cambridge History of India
<i>DHB</i>	Dacca University History of Bengal
<i>EI</i>	Epigraphia Indica
<i>EIM</i>	Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica
<i>Elliot (Aligarh)</i>	Elliot and Dowson's History of India as told by its own Historians. Vol. II. reprinted with (a) Introduction by Professor Muhammad Habib, (b) Commentary by Prof. Hodivala and (c) Supplement by Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, Aligarh, 1952
<i>HCIP</i>	History and Culture of the Indian People
<i>IA</i>	Indian Antiquary
<i>IC</i>	Islamic Culture
<i>IGI</i>	Imperial Gazetteer of India
<i>IHQ</i>	Indian Historical Quarterly
<i>IO</i>	India Office, London
<i>JAOS</i>	Journal of the Americal Oriental Society
<i>JASB</i>	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
<i>JBORS</i>	Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society
<i>JDL</i>	Journal of the Department of Letters, Calcutta University
<i>JGIS</i>	Journal of the Greater India Society
<i>JRAS</i>	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain
<i>JRASBL</i>	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Letters
<i>MASB</i>	Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
<i>MASI</i>	Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India
<i>NC</i>	Numismatic Chronicle
<i>Or</i>	Oriental Manuscripts in the British Museum.
<i>PIHC</i>	Proceedings of the Indian History Congress
<i>PIHRC</i>	Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission
<i>TA</i>	Tabaqat-i-Akbari
<i>TM</i>	Tarikh-i-Mubarakshahi

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
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The two photographs of the Jam Minaret are reproduced with the kind permission of Delegation Archeologique Française en Afghanistan, received through Professor Schlumberger.

For permission to reproduce the miniature from the *Qiranus-Sadain* manuscript thanks are due to the authorities of the British Museum.

The painting from the *Jamiut-Twarikh* is reproduced with the courteous assistance and permission of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.



Minaret of Jam. (Firozkoh)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

It was no strange faith that came to India with the Turkish conquerors. Almost simultaneously with political conquests in the seventh century Islam began to find lodgements in India's western coast, where Arab merchants, familiar for centuries, continued, even as Muslims, to receive warm welcome. Princes, anxious to improve their commerce, accorded generous treatment to the people who commanded the main trade routes of the civilized world. Bearded men in longskirted tunics congregating for prayer, at fixed intervals, in a rectangular building which contained no idols, and adhering to no caste rules, presented a sight whose novelty wore off with the passage of time. As they established colonies and multiplied, they became an integral part of the population. Moving with his wares in the country, the '*Tajik*' added a new pattern of culture and a new channel of intellectual commerce. He enjoyed the liberty of preaching his faith, though direct conversion at the beginning must have been rare ; an early report, quoted by a tenth century Arab geographer, complains that Islam had not made a single convert in India.¹ But a permeation of its cultural ideas was inevitable ; to the natives, particularly of the lower class, the Muslim symbolised prosperity and emancipation. To the efforts of these merchant-missionaries is to be ascribed the formation of the earliest community of Indian Mussalmans.

Nor was the invasion of Sind an isolated or for-

tuitous military event. With the Arab merchantmen came patrol boats and survey parties. The Konkan coast suffered a seaborne attack in the second Caliph's reign. Armed ships, convoying the merchant vessels, kept probing the shore defences. And from the Mekran frontier reconnoitering expeditions finally developed into a determined advance through the border kingdoms of 'Kabul and Zabul' to culminate in Muhammad b. Qasim's victories.

But the Arab was not destined to raise Islam to be a political force in India. Whatever its cultural implications, politically, the Sind affair led to a dead end. It touched only a fringe of the Indian continent and the faint stirrings it produced were soon forgotten. In the Islamic Commonwealth the Arab soon began to loose ground ; geography stood in the way of his expansion in India ; and by the tenth century, his conquering role having been played out, the Indian princes recognised in him only the enterprising and adaptable merchant of old.

To win a sovereign state for the faith in India was a task for which history selected the Turk, a race whose own conversion was still incomplete and whose *forte* was the sword. He brought boundless energy, an all-pervading racialism and the fierce orthodoxy of a neo-convert. He drank deep at the well of Persian culture but he possessed neither the Persian's grace and imagination nor the Arab's fine sensibility of mind. He was grossly materialistic and an intensely practical man of action. The Arab's fiery enthusiasm produced only a faint echo in his heart and, though good-natured and jovial, he could at times, like his distant Mongol kinsmen,

be almost devoid of human sentiments. To him, Islam was only a weapon, a weapon of decoration and of offence. It raised his status as a member of the most progressive world community and opened the way to power and to riches. But he was not a barbarian ; he detested the uncouth Mongols of Tartary. He was sensitive to beauty, justice and to humanism and learning ; and amazing was his transformation. From the rude horsemen, galloping in the steppes, to the poetry-loving patrons of Firdausi and Khusraū seems a vast change but all this was accomplished in less than a hundred years. For a nomadic, fighting race to be the protector of all that was best in Islamic culture when the Mongols enveloped all Asia in a whirlwind of destruction, is no mean achievement.

Such were the people on whom fell the mantle of the Arabs. From the eighth century a vast shifting of population was in progress in Central Asia, and in successive waves the Seljuq, the Ghuzz, the Khitai, the Ilbari and the Qarlugh tribes of the Turkish race spread over the Islamic lands. They established kingdoms and empires and on pressure from behind, yielded and moved further afield. Thus they overran Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and India, only to loose ground once more to the final wave of immigrants, the Mongols.

By the tenth century the Turk was in military contact with the Indian principality beyond the Indus, the Hindu Shahiya kingdom of Kabul. Within a little over fifty years of the establishment of Ghazni principality that kingdom was wiped out of existence and Turkish dominion was extended to the Ravi. Far to the east of the Indus, a Muslim power was established, which, unlike the Arab colonists of Sind,

soon found the key to the geography of India and threatened the approaches to the Gangetic valley. For nearly two centuries the Ghaznawids ruled over the Punjab and became an integral part of India's political map. Hindustan became the next objective. And great was the concern of the Indian princes. The '*Hammira*' became the symbol of a mighty aggressor, and it looked as if the House of Mahmud would enthrone Islam in the heart of Aryavarta.

That honour, however, was not to be theirs. In the third generation from Mahmud his central Asian Empire was rolled up by the Seljuqs. Fresh eruption from Turkistan, family feuds and incompetence, coupled with the rise of their erstwhile Shansabani vassals from the mountain fortress of Ghor, compelled the latter Ghaznawids to fall back on their Indian possession. Even if resources permitted, expansion on the East and consequent war with the Rajputs would have been ill advised when Ghor was in perpetual hostility. Instead, they compromised and made alliance with the Indian princes.

It was thus left to the Shansabanis, an obscure dynasty of mixed origin to complete the process. They replaced the Ghaznawids, and though Central Asia received their first attention, devitalised and warring Hindustan was found easier to overrun. Wave after wave of Turkish adventurers came from the North and along the road which now lay open to India's richest provinces to find congenial employment, prosperity and means to win fame. Within a span of fifteen years mighty princes from the Siwalikh to Bengal were laid low and improvised mosques proclaimed the installation of Islam as the ruling faith.

But to overrun was not to make permanent conquest. That was a protracted affair and took a whole century. Rajputs got over the initial blow ; Turkish factiousness retarded progress ; like a tornado Changiz Khan swept over Asia and cut the Turks from their homeland. Through perseverant statesmanship and luck, however, the Turk escaped the fate of his Arab predecessor and was able to provide a solid foundation to Muslim rule. In this work of initial consolidation the Mamluk Sultans played a vital role. They preserved the kingdom from destruction and the Khaljis only fulfilled a historical task when they expanded and made it an empire.

As the founders of Muslim rule in India the Mamluk sultans thus deserve greater respect and closer study than have so far been devoted. The century witnessed not only the gradual shaping of a State system, but also the beginnings of many of the factors that constituted the composite culture and society of medieval India. The brilliance of the Moghuls has tended to obscure the no less remarkable epoch of their predecessors. A balanced judgement, however can only proceed from a closer study to which the following pages are devoted.

Paucity of original materials may, however, to some extent, account for the neglect shown to this period, but a careful search will yield encouraging results.

For the history of Central Asia and the rise of the Shansabani dynasty of Ghor, the *Kamilut-Tawarikh* of Sheikh Abul Hasan b. Abul Karam as-Shaibani, known as Ibnul Asir, stands out pre-eminently. The author who lived in Mesopotamia, and completed his work in 628/1230, was contemporary to many

of the events narrated in the last two volumes of his work. He used a critical judgment in utilising his sources of information with the result that rarely has his account been found wrong or unconfirmed. This however can not be said of his notices of Indian affairs which, though remarkably correct in dates and essential facts, are admittedly based on hearsay which thus taints the details of his narrative. He is however valuable in so far as he confirms other sources. In some places he supplies interesting explanations or details which, though not mentioned by other authorities, appear to be correct. The *Rahatus-Sudur* of Najmuddin Abu Baker Muhmmad b. Ali ar-Rawandi, is a valuable history of the later Seljuqs of Iraq, whose final extinction the author lived to see. Although Ata Malik Juwaini, the author of the famous *Tarikh-i-Jahan Gusha-i-Juwaini*, must have drawn from these two sources, his work, completed in the year 658/1260, is invaluable for the history of Central Asia in the first half of the 13th century. He held a high administrative office in Baghdad under Hulaku and was in a position to use Mongol official documents. His work is thus the first detailed and authentic account of the Mongol conquests in Western Asia. He is pro-Mongol in his attitude—for he wrote to commemorate the reign of Mangu Khan—but the account is singularly free from inaccuracies. Like all other Central Asian writers, however, his notices of India are meagre and are made only in connection with either the Shansabanis or the fugitive Khwarizmi Prince, Jalaluddin. The same may be said of a few other histories written outside India during the century. Of these, the *Sirat-i-Jalaluddin Mangbarni*, by Nuruddin

Mohammad Zaidari, al-Nessawi, a friend and companion of the fugitive prince, completed in 1240 A. D., is important as supplying valuable detail of the prince's activity in India. The work is extremely biased in favour of its hero, and presents a distorted picture of the conditions in which Jalaluddin appears all the more brilliant. The *Nizamut-Tawarikh* of Abu Said Abdullah b. Abul Hasan al-Baizawi, the celebrated commentator of the Quran, completed in 674/1294, hardly deserves mention not only for its extremely brief account of the Ghorides and the Sultans of Delhi, but also for its grossly inaccurate statements which were evidently based on rumours and tales. Of the histories written early in the 14th century, mention should be made of the *Tarikh-i-Wassaf*, by Abdullah b. Fazlullah Shirazi, written between 1300 and 1328 A. D. It is a continuation of Juwaini's history of the Mongols and begins with the later years of Mangu Khan's reign. India finds only casual reference in course of the account of the Mongol conquest, and yet, the work throws light on Mongol activities on the Indian frontier. In one place it furnishes valuable information respecting the relation of Mahmud's government with Mangu Khan and supports the account of the official chronicle of Delhi. Its notice of the history of the Sultans of Delhi is however, unreliable; only from the time of the Khaljis the account begins to be tolerably free from errors. Containing almost the same matter relating to India is the universal history of Rashiduddin called *Jamiut-Tawarikh*, completed in 1310 A. D. Valuable as the work is for the contemporary history of Central Asia, its account of the rulers of Delhi is

hardly more dependable than that of Wassaf, from whom it quotes extensively. Equally imperfect is another work of the same period called *Tarikh-i-Binagiti*, written in 1317 A. D. by Abul Fazal b. Muhammad al-Binagiti, and dedicated to Sultan Abu Said, the Il-Khanid ruler of Persia. It is a general history of the world but in reality is nothing more than an abridgment of Rashiduddin's *Jamiut-Tawarikh*, which it follows in all its errors and is thus of no material help. The *Tarikh-i-Guzidah*, completed in 730/1329 by Hamdullah Mastaufi Qazwini, is however, a more helpful history. It has been considered to rank among the best general histories of the East, but its usefulness for the history of India is confined to its brief though generally accurate account of the Ghaznawids, Shansabanis and the sultans of Delhi. Except for the Ghorides, for whom it supplies some interesting details, the value of the work, so far as facts and dates are concerned, is merely corroborative. Of later histories written outside India, mention may be made of the *Mujmal-i-Fasihi*, a chronological compendium of prominent events composed about the middle of the 15th century by Fasihuddin Ahmad b. Muhammad Fasihi al-Khafi, the *Rauzatus-Safa* of Mir Khvand completed in 1498, the *Habibus-Siyar* and the *Khulasatul-Akhbar* of his grandson, Khwand Amir, compiled in 1528. Mention should also be made of the *Tarikh-i-Alfi*, compiled by a board of editors under the direction of Akbar and brought down to 1632, the thousandth year from the death of the Prophet. The authors took great pains in utilising all available sources with care and discretion. The sultans of Delhi, however, find only casual mention, for the work is mainly concerned with the history

of Central Asia and is arranged in a strictly chronological order. A historical account of the city of Herat by Saif b. Muhammad b. Yaqub al-Harawi, presumed to have been written between 1318 and 1322,² at Herat under the Kurt ruler Ghiyasuddin, supplies valuable details respecting Mongol operations on the Indian border in the 13th century. It is one of the sources of the well-known *Rauzatul Jannat* by Muinuddin az-Zamchi al-Isfizari, who, late in the 15th century, wrote an extended account of Herat upto his own times.

Apart from these works which are only supplementary in value, our chief original literary sources are very few in number. The earliest among them is the *Tajul-Maasir* of Hasan Nizami, completed towards the end of Ilututmish's reign. It contains a narration of the chief military events of the years 588-626/1192-1228, and although extremely florid and ornamental in style, is generally correct in the minimum of facts which it embodies. The author came to India soon after the conquest of Delhi and commenced his work early in the reign of Aibak to whom the first part of the work was dedicated. Except one in the India Office, all the existing manuscripts of the work are defective in one place or another, and none of them contains the last portion covering the years 614 to 626/1217-1228, which Elliot quoted, in his extracts, from a copy in the possession of Nawab Ziauddin of Loharu. Extremely valuable for the early history of the conquest and independent of the *Tajul-Maasir*, is the historical portion contained in the Introduction to the book of genealogies of Fakhruddin Mubarakshah known as *Fakhre Mudabbir*, discovered and edited by Denison Ross. The author,

who was a learned man of repute in the court of Ghazni and later of Delhi, wrote another history of the Ghorides in verse which, though mentioned by Minhaj-i-Siraj, unfortunately does not appear to be extant. Manuscripts of another work by him entitled *Adabul Harb was-Shujaat* and dedicated to Iltutmish, are however, preserved in several collections. This supplies useful details about the government and military organisation of the newly established kingdom of Delhi. The famous collection of stories entitled *Jawamiul-Hikayat* by Nuruddin Muhammad Afi, and dedicated to the wazir of Iltutmish, Nizamul Mulk Junaidi, contains in its preface details of the military operations which Iltutmish conducted against Qubachah in 625/1227 and of which the author was an eye witness. For a connected contemporary account of the period, however, we are mainly dependent on the *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri* of Minhajuddin Abu Umar b. Sirajuddin al-Juzjani, completed in 658/1260. It is a general history of the world but its value consists in its first-hand account of the Shansabani conquests in India and the subsequent history of the new kingdom in which the author held high ecclesiastical and judicial offices. He was not only a contemporary, but also an actual participater in some of the events narrated in the work, which consequently, suffers from personal prejudice. He is biased towards the Ghorides and the dynasty of Iltutmish and in many places conceals facts unfavourable to his patron Ulugh Khan and the Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud to whom the work is dedicated. Although generally correct with regard to facts, he is very sparing in supplying details and in some places makes contradictory statements. Neverthe-

of Thattah, completed in 1620 and dedicated to Jahangir. This work is useful only for its account of the Sumras, though it is disjointed and does not state its authority. The *Tuhfatul-Kiram*, a general history of the east from the earliest times to the 18th century by Mir Ali Sher Qaani, of Thattah, partly confirms the accounts of Mir Masum and Tahir Nisyani, though it also does not state its source. The traditional account of the fortress of Gwalior since its foundation is contained in the *Gwalior Namah* of Hiranman Munshi completed in the 12th year of Aurangzeb's reign. Much of the account is evidently legendary and, at its best, has only a corroborative value. The same may be said of a local history of Jammu entitled *Raj Darashani* by Ganesh Das Badrah written in 1847. It is hardly worth the confidence placed in it by Raverty, since it is based entirely on such unreliable and legendary accounts as the *Prithviraja Raso*, and none of the statements regarding the ancient dynasty of Jammu finds confirmation in the chronicles of Kashmir or, in fact, in any of the earlier works. Mention should also be made in connection with provincial histories of the *Riyazus-Salatin* by Ghulam Husain Salim, completed in 1768, purporting to be a history of Bengal from the Muslim conquest. Although the author claims to have used earlier histories, he was able to exercise very little discrimination and has incorporated statements in his account of the 13th century which on several points are opposed to the epigraphic and numismatic evidence.

Among works throwing light in the administrative practices, very few treatises belong to this period. But Muslim governmental institutions, methods

and notion have a continuity whose full comprehension can only proceed from a study of such works as al-Mawardi's *Ahkamus-Sultaniyyah* — a tenth century treatise on Abbasid statecraft, and the *Siyasat Namah*, (discourses on the art of government and politics) by the prime minister of the Seljuq king Malikshah, named Nizamul Mulk of Tus. Books on Muslim jurisprudence like the *Wiqayah*, also have a bearing on the subject, for all Muslim legal institutions and practices have a basic uniformity. Of those written specifically in our period in India, the *Adabul Harb* and the *Fatawa-i-Jahandari* have already been mentioned. The *Fiqh-i-Firozshahi*, originally compiled by one Yaqub but revised and enlarged by an anonymous author and dedicated to Firoz Tughluq, is of considerable interest as it embodies, like the *Fatawa-i-Alamgiri*, current legal practices which are not always found to be in conformity with the standard works of jurisprudence. It is thus a key to the understanding of the extent to which state practices were being secularised. Mention should also be made of the *Fawaid-i-Firoz-Shahi*, by one Sharaf Muhammad and dedicated to Firoz Tughluq, containing an encyclopaedic account of the popular beliefs, rituals, and manners of the 14th century Indian Muslim society. Of no inconsiderable help though not strictly contemporary, are al-Qalqashandi's *Subhul-A'sha*, an encyclopaedic description of the Muslim world, and Shihabuddin Abbas's *Masalikul-Absar*, both compiled early in the 14th century, wherein is found valuable account of Delhi administration.

Exclusive dependence on Muslim sources is apt to produce an unbalanced view; the mind of the conquered people can only be revealed by their own writings. Unfortunately, not many non-Muslim

writings of a historical nature have survived from those days. The few that we have are merely Indian counterparts of Persian court chronicles and make fulsome adulations of their hero. For many years, the *Prithviraja Raso* of Chand Bardai, thanks to Col. Tod, enjoyed respect as a piece of sober history. Recent researches are increasingly showing it to be a good specimen of early Hindi poetry but useless as a historical account. The anonymous and incomplete *Prithviraja-Vijaya-Kavya*, believed to have been written during the life-time of the Chauhana prince and only a fragment of which has so far been discovered, is a more dependable work.¹⁰ A much more useful account is the *Hammira-Mahakavya*, recounting the achievements of Hammira, the Chauhana ruler of Ranthambhor and a descendent of Prithviraja. Although written in the usual Rajput style of an eulogy, it supplements the Muslim chronicles in a number of places and helps to form a clearer picture of the vicissitudes of Muslim hold on Rajputana. The *Surjana-Charita-kavya* of Chandrasekhara, a sixteenth century Bengali, poet, continues the history of the Chauhana family. Although in its earlier portion it reproduces Chand's account of the Turkish contact with Rajputana, it is yet not entirely without value. Collections of folk stories like the *Rasmala* of Gujrat, sometime contain useful corroborative evidence. Of greater interest is the *Rajmala*, a continuous official chronicle of the ruling family of Tipperah, the earlier phase of whose history is linked up with the 13th century Muslim rule in Bengal. The work is in Bengali verse and from medieval times is claimed to have been continued by successive generations of compilers. The Jaina writings of the 13th and 14th centuries,

collected in the *Puratana Pravandha Samgraha* and in the *Aitihāsik Jaina Kavya Samgraha*, are not without value, for they contain incidental notices of political affairs, and throw a very welcome light on the culture and religious tolerance of the Muslim conquerors. An interesting composition in a corrupt form of Sanskrit, entitled *Shekasubhodaya*, has also come to light in Bengal. Though pronounced as a sixteenth century forgery, scholars agree that it contains a kernel of genuine history relating to early Muslim contact with the province in the time of Lakshmana Sena. It professes to recount the miraculous activities of the Muslim saint, Jalaluddin Tabrezi. Many of the stories narrated have a circumstantial authenticity, for personages and events, that are mentioned, illustrative of contemporary manners, are mostly confirmed by other evidences. There is little doubt that the work embodies, in a substantial measure, historical facts which had passed into popular tradition.

NOTES

1. Quoted in Nainar: *Arab geographers' knowledge of South India* p. 108. See also Habib in *Elliot (Aligarh)*, ii, introduction, pp. 46-48.
2. *Tarikh Nama-i-Herat*, of Saif ibn Muhammad ibn Yaqub at Harawi, ed. M. Z. Siddiqi, Calcutta. 1944, introduction p. xiii-xiv.
3. The abrupt ending of his work and his lapsing into obscurity may be due to his falling out with the all-powerful Balban. A suggestion to this effect is implied in a remark of Balban recorded in the *Saroor-us-Sudur* a 13th century anonymous compilation of the conversations of a saint Fariuddin Mahmud, the son of a disciple of Muinuddin Chishti of Ajmer. Balban is reported to have observed that among the Qazis he had, Minhaj-i-Siraj was one of those who "feared neither him nor God". Nizami, K. A. *Supp. Elliot. (Aligarh)*, ii, p. 844.
4. On this point see *IC*, 1941 p. 207-16; *infra*, chapter viii; for a detailed comparison of the *Tarikh* with the *Fatawa* see Hardy: *The Oratio Recta* of Barani's *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi*, in *BSOAS*, 1957, xx, pp. 315-21.

5. Habib, M : *Chishti mystic records of the Sultanate period in Mediaval India Quarterly*, Vol. i, No. 2, 1950 ; Nizami, K. A. ; *op. cit.* pp. 833-34.
6. Nizami, K. A. ; *Saroor-us-Sodur*, in *PIHC*, Nagpur, 1950, pp. 167-169.
7. Ed. A. M. Husain, Agra, 1938; a more critical edition with notes is by M. Usha, Madras.
8. For a discussion of such non-extant source books see Habibullah—*Undiscovered literary sources for pre-Mughal India* in *PIHC*, 1939, pp. 858-872.
9. *TN*, trans. i, p. 302.
10. Recent suggestions are that it should be ascribed to the authorship of the Kasmiri, Jayanaka; *HCIP*, v, p.384, note 20.

CHAPTER II

THE BACKGROUND : CENTRAL ASIA

The century and a half that followed Mahmud's secession to the principality of Ghazni witnessed the rise and fall of two great empires. The Seljuqs, who supplanted the Ghaznavids in Central Asia,¹ were, during the period under review, in their turn, undergoing a process of rapid decline facilitating the rise of new dynasties. Sanjar was the last of the imperial Seljuqs whose long reign could scarce conceal signs of the approaching end. His early triumphs over Ghazni,² Samargand,³ and Ghor,⁴ were followed by defeats which shook the empire to its foundation. The most crushing defeat came from the southern Turks, called *Qara-Khitai* by the Muslim writers, who had established a strong empire on the eastern bank of the Jaxartes and were making powerful inroads into Transoxiana. In 537/1137 they invaded Samargand and obtained a decisive victory over Sanjar's vassal.⁵ Five years later, they again crossed the Jaxartes on the plea of aiding their Qarlugh allies who had broken in revolt against the Khan of Samargand. The latter thereupon summoned his suzerain to assistance. In the battle that followed Sanjar suffered the greatest defeat of his life and could escape only with a few followers.⁶ This defeat cost him the whole of Transoxiana.⁷ It produced repercussions on other parts of the empire as well. According to the *Guzidah*,⁸ Atsiz, the vassal ruler of Khwarizm (Khiva) now declared independence and assumed royal titles; he even captured Merv, Sanjar's capital,

which however, was easily recovered. The final disaster to his empire was the eruption of the Ghuzz from Balkah⁹ and his subsequent defeat and captivity at their hands in 548/1153. After four years he managed to escape but died shortly afterwards.¹⁰

Even before his death smaller states were well on their way to independence. The western provinces of Iraq, Azarbaijan and Hamadan, under the collateral Seljuq family of the *Atabeks*, were practically cut off from Central Asian politics by their quarrel with the Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad whose ambition to revive temporal power soon culminated in a bitter hostility to the Seljuqs.¹¹ Sanjar's successor was forced to accept Ghuzz vassalage and remained practically a prisoner in their hands. He obtained freedom in 557/1162 only to die a captive in the hand of Muayyid, a former slave of Sanjar and at that time the self-appointed ruler of the greater part of Khurasan.¹²

Of supreme importance for the history of Central Asia at this period was the rise of Khwarizm and Ghor and their eventual struggle for the mastery of Khurasan. Atsiz, the real founder of Khwarizm's greatness, was originally a loyal vassal of Sanjar until jealously the latter's courtiers drove him to open revolt in 533/1138. Sanjar defeated him and appointed his nephew Sulaiman to his office.¹³ As soon as Sanjar's back was turned Atsiz advanced and drove Sulaiman out of Khwarizm. Reference has been made to his assertion of sovereignty in 1141 when Sanjar's defeat by the Qara-Khitais foreshadowed the end of Seljuq power.¹⁴ Their predominance however affected Atsiz also; for, his own territories were also overrun on this occasion

and he was forced to promise an annual tribute of thirty thousand gold *dinars*, an obligation which he is said to have scrupulously fulfilled for the rest of his life.¹⁵ His second defeat by Sanjar in 538/1143, following his capture of Merv, failed to rid him of ambition; for, although he was pardoned and reinstated¹⁶ he revolted almost immediately and slew Sanjar's agent. He even planned to assassinate his overlord. For the third time Sanjar marched to Khwarizm in 542/1147 and once again pardoned the vanquished rebel.¹⁷ During Sanjar's captivity at the Ghuzz camp Atsiz invaded Khurasan on the plea of freeing his sovereign but had to retire unsuccessful. During the last few years of his life he desisted from open revolt but continued surreptitiously to extend his possessions. Before his death in 551/1156 he had thus annexed Jand and Mankislagh and had imposed something like suzerainty over the Khan of Samarqand.¹⁸ In Khurasan, however, Ghuzz power impeded his expansion and favoured the rise of Muayyid who, pretending to champion the Seljuq cause, succeeded in establishing his hold over Neshapur, Tus and the adjacent districts. The Ghuzz held Merv, Sarakhs and Balkh, while Herat passed under Aetigin, a former vassal of the Seljuqs and now a Ghuzz protege.¹⁹

Il-Arslan, the successor of Atsiz, followed his father's imperialist policy with steadfast resolution. He obtained Sanjar's approval to his accession and also the recognition of Ghiyasuddin, the Seljuq *atabek* of Iraq. Soon he managed to establish his suzerainty over the Ghuzz chief of Gurgan and Dihistan, and when in 558/1162, the chief was found making common cause with Muayyid with whom he had

lately fought an indecisive battle, Il-Arslan made it a pretext to annex the latter district.²⁰ In order to extend his influence over Transoxiana in 553/1159 he readily agreed to intervene in the quarrel which again broke out between the Qarlughs and the Khan of Samarqand. The result, however, did not prove happy for him; for although the dispute ended peacefully, his siding with the Khan of Samarqand, led to an eventual rupture with his father's *Qara-Khitai* suzerain. By his refusal to continue the annual tribute, he even provoked them to invade his territories in 567/1172. In the engagement that followed the Khwarizm army was decisively beaten.²¹ This was a forcible reminder that no empire-building was possible in Central Asia until this infidel power was finally crushed. Henceforth Khwarizm directed her policy to that end. Il-Arslan died early next year.

In Khurasan the Khwarizm Shah failed to make much headway; the Ghuzz and lately, the *Qara-Khitai*, arrested his efforts. His preoccupations, however, provided an opportunity to the rulers of the petty principality of Ghor, designated by Minhaj-i-Siraj as the *Shansabani*, because of their descent from an ancestor named *Shansab*, to extend their power quite at the cost of the war leaders holding the province. From their insignificant position as the chiefs of the mountain fortress of Ghor, they came into prominence during the reign of the Ghaznawid Bahram, who perfidiously murdered Malik Qutbuddin Hasan, a Ghoride prince who had taken refuge at his court and been married to one of Bahram's daughters. This roused the wrath of Saifuddin Suri, brother of the murdered prince, who thereupon invaded Ghazni

and drove Bahram from the city. He soon returned in 543/1148 and, taking advantage of the absence of the Ghoride troops, then wintering at home, seized Saifuddin and sent his head to Sanjar.²² Alauddin Hussain, Saifuddin's younger brother, then advanced on Ghazni and wreaked a terrible vengeance. After plundering the city he set fire to the buildings, which were left burning for seven days, and massacred the whole population.²³ This action, which earned him the unenviable nickname of '*Jahan Soz*' (the world-burner), combined with his refusal to pay the stipulated tribute due from Bahram, engaged Sanjar whom he had already provoked by unwarrantedly capturing Herat and Balkh²⁴ during his preoccupation with Atsiz's rebellion. His consequent defeat and imprisonment has already been alluded to.²⁵ His wit and refined intelligence, however, impressed his captor who restored him to his principality. Taking advantage of Sanjar's subsequent captivity, Alauddin later conquered Bamian, Tukharistan, the districts of Jarum and Bust, and reduced Gharjistan in the valley of the Murghab river; he even made an inroad into Khurasan by capturing Tulak near Herat.²⁶ His conquests in Balkh and Tukharistan, however, were soon lost to the Ghuzz while one of their allies, Aetigin, possessed himself of Herat. The 'world-burner' died in 1161,²⁷ and was succeeded by another of his brothers named Saifuddin who recovered and successfully defended a part of Herat against Muayyid's attack.²⁸ Following his death in an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge the Ghuzz from Balkh, Ghazni was also lost to them who occupied the city for twelve years.²⁹ Ghiyasuddin,

succeeding to his cousin's throne in Ghôr, however, resumed the struggle and is stated to have liberated Garmsir and Zamin Dawar.³⁰ The waning power of the Ghuzz enabled him to annex Faras, Kaliyun, Garjistan, Baghshor and Talqan and finally in 568/1173-4, to recover Ghazni.³¹ Sijistan also acknowledged his sway and, four years later, Herat was delivered by the citizens who opposed the pro-Ghuzz policy of its ruler.³² The Ghuzz chief of Kirman eventually accepted his vassalage. Balkh and parts of Khurasan, adjacent to Herat, were thus gradually annexed to his growing empire.

This advance into Khurasan brought the Ghorides into open rivalry with the Khwarizm Shah. Il-Arslan's death was followed by a civil war between his two sons, Takash and Sultan Shah, in which the former, by agreeing to pay an annual tribute, obtained help from the *Qara-Khitai* in expelling his brother. Sultan Shah took refuge with Muayyid who soon lost his life fighting for him with Takash. Sultan then fled to Dihistan and eventually to Ghor.³³ His ambition thus introduced a new factor into the complex political situation of Khurasan. Takash soon quarrelled with his *Qara-Khitai* suzerains with whom Sultan now found it expedient to enter into alliance.³⁴ With their help he succeeded in wresting Merv, Sarakhs and Tus from the Ghuzz chieftain, Malik Dinar, and also in dislodging Tughan Shah, Muayyid's successor, from Neshapur. The latter then accepted vassalage under Takash who allowed him to hold Nessa till his death.³⁵ Following Takash's capture of Neshapur in 583/1187, the two brothers entered into an agreement by which Sultan was permitted to retain sovereignty over Merv, Sarakhs

and a few other towns.³⁶ His ambition however, gave him no rest and led him to open conflict even with his erstwhile Ghoride friends. Allying himself with Tughril, an adventurer who seized and for a brief period held sway over Herat, Sultan now "invested Fushanj and made raids upon the territories of Ghor and created tumult and disorder".³⁷

The Ghorides found their ambition thwarted, for Khwarizm reimposed her domination in Khurasan. Sultan only aggravated a situation in which a recourse to arms seemed unavoidable. Owing to their preoccupations with the Ghaznawids at the moment and Ghiyasuddin's brother, Muizzuddin's projected Indian expedition, the Ghorides, however, could hardly open hostilities. So they sought to negotiate with Takash regarding matters in Khurasan. Ghiyasuddin was even anxious to obtain the latter's help against Sultan Shah, and in a letter dated in 1183 he offered armed assistance in return.³⁸ Minhaj speaks even of a treaty of alliance between the two sovereigns,³⁹ and makes some reference to, possibly a resultant, Ghoride conflict with the *Qara-Khitai* the termination of whose unwelcome suzerainty the Kwarizm Shah desired by all means. After Takash's above mentioned agreement with his brother, the alliance, directed against Sultan, naturally became inoperative. The Ghorides were thus left to deal single handed with Sultan. When they were in a position to move against him in 586/1190-91,⁴⁰ they had, however, a freer hand, for the Ghaznawid enemy had been entirely eliminated. Both Sultan, and his ally, Tughril of Herat, were easily defeated, and Herat most probably annexed to Ghor.⁴¹ Sultan died next year but his possessions were at once

occupied by Takash.⁴²

In spite of his victory over Sultan, Ghiyasuddin was thus unable to extend his dominion, for Takash controlled the whole of Khurasan. In 578/1182, he sent an expedition to Bukhara to consolidate his possessions in Transoxania; he also reduced the turbulent tribes of Qipchaq on the northern boundary of his empire. On the west he successfully intervened in the conflict of the last Seljuq Tughril with his rebellious vassal, the Atabek Inanaj, and in the battle that followed the Atabek's head was sent as a present to the Caliph at Baghdad.⁴³ He thus became the virtual successor to the Seljuq emperors. But with their empire he also inherited their traditional enmity to the Caliph. This had the most disastrous consequence not only for his empire but also for the whole of Muslim Asia. It converted the political situation into a triangular conflict which facilitated the easy advance of the Mongols a few years later. For the time being, Takash's advance into Iraq offered a prospect to the Caliph of realising his ambitions of temporal power, so long thwarted by the Seljuqs. But his hopes were frustrated when Takash paid scanty respect to his *wazir* and did not show any inclination to share the sovereignty of Iraq with him.⁴⁴ As a result, the Caliph became bitterly hostile and henceforth devoted himself exclusively to fomenting enmity against the Khwarizm Shah. Minhaj records the arrival at Ghor of emissaries from Baghdad urging Ghiyasuddin to make immediate war on Takash.⁴⁵

In spite of their ambition, the Ghorides were however, not strong enough to comply immediately with the request. But on Takash's death in 596/1200,

they at once took advantage of a civil war that broke out between his son and grandson, Alauddin and Hindu Khan. Ghoride troops entered Khurasan and captured Neshapur, Merv, Sarakhs and Tus early next year.⁴⁶ Territories as far as Jurjan and Bistam were brought under their sway. Kohistan, the stronghold of the Mulahidah heretics, was plundered, and the whole of Khurasan for the first time was thus occupied by the Ghorides.

Their triumph was however short-lived, for Alauddin, who ultimately succeeded to Takash's throne, proved to be of the same metal as his father. He soon recovered Neshapur and other Ghoride conquests; even Herat capitulated to him in 598/1201.⁴⁷ In spite of his easy success Alauddin appears to have been anxious for peace with Ghorides, in order to deal finally with his hated *Qara-khitai* suzerain.⁴⁸ But they gave him no rest. Impatient to recover Khurasan, the Ghorides opened the attack and after obtaining a victory near the Merv-ar-rud, besieged Tus and Sarakhs. Herat easily fell before them. Alauddin, however, taking advantage of Muizzuddin's brief absence from Herat on the occasion of his brother Ghiyasuddin's death in 599/1202, defeated the Ghoride troops under Kharnak beseiging Merv, and relieved the city.⁴⁹ The long standing rivalry between the two dynasties thus came to a head and a decisive conflict could no longer be postponed.

With a view to striking a final blow, Muizzuddin accordingly advanced to besiege Gurganj, Alauddin's capital. The latter then hastily returned and was compelled to appeal for help to his *Qara-khitai* suzerain.⁵⁰ This turned the table, and Muizzuddin,

on the news of the latter's approach, had to beat a hasty retreat. The *Qara-khitais* pursued him and on the banks of the Oxus signally defeated his forces. He escaped with the remnant of his beaten army, but was surrounded at Andhkhud in 601/1204.⁵¹ It was only through the intercession of Takash's vassal, Usman, the Khan of Samarqand, that he was able to obtain a safe retreat to his capital. Thus beaten most decisively Muizzuddin could hardly refuse to conclude a defensive alliance with his former enemy Alauddin.⁵² Of their late conquests Alauddin allowed the Ghorides to retain possession only of Herat and Balkh.

The Khwarizm Shah thus clearly beat his rival not only in war but also in diplomacy. In vain he had sought Ghoride assistance against the *Qara-khitais*; all he had achieved was merely to increase the ambition of the opportunist Muizzuddin. In compelling the latter to make peace and even enter into an alliance with him, he now used the same enemy whose destruction was his ultimate aim. But neither the Ghorides nor the *Qara-khitais* realised the significance of Alauddin's policy. His ignominious defeat hung heavily on Muizzuddin's mind and the destruction of the infidel power became his immediate objective.⁵³ "Vainly did the Caliph of Baghdad entreat him to finish with the Khwarizm Shah first and even to conclude an alliance with the *Qara-khitais* for the purpose."⁵⁴ Hostilities were commenced with the latter by Muizzuddin's governor of Balkh who captured Tirmiz.⁵⁵ Before he could follow this up by a full scale invasion of their territory in Transoxiana, the rising in the Punjab, however, compelled Muizzuddin to make a hasty

expedition thither in order to "put the affairs of the treasury and armoury in order."⁵⁶ On his way back he despatched orders to the ruler of Bamian to prepare for the ensuing campaign and to arrange for the building of a bridge over the Oxus. From Lahore he granted leave to his troops to return to their homes for a short while, after which they were to assemble for the campaign which he proposed to carry on for three years.

This he was never able to commence, for he died before he could reach his capital. With him died his empire across the Hindu Kush. Within a few years Mahmud, his nephew and successor at Ghor, was compelled to acknowledge the Khwarizm Shah's suzerainty; after his death the Shansabani kingdom was practically absorbed within the Khwarizmi empire. The dissolution of Ghor was complete when in 612/1215 Yalduz, Muizzuddin's viceroy was driven out and Ghazni was attached to the appanage of Alauddin's crown prince, Jalaluddin. In his scheme of empire-building, Muizzuddin's Indian conquests appeared to have a secondary importance. And yet, they survived the destruction of his own principality. Had not the Khwarizmi empire gone down before the Mongols, the infant state of Delhi would probably have met with a fate similar to that of Ghazni.

North India

The beginning of Turkish ascendancy over the Islamic world was almost contemporaneous with the emergence of a new fighting order in Indian society. The Arab had to fight a Brahmin dynasty in Sind;

the Turk faced the Rajput. Resulting from foreign invasions and colonizations, in India great social transformations had been in progress from the beginning of the Christian era. The passing of Harsha's empire towards the end of the 7th century and with it, of ancient traditions and social ties, saw a new aristocracy taking gradual shape. This was the Rajput, who, for the next few centuries championed a resuscitated Brahmanism and controlled the destiny of North India. He claimed to have a purely Indian origin, a twice-born (*dwija*), sprung from the sacrificial fire at Mt. Abu, and to represent the solar dynasty. Scholars agree in giving him a mixed origin, with a large proportion of foreign blood, who eventually found a place in Hindu society but with a distinctive name. He practically replaced the old fighting class, the *Kshatriya*, and in so doing, inaugurated an age of romantic militarism, chivalry and of ballads. He had points of resemblance with the Turk. To both, the sword was the means of achieving glory ; philosophical speculation held no attraction for either of them ; clannishness and a blind loyalty characterised the two peoples. A kind of feudalism featured both the political systems. But the Rajput excelled the Turk in reckless bravery and a chivalrous sense of honour that led him to commit self-destruction rather than suffer defeat or go down in his own estimation.

The Arabs had faced an effete people in Sind. To the Turk was opposed this virile warrior race who ruled the country from the Siwalikh to the Vindhyas. But the Rajput thirst for military glory proved his nemesis, for it led to constant wars and to political disintegration. The Gurjara-Pratihara empire⁵⁸

had given way to a multi-state system in which a ceaseless struggle for lord-paramountcy was the order of the day. The militant Muslims occupying Sind and the Punjab increased the forces of disunity. Twelfth century India was, indeed, a tempting prize for the land-hungry Turks.

It would be convenient to make a rapid political survey of the North Indian states under dynastic groupings.

Muslim States of Punjab and Sind

Ever since the days of Mahmud, Punjab had remained an integral part of the Ghaznawid empire. Masud found there a safe refuge from the Seljuqs. We have seen how Bahram and finally his son Khusrau were driven out of Ghazni to rule their Indian province. The last-named was succeeded by Khusrau Malik at Lahore, who, in the language of the chronicler, "abandoned himself wholly to pleasure while the servants of state and governors of the country exercised independent power".⁵⁹

The extent of his kingdom cannot be determined with any amount of certainty. It probably included Peshawar to which Muizzuddin led his first attack on the Ghaznawid possessions in India. Mahmud had wrested Multan from the *Qaramitah* sect of the Shiite Muslims but with the reassertion of the latter's power a few years after his death, it fell off from the Punjab province.⁶⁰ Sialkot appears as the boundary towards the state of Jammu which, according to a late chronicle, was hostile to Khusrau Malik.⁶¹ The Ghaznawid frontier, however, was far from stable, for the Rajputs steadily pushed it back.

The Chauhan king Visaladeva Vighraharaja IV claimed to have captured Asi (modern Hansi) in the Punjab from the Muslims whom he defeated in a number of battles. An inscription of his nephew and successor Prithviraja I records the conversion of Asi (hansi) into a fortified outpost against the Muslims, in V. S. 1224/1167 A. D.⁶² That this pressure must have been continued is proved by the fact that Bhatinda (written Tabarhinda), situated further north, appears a few years later, in the possession of Prithviraja II from whom Muizzuddin was to capture it in 1191.

Faced with the prospect of a long war with the Khwarizm Shah, the Shansabanis found it necessary to eliminate the enemy finally from the rear. The thrust through Sind proving a failure, Muizzuddin directed his attention to the northern entrance and occupied Peshawar in 575/1179.⁶³ Two years later he advanced against Lahore. Khusrau could buy his safety only by offering costly presents and furnishing his son as a hostage. In 581/1185 Muizzuddin again invaded the Punjab but contented himself in plundering the countryside and occupying the fortress of Sialkot, which was repaired and garrisoned. Sensing the enemy's ultimate design, Khusrau at last exerted himself, and with the help of the Khokar⁶⁴ tribes besieged the fortress but had to retire unsuccessful. Next year, Muizzuddin returned to the attack and laid siege to Lahore. Unable to take it by force, he resorted to diplomacy and by assurances of safety persuaded Khusrau to visit his camp. There, he was treacherously seized and sent to the castle of Balarwan in Gharjistan to be kept in perpetual confinement. He was put to

death in 588/1192.⁶⁵

The *Qaramitah* of Multan held the greater part of Upper Sind. The history of Uch, however, is far from clear. Later writers like Yahya Sirhindi, Ferishta and others, probably on the authority of Ibnul Asir, state that it was held by the Bhatti Rajputs.⁶⁶ The annals of the Bhattis, however, do not make the slightest reference to their ever having held Uch.⁶⁷ A likelier suggestion is that it was held by the *Qaramitah*. Muizzuddin in any case captured both Uch and Multan in one operation in 571/1175.⁶⁸

Lower Sind, with its capital at Debal, was under a local dynasty. Mahmud's conquests in those parts were anything but complete. Not long after his death, a local tribe called Sumra, recovered control over the district and became independent. The origin of the tribe is uncertain. Ibn Battuta had heard they were of Arab descent.⁶⁹ He is supported by the *Tuhfatul Kiram*,⁷⁰ but controverted by Ferishta, Tahir Nisyan and Abul Fazal who assert that they were a local Indian tribe converted to Islam at an early date.⁷¹ Elliot and Tod regarded them as of Rajput stock, a branch of the Paramaras.⁷² Their rise to power, according to Mir Masum,⁷³ occurred towards the end of Abdur Rashid Ghaznawid's reign whose weakness prompted them to establish their sovereignty near the town of Thari. The *Tarikh-i-Tahiri*, however, places the beginning of their independence about 700/1302.⁷⁴ This is near enough to the statement of the *Tuhfatul-Kiram* that they rose to power in the reign of Ghiyasuddin Tughluq.⁷⁵ This, however, should, in reality, refer to the Summas who, it is certain, supplanted

the earlier dynasty and were in possession of Lower Sind when Firoz Tughluq, in 762/1362, opened his attack against the Jam of Thatta. Elliot found evidence dating from 1032 of a Sumra prince (Rai) of Sind receiving communications of a religious import from the *Qaramitah* leader of the Druzes who were staunch supporters of the Fatimide Caliphs.⁷⁶ Their acceptance of the Shiite faith and a resulting intimacy with the *Qaramitah* of Multan would thus appear to be of long-standing. In the list of the Sumra rulers found in the *Tuhfatul-Kiram*, the eleventh, named Chanisar (or Chatisar) is clearly to be identified with Sinanuddin Chanisar, the ruler of Debal who submitted to Iltutmish in 1228.⁷⁷ According to *Juwaini*, he fled from his capital when the Khwarizmi prince Jalaluddin Mangbari passed through Lower Sind on his way to Iraq.⁷⁸ When Muizzuddin captured Debal "as far as the sea" in 578/1182,⁷⁹ he must have only compelled the Sumra ruler to acknowledge his suzerainty.⁸⁰

The Western Rajputs

Three powerful dynasties ruled the land from Delhi to Gujrat including Rajputana. Of these the Chalukya dynasty of Anhilwara (Anahillapattan) attained the zenith of its power in the reign of Jayasinha Siddharaja (1094-1143), who after prolonged warfare annexed a considerable portion of the Paramara kingdom of Malwa.⁸¹ He also conquered the principality of Chitor. Following the defeat of Jasovarman (1133-1143), the Paramaras practically became Chalukya feudatories. Not until the weak reign of the Chalukya, Mularaja II, (1176-1178)

were the Paramaras, under Vindhyavarman, able to reassert their independence.⁸² Branches of the Paramaras ruling in the country round Mt. Abu, also reduced to subjection, however, continued in their vassalage until 1179 when those ruling at Bagar were supplanted by the Guhelots of Mewar.⁸³ The Chauhana principality of Nadol also submitted to the Chalukyas.⁸⁴ Jayasinha also reduced the Jadava principality of Girnar, in Kathiawar peninsula.⁸⁵

Their power soon brought them into hostility with other ambitious dynasties. Jayasinha fought an indecisive battle with the Chandellas of Bundelkhand.⁸⁶ His most powerful rival was the Chauhana king of Ajmer. This dynasty, founded by Samanta, received considerable extension of territory under Ajayadeva who founded Ajmer in the eleventh century. His descendant, Arnoraja (c. 1153-1164) was for a short period compelled to acknowledge Chalukya suzerainty, but soon obtained his independence. One of the Chauhana branches occupied Nadol, and about the year V. S. 1200/1143 A. D., supplanted the Pariharas of Mandor.⁸⁷ Branches from this family founded the ruling houses of Kotah, Jalor, Sirohi and Bundi.⁸⁸

The two paramount dynasties of Rajputana with their insatiable ambition for power, could thus hardly live in peace. Between 1140 and 1150, Siddharaja's successor, Kumarapala (1143-1173) twice defeated Arnoraja of Ajmer.⁸⁹ For a second time the Chauhanas became vassals of Gujrat and Someswara, son and successor of Arnoraja, fought under Kumarapala's banners in the latter's war with the Silaharas of Konkan.⁹⁰ With his death,

however, Chalukya power declined. The next ruler, Ajaipal suffered defeat from the petty Guhelot chieftain Samanta Sinha of Chitor who, from a later inscription, appears to have expelled the Chalukyas from Mewar even in the life time of Kumarapala.⁹¹ The Paramaras of Malwa also asserted independence and even invaded Gujrat.⁹² Only the Paramaras of Chandravati remained faithful to the Chalukyas even upto 1230 ;⁹³ the rest of western and southern Rajputana became independent. The next two rulers of Gujrat, Mularaja II and Bhima depended entirely on the support of their Paramara vassal and on the Baghela chief Lavana-prasada, whose son Viradhavala ultimately supplanted the dynasty.

With the decline of the Chalukyas, the Paramaras of Malwa and the Chauhanas of Ajmer rose to prominence. The former were not destined to retain power for long, for their success over the Chalukyas and the Guhelots was followed by a series of defeats which brought about their complete collapse. The Chauhanas on the other hand, rapidly swallowed up north-eastern Rajputana. Visalaraja of Ajmer was a mighty conqueror and by 1150 captured Delhi from the Tomaras.⁹⁴ In his inscription he boasts of his having conquered and subjugated the land between the Himalaya and the Vindhya mountains including "Baikuntha and Jabalipura".⁹⁵ His capture of Hansi from the Ghaznawides has already been mentioned. After the short and uneventful reigns of his son Aparagangeya and that of his cousin Prithviraja I, the throne devolved on his younger brother Someswara. He ruled from 1170 to 1179 and was succeeded by his son, the famous Prithviraja

II, or Rai Pithora of the Muslim writers. Much of his alleged prowess and conquests recounted in the *Prithviraja Raso* of Chand Bardai have been disproved by modern research.⁹⁶ The only undoubted evidence of his military exploits is an inscription in the Lalitpur district of Bundelkhand dated 1182 A. D. recording his capture of Mahoba from Paramardideva the Chandella king of Kalinjar,⁹⁷ which however was recovered within a year. It is needless to refer to his reputed victory over the Paramaras of Abu, the Chalukyas of Gujrat or the Gahadavalas of Kanouj—the latter following his abduction of the Gahadavala king Jaichand's (Jayacchandra) daughter—, for these rest on no better authority than the legendary and unreliable *Raso*.⁹⁸ He was undoubtedly a vigorous king though his claim to Lord-Paramountcy of North India requires substantiation. His relation with the neighbouring kings could not have been very cordial and this probably should explain his single-handed resistance to the Turki invader. We have no means of ascertaining the names of the feudatory princes who are said to have fought in his side against Muizzuddin.⁹⁹ It is probable that Govindarai (written Khandirai by the Muslim chronicler) described as the Rai of Delhi, was his vassal and belonged to the Tomara dynasty.

The Eastern Rajputs

These consisted of the Gahadavalas of Kanouj, the Chandellas of Kalinjar, and the Kalachuris of Chedi. The Gahadavala principality was founded by Chandradeva towards the end of the eleventh century.¹⁰⁰ The Chandellas established their power at the expense of the declining Gurjara-Prati-

hara dynasty earlier in the century.¹⁰¹ They held a brief suzerainty over the Ganges-Jumna *doab* but were supplanted by Lakshmikarna of the Kalachuri dynasty founded still earlier at Tripuri, in the Jubbulpur district of the Madhya Bharat province.¹⁰² The latter, however, had to succumb to the rising Gahadavalas who under Govindachandra (1114-1154) extended their territory at the cost of the Pala and Sena rulers of Bengal on one side and probably of the Tomaras of Delhi on the other. The Chandella dominion comprised Western Bundelkhand probably with the Jumna as the northern boundary; the south-eastern frontier must have been co-terminous with that of the Kalachuris. They also appear to have exercised suzerainty over the Kachwaha rulers of Gwalior.¹⁰³ The Gahadavala kingdom originally consisted of Kasi (Banaras), Kosala (Awadh), Kausika (Allahabad region) and Indrasthana (Delhi?).¹⁰⁴ The expansionist policy followed by the kings of this dynasty soon affected the neighbouring states. Judging from the regnal titles of Chandradeva which include those borne earlier by Jasahkarna of Tripuri, the Kalachuris appear to have been the first to suffer.¹⁰⁵

Chandradeva's grandson Govindachandra was the greatest ruler of his dynasty. His contemporary in Kalinjar, Madanavarman was however an equally ambitious prince who is said to have defeated the Paramaras of Malwa and to have successfully crossed swords with Jayasinha Siddharaja of Gujrat.¹⁰⁶ The ambition of the Chandella and Gahadavala powers could find satisfaction only at the cost of the weak Kalachuris. A part of the latter's kingdom comprising areas in Saugar, Damoh and Jubbulpur districts was thus annexed to the Chandella domin-

ion.¹⁰⁷ On the northwest Govindachandra appropriated a goodly portion.¹⁰⁸ Towards the south also the Kalachuris suffered attack from the Ganga kings of Orissa who attained the height of their power under Chodaganga (1076-1147). Hostilities with the latter are referred to in two inscriptions of a line of collateral Kalachuri princes of Tummana which led to prolonged warfare.¹⁰⁹ The Gangas ultimately succeeded in reducing the Kalachuri king Paramardi to vassalage, for the latter is mentioned as fighting under the banners of Narasinha II (1278-1302).¹¹⁰ The dissolution of their kingdom even before the end of the 12th century is indicated by a grant dated in 1214 wherein the Maharana of Kakkaredi (modern Rewah), formerly a Kalachuri vassal, is found acknowledging Chandella supremacy.¹¹¹ The last Kalachuri record so far discovered belongs to the year 1195 A. D.¹¹²

In spite of their initial success over the Kalachuris, the Chandellas appear to have been finally beaten by the Gahadavalas in the race for power in north India. The long reign of Madanavarma (1125-1165) was followed by that of his grandson Paramardideva. His power was shaken by the defeat inflicted by Prithviraja II, resulting in the probable loss of his western possessions to the Chauhanas. His immediate control could not have extended far beyond Mahoba, Khajuraho, Kalinjar and Ajaigarh. An inscription dated in 1176 recording a gift of some villages, would however seem to extend his sway upto Jhansi.¹¹³

Left alone in the field the Gahadavalas steadily widened their dominion. Grants found in Gorakhpur, Allahabad and Patna outline the eastward expansion of Govindachandra's kingdom.¹¹⁴ These conquests

were mostly at the cost of the Palas, now being practically confined to South Bihar. Govindachandra's expansionist policy was continued by his successor Vijayachandra (c. 1155-1170) in whose reign the district of Shahabad also appears under Gahadavala rule.¹¹⁵ His son Jayachandra (Jaichand of the Muslim writers) was the last of the imperial Gahadavalas. Among his grants which range in date from 1170 to 1189, those issued from Banaras and Gaya testify to his continued hold on Bihar.¹¹⁶ We shall have occasion to describe the hostilities that must have been caused by this expansion with the Pala and Sena rulers of Bengal. Towards the northeast corner of the Gahadavala kingdom a line of princes, calling themselves Rashtrakutas, held sway over Budaun from the time of Chandradeva, probably as feudatories¹¹⁷.

The States of Eastern India

The principal feature in the political situation of northeastern India during the period under review was the rapid dissolution of the Pala empire. Ramapala (c. 1126)¹¹⁸ who succeeded in recovering his ancestral throne from the Kaivarta usurper Dibya, was able to revive the imperial glory by obtaining victories in Utkala, Kalinga and Kamrup. But his death was followed by an almost immediate collapse. His viceroy Vaidyadeva declared his independence in Kamrup and the Brahmaputra valley ; the feudatory kings of the Varman dynasty ruling over the eastern and parts of southern Bengal also set themselves up as independent sovereigns¹¹⁹. Even the petty rulers of Aparā-Mandara (in Hooghly district) repudiated their vassalage and, what is more, entered into alliance with the Senas who, under Vijayasena (1097-1159)

had lately asserted independence over a part of Radha (West Bengal)¹²⁰. Under Kumarapala (1126-30) and Madanapala (c. 1130-50) the Pala kingdom fast dwindled in size and came to comprise only a small portion of the Varendri division of north Bengal. In Bihar their power was circumscribed by the independent principality of Yakshapala at Gaya, a former vassal of Ramapala.¹²¹ Another recently independent dynasty calling themselves *Pithipatis*, ruled over parts of Gaya and Hazaribagh districts¹²².

In the scramble for territories that followed the dissolution of the Pala empire the Senas forestalled all the others. In their grants they call themselves *Brahmakshatriyas*¹²³—a term which indicates a mixed origin—and are known to have come from south India either as adventurers taking service under the Palas or in the train of the Chalukya king Vikramaditya when he invaded northeast India between c. 1044 and 1068.¹²⁴ Vijayasena (1097-1159)¹²⁵ soon attacked and dispossessed the Varmans of east Bengal from where he issued a grant in 1159.¹²⁶ Evidence suggests that he also made himself master of a part of Varendri ; the last grant of Madanapala issued in Bengal is dated in his eighth regnal year.¹²⁷ In his grants Vijayasena claims not only to have defeated the Gaura ruler but also those of Kamrup, Kalinga and the smaller princes of north and south Bengal. The victory over the Kamrup king may have some reference to his conflicts with either Ryarideva or his successor Udayakarna who preceded Vallabhadeva of the Chandra dynasty in Kamrup.¹²⁸ Raghava, the successor of Choraganga of Orissa is said to have levied tribute on the lands bordering the Ganges and thus presumably incurred the hostility

of the Senas who were related to the Sura princes of the affected territory. Vijayasena also fought successfully with Nanyadeva of Mithila (north Bihar).¹²⁹ In the grant of his successor Vallalasena, Vijayasena is mentioned as having sent a naval expedition up the Ganges. This must obviously refer to the beginning of hostilities with the Gahadavalas, then advancing rapidly into Magadha.

Madanapala of the Pala dynasty was most probably driven out of Bengal after his eighth regnal year. He succeeded in maintaining only a precarious hold over parts of Patna and Monghyr districts upto c. 1150.¹³⁰ Vallalasena (1159-1170) and his son Lakshmanasena, the '*rai Lakhmania*' of the Persian chronicles, (1170-1206) not only maintained their hold over Mithila but also appear to have advanced westwards.¹³¹ The Palas lingered somehow near Gaya where an inscription of a prince, presumably of this dynasty, named Govindapala is dated in his 14th regnal year which some scholars equate with V. S. 1238/1175 A. D..¹³² Another prince, named Palapala, is also mentioned in the inscription of an image dedicated in his 35th regnal year.¹³² For all practical purposes, however, the Palas ceased to exist in Bihar, the greater part of which passed to the control of the Gahadavalas. By the end of the century Pala rule, if it existed at all, must have been confined to what is now Bihar district within which was situated the Buddhist monastery (*vihara*) town of Uddandapur (Odantapuri).

NOTES

1. The beginning of Seljuq empire can be dated from 1040, the year in which they inflicted a resounding defeat on Masud I, south of the Oxus. *Guzidah*, I, p. 435.

2. In 510/1116, according to *Ibnul Asir*, x. p. 213, Sanjar successfully intervened in favour of Bahram in his quarrel with his step-brother Arslan. On his accepting Seljuq suzerainty, the former was installed on the Ghazni throne. Bahram soon repudiated the vassalage and stopped the payment of tribute ; but he was easily reduced in 530/1135. *Guzidah* i, p. 458. *Juwaini* gives the date as 529/1134 ; i, p. 4.

3. *Ibnul Asir*, xi, p. 281-82 ; *Guzidah*, gives a slightly different account.

4. According to *Fasihi*, quoted by Raverty ; *trans. Tab. Nas.*, p. 358, note I, even the father of Alauddin Husain of Ghor, the "world-burner" was Sanjar's vassal. Alauddin himself was reduced in 547/1152. Minhaj seems to allude to this act in his account of Alauddin's conflict with Sanjar ; *Ibid*, p. 149 and 357-8.

5. Bartold ; *Turkestan*, p. 323.

6. *Ibnul Asir*, xi, p. 37-8. *Guzidah*, i, p. 487 and *Rawandi*, p. 172, place it in 534/1140, but *Juwaini*, ii, p. 5, and *Ibnul Asir*, xi, p. 37, as well as Bartold : *Turkistan*, p. 326, place it in 536/1141.

7. *Juwaini*, p. 88.

8. i. p. 487. For the origin of the dynasty of Khwarizm, which was founded by Nushtigin, a slave of Malik Shah, see *Juwaini*, p. 2 ; *Guzidah*, I, p. 486 ; Minhaj, pp. 243-5, however, gives an entirely different account. For the name Khwarizm and its capital Gurganj (modern Konya Urgendj) see the article on Khwarizm in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

9. The Ghuzz belonged to the Turkish stock and had only recently began to accept Islam. See *Ency. Isl.*, article on Ghuzz.

10. For details see Bartold : *Turkistan*, p. 329ff.

11. The beginning of this quarrel may be traced to the early years of Sanjar's reign when Masud I, the Seljuq ruler of Iraq (1134-1152) deposed the reigning Caliph and appointed his own nominee. See *Ibnul Asir*, x, pp 270-272 for details.

12. *Juwaini*, ii, p. 16 ; *Guzidah*, i, p. 463. According to *Ibnul Asir*, xi p. 101, he was originally Sanjar's slave, but Bartold, *op. cit.*, p. 335, asserts that he was the leader of the Ghuzz.

13. *Ibnul Asir*, xi, p. 168. *Juwaini*, *idem.* places the event in 565/1169.

14. *Ibnul Asir*, xi, p. 37, states that Atsiz even concluded a friendly alliance with the *Qara-Khitais* against his suzerain ; but Bartold : *Turkistan*, p. 327, is inclined to doubt it.

15. *Juwaini*, ii, p. 88 ; *Guzidah*, i, p. 489.

16. *Juwaini*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

17. *Ibid*, p. 7.

18. *Juwaini*, ii, p. 10. For these periodical conflicts in which the help of the *Qara-Khitai* and the Seljuq or the Khwarizm Shah was invariably sought by the two contending parties, see Bartold, *op. cit.* p. 333ff.

19. *Ibnul Asir* : xi, p. 131.

20. *Juwaini*, ii, p. 16.

21. *Ibnul Asir*, xi, p. 168 ; *Juwaini*, *idem.* places the event in 565/1169, but Bartold upholds the above date.

22. *Guzidah* i, p. 460 ; *Rawandi* : p. 175.

23. Minhaj : p.55ff. It is not certain who was the antagonist of Alauddin at Ghazni, for the accounts are not unanimous as to the date of Bahram's death and the accession of his son, Khusrau. Minhaj, pp. 24-5, states that Bahram was driven out of Ghazni by Alauddin, and places his death in 552/1156. An anecdote on p. 115, however, implies that it was Khusrau who opposed Alauddin. *Guzidah*, i, p. 406, and *Ibnul Asir*, xi, p. 85, date Bahram's death in 544/1149 and 548/1153, respectively. *Baizawi*, f. 51a, states that Bahram died before Alauddin's march on Ghazni, which must have occurred soon after 544, the year in which Saifuddin's head was sent to Sanjar. *Ibnul Asir*, xi, pp. 74, places Alauddin's sack of Ghazni after his defeat by Sanjar in 547, which seems improbable. He further states that Alauddin placed his brother Saifuddin on the throne of Ghazni and on Bahram subsequently murdering the latter, once again marched to sack the city. But Bahram had died in the meantime and his successor Khusrau had fled to the Punjab. *Guzidah* supports this but confuses Khusrau with his son Khusrau Malik, last of the Ghaznawids. According to Minhaj, Khusrau left Ghazni only on the approach of the Ghuzz who then occupied it for 10 years. The dates 552/1157 and 555/1160 for the accessions of Khusrau and his son, Khusrau Malik, quoted by Raverty : *op. cit.*, p. 114, note—from their suppositious coins described in a manuscript entitled *Tafsil -i-sikkah*, do not prove anything, since the legends given therein are fictitious and the work was admittedly compiled late in the 18th century.

24. *Ibnul Asir*, xi, pp. 66 and 74. *Rawandi*, p. 176, and *Guzidah*, i, p. 460, add that Alauddin also entered into an alliance with Ali Chatri, Sanjar's rebellious Governor of Herat, who was, however, executed at the time of Alauddin's defeat. See Minhaj *tr.* p.237 for an ambiguous allusion to this fact.

25. *Supra* p. 22. See also Nizami Uruzi : *Chahar Maqala*, p. 29, for an eye witness account of the event.

26. Minhaj, p. 62ff.

27. *Ibnul Asir* : xi, p. 121. *Guzidah*, i, p. 408, and *Baizawi*, 86b, however respectively, date the event in 551/1156 and 558/1163. Raverty : *op. cit.* p. 363, note, also supports *Guzidah*, but in view of the fact that Nizami Uruzi dedicated his *Chahar Maqala*, finished, according to Browne, in 1156/7, to Alauddin, who is referred to as living, *Ibnul Asir's* date must be regarded as correct. Browne : *translation of Chahar Maqala*, p. 71.

28. *Ibnul Asir* : xi, p. 126.

29. *Ibid*, p. 131.

30. *Fasihi*, quoted by Raverty *op. cit.* p. 374, note 3 ; Minhaj, p. 71.

31. *Ibid*, p. 72ff.

32. Raverty : *op. cit.* p. 192, Minhaj, p. 73 ; *Ibnul Asir* : xi, p. 77.

33. *Juwaini*, ii, pp. 7-19 ; Raverty : *op. cit.* pp. 345 and 378.

34. *Ibnul Asir* : xi, p. 169 ; *Juwaini*, ii, p. 19f.

35. Bartold : *Turkistan*, p. 340. *Juwaini*, ii, p. 22, adds that he vainly appealed to the Ghorides for help against Sultan .

36. *Juwaini*, ii, pp. 24-25.

37. Minhaj. p. 73-4.

38. Bartold : *Turkistan*, p. 340-42.

39. Minhaj ; p. 329. Raverty, *op. cit.* pp.243, 245 and 382.

40. *Ibnul Asir* : xii, p. 28. *Juwaini*, ii, p. 28 places some events which happened subsequently, in 586/1190. Minhaj, p. 74, dates these in 588/1192 but in this year Muizzuddin could not have been present in this battle as he is reported to have been, since in that year he was engaged in preparations for his second expedition against Prithviraja.

41. *Ibnul Asir* : xii, p. 64, also mentions the fact that in 594, Takash besieged Herat which would show that the city was not included in his empire. See also Minhaj, p. 329.

42. *Juwaini* : ii, p. 30.

43. Bartold: *Turkistan*, p. 341. For the details of Tughril's conflict with the Atabeks, see *Rawandi* : pp. 435-441 ; *Ibnul Asir*, xii, pp. 44-50 ; *Guzidah*, i, pp. 475-6.

44. The Caliph Nasir-le-dinellah, in support of the Atabek against Tughril, sent, along with Inanaj's letter, a similar invitation to Takash, to intervene in the quarrel. *Ibnul Asir* : xii, p. 45 ; Bartold : *Turkestan*, 346-7 ; *Juwaini*, ii, p. 33.

45. Raverty : *op. cit.* p. 243. A similar letter from the Caliph urging him even to enter into an alliance with the 'infidel' *Qara-khitaïs* against Takash, was discovered at Ghazni, in 1215 ; *Juwaini*, ii, p. 120. See also *Ibnul Asir*, xii, pp. 51 sq.

46. *Juwaini*, ii, p. 46-49.

47. *Ibnul Asir*, xii, p. 81-82.

48. Minhaj, p. 75, refers to a request made by Alauddin for the conclusion of an agreement with Ghor even on condition of his vassalage. *Ibnul Asir*, *idem*, also refers to a similar request made by the Khwarizm Shah in 598/1201.

49. Minhaj, p. 77.

50. *Juwaini*, ii, p. 55. *Guzidah*, i, p. 411, adds that he also summoned to his assistance his vassal, the Khan of Samarqand on this occasion.

51. Minhaj, p. 123 ; *Ibnul Asir*, xii, p. 86.

52. *Juwaini*, ii, p. 58. *Guzidah*, i, p. 412.

53. Minhaj, p. 121 ; *Juwaini*, p. 53.

54. Bartold : *Turkestan*, p. 352.

55. *Ibnul Asir*, xii, p. 96.

56. *Juwaini*, ii, p. 58.

57. Minhaj, p. 123.

58. For an account of the dynasty's achievements see Majumdar : *The Gurjara-Pratihara Empire*.

59. Minhaj, p. 26.

60. *Adabul Harb* ; f. 76a.

61. *Raj Darashani* I. O. 507, f. 45. The Raja of Jammu named Chakra Deo is said to have invited and helped Muizzuddin against Khusrau. The account, inspite of its doubtful authenticity is accepted unreservedly in the *CHI*, iii, p. 39. Raverty quotes extensively from it. The hostility of the alleged ruler of Jammu with Khusrau, however, might have had some connection with the aggressions of the "Mlecchas from the upper Indus Valley" in 1144 and of the "Javana Turushkas" between 1150-55, as mentioned in the Kashmir chronicles ; *Rajatarangini*, ii, p. 217 ; see also introduction, p. 128 ; *Dvitiya*.

Rajatarangini, cited in Roy, H. C. : *Dynastic history of Northern India*, i, pp. 172-3.

62. *IA*, xli, p. 17-8 ; see also Tod ; *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society*, p. 135. Thomas : *Chronicles*, p. 6c. *HCIP*, v, p. 82.

63. Raverty : *op. cit.* p. 452 ; note 8, doubts whether the work *Furshor*, as written in Minhaj, p. 116, really refers to Peshawar, which according to him, was called Bagram in those days. *Ibnul Asir*, xi, pp. 75-6, however, removes the doubt by referring to it as Furshawar which according to Raverty, was the same as Peshawar. Minhaj also uses the term on another occasion ; p. 9.

64. Minhaj, p. 117 *The Raj Darashani*, f. 45b, states that the Khokars were originally subjects of Jammu but had withheld payment of taxes and allied themselves with Khusrav. Upon this the Raja invited Muizzuddin and it was on his suggestion that Sialkot was garrisoned.

65. Minhaj gives no less than three dates for the event : p. 27, 598 ; p. 118, 587 ; p. 74, 588.

66. *TM* p. 6, Ferishtah, p. 56. *TA*, i, p. 37. The story of Muizzuddin's intrigue with the queen of the Bhatti raja of Uch who, in the hope of marrying her daughter to the Ghoride chief, poisoned her husband and then allowed the fort to be occupied, is first related by *Ibnul Asir*, xi, p. 77 ; but the author himself admits, on p. 79, that his account regarding India is based on hearsay and is unconfirmed. And yet this admittedly tainted account is unreservedly accepted in *CHI*, iii, p. 38. For an obviously legendary account of the early Muslim occupation of Uch, see, *IGI*, xxiv, p. 82.

67. See Tod : *Annals*, ii, p. 1190-1205, where the progress of the Bhattis from the Punjab to Jaisalmer in the end of the xii century is recounted. Jaisal, the founder of Jaisalmer, is said to have sought and obtained the assistance of the king of Ghor in occupying Lodorva, the ancient capital, 10 miles N. W. of Jaisalmer. He is also said to have acknowledged the latter's suzerainty whose troops thereafter left for Bhakar in Lower Sind. The story may have some obscure reference to actual facts but does not confirm *Ibnul Asir's* account. See also Erskine : *Rajputana Gazetteer*, p. 11.

68. Minhaj, p. 127, speaks of a holy war against the *Qaramitah* of Multan and Uch, see also *TM*, p. 5-6. Ferishta, i, p. 56, dates the event in 572/1176.

69. *Kitabur-Rahlah*, ii, p. 5.

70. *Add.* 21589, f. 263b.

71. Ferishta, ii, p. 314 ; *Tarikh-i-Tahiri*, f. 14b ; *Ain-i-Akbari*, Jarrett & Blochmann, ii, p. 341, 345.

72. Elliot, i, pp. 448-9 ; *Annals*, iii, pp. 1281-83 and 1299.

73. *Tarikh-i-Masumi*, f. 51a.

74. *op. cit.* f. 12a.

75. *op. cit.* f. 263b.

76. Elliot, i, p. 491.

77. Quoted by Raverty, *op. cit.* p. 614 ; note : Minhaj, p. 173

78. ii, p. 147

79. Minhaj, p. 117

80. For a critical account of the Sumras, see Riazul Islam : *The Sumras of Sindh* in *IC*, 1948-49.

81. Ojha : *Rajputana*, pp. 196 and 217.

82. *Ibid*, p. 199 ; *JAS*, vii, p. 32-3.
83. Ojha : *op. cit.* p. 208. Bagar, according to Ry : *op. cit.* ii, p. 1182, is to be identified with the modern state of Dungarpur.
84. Ojha : *op. cit.* p. 216.
85. *Ibid*. p. 217.
86. Ray : *op. cit.* ii, p. 971.
87. Inscription of Shahajapala dated V. S. 1202/1145 A. D. ; *ASR*, 1909-10, p. 102-3
88. Erskine : *Rajputana Gazetteer*, p. 236-7 ; *EL*, ix, p. 72.
89. Ojha : *op. cit.* p. 218.
90. *Nagari Pracharini Patrika*, i, p. 399. From inscriptions found in Udipur Kumarapala appears to have conquered Mewar also ; *EL*, ii, p. 421.
91. *EL*, viii, p. 216 ; *IA*, liii, p. 100-102.
92. *JASB*, 1836, p. 378-9 ; Ojha : *op. cit.* p. 200.
93. *Vienna Oriental Journal*, xxi : *The Chirwa inscription* ; *IA*, 1928, p. 32.
94. *JASB*, 1886, p. 41-43 ; Ojha : *op. cit.* p. 234.
95. *IA*, 1890, pp. 215-17.
96. *Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1893, p. 93-94 ; Cunningham, *Coins of Medieval India*, p. 83 ; *JASB*, 1886, p. 5 ; *IA*, 1930, pp. 6-9 ; cf. Smith : *Early History of India* p. 402, note 2, who tries to explain the obvious impossibilities contained in the ballad. A defence of the *Raso* is in *IHQ*, 1940, pp. 738-749.
97. Cunningham : *Reports*, xxi, p. 173-4 ; another inscription at Visalpur, Jaipur state, mentions his name and is dated V. S. 1244/1187 A. D. : *ibid*, vi, p. 156. Another at Udaipur is noticed in *ASR*, Western Circle, 1906, p. 62. See also *HCIP*, v, p. 108.
98. The *Prithviraja-vijaya-kavya* does not refer to these events ; see *JRAS*, 1913, p. 26 ; *IA*, 1879, p. 25 ; Ojha : *op. cit.* p. 277-8.
99. Minhaj, p. 118.
100. His earliest known inscription is dated V. S. 1148-1090 A. D. ; *EL*, ix, p. 304. His rise to power and conquests are described in the inscription of Govindachandra ; *IA*, 1885, p. 102-3.
101. Smith ; *op. cit.* p. 405.
102. Ray : *Dynastic History*, i, p. 504, ii, p. 779.
103. For a traditional account of the Gwalior fort see *Gwalior Namah* of Hiranman Munshi ; also Cunningham : *Reports*, ii, pp. 312-316. According to Ojha : *Tod's Annals*, (Hindi trans.) p. 373, the Kachwahas ruled there upto 1155 ; see also Ray : *Dynastic History*. ii, p. 825-6.
104. *EL*, ix, p. 304 ; *IA*, xvii, p. 102-3.
105. *EL*, xviii, p. 193.
106. *EL*, i, pp. 195-207 ; *JASB*, xvii, pp. 317-20.
107. *IA*, 1908, p. 143-4.
108. In an inscription he is found confirming a grant originally made by Jasahkarna ; *JASB*, xxxi, p. 123-4.
109. *EL*, x, pp. 45-52.
100. *Ibid*, xiii, p. 151-2.
111. Cunningham : *Reports*, xxi, p. 104, 146-8 ; cf. Smith, in *IA*, 1908,

p. 124, note 35, who does not think that Trailokyavarma of the inscription belonged to the Chandella dynasty.

112. *IA*, xvii, p. 228; see *IHQ*, 1927, p. 175, for some coins of a Kalachuri prince said to have been ruling in Ratanpur in Madhya Pradesh, from 1250 to 1293.

113. *IA*, 1909-10. p. 44.

114. *EL*. v. pp. 113-5 ; vii, p. 98.

115. *JAOS*, vi, p. 547. The grant dated in 1169 mentions a feudatory ruler named Maharataka Pratapadhavala of Japila. See also *EL*, v, no. 153 of Kielhorn's list.

116. *IA*, xviii, pp. 129-34; *IHQ*, 1929, pp. 14-30.

117. *IA*, xvii, p. 61. Kielhorn read the date on Madanapala's inscription as V.S. 1276/1219 but this was later rectified and the correct date was found to be 1176/1119 ; *IA*, xxiv, p. 176; see also *JASB*, 1892, extra number, p. 58. Lakhanapala of the Budaun inscription belongs to the same line of princes as Madanapala; *EL*, i, p. 61-62. On palaeographic grounds the second inscription is ascribed to the end of the 12th century A. D. See also Reu : *History of the Rathors*, p. 16, for the relation of this Rashtrakuta family with the Gahadavalas of Kanauj.

118. *EL*, ii, p. 355-6.

119. Two records have so far been found of this dynasty. Although without dates, they can be assigned to the 12th century; *EL* xii, pp. 37-43. Majumdar : *Inscriptions of Bengal*, iii, pp. 25-41.

120. *JASB*, 1914, p. 97; Ray : *Dynastic History*, i, pp. 320-21, 342-43 and 359; also Sarkar : *Early History of Bengal* in *JDL*, xvii, p. 14.

121. *IA*, xvi, pp. 63-66.

122. *EL*, ii, pp. 330-42 ; also *DHB*, i, p. 259-60.

123. The term has been interpreted to mean either a *Brahmin* adopting the profession of a *Khsatriya* or a *Khsatriya* intermarrying with the *Brahmin* caste. For a discussion see *DHB*, i, pp. 205-209.

124. Ray : *Dynastic History*, i, p. 354-57.

125. There is much controversy over the Chronology of the Senas ; for a full discussion see *DHB*, i, pp. 230-32. A full bibliography of the question is in Ray : *Dynastic History*, i, p. 353-4

126. *EL*. xv, pp. 278-86.

127. *JASB*, 1900, pp. 66-73.

128. Vallabhadeva's inscription bears the date *Saka* 1107/1184-5 A. D. *EL*, v, pp. 181-88. The relation between Vaidyadeva and Vallabhadeva is not clear.

129. *JASB*, 1915, p. 408-9. On Nanyadeva and his relation with the Gahadavalas and Senas see Radhakrishna Choudhary : *The Karnatas of Mithila*, in *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, xxxv, pp. 92-8.

130. An inscription dated in his 19th year was found near Lakhisarai, Monghyr dist. ; Cunningham : *Reports*, iii, p. 125.

131. Lakshmanasena is said to have erected pillars of victory at Puri, Banaras, and Allahabad ; *JASB*, 1914, pp. 97-104 ; Ray : *Dynastic History*, i, p. 368.

132. Cunningham: *Reports*, iii, p. 125. Another of his inscriptions has been found nearby dated in 1178 A. D. ; *ibid*, xv, p. 155. See Banerji : *A history of the Pala dynasty* in *MASB*, no. 5, pp. 108-12, for a different interpretation of the dates. See also *JASB*, (new series) ix, p. 278, and Banerji : *Banglar Itihasa*, i, pp. 348-51.

133. Cunningham : *Reports*, iii, plate xlv, no. 33 ; *JBORS*, 1918, p. 496. For the account of the last traditional Pala king who is reported to have fled and fortified himself in the Jainagar fort against the Muslim forces led by a saint named Makhdum, who is believed to have been buried at Kajol, near Lakhisarai, see Cunningham: *Reports*, iii, p. 159; also Martin : *Eastern India*, ii, p. 23.

CHAPTER III.

THE INITIAL CONQUEST

In the last chapter have been described the stages in which Punjab and Sind were annexed to the growing Ghoride empire. Muslim rule in these countries was not new ; the conquest was little more than a dynastic change, and resistance to the invader could never assume the colour of a socio-religious war. Such conflict was bound to occur in territories which had an unbroken tradition of Hindu rule, and there it was that the Muslim Turks met with real and sustained opposition. Not only were they of an alien race but were followers of a religion which had little in common with that practised in India. Hinduism has amazing powers of assimilation ; it has absorbed countless peoples in the past whose identity is now lost in the mosaic of Indian society and culture. But not so the Muslims ; they resolutely maintained their identity and refused compromise in religion. For the first time in her history, India was to reconcile herself to the existence of a separate culture-community.

Before we proceed to describe the initial conquest of the north Indian kingdoms, it would be appropriate to discuss the geography of the invasion. India is a land of sharp climatic and orographical contrast. In spite of apparent lack of natural boundaries within her frontiers, an invader has to proceed with caution. The Indus valley region is a world in itself. It has greater affinities with the west and the north rather than with the south and the east. A formidable desert on the east, leads to an inhospitable region where

mountains, parched soil and a pitiless sun make subsistence the reward of constant struggle. The stony soil of Rajputana has made restless warriors of her men. And yet, across the Aravalli range, only a couple of hundred miles from Central Rajputana is the agriculturists' paradise. The Ganges valley, a belt of land not exceeding three hundred miles in breadth and skirted by the forbidding Himalayas and Central Indian wilderness on either side, has the means of supporting the densest population in the whole of North India. Like the Nile valley, it has been the centre of civilised life from the earliest times, for a kind nature has made man indifferent to struggle for material ends. As if to complete its isolation nature has provided a narrow entrance to the valley which it is not difficult to guard. The Aravalli hills from the southwest and the Siwalikh (Sapadalaksha) from the northeast approach each other across the plain separating the Punjab from the Ganges valley, leaving a conveniently narrow gap not more than a hundred miles in width. Through this gap, or to use a commoner term bottleneck, alone, the Ganges valley or, to use the name given by the Muslims, Hindusthan could be approached militarily from the west. Nature has decreed that Hindusthan's fate is decided in battles fought not inside the valley, but in the plains extending from the Sutlej to the Jumna. For once the invader set his foot inside the flat river-country of the Ganges, defence was necessarily at a disadvantage. Progress would be found easy until he came up, at the eastern bend of the river, against a similar entrance narrowed by the northern spurs of the Vindhya and the Terai. At this point, north of the river, the plains are intersected by numerous swift

flowing hill-streams and broad rivers ; on the south, the very narrow ledge of the hills jutting almost on the river, affords the only comparatively easy passage into yet another fertile country of rivers, and, of plenty. Bengal is remarkably well-provided with natural defences also. Her climate, marshy soil and countless rivers with seasonal floods are a great deterrent to the northerner. On the west, almost an unbroken chain of hills and trackless forests extend to a great length towards the sea ; on the east, she is shut off by a similar barrier pierced only by the Brahmaputra which leads to another narrow valley, equally fertile, but whose uneven soil, flooded streams and moist air are a death-trap to the western invader.

It is these water-courses that the invader from the northwest had perforce to follow, for living on the lands he traversed was a vital necessity ; to misunderstand the direction of geography was to court disaster. Muizzuddin's earlier attempts on India provide a good illustration, but a preliminary remark on the route from Afghanistan appears relevant. The ordinary route from beyond the Sulaiman mountains in those days was not the well-known Khaibar pass, nor the Bolan in the south, but through the Gomal, which led to Dera Ismail Khan and thence to upper Sind Sagar Doab. The Khaibar, Bolan and the less accessible Kurram and Tochi passes were not used by trading caravans to the same extent as the Gomal passage which was the normal military route.¹

This is borne out by the fact that throughout the 13th century the first point of attack for an invading army from beyond the Sulaiman range was Multan or Uch and not Lahore or Peshawar. From Ghazni the shortest route to the Punjab was through the

Kurram, Tochi and Gomal passes and Khaibar involved a long detour through the north. Politically the Khaibar area was not safe ; the tribes inhabiting the northern Sind Sagar Doab were perpetually hostile.

It was Upper Sind therefore which Muizzuddin could reach on his first expedition into India. How easily the dynasties of Multan and Uch fell to his army has been described in the last chapter. His next expedition, bold as it was ill advised, was yet only a continuation of earlier attempts to penetrate through western Rajputana. For, pressure from the Turks had kept the Rajputs busy in that quarter throughout the last fifty years. In an inscription of the Chauhana ruler, Chachigadeva of Nadol, dated in 1262, reference is made to the defeat and destruction of a Turushka army by his ancestor, Anahilladeva, a contemporary of Bhima I of Gujrat.² His son Kalhana, the dates of whose inscriptions range from 1161 to 1179, also destroyed a Turushka army.³ It was perhaps one of these expeditions which resulted in the capture of Nagaur (in Marwar state) by Bahlim, Bahram's governor in the Punjab, as recorded in the *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*.⁴ All these were destined to fail, but in so doing they were to bring geography to the forefront of military calculations.

Following these examples, Muizzuddin directed his forces against the Chalukya state of Gujrat, a province rich in resources and holding, as it might have been presumed, the key to the Indian hinterland. It held, at any rate, an effective paramountcy over the western Rajput states and was thus an obstacle to his plan of outflanking the Ghaznawids and opening up a route into Hindusthan. Passing through Multan and Uch in 1178, he struck across the Rajputana

desert and arrived with an exhausted army at the foot of Mt. Abu where he found the fresh troops of Mularaja II waiting to oppose his progress. In the engagement, fought near the village of Kayadra⁵ in a position which was not of Muizzuddin's choosing, he suffered a signal defeat. He was lucky to be able to escape with his beaten army.

It was a defeat not only of his forces but also of his plans. For him Hindustan now appeared to have only one practicable approach and the annexation of the Ghaznawid Punjab became more a strategic than a political necessity. The next few years accordingly found him making a determined and gradual advance through Khusrau Malik's dominion. Peshawar, as we have seen, was taken in 1179; Sialkot fell in 1185; and Lahore, after three expeditions was finally occupied in 1186. Three years later he began his operations against India proper.

It is worthwhile at this stage to refer to earlier attempts in this direction, for Muizzuddin's victory on the plains of Tarain was not, as is generally supposed, an isolated personal triumph, nor was it an accident. It was, on the one hand, the execution of a deliberate plan by a resolute conqueror and, on the other, the consummation of a process which extended over the whole of the 12th century. His was only the most successful of the many attempts made by the Turks from the northwest to obtain a foothold in Hindusthan all of which may therefore be regarded as preliminaries to Tarain. The Shansabani conqueror thus, perhaps unwittingly, brought to a successful end a century of reconnoitering activity, a programme of military action of which he was not the originator. Mahmud's brilliant campaigns had shown the way,-

and the Ghaznawid governors of Punjab, although serving a fast-declining empire, yet maintained pressure on the Hindu states of the Gangetic valley. According to Baihaqui,⁶ Ahmad Niyaltigin led an expedition into Hindusthan and penetrated as far as Banaras. The same authority also credits Masud with the capture of Hansi.⁷ Ibrahim is also said to have conducted expeditions against "the infidels".⁸ Between 1086 and 1090 his son Mahmud, the governor of the Punjab, is also reported to have plundered Kanouj and Kalinjar and attacked Ujjain.⁹ The cumulative effect of these raids at the end of the 11th century could not have been very great, but the seriousness of the Turkish danger was realised by the Rajput kings. This is clear from the mention of the tax called *Turushka-danda* (probably collected to pay off the Turks or to meet the increased cost of fighting them) in a grant of the Gahadavala ruler Govindachandra.¹⁰ The language of the grant suggests that the tax was a familiar impost. These attacks increased in frequency and extent in the following century. A grant of Govindachandra dated in 1109 refers to his father Madanapala as having "compelled the *hammira* to lay aside his enmity by his matchless fighting".¹¹ In an inscription of the feudatory prince Lakhanapala of Budaun his great grandfather Madanapala is mentioned "in consequence of whose distinguished prowess there never was any talk of the *hammira* coming to the bank of the river of the Gods".¹² The queen of Govindachandra extols her husband as one "who had been commissioned by *Hara* (God) in order to protect Baranasi from the wicked Turushka warrior as the only one who was able to protect the earth".¹³ The reference to Banaras seems to indicate its connection with the

expedition of Hajib Tughatigin, the governor of Punjab under Masud III who is reported to have penetrated to a place across the Ganges which no one except Mahmud I had reached before.¹⁴ Vijayachandra (1150-1170) also claimed to have "swept away the affliction of the globe by streams of water flowing from the eyes of the wives of the *hammira*, the abode of wanton destruction to the earth".¹⁵ The last Gahadavala ruler Jayachandra is also credited in later Sanskrit works with having overcome the king of Ghor.¹⁶ This must refer to some preliminary inroad before the final engagement.

The most vigorous pressure, however, was bound to be felt by the Chauhanas who ruled the territory extending from Ajmer to Delhi and who thus guarded the entrance into Hindusthan. Durlava II of Sambhar is said to have lost his life in fighting the Turks. Ajayadeva is credited with having repeatedly defeated the Muslim intruders.¹⁷ During the reign of Arnoraja the Turks destroyed Pushkar and reached as far as Anasagar. In the following reign of Vighraharaja IV they advanced on Balbera (modern Rupnagar in Kishangarh).¹⁸ The Delhi pillar inscription of this king dated V. S. 1220/1163 A. D. records his conquest of the land between the Vindhya and the Himalayas, his extermination of the *mlecchas* and restoration of the country to the *Aryas*.¹⁹ He exhorts his descendants to continue the war against the unclean invaders. A more definite evidence of the threatening advance of the Turks is furnished by an inscription of Prithviraja I recording the fortification of the frontier town of Hansi to check the progress of "the *hammira* who has become the cause of anxiety to the world".²⁰ The inscription also mentions the sack

of "Panchapur", probably identical with Panchapattan (Pakpattan) on the old bank of the Sutlej.²¹ The mention of Hansi along with Pakpattan indicates the tract through which the Turkish attacks were being delivered. The fortification of Hansi points to a policy of occupying important towns in this area for better defence. No epigraphic records exist to show the extent to which this policy was subsequently continued by the Chauhanas, but a few years later, as we know from the Muslim accounts, Bhatinda, situated about a hundred miles north of Hansi, had become a Chauhana stronghold when Muizzuddin, opening his attacks on Hindusthan,²² closely besieged it in 587/1191.

It was probably a surprise attack, for the garrison failed to hold out and quickly surrendered. This easy victory, however, Muizzuddin was not prepared to follow up by an immediate advance into Chauhana territory. Instead, he left Ziauddin of Tulak with 12,000 troops to hold it till his return next year. But before he could start on his way back, Prithviraja came in person to recover the fortress.²³ According to Ferishta, his army consisted of "two hundred thousand horsemen and thirty thousand elephants".²⁴ Muizzuddin turned round to meet him but in the battle fought near the village of Tarain, not far from the fort, he was decisively beaten.²⁵ Wounded seriously, he was helped to escape by a Khalji cavalryman, and with the remnant of his forces managed to reach Ghazni. Prithviraja immediately invested the fortress but it took him thirteen months to force Ziauddin to surrender.

According to Ferishta the battle was lost owing to the negligence of the Afghan, Khalji and Khurasani

officers whom Muizzuddin subjected to great humiliation at Ghazni. Next year he returned to the attack with a force of one hundred and twenty thousand cavalry and once more met his Chauhana adversary on the field of Tarain. He was naturally cautious this time. In order possibly to gain time for completing his preparations he had sent Qiwanul Mulk Ruknuddin Hamza ahead from Lahore to demand Prithviraja's submission.²⁶ The answer, full of defiance and scorn, was probably expected. When battle was eventually joined Prithviraja's army was reported to have numbered three hundred thousand men "according to the most authentic accounts".²⁷ Muizzuddin divided his forces into five divisions, four of which engaged the enemy on all sides. At the end of the day the fifth division, kept in reserve, attacked the exhausted enemy and thus decided the issue.²⁸ Khandi Rai (Govinda Rai) who had wounded Muizzuddin in the former battle, was killed and Prithviraja, trying to escape, was captured near Sarsuti.²⁹ According to Hasan Nizami he was taken to Ajmer where after some time, on being found guilty of treason, he was put to death.³⁰ A few coins of Prithviraja with the superscription *hammira* in Sanskrit on the obverse may however indicate his initial acceptance of Muizzuddin's suzerainty.³¹

This victory laid the whole Chauhana kingdom at Muizzuddin's feet. Hansi, Kuhram and Sarsuti, all places of military importance, were immediately occupied and garrisoned.³² But immediate taking over of the administration did not seem convenient and so Ajmer was allowed to be retained by Prithviraja's son as a vassal ruler.³³ The same policy was adopted with regard to Delhi also where Khandi Rai's successor

acknowledged Muizzuddin's suzerainty. An occupation army was stationed at Inderpat near Delhi under the command of Qutbuddin Aibak who was to act as Muizzuddin's representative in India.³⁴

The conqueror then returned to his Central Asian projects leaving Aibak with wide powers to consolidate and extend the conquests. A serious rising by the supporters of Prithviraja engaged the latter's immediate attention. In *Ramzan* 588/1192 a Hindu chief whom Hasan Nizami calls Jatwan (evidently some chief of the Jat tribe who traditionally are said to have possessed the area, besieged the Muslim garrison at Hansi. Aibak at once rushed to its relief, raised the siege and pursued Jatwan upto Bagar. There the chieftain turned round, gave battle and was defeated and slain.³⁵ Having refortified Hansi towards the end of the same year Aibak crossed the Jumna to establish a military base in the Upper Doab.³⁶ The greater part of the region was held, under the Gahadavalas, by the Dor Rajputs with their stronghold at Baran, who were by no means pacifically disposed to the Muslim power established just across the river³⁷. Their traditional accounts, emphasising the hard fight they put up against the Turkish forces under the leadership of Chandrasena, find partial confirmation in a document purporting to be a grant made by Muizzuddin Mohammad bin Sam wherein Ajaipal, a relation of Chandrasena is rewarded for his help in the capture of Baran, a clear proof that treachery expedited the event.³⁸ Meerut was also occupied on this occasion, and the two places, fortified and garrisoned, became spearheads of attack from the north on the Gahadavala dominions.³⁹

Aibak next set himself to find a central and perma-

ment headquarters. The camp at Inderpat was clearly a temporary residence and could hardly satisfy the growing needs of a political capital. Ajmer, situated well inside Rajputana, appeared unsuitable as a centre of Turkish power which was meant to be expanded towards Hindusthan. Delhi was a better alternative ; its situation and historical traditions provided the necessary features. A timely discovery of hostile designs of the Tomara ruler furnished the pretext and accordingly, early in 589/1193, Aibak moved his forces against the city. It was occupied with comparative ease, the Hindu prince being allowed to evacuate his men. Delhi thus became the capital of Muizzuddin's Indian dominion.⁴⁰

Very soon Aibak had to take the field again. Hariraja, the brother of the late Chauhana king, collected a Rajput force and besieged Ranthambhor where, earlier in the year, Aibak had placed a garrison under Qiwamul Mulk.⁴¹ The Chauhanas also drove out the feudatory prince, Prithviraja's son, and occupied Ajmer. On Aibak's approach, they withdrew from both the places enabling the prince to be reinstated. But before Hariraja could be effectively pursued, the Muslim general was called away by the news of another rising headed by the dispossessed ruler of Delhi. This was however easily crushed.⁴² Hariraja was still at large when, according to Hasan Nizami,⁴³ Aibak was sent for by his master at Ghazni where, for reasons nowhere adequately explained, he stayed for nearly six months. How in his absence the Turkish garrisons fared against the attacks of Hariraja and other chiefs like him the chronicles give us no means of knowing. The Dor Rajputs, possibly, became a more serious menace calling for urgent action, for

immediately on his return in 590/1194, Aibak is stated to have crossed the Jumna a second time and captured Kol (Koil, Aligarh).⁴¹

He was still in the Doab when Muizzuddin once again marched his forces to Hindusthan. The operations against the Dors in the upper Doab were clearly designed to prepare the way for an eventual conquest of the Gahadavala dominion, for it contained the coveted Hindusthan proper. Aibak probably visited Ghazni to assist in the formulation of plans which his master now came personally to execute. With the Delhi forces having joined him, Muizzuddin marched at the head of the invasion army numbering fifty thousand horsemen, towards Banaras.⁴⁵ Jayachandra's reconnoitering force suffered defeat in a preliminary engagement with Aibak's advance guards.⁴⁶ The two main armies eventually met in the vicinity of Chandwar on the Jumna, between Kanouj and Etah. The battle was severely contested, the Gahadavalas, led by Jayachandra in person, almost carrying the day when his own death threw his army into confusion. Muizzuddin was quick to take advantage of the development and turned the confusion into a rout.⁴⁷

This victory added another great kingdom extending as far as Monghyr to the Shansabani empire. It was made a military division and Malik Husamuddin Ughulbak became its first commandant (*Muqti*). Garrisons were placed in Banaras, Asni and other towns whose occupation, because of the treasure they were reported to contain, took precedence over that even of the capital city of Kanouj,⁴⁸ which was not taken until 595/1198-9. Gahadavala rule however, still survived in the country. A grant discovered at Machlishahr, dated in 1199, was issued by Jayac-

chandra's son, Harishchandra who appears therein as an independent sovereign.⁴⁹ An inscription of Ranaka Vijayakarna discovered in the Mirzapur district refers to the Gahadavala kingdom as if it was still continuing ; it, however, omits the reigning king's name, possibly to indicate the recent political change.⁵⁰ Even Kanouj must have been recovered to necessitate its subsequent reconquest by Iltutmish.⁵¹

After Muizzuddin's departure Aibak had to proceed to the relief of the garrison in Kol, hard pressed, possibly, by the Dor Rajputs. On his return to Delhi in 591/1195, news arrived of fresh trouble in Ajmer. Hariraja had once again driven out his nephew and was reported to be sending an army under Jhatrai to attack Delhi. Leaving a part of his forces to guard the capital, Aibak quickly set out to intercept Jhatrai. The latter thereupon turned and took shelter in Ajmer. On being closely besieged and unable to hold out any longer, Hariraja with all his followers sacrificed himself in the funeral pyre. Aibak then entered Ajmer but as Prithviraja's son had proved a liability as vassal, he decided on direct annexation, and a Muslim officer was installed there for the first time. The prince, was, however, compensated with Ranthambhor which later was to become the seat of a revitalised Chauhana dynasty.⁵²

Next year, in 592/1195-6, Muizzuddin again came to India and moved against Bayana, the capital of the Jadon Bhatti Rajputs. Without offering any frontal resistance the ruler, Kumarapala, withdrew to entrench himself in the neighbouring stronghold of Thangir (Tahangarh).⁵³ An effective siege however, soon compelled him to surrender and evacuate the fortress. Thangir and the fortified Vijayaymandir-

garh were then occupied and garrisoned under the command of Bahauddin Tughril.⁵⁴ The latter founded a military station called Sultankot which was meant to serve as base of operations in the plains. The strong fort of Gwalior, held by a prince of the Parihara dynasty, named Sallakshanapala by Hasan Nizami,⁵⁵ next engaged Muizzuddin's attention. The hill-fortress stood the siege well and showed that it could do so indefinitely. Muizzuddin therefore, was glad to raise the siege when Sallakshanapala, obviously a man of practical wisdom, sent messages offering to acknowledge his suzerainty.⁵⁶ To allow a half-subdued enemy to continue in occupation of a strong fort was, however, strategically inadvisable, and its reduction, at a suitable time in future was, accordingly, decided upon. Tughril was selected for this purpose, who, the chronicler tells us, continued from the Sultankot base, to harry and cut off Gwalior's communications with the plains. Within a year and a half the Rajputs' position became untenable. They offered to evacuate the fortress and thus enabled Aibak to occupy it in the name of his master.⁵⁷

✓ Towards the end of 592/1196, Aibak had to face another and as yet the most serious threat from the Rajputs. The Mher tribe inhabiting the neighbourhood of Ajmer,⁵⁸ in alliance, obviously with the dispossessed Chauhanas, asked the Chalukyas for armed assistance for expelling the Turks out of Rajputana. The garrison at Ajmer was not strong enough to meet the combined forces and sent to Delhi urgently for reinforcements. Setting out immediately, Aibak attacked the Mher forces assembled in front of the city awaiting the Chalukya army. In the midst of the fiercely contested battle however, the latter arrived

to compel Aibak to withdraw into Ajmer. The Rajputs thereupon commenced a close siege and Aibak found himself in a highly critical situation. Luckily for him, a relieving contingent arrived from Ghazni on whose establishing contact with the city, the Rajputs withdrew.⁵⁹

From Ajmer, early next year, Aibak led his forces towards Anhilwara to avenge the treacherous attack. Passing through south-west Rajputana he arrived to find the Chalukya army under Dharavarsha of Abu and Kelhana of Nadol,⁶⁰ drawn up at the foot of the mountain where Muizzuddin had suffered his first defeat. Realising the strength of their position Aibak showed open hesitation to attack. Mistaking this prudence for fear the Chalukyas came out in the open where the Turkish horse could manoeuvre to the best advantage. In the resulting battle, superior mobility and shock tactics decided the issue.⁶¹ Having obtained a clear victory Aibak found the way open to the capital Anhilwara, from where the reigning king Bhima II fled.⁶² The expedition was intended to be a purely punitive measure but easy success probably tempted the victor to turn it into an occupation. The city was subjected to a thorough plundering and according to Ferishta, a Muslim officer was placed in charge of the country.⁶³ Its hazardous distance from Delhi, however, was bound to make it a liability; the imperfect hold on Rajputana became a serious obstacle. The conquest, in any case, was soon nullified. Contemporary Chalukya inscriptions boastfully record the expulsion of the Turks; Ibnul Asir's informant speaks of Aibak himself eventually restoring the country to its Hindu rulers.⁶⁴ The Chalukya king is epigraphically proved to have re-

tained his independent sovereignty down to 1240 with his hold on Abu remaining unimpaired.⁶⁵

Fakhre Mudabbir alone furnishes details of Aibak's military activities during the next six years. The country across the upper Ganges, hitherto unaffected by Turkish operations in the Doab, sheltered a large number of Gahadavala *emigre* from the south ; Budaun presumably still retained its Rashtrakuta dynasty. To this part Aibak seems to have directed his arms. In 594/1197-8, Budaun was captured, followed by a second occupation of Banaras.⁶⁶ Next year, in 595/1198-9, "Chantarwal" (Chandwar?) and Kanouj are reported to have been captured. His subsequent operations were in Rajputana where, after the reduction of the kingdom of "Siroh" (Sirohi ?), Fakhre Mudabbir mentions, under the year 596/1199-1200, the conquest of Malwah.⁶⁷ This latter fact however, needs confirmation. It is not improbable that the hold on Rajputana was sought to be extended, and the process caused a Chauhana migration from Nadol southwards. The foundation of the Chauhana ruling families of Bundi, Kotah and Sirohi are, at any rate, ascribed to this period of Muslim penetration.⁶⁸ Aibak's acquisition in Rajputana, however, was not, as will be seen in the next chapter, destined to be permanent.

The opening of the thirteenth century saw the Turkish forces engaged against the last surviving imperial Rajputs, the Chandellas of Bundelkhand. Their northern boundary touched the Muslim dominion ; the occupation of Banaras and Asni must have affected their security, for predatory raids in the neighbouring countries was a favourite exercise with the Turkish militarists. Latent hostilities in any case cul-

minated in an open attack, in 599/1202, on Kalinjar, the military capital of Paramardideva. The Chandellas offered strong resistance on the field but on being defeated were compelled to take refuge in the fort. As the siege dragged on and became effective, Paramardideva opened negotiations and offered to accept a tributary vassalage. Before he could execute his agreements, however, he died and the negotiations fell through. His chief minister, Ajayadeva, withdrew the offer and relying on the supply of water from a hillside spring, recommenced hostilities. The Turks, discovering the source of his strength, found means to divert the water-course and thus compelled him to sue for terms. Being allowed to evacuate the fortress, the Chandellas withdrew to the neighbouring stronghold of Ajaigarh. Kalinjar, Mahoba and Kharajaho were then occupied and grouped into a military division under the command of Hasan Arnal.⁶⁹

Under Malik Husamuddin Ughulbak, the commander of the Banaras and Awadh division, was employed a Khalji troop-leader, named Ikhtiyaruddin Muhammad Bakhtiyar⁷⁰ for reconnaissance work in the adjacent territories. Refused service both in Ghazni and Delhi⁷¹ for his ungainly figure, Bakhtiyar, however, soon proved himself possessed of great daring and resourcefulness. He was assigned the villages of Bhagwat and Bhiuli⁷² by whose income he soon collected a band of adventurers, mostly drawn from the Khalji tribesmen living on the eastern borders of Afghanistan. With these he commenced raids on the Magadha region east of the Karamanasa river where, after the fall of the Gahadavalas, as has been shown above, but little organised opposition could be encountered. By frequent raids into the district of Maner Bakhtiyar

earned fame and also wealth to augment his military resources. He even pushed as far as Uddandapur Vihar, the monastic university town which gave its name to the country around.⁷³

Emboldened by success in these raids Bakhtiyar obtained Aibak's commendation for a final attack on the monastery town.⁷⁴ Minhaj speaks of the fort (*hisar* and *qalah*) of Bihar, although it is extremely uncertain if it possessed any effective military force. The citadel containing the university proper seems, in any case, to have been defended by some sort of armed men, the majority of whom, however, were the "shavenheaded" *Sramanas* (Buddhist monks), whom the Muslims mistook for Brahmins.⁷⁵ But it only resulted in their being put to the sword, for Bakhtiyar with his two hundred well-armed fighters, easily captured the town. Too late he learnt, on being apprised of the large number of books stored there, of the real nature of the place.⁷⁶ According to the 15th century Tibetan chronicler Taranath, Bakhtiyar on this occasion also captured the monastery towns of Vikramsila and Nalanda and erected a fortress on the site of Uddandapur.⁷⁷

The date of this event, important as it is for the chronology of the subsequent conquest of Bengal, is not found in the *Tabaqati-Nasiri* and has only to be inferred from the sequence of events.⁷⁸ Occupation of the area brought the Turks to the Sena frontier; and yet, showing a shortsightedness characteristic of the contemporary Hindu strategists, they made no move to throw them out of Bihar or to strengthen their own frontier defence. Their very passivity was thus an invitation to the adventurous Khalji troop-leader. After the capture of Uddandapur Bakhtiyar visited

Aibak and received commissions for further conquests but evidently no material reinforcement. The report of a rich demoralised country ruled by an almost incapacitated old man living a retired life and given to the pursuit of letters, decided his next move. A full-scale invasion of the Sena kingdom was beyond his resources ; he could only aim at destroying the Sena morale by a lightning raid on the king's residence. He would gain prestige and, what is more, the where-withal for bigger attacks in future ; with luck, he might even obtain a defensible footing in the country.

"A year after" his success in Bihar, i.e., about 1204-5,⁷⁹ Bakhtiyar accordingly set out on his second adventure in the lower Ganges valley. Taking the available forces with him he marched so swiftly through the unfrequented and difficult Jharkhand region in south Bihar, that "not more than eighteen horsemen could keep pace with him".⁸⁰ Mistaken as a horse-dealer and hurting no one on the way, he had an easy and unopposed march to the very gates of Lakshmanasena's residence at Nadia, or, as Minhaj calls it, "Nodia". The king was reported to have just sat down to his midday meal when the uproar at the gate, occasioned by the 'horsedealers' cutting down the guards, caused him to sense danger and prepare for flight. As the raiders entered the palace he hurriedly left by a postern door and fled along the river to the safety of his eastern province. The king's flight decided the issue. Before his troops could recover from the surprise and rally to action, Bakhtiyar's main force arrived and resistance became useless.⁸¹

The ease with which the king was put to flight and the city occupied, must have surprised even Bakhtiyar himself. The story of "the 18 horsemen

defeating a great king" has, at any rate, evoked sceptical comments from a number of Hindu scholars.⁸² Minhaj's veracity has been questioned and arguments have been advanced to reduce the account to sheer myth. There is however, little need to feel apologetic for the supposed cowardice of the Sena king ; even were he really so, to consider his conduct as typical of the Bengali people would be historically incorrect. Hasty, and what ungenerous critics would call, shameful flights have been the lot of even greater men and admittedly heroic peoples. Rajput recklessness has an element of romance in it but of little practical wisdom. It is possible to reject the story altogether. To dismiss it on the ground, as Mr. Banerji, did, that the Hindu accounts never speak of Nodia or Navadwip as a Sena capital or that "Rai Lakhmania" cannot be identical with Lakshmanasena who, in Mr. Banerji's view, had long been dead, is to base positive history on negative argument. For Bakhtiyar's occupation of a portion of the Sena kingdom following his raid on Nadia is an undisputed fact. It is true, one cannot claim a literal accuracy for Minhaj's account, but the results of recent research certainly do not strengthen Mr. Banerji's arguments.⁸³ There is, on the other hand, little improbability in the story, for Bengal from all accounts presented not many elements of strength. A Brahmin-ridden, disintegrated society, with a king whose youthful valour and military energy had given way to a supine addiction to religion and poetry, a top-heavy, hollow administration, and with vassals finding strength to declare independence,⁸⁴ Lakshmanasena's kingdom was anything but a force that could put up sustained frontal resistance. The *Turushka* had become a bogey and every-

where inspired a paralysing fear. The superstitious "prophecy" about the "long armed *Turukshka*" eventually destroying the Sena kingdom is perhaps an overstatement ; the king's refusal to fly with his frightened courtiers from the threatened zone⁸⁵ shows that rational courage had not entirely taken leave of him. But the apprehension of an impending catastrophe was undoubtedly felt ; for, epigraphic evidence shows that the king in his 25th year (1203 A.D.) performed a great sacrifice to propitiate the Gods for help in averting it.⁸⁶ Every fresh advance of the Turk only deepened this fear and destroyed self confidence. The easy success of Bakhtiyar's noon-day attack thus needs no other explanation. Boldly led surprise attacks can paralyse even more courageous and well-prepared forces. It is worthy of note that the city of Nadia was occupied only after the main force had arrived.

The occupation was presumably intended to be temporary ; a permanent stay in lower Bengal would have undoubtedly strained Bakhtiyar's resources and communications. The Ganga kingdom of Orissa was reputedly a great power ; the Sena army was still intact and could not be expected to retire without a struggle. A place nearer his base in Bihar would offer greater security and freedom of expansion. Bakhtiyar accordingly sacked Nadia and retreating northwards took up his quarters at Lakhnauti (Lakshmanavati, the city founded by or renamed by Lakshmanasena), the western capital of the Senas, near the present site of Gour, in Maldah district.⁸⁷ His calculations proved correct, for over the *Rarh* country (the districts west of the Bhagirathi river) as well as Nadia, Hindu rule continued for the next fifty years.

A grant dated in 1205 was issued by Lakshmanasena himself from a place which seems to answer the description of Nadia.⁸⁸ Minhaj states that 'Lakhmania', following his panicky courtiers—the Brahmins and the *Shahas* (merchants)—retired to the country of 'Sanknat and the towns of Bang and Kamrud' where he soon after died. Sanknat is perhaps a mis-pronunciation for Sankat or Sankakot, a stronghold of the *baniks* (merchants) in the 12th century,⁸⁹ situated not far from Vikrampur, Ballalasena's capital in East Bengal where Lakshmanasena's dynasty is archaeologically proved to have ruled for the next three generations.

Bakhtiyar's hold was thus over a very small portion of north Bengal from where, according to a later genealogical work, he drove away Lakshmanasena's son.⁹⁰ To guard the southwestern frontier towards Orissa whose traditional hostility to the rulers of Gour he could not help inheriting, he established a military outpost at Lakhanor, identified with Nagar in Birbhum district, on the route connecting Bihar with Orissa.⁹¹ On the northeast he established a similar station at Deokot (Devikot) an ancient town locally known as Bangarh, a few miles southwest of Dinajpur town. The area contained within these points thus comprised parts of Maldah, Dinajpur, Murshidabad and Birbhum districts on the two sides of the Ganges, called, as noticed by Minhaj, Rarh and Varendri (*Ral* and *Barind*),⁹² with the western border running along the Tista-Karatoya basin, the former then flowing in a more westerly channel than at present.⁹³

Bakhtiyar's ambitions allowed him no rest. Within two years from the raid on Nadia he began making preparations for a third adventure, an expedition to the northeast, to conquer "Tibet and China".⁹⁴

On the face of it, it was a mad project ; but the founder of Muslim rule in Bengal should, perhaps be credited with some calculating sense. Minhaj possibly hints at the real purpose of the expedition when he speaks of the trading routes, numbering about 35,⁹⁵ that carried a brisk traffic in Tangan horses from "Karambattan" (possibly Kumrikotah in Bhutan) and "Tibet" to Kamrup and thence to the districts of North Bengal. Bengal being particularly deficient in horses, Bakhtiyar may reasonably have desired to obtain a monopoly of this imported breed. In undertaking it, however, he overstepped his limit. Having posted his lieutenant Muhammud Sheran to watch the frontier at Lakhanor and securing the services of a converted Koch guide, he set out with ten thousand horsemen. From Lakhnauti he arrived, according to Minhaj, at 'Bardhankuti' whence for ten days he marched northwards along the river named Bangmati, "three times as broad as the Ganges." He must have crossed the river and followed the Brahmaputra to be able to arrive at a place, in the hills, where there was a stone bridge spanning a river. At this spot, where his guide left him, he received a message from the king of Kamrup requesting him to postpone the expedition till next year when he would aid him with his forces.⁹⁶ Paying no heed to the counsel, he left a detachment of troops under two officers to guard the bridge and crossed over into the hills. Pushing through the mountain defiles he arrived, on the 16th day, at the "open country of Tibet". The hazardous march, coupled with the alarming news of the imminent approach of "50,000, well-armed Turks" from the nearest fort of 'Karambattan,' as well as a severe but indecisive battle with the local garrison, damped the spirit

of his troops and he decided to return. The retreat was marked by terrible hardship, for the hill people destroyed every food and forage along the route. On reaching the bridgehead, he found it broken by the Kamrup forces who had been waiting to strike ; his officers, quarrelling among themselves, had been driven off. Thus forced to halt, Bakhtiyar sought temporary shelter in a temple near by, while arrangements were started for the construction of rafts. But to his alarm he soon noticed that the Kamrup forces lying hidden in the vicinity, were planning to entrap him within a bamboo stockade which began quickly to rise all round the temple. Bakhtiyar acted promptly and dashed out. On being driven to the edge of the water, the whole army threw itself into the river desperately hoping to find it fordable. It, however, proved deep with a strong current which carried away most of the troops ; Bakhtiyar managed to reach the opposite bank with only a hundred followers.⁹⁷ There he was met by his guide who brought him back to Devkot, a man crushed by the weight of the disaster.

Bakhtiyar's route on this expedition and the incidental details have long been a matter of controversy. While Bardhankuti (Bardhankot) still bears the name,⁹⁸ the river "Bangmati" has been difficult to identify. The identification of the stone bridge with the Silhako, discovered over the Barnadi flowing into the Brahmaputra, however, furnished a broad indication of the route. The recent discovery of a Sanskrit inscription opposite Gauhati, recording the destruction of a *Turushka* force in March, 1206, has conclusively settled the question.⁹⁹

At Devkot Bakhtiyar sank rapidly under the weight of his grief. A mortal affliction seized and confined

him to bed until one of his own lieutenants, named Ali Mardan, secretly drove a knife through his sick body. The disaster and pitiful end of his career almost coincided with a similar event in another corner of the Turkish state.¹⁰⁰

In describing Muizzuddin's campaigns in Central Asia mention has been made of his plans to retrieve the defeat at Andhkhud. The defeat soon spread the rumour of his death which became the signal for a general rising among the turbulent tribes inhabiting the western provinces of his Indian empire. Even one of his lieutenants, named Aibakbak, deserting from the battlefield of Andhkhud came to Multan, killed the governor and established his independent authority there.¹⁰¹ News of this disloyalty soon spread and its occurrence was considered a sufficient proof of Muizzuddin's death. A chief of the Salt Range, named Raisal¹⁰² allying himself with the Khokar and other tribes¹⁰³ living on the region through which the Lahore-Ghazni route passed, began plundering the districts between the Chinab and the Jhelum and even prepared to capture Lahore.¹⁰⁴ The roads being thus cut off by the rising, no revenue from the Punjab could be sent to Ghazni. The local officers having failed to quell the rising which seriously interfered with his plans, Muizzuddin decided to deal with it himself. Directing Aibak to join him on the Jhelum, he set out for the Punjab and on the river was opposed by the rebels. They fought with desperate courage but were overpowered. A large number was killed or captured, while the rest took refuge in a hill-fort near by. On its being reduced the next day some fled to the nearest forest only to perish miserably when it was set on fire.

Before his return Muizzuddin, accompanied by Aibak, came to Lahore to settle its affairs. Giving Aibak leave to depart for Delhi, he left the city and on the way back to Ghazni halted on the Indus at a place called Damyak, and pitched his tent on a cool, grassy plot on the edge of the water. There, while engaged in the evening prayers, he met his death at the hands of an assassin, on the 3rd *Shaban*, 602/ March 15th, 1206.¹⁰⁵ Some of the contemporary writers ascribe the murder to the *Mulahida*, a term applied not only to the Qaramitah and Ismaili Shias but also, sometimes, to non-Muslims;¹⁰⁶ others specifically mention the Khokars.¹⁰⁷ Both the people had reason to be hostile to him and probably both participated in the crime.¹⁰⁸

There could be no two opinions as to the place Muizzuddin should occupy in history. Unlike Mahmud of Ghazni he was a practical statesman; of the rotten political structure of India he took the fullest advantage. As in the founder of the Mughal empire, his sovereign quality lay in the steadfast determination with which he pursued his objective and in his refusal to accept a defeat as final. Against his far more gifted rival, the Khwarizm Shah,¹⁰⁹ his Central Asian empire, it is true, could have had only an ephemeral existence. But as in the case of Babar, his Indian conquests survived. If he failed to found a dynasty, he yet trained up a band of men who were to prove more loyal to his ideals and better fitted to maintain his empire. In choice of men he displayed a singular talent, for to slaves like Aibak, Yalduz, and Tughril he owed most of his success. His almost annual campaigns from the Jaxartes to the Jumna display a military talent of no mean order. His military

pre-occupations probably left him little leisure for aesthetic recreations, but he was not indifferent to learning and scholarship. The celebrated philosopher and savant, Fakhruddin Razi, and the famous classical poet Nizami Uruzi adorned the Ghoride court and have paid deserving tributes to the mental qualities of their friend and patron.¹¹⁰

NOTES

1. On one or two occasions when Muizzuddin came to Peshawar he might have used the Khaibar, but the southern routes were more convenient. The troops of the Khwarizm Shah, with a view to capture Yalduz, the ruler of Ghazni, in 1215, are stated to have seized the frontier routes into Hindustan, "leading towards Gardaiz and Karaha pass", that is, the Kurram valley; Yalduz had to take a more southeasterly route, through the "Sang-i-Surkh" mountains, which according to Raverty, *op. cit.* p. 505, is the name given to three or four passes; Minhaj, p. 135. Through the province of "Karman and Sankuran", the old name of the tract between the Salt Range and Gardaiz, south of the "Safed Koh", passed the lower route into Hindustan usually used by Muizzuddin; Minhaj, p. 132; Raverty: *op. cit.* pp. 498-9; see also Raverty: *Notes on Afghanistan*, pp. 80-84. It was probably within this area that the passes of the "Sang-i-Surkh" (Red mountain) were situated through which both Yalduz and Aibak retreated from Ghazni. Minhaj, p. 194-35; see also Raverty: *Notes on Afghanistan*, pp. 38-9; *Trans. Tab. Nas.*, p. 538, note.

2. *EL*, ix p. 62-63; Ojha: *Rajputana* i, p. 269.

3. *EL*, xi, pp. 46-51.

4. p. 24.

5. Minhaj, p. 116. It mentions Bhima as the reigning king of Anhilwara, but inscriptions and other Hindu records ascribe this victory to Mularaja II; *IA*, 1877, p. 186 and 198. See also Forbes: *Rasmala* (ed. Rawlinson) i, p. 199; Ojha: *Rajputana*, i, p. 220. Cf. Ray: *Dynastic History*, ii, p. 1004-5. A fragmentary inscription at Kiradu near Mt. Abu, dated V. S. 1235/1178 A. D. records the repair of a temple broken by a Turushka army, possibly referring to Muizzuddin's invasion; *EL*, xi, p. 72.

6. *Tarikh-i-Al-i-Sabuktigin*, p. 497.

7. *Ibid*, p. 665. Minhaj, p. 14, states that he led armies into Hindustan on several occasions. Raverty: *trans. Tab. Nas.*, p. 93, states, without citing any source, that near Zafarabad, in Jaunpur, Firoz Tughluq witnessed ruins of a temple believed to have been destroyed by Masud.

8. Raverty: *op. cit.* p. 105, note 4.

9. *IC*, 1942, p. 422 sq.; see *HCIP*, v, p. 51, for the suggestion that Chand

Rai' mentioned in the Muslim chronicles as the prince of Kanouj who became an ally of Mahmud on this occasion, was Chandradeva of the Ghahadavala dynasty who by entering into some kind of agreement with the Ghaznavids probably sought to gain support against the still powerful Paramara and Kalachuri kingdoms.

10. *IA*, xiv, p. 113.

11. *Ibid*, 1889, pp. 14-19

12. *EI*, i, p. 62.

13. *EI*, ix, pp. 234-37.

14. Minhaj, p. 22. It is also mentioned in some detail in the *diwan* of Masud Sad b. Salman, a contemporary poet ; Elliot, iv, pp. 526-7.

15. *IA*, xv, p. 9.

16. Vidyapati : *Purushapariksha*, p. 146-7. In a Sanskrit drama named *Rambharnajari*, Jayachandra is called the "destroyer of all the *Javanas*".

17. Ojha : *Rajputana*, i, p. 266.

18. *IA*, 1890; p. 202 ; Sarda : *Ajmer*, p. 79.

19. *IA*, 1890, pp. 215-17.

20. *IA*, xli, p. 17. Thomas : *Chronicles*, p. 59, noticed a coin of one Kilhana with the Arabic legend reading 'sina' on the obverse, which, according to him, is found only on the coins of Masud III. Kilhana in that case must originally have been Masud's feudatory who had later rebelled and fortified the route from Pakpattan.

21. The inscription ascribes this to Kilhana of the Guhila clan, a maternal uncle of Prithviraja, doubtless the same person mentioned in the coin noticed by Thomas. See *HCIP*, v, p. 83 for the suggestion that Kilhana's adversary whom he took prisoner on this occasion was Khusrau Malik, the Ghaznavid king then ruling in Lahore.

22. Iswariprasad : *Medieval India*, p. 177, states that Sirhind, in Patiala, 100 miles n.w. of Karnal was the first place captured. He relies on the printed text of Minhaj, p. 118, which has Sirhindah, and in this is supported by later histories like the *Mirat-i-Jahan Numa*, f. 50a, and *Zubdatul-twarikh*, f. 7b. Ferishta and *TA*, however, have Bhatindah ; *Tarikh*, i, p. 5, and 7 ; *TA*, i, p. 37 ; Raverty : *op. cit.*, p. 457, note 3, however informs us that in all the Mss. collated by him it is written Tabarhindah, which is also found in *TM*, p. 7, *Budauni*, i, p. 49, and *Haji Dabir*, ii, p. 677. No such place is known to have ever existed. No one acquainted with the hurried style of writing Persian characters can fail to see that a transposition of a few dots and a careless joining of letters are all that is required to make Bhatindah read Tabarhindah and even Sirhindah. Sirhind seems to be very improbable, for the shortest route from Lahore to Hindusthan lay through western Patiala in which Bhatindah is situated. No remains of any strong fort, such as that which withstood Prithviraja's assault for over a year, were found in Sirhind. On the other hand, in Bhatindah, Garrick noticed a strong massive fort and also heard local legends respecting Muizzuddin's attack on the place ; Cunningham : *Reports*, xxiii, p. 2-3. According to Raverty : *op. cit.*, p. 458, note, the *Lubbut-twarikh-i-Hind*, states that "Tabarhindah is now known as Bhatindah". But Iswariprasad asserts that Sirhind was known as Bhatindah.

23. Minhaj, p. 119.
24. i, p. 5 and 7 ; *Ibnul Asir*, xi, p. 255.
25. Minhaj, p. 118. *Ferishta*, i, pp. 5-7, and *TA*, i, p. 37, state that it was fought at Narain, near Tarain, "in the district of Sarsuti". For a discussion on the location of the battlefield see Appendix B.
26. *Tajul Masir*, I. O. Ms., no. 1486, f. 34. See *Ferishta*, i, p. 58, who obviously borrowed from *Ibnul Asir*, xi, p. 43-4, for the story of Muizzuddin's feint to throw Prithviraja off his guard which succeeded remarkably well and was taken full advantage of. Cf. Ray : *Dynastic History*, II, pp. 1010-1013, where it is fully reproduced from Raverty's supposed quotation from the *Tajul Maasir*. Hasan Nizami, however, does not mention the story at all, and *Ibnul Asir*'s account is admittedly based on questionable authority. See Isami : *Futuhus-Salatin*, p. 71-2, for the ingenuous manner in which Muizzuddin provided for the lack of elephants whose presence in the Indian army frightened his horses. For reference to this event in the *Prithviraja-Vijaya-Kavya* and the *Hammira Maha Kavya*. See *HCIP*, v, pp. 109-112.
27. *Ferishta*, i, p. 58.
28. For details of the tactics followed see *TM*, p. 9.
29. Minhaj, p. 120.
30. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 44b. Minhaj states that he was immediately executed. For the absurd story of Chand Bardai of how Prithviraja, blinded and kept in confinement at Ghazni, was yet able with the help of Chand himself, to slay Muizzuddin before his own execution, see *Prithviraja Raso*. vi ; also *Raj-Darashani*, f. 49a.
31. Thomas : *Chronicles*, p. 12, no. 15. A near contemporary Sanskrit account, *Viruddhavidhi-Viddhavamsa* also mentions that Prithviraja was taken to Ajmer with a view to be reinstated on the throne ; *IHQ*, 1940, pp. 567 sq.
32. Minhaj, p. 120 ; Fakhre Mudabbir, p. 22.
33. Hasan Nizami calls him Kola or Gola (lit. an illegitimate son). He is not mentioned in the *Hammira-Maha-Kavya* which states that his brother Hariraja performed Prithviraja's funeral ceremony and then ascended the throne. Vaidya : *Downfall of Hindu India*, iii p. 339, calls this prince Rainsi while Ojha, *Rajputana*, i, p. 270, prefers Govindarai. This last-named person, however, according to the *Hammira-Maha-Kavya*, was Prithviraja's grandson ; *IA*, 1879, p. 55. On this last point see also Ray : *Dynastic History* ii, p. 1093, note.
34. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 46.
35. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 55a and 60a. Bagar would seem to be a general term applied to western Rajputana.
36. *Ibid*, f. 67a.
37. They held extensive territories in Meerut, Aligarh, Bulandshahr, Mathura, Etah and also across the Ganges in Moradabad. For their history, see *JASB*, 1879, p. 273.
38. See appendix, A. According to the Dor traditions Chandrasena lost his life in defending Baran against the Muslims in 1194. This date, however, against 1192 of the Muslim chronicles, is obviously wrong.
39. Minhaj, p. 139, dated the capture of Meerut in 587/1191, but he is

more correct in assigning it to 588/1192, on p. 120.

40. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 67b. places the conquest of Delhi towards the end of 588/1192, as is done also in Minhaj, p. 120, *TM*, p. 11, *TA*, i, p. 38-39, and *Ferishta*, i, p. 58. Thomas read the date on the Qutb Minar inscription as 587; *Chronicles*, p. 22. But this may also be read as 589.

41. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 70a; Fakhre Mudabbir, p. 22. For a grant dated in 1194, of a village near Ajmer, by Hariraja's wife, Pratapadevi, see *Annual Report of the Rajputana Museum*, 1911-12.

42. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 72b.

43. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 75a. Ibn Battuta, ii, p. 19-20, relates a curious story of how his master summoned him secretly to confound his enemies who accused him of disloyalty.

44. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 103b. Minhaj places it in 589; p. 120.

45. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 123b. The *Tarikh-i-Alfi* f. 485, states that Jayachandra with an army of a hundred thousand horse and seven hundred elephants, was himself marching against Muizzuddin's territories.

46. Only *Ferishta*, i, p. 58, mentions this preliminary engagement.

47. Fakhre Mudabbir, p. 23; *Tajul Maasir*, f. 112, 117-8; *Ibnul Asir*, xii, p. 49.

48. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 123b. In 1197 Kanouj, Jaunpur and Mirzapur were in the possession of Harishchandra, son of Jayachandra; *HCIP*, v. p. 55.

49. *EL*, x, pp. 93-98.

50. *JASB* (N. S.) vii, p. 757. Tradition has it that Zafarabad, near Jaunpur, was the capital of the later Gahadavalas.

51. He issued coins to commemorate its conquest; *CCIM*, ii, Pt. i, p. 21 no. 39. Smith, however, asserts that after the fall of the Gahadavalas, for eight generations Kanouj was ruled by the Chandellas; *JASB*, 1881, p. 48-9.

52. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 136; Cf. *HCIP*, v. p. 84.

53. Written Kupala by Hasan Nizami, f. 144a; Kumarapala is mentioned in the annals of the ancestors of the Jadon Bhatti dynasty of Kerauli; Cunningham: *Reports*, XX, pp 6, 7-8.

54. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 144b; Minhaj, p. 114, dates the event in 591/1195, but Fakhre Mudabbir p. 23, confirms Hasan Nizami. A locally current couplet in Hindi has preserved the date and name of the Muslim officer; Cunningham: *Reports*, VI, p. 55.

55. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 146b. According to Cunningham, he is probably to be identified with Lahangdeo, the fifth king in the list of Hiranman Munshi's *Gwalior Namah*, f. 9a; see also the version of Motiram and Khushal: I. O. Ms. 860 f. 8b. The prince, Sallakshanasinha, is mentioned in a fragmentary inscription discovered in Jhansi, as being engaged in fighting the *Javanas*. It is however, without date; *EL*, i, p. 214-15.

56. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 146a; Minhaj, p. 145.

57. Minhaj, p. 145; Neither Hasan Nizami, nor the *Gwalior Namah*, records its final occupation. Fakhre Mudabbir places the event in 597/1200-1.

58. In all the manuscripts of the *Tajul Maasir* that I have been able to examine, the tribe's name is written as Tunir or Natir; *Ferishta* also has the

same form ; i, p. 62. Elliot : ii, p. 228, however, writes it as above which in any case, was the name of the tribe originally inhabiting Ajmer. See Cunningham : *Reports*, vi, p. 8.

59. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 156a.

60. Hasan Nizami calls Kelhana Karwan Rai. For his inscription referring to this event see *EL*, xi, pp. 46-51.

61. Minhaj, p. 140.

62. Ojha : *Rajputana*, i, p. 271. He seems to have confused the sequence of events.

63. i, p. 52.

64. *EL*, i, p. 22, 338-9 ; ii, p. 439. *al-kamil fit-twarikh*, xii, p. 79.

65. *Asiatik Researches*, p. 289 ; *IA*, 1877, p. 187.

66. Fakhre Mudabbir, p. 24. The *Tajul Maasir*, f. 176b. mentions Aibak's stay in Budaun in 599/1202-3.

67. p. 24. Minhaj makes an obscure reference to the event by stating that Aibak subdued territories as far as Ujjain ; p. 140.

68. Erskine : *Rajputana Gazetteer* p. 237; for a Rajput reference to an invasion of Nadol by Aibak in 1197, see *HCIP*. v. p. 87.

69. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 185b ; Fakhre Mudabbir, p. 25 ; *Cf.* Cunningham : *Reports*, ii, p. 456 who erroneously asserts that Kalinjar was attacked twice, in 1196 and again in 1202.

70. I prefer this simpler form of the name as found in the printed text and also in the B. M. Mss. of the *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*, in spite of Raverty's craze for the *izafat* inserted between Muhammad and Bakhtiyar, as a substitute for *bin*.

71. Minhaj, p. 146-7. A different version, given in the footnote, would imply Bakhtiyar's employment after his rejection at Ghazni, under the *Muqti* of Kanauj. Isami, however, refers to Bakhtiyar's first employment under "Jaisingha of Jitur" (Jaitrasinha of the Guhelot clan then ruling at Nagda, about 70 miles west of Chitor ?) ; p. 95.

72. The printed text has Sahlat and Sahli, but Raverty's reading has been generally upheld ; Hodivala : *Studies in Indo-Moslem History*, p. 206. Ferishta and the *TA* (i, p. 292, and i, p. 47 respectively) have "Kampilah and Patiali near Budaon". The mistake is due to phonetic resemblance with Patitah and Kuntilah which, like Bhagwat and Bhiuli, are situated close to each other in the neighbourhood of Chunar ; Cunningham : *Reports*, xi, p. 128.

73. Minhaj, p. 147. For Uddandapurdesa, see Cunningham : *Reports*, iii, p. 118 ; viii, p. 75 ; xi p. 185. One of these early raids on Uddandapur is probably referred to by Taranath who talks of a Turushka force of 500 being defeated ; Samaddar : *Glories of Magadh*, p. 131-32. See also Sarkar S.C. : *Some Tibetan references to Muslim advance in Bihar and Bengal in PIHRC*, 1942.

74. Minhaj, p. 147.

75. Minhaj, p. 148. *Cf.* Banerji R. D : *Banglar Itihasa*, i, p. 252-53, who thinks it was Govindapala, then ruling in the district round Uddandapur, Nalanda and Vikramsila, who was killed on this occasion by Bakhtiyar's forces. *Cf.* with this view *JASB*, 1921 p. 14, and Ray : *Dynastic History* i, p. 369. On the point of the *Sramanas* offering resistance, see Taranath, quoted in

Samaddar, *op. cit.* p. 26, and 148.

76. There is no evidence for Banerji's statement that the books were all destroyed ; *op. cit.* i, p. 322. See Minhaj, p. 148.

77. *Id.* iv, p. 366-7.

78. Fakhre Mudabbir, p. 25, mentions the conquest of Bidur (Bihar?) in 600/1203-4. Hasan Nizami, *op. cit.* f. 176b, states that after this conquest of Kalinjar in 599/1202-3, while at Budaun, Aibak received Bakhtiyar who came from the direction of 'Udandbihar'. This is also alluded to in Minhaj, p. 147 and 150. On this date of 599 in the *Tajul Maasir*, see Raverty : *op. cit.* Appendix D.

79. Bakhtiyar's capture of Uddandapur Vihar nearly synchronised with that of Kalinjar by Aibak which is dated 1203 by Hasan Nizami ; *Tajul Maasir*, f. 176b. Fakhre Mudabbir also seems to refer to Bihar under the year 600/1203 which he assigns for the capture of Bidur (?) ; *Tarikh*, p. 25. Next year, according to Minhaj, p. 150, would bring us to 1204. In 1203 and 1205-6 (25th and 27th year) Lakshmanasena was issuing grants from Dharyagrama, possibly on the Bhagirathi ; *JASB*, 1942 pp. 70-72. In March 1206 Bakhtiyar's army was destroyed on the Barnadi bridge ; see *infra*. Lakshmanasena was certainly alive in 1206 as is proved from the preface to the *Saduktikarnamrita* ; see Ray : *Dynastic History*, i, p. 374. To date the event earlier would conflict with Minhaj's statement that the Sena King died in Bang soon after the sack of Nodia. See, however, *DHB*, i, pp. 223-24, 232 and 247 which, on the basis of the Tibetan Chronicle *Pag-Sam-Jon-Zong*, and the later compilation *Sheka Subhodāya*, dates the sack of Nadiya in 1202 A. D. This, again, conflicts with *DHB*, ii, p. 334, which places it in January 1201.

80. Minhaj, p. 150.

81. Minhaj, p. 150-51.

82. See for example, Vaidya : *op. cit.*, pp. 126-29 ; Banerji, *op. cit.* i, p. 324-25 ; *Indian Culture*, 1935, pp. 133-36.

83. A fuller discussion will be found in *DHB*, i, pp. 230-238 ; also 242-246.

84. See *IHQ*, x, p. 321, for a grant found in the Sundarbans area of an independent ruler named Samanta Modammanapala, dated Saka 1118/1196. On the Sena administration, see Ray N. R. : *Bangalir Itihasa* pp. 516-29.

85. Minhaj, p. 150.

86. *JRASBL*, 1942, p. 17-21. The ceremony called *Aindri Mahasanti* is performed only to avert great calamities.

87. *IGI*, xii, p. 18 ; *JASB*, (N. S.), ii, p. 282.

88. *JRASBL*, 1942, p. 71-72.

89. Minhaj p. 150-51. Cf. *Ferishta*, ii, p. 282, who interprets it as Jagannath in Orissa. As a place of religious sanctity Jagannath came into prominence only in the first quarter of the 13th century. For Sankakot see Dutta : *Vaishyas in medieval Bengal* in *IHQ*, 1940, p. 705-6.

90. *JASB*, 1896, p. 20.

91. Minhaj, p. 157, has "Lakhnouti" but its direction is indicated by its being coupled with Jainagar. For its location, see Stewart : *History of Bengal*, p. 62, who identifies it with Nagar in Birbhum, about 85 miles S W

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of Lakhnauti; Banerji : *History of Orissa*, i, p. 248, supports it ; Cunningham also seemed to accept the identification; *Reports*, viii, p. 146; but later he became doubtful ; *op. cit.* xv. p. 44. Mr Chakravarti : *JASB*, (N.S.) v, p. 214-15, was inclined to place it somewhere in modern Murshidabad district. Lakhnauti doubtless lay towards the south west on the Orissa frontier. Minhaj's statement that Devkot and Lakhnauti were both equidistant from Lakhnauti would tend to support Stewart's identification.

92. A Hindu account, named *Laghu Bharata*, mentions Bakhtiyar's plundering the merchants of Jogibhaban, near Bogra, and capturing the wealth of the Senas ruling on banks of the Karatoya ; *DHB*, ii, p. 34.

93. For changes in its course, see *DHB*, ii, p. 5-6.

94. Minhaj, p. 152.

95. *Ibid*, p. 154.

96. *Ibid*, p. 153.

97. *Ibid*, p. 156.

98. It is 20 miles from Bogra, on the Karatoya river.

99. For the views of Raverty and Blochmann, both of whom led the expedition through Sikkim into Darjeeling, see (a) *Trans. Tab. Nas.*, pp. 561-665 note, and (b) *JASB*, 1875, p. 283. For the Silhako bridge, discovered by Col. Hanny, see *JASB*, 1851, pp. 29-94. The inscription at the spot known as the *Kanaibadasibaoa*, was first noticed in Bhattacharya: *Kamarupa Sasanabali*, pp. 27-44. It refers to the Turks as "Samagatyec", "who had come", and not "invaded". The best contribution to the whole question of Bakhtiyar's route is by Bhattacharya : *IHQ*, 1927, pp. 49, sq. The name Begmati or Bangmati creates some doubt, for no Bengal river bears that name; but solution may lie in supposing that Minhaj erroneously transferred the name of Rangamat (Bangmati being a likely clerical slip), an ancient place on the bend of Brahmaputra, to the Karatoya. Alternatively, Barnadi might have become Bangmati ; a recent suggestion is that the Nepal river Bangmati may once have flowed, as did the Kosi, into Bengal and joined the Karatoya.

100. Minhaj, p. 157.

101. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 178b. An allusion to this incident is made by Minhaj, p. 122, who, however, calls the deserter Hussain Kharmil. See *Guzidah*, i, p. 411-2, from whom *Ferishta*, i, p. 59, copied the story of another of Muizzuddin's officers, named, Iladgiz, who on this occasion occupied Ghazni itself.

102. *Ibnul Asir*, xii, p. 96, says he was converted to Islam on a previous occasion. The *Tajul Maasir*, f. 180, mentions Bakan and Sarka, sons of Khokar, possibly implying two subdivisions of the Khokars.

103. Fakre Mudabbir, p. 27. names the tribes who raised the rebellion as "Siaha" (Schi? Rose : *Glossary of the Punjab tribes*, iii, p. 394), Jamuns (*ibid*, ii, p. 325), Harhars (Haras? *ibid*, p. 327) and Nahuns. On the Khokars and their supposed conversion to Islam mentioned by *Ferishta*, i, p. 59-60, see App. C.

104. *Ibnul Asir*, xii, p. 97.

105. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 198a ; Minhaj, p. 124.


106. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 197b ; Minhaj, *idem* ; *TM*, p. 12 ; Haji Dabir, p. 602. See also Raverty, *op. cit.* p. 458, note.

107. *Guzida*, i, p. 412 ; *Juwaini*, i, p. 59 ; *Mirat-i-Jahan Numa*: Or. 1898, f. 50a ; *TA*, i, p. 40.

108. *Ibnul Asir*, xii, p. 99, states that when the assassins were secured two among them were found to be Muslims (circumcised) ; this would imply that among them were others who were not Muslims, the deed being a joint Qaramitah Khokar affair.

109. Cf. Bartold: *Turkestan*, p. 339 and 352, for an estimate of his statesmanship compared to that of the Khwarizm Shah.

110. Fakhruddin Razi dedicated one of his works—the *Lataiful Ghiyasi*, to Muizzuddin's elder brother Ghiyasuddin. Nizami Uruzi was a great friend of Alauddin, the "world-burner", and lived in the Ghor court down to the reigns of Ghiyasuddin and Muizzuddin ; *Chahar Maqala*, intr. Another reputed litterateur enjoying Muizzuddin's patronage was Fakhruddin Mubarakshah the author, among others, of a voluminous book of genealogies and a versified history of the Shansabani dynasty. His father was also an eminent divine and attended the court of Firozkoh ; see *Ajaib Namah*, (E. G. Browne presentation volume), p. 393-94, and 409 ; also Minhaj, p. 27.





CHAPTER IV

THE DELHI SULTANATE

1206-1235

Muizzuddin's sudden death placed his officers in India in a difficult situation. The Delhi government was far from well-established ; want of common loyalty now threatened to intensify personal jealousies. Aftermaths of the late rising still rendered communications unsafe with Ghazni which, in any case, now seemed an easy prey to the aggressive Khwarizm Shah. By far the most serious menace came from the Hindus whose military power, only stunned by the rapidity of the conquest, now showed signs of recovery and even of offensive action. Already, by 1206, Kalinjar had been recovered and the Chandella king appeared effectively to stop further expansion in the south.¹ In the Gangetic plain numerous chiefs still held out in open defiance.² Gahadavala rule was still a reality, for Harishchandra found means to establish himself in the districts of Farrukhabad and Budaun.³ Even the Pariharas appeared to have regained their initiative and recovered Gwalior which had to be reconquered several years later. In the east, a terrible disaster had befallen the Muslim arms and the two-year-old possession of Lakhnauti rendered insecure by distance and by Khalji factiousness, promised to be a heavy liability. The Turks had overrun the whole of north India, but on Muizzuddin's death found themselves in effective possession only of Sind and parts of the Punjab and the

Gangetic valley with Rajput resistance increasing in extent.

The situation called for quick action and unified command. Muizzuddin left no son ; his nephew, Ghiyasuddin Mahmud, in possession of Ghor, showed no promise of leadership or of energetic action. With the Khwarizm Shah menacingly advancing to Ghazni and Ghor, political foresight demanded severance of Delhi's connection with the trans-Indus state. Among Muizzuddin's officers three held important commands and nourished ambitions of sovereignty. Tajuddin Yalduz held Karman and Sankuran on the route from Afghanistan to upper Sind, and was widely believed to have been marked out for the viceroyalty of Ghazni proper. Another equally favoured slave was Nasiruddin Qubachah,⁴ a son-in-law of Yalduz and lately appointed to hold charge of Uch. By far the most capable and devoted of his slaves was Qutbuddin Aibak. Purchased early in life, he was noted for intrepidity and munificence, and had earned his master's confidence to be placed, as noticed above, after the victory of Tarain, in charge of his Indian conquests. Latterly, as Muizzuddin's representative, he exercised from Delhi the functions of a viceroy and commander of all the military forces stationed in the realm.⁵ In 1206 he was formally invested with viceregal powers and promoted to the rank of Malik.⁶

It was therefore a fulfilment of his master's wish when, in response to the invitation of the Lahore citizens, he came from Delhi and assumed sovereign power. His formal accession took place on the 17th *zilqad*, 602/June 24th, 1206,⁷ more than three months after Muizzuddin's death, an interval that must have

been occupied by manoeuvres to build up a party of supporters. Technically he was still a slave for, although Ghiyasuddin Mahmud of Ghor sent him the royal insignia and standard and also conferred the title of *Sultan*,⁸ his formal manumission was not obtained till 605/1208; in inscriptions no higher titles are used with his name than *Malik* and *Sipahsalar*.⁹ The statement that "coins were struck and the *khutbah* read in his name throughout Hindustan" must be taken as a conventional phrase emphasising his sovereign power, for no silver or billon coin of his has yet been discovered.¹¹

Aibak's was a short reign and foreign affairs occupied most of his time. Yalduz possessed himself of Ghazni and commenced playing a diplomatic game with both Ghiyasuddin Mahmud and the Khwarizm Shah. The latter, having swallowed the whole of Iran and Central Asia, now cast covetous eyes on Ghazni. To make matters worse for Aibak, by virtue of his possessing the capital of Muizzuddin's empire, Yalduz now laid claim to the whole of his master's dominions including Delhi. Unless vigorously resisted, this claim would mean not only a negation of Delhi's sovereignty but also an extension of the Khwarizm Shah's ambitions of conquest to India. The situation in the northwest had thus to be closely watched and other affairs had to yield to the urgency of this problem. In such a context Aibak's continued residence in Lahore from where he is reported to have never moved, becomes intelligible.¹²

Yalduz was no match for the Khwarizm Shah. The latter had partisans in Ghazni whose citizens were notoriously fickle in their attachment. In 605/1208, hard pressed by the Khwarizm Shahi fac-

tion at his court, Yalduz was compelled to leave the
 ✓ city and withdraw towards the Punjab. What Aibak
 had foreseen, now came to pass ; it was now impera-
 tive to forestall the Khwarizm Shah and occupy
 the city. A party of its citizens also suddenly felt an
 ✓ affection for him and sent an invitation. Yalduz
 in any case could not be allowed to find refuge in the
 Punjab, and was therefore promptly driven out to his
 ✓ former possessions in "Karman and Sankuran".
 Aibak then moved up to Ghazni to occupy it.
 Judging from the sequel, the step was obviously
 taken in haste and was militarily ill-supported.
 Within forty days the citizens conceived a dislike for his
 rule—he had no direct association with them for many
 years—and Yalduz once again became a favourite.
 ✓ On the latter advancing unexpectedly, Aibak was obli-
 ged to beat a hurried retreat.¹² The venture thus
 did little to improve the situation and now Yalduz's
 ✓ enmity added to his anxiety.

He was thus in no position to resume offensive
 ✓ military action against the Rajputs. Even the
 affairs in Lakhnauti, urgent in themselves, could
 engage only his passing attention. The least that
 ✓ Bakhtiyar's murder had threatened to do there was
 to sever Delhi's connection and split the province
 into small, mutually jealous units. Having seized and
 imprisoned the murderer Ali Mardan, the Khalji
 chiefs proceeded to elect Muhammad Sheran to the
 chieftaincy who was pledged to acknowledge little
 ✓ subordination to Delhi.¹³ Ali Mardan escaped from
 confinement, and making his way to Delhi, persuaded
 ✓ Aibak to intervene in the Lakhnauti affairs. On
 proceeding thither to establish order the Delhi agent
 ✓ Qaimaz Rumi, however, met with blank refusal on

the part of the Khaljis to recognise his authority. In Husamuddin Iwaz, one of the Khalji chiefs, Rumi, however, found a willing tool and left him at Devkot to hold temporary charge of the province. On the agent's departure Iwaz was immediately turned out ; whereupon Rumi returned and reinstated him but only after a severe struggle with Sheran and his party.¹⁴ But Ali Mardan, who had meanwhile stayed back at Lahore, eventually induced Aibak to appoint him governor over the province where he was soon to commence a reign of terror.¹⁵

This imposition of its authority over the eastern province was but a poor consolation, for the Delhi state at the moment needed political security more than suzerain status. When Aibak died in 607/1210, of injuries received in a fall from his horse while playing *chaugan*,¹⁶ the clouds on the northwest were gathering thick and fast. He read the portents and did his best to preserve Delhi's separate entity. A military leader of great energy and high merit, he combined the intrepidity of the Turk with the refined taste and generosity of the Persian; extreme liberality earned him the epithet of "*Lakh Buksh*" (giver of lakhs), while, characteristically enough, his killing is also said to have been by lakhs.¹⁷ Both Hasan Nizami and Fakhre Mudabbir found in him an appreciative patron and dedicated their works to him.¹⁸ On two occasions at least, he interceded with his master for the vanquished Hindu princes.¹⁹ It hardly needs emphasising that to his untiring exertion and devoted service Muizzuddin owed most of his success in India. For he merely supplied the motive power ; Aibak was responsible for the detailed planning and initiation of the Delhi state.

On his death the officers at Lahore nominated his

son Aram Shah to be their chief. But the step was not supported at Delhi where the citizens headed by the chief magistrate, "invited" Iltutmish, the governor of Budaun and a son-in-law of Aibak, to assume the crown. Backed by the Lahore faction, Aram thereupon marched against Delhi but Iltutmish found it easy to defeat and possibly slay him. Aram's reign, devoid of any other recorded interest, lasted not more than eight months.²⁰

Iltutmish at last became master of the Delhi state but the schism had an adverse effect on the outlying areas of its attenuated dominion. In Lakhnauti, Ali Mardan assumed independent sovereign status and began to behave like an emperor.²¹ Qubachah occupied Multan and extended his dominions to include Bhatinda, Kuhram and Sarsuti; and on Aram's death even possessed himself of Lahore.²² Rajput chiefs withheld tribute and repudiated allegiance. The small Chauhana principality of Jalor, whom Aibak had forced to submission, declared independence; Ranthambhor, given as an appanage to Prithviraja's son, also ceased to acknowledge vassalage.

The new king's position was too insecure to enable him to take action at once; he did not feel safe enough to assume even sovereign dignity. Realist as he was, he found it wiser to compromise for the time being, and accept the regal insignia—the canopy and the mace—from Yalduz who, now that Aibak was dead, felt free to push his claims of suzerainty.²³ A great peril confronted Iltutmish when the Turkish guards (*jandars*) of Delhi, in alliance with Aram Shah's party rose in open rebellion and meant to negative his accession. It was only by a sanguinary conflict that they could be dispersed.²⁴ It took him some

month's hard and tactful action to extend his authority even in the districts in the immediate vicinity of Delhi, in charge of officers whose ranks were originally equal to his own. Even then his rule does not appear to have been effective beyond Banaras on the east and the Siwalikh hills on the west.²⁵

His position was further imperilled by developments in Afghanistan. Yalduz's troops, sometime before 612/1215, succeeded in expelling Qubachah from Lahore and occupying the greater part of Punjab.²⁶ While this undoubtedly slackened the latter's hold on Kuhram, Sarsuti and Bhatinda, it constituted a serious menace to Iltutmish, for Yalduz holding the Punjab meant a direct invitation to the Khwarizm Shah whose annexation of Ghazni was only a question of time. It was a repetition of the problem which had led Aibak to occupy Ghazni. ✓ With the example before him of the latter's failure to hold the city Iltutmish, however, dared not attempt the same solution and thus to cross swords with the mighty Khwarizm Shah. Prudence pointed to a defensive policy and he bided his time. It came soon enough. In 612/1215, Yalduz was finally forced out of Ghazni and fell back on Lahore.²⁷ He then renewed his claim to overlordship and thus precipitated the struggle for which Iltutmish was now well-prepared. He accordingly marched out, met him on the field of Tarain, defeated and finally captured him.²⁸ The victory completed Aibak's work; the last obstacle to Delhi's independence and to her disengagement from central Asian power-politics was finally eliminated. Delhi became a sovereign state, in fact if not, yet, in theory.

Lahore was not immediately annexed but seems to

have been restored to Qubachah ; Hasan Nizami hints at an agreement whose alleged breach, in 614/1217, furnished Iltutmish with a *casus belli* to make war and wrest the province.²⁹ Lahore was evidently in Qubachah's possession when the Delhi forces marched out. As they crossed the Beas, Qubachah took flight and fled to Uch.³⁰ Unopposed, Iltutmish occupied Lahore and for the first time placed his own governor there.³¹

This success, however, did not, by any means, secure him the whole of the Punjab. Qubachah remained confined to Sind but it was some years before Iltutmish could annex territories in the Chinab and Jhelum valleys. Ever since the Khokar rising the district round the Salt Range had been practically in control of the insurgent tribes. Within three years of the occupation of Lahore, across the Indus came the gusts of a storm that had burst in, and was now sweeping across, Central Asia. Issuing from the uplands of Tartary, the Mongols, under Temujin, whose imperial title the Persians pronounce as Chengiz Khan, literally rolled up the vast Khwarizmi empire, and with fire and sword, were now tearing up the great fabric of Islamic civilization in the east. While the Khwarizm Shah was driven to find shelter in the Caspian coast, his crown-prince Jalaluddin Mangbarni, pursued relentlessly across Khurasan, could elude him only by crossing over into the Punjab, where Iltutmish was thereby robbed of his recently gained advantage. Mangbarni established himself in the upper Sind Sagar Doab and contracted a matrimonial alliance with the chief of the Salt Range.³² This gave him an excuse as well as help for widening his hold at the expense of Qubachah, with whom the hill chief was in

perpetual hostility. In consequence, Qubachah, was practically driven out of the Sind Sagar Doab. Mangbarni's three years' sojourn in western Punjab also affected Iltutmish's hold on the Ravi and Chinab regions. The prince captured the fort of Basraur (Pasraur) in the Sialkot district and tried to support himself by plundering the riverine tracts.³³ He even found it possible to advance upto Lahore whence he appealed to Delhi for shelter.³⁴

Rules of hospitality required only one answer to the request but Iltutmish was a great realist. To reverse Aibak's and his own foreign policy at this stage and to seek the displeasure of a far more terrible power by receiving the fugitive prince, would have been not only unwise but almost suicidal. Mangbarni therefore was given a polite refusal and when he prepared to avenge himself by further aggressions in the Punjab Iltutmish got ready for military action.³⁵ It did not, however, come to actual fighting, for the prince thought it prudent to turn his attention to Qubachah.³⁶

Mangbarni left India in 1224, but western Punjab continued to witness rapid political changes. These changes which extended far beyond Iltutmish's reign, require a fuller discussion³⁷ and admit of only a passing reference here. They upset Iltutmish's plan of consolidation on the west but they also helped him to destroy his rival Qubachah.³⁸ For, the latter had to bear the brunt of Mangbarni's invasion and of its aftermath, which fearfully weakened his power of resistance. Close on the heels of the Khwarizmi fugitive, came the Mongols in his pursuit and reached as far as Multan; then, a mass migration of the Khalji supporters of Mangbarni who appeared like an invading army.

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Iltutmish had thus the satisfaction of seeing Qubachah nearly crushed by these events. He needed little military exertion to recover Bhatinda, Kuhram and Sarsuti and the tracts along the Hakra river.³⁹

Chengiz Khan's departure from Afghanistan removed a dominating fear from Iltutmish's mind. With Qubachah struggling against foreign intruders in lower Sind he now felt free to reoccupy Lahore.⁴⁰ Soon after, in 625/1228, he prepared to deliver his final attack.⁴¹ Directing the governor of Lahore to attack Multan, he himself marched his forces to Uch. Unable to offer frontal resistance Qubachah left a garrison in the town and himself fled to the security of the island fortress of Bhakar in lower Indus.⁴² Uch capitulated after three month's brave defence.⁴³ Bhakar could not give Qubachah the expected security when a detachment of Delhi troops, commanded by the wazir, pressed the siege by cutting it off from the mainland. In desperation he sent his son to Iltutmish to negotiate for terms.⁴⁴ The latter demanded his unconditional surrender. This he refused and when the citadel was assaulted, drowned himself in the Indus waters.⁴⁵

With Qubachah thus finally eliminated, the extension of Delhi's unified control was now possible over Muizzuddin's west Indian provinces. Multan and Uch were annexed and became governor's provinces. The Sumra ruler of Debal, named Sinanuddin Chanisar, transferred his allegiance to Delhi and was confirmed as a vassal.⁴⁶ According to Hasan Nizami, twelve celebrated fortresses were captured on this occasion and "Siwistan (Sehwan) and Lak (Lakki Pass?) as far as the shores of the ocean came under Iltutmish's authority ; coins were struck and the *Khutbah* read in

his name as far as Kusdar and Makran."⁴⁷ It is doubtful, however, if he could make any immediate headway in the upper Sind Sagar Doab. Besides the area dominated by the unsubdued tribes of the Salt Range, the western part, called Baniyan by the contemporary writer, which originally formed part of Mangbarni's Indian possessions, was now under his lieutenant, Saifuddin Hasan Qarlugh, who was to hold it for his master as best as he could.⁴⁸ Judging from Mangbarni's alliance with the Salt Range chief, Qarlugh's influence must also have been fairly extensive. In the northeastern Punjab, however, Iltutmish appears to have succeeded in extending his rule upto Sialkot and Janer (Hajner) and possibly also Jalandhar, which appear as part of the Delhi kingdom early in Mahmud's reign.⁴⁹

The Lahore and Multan provinces were however, exposed to the incursions of the hill-tribes and their reduction must have figured in his plans. It is more than probable that the governors were instructed to gradually reduce the Jhelum and Indus tract. The occupation of the stronghold of Nandanah, in the Salt Range, recorded by Minhaj,⁵⁰ could only have been the result of such operations. Kujah, mentioned along with Nandanah as having been placed in charge of Malik Aetigin, must also be looked for in the same area and also as a resulting acquisition.⁵¹ Iltutmish's last expedition, which illness compelled him to abandon was projected towards Baniyan.⁵² Nevertheless, as will appear from a subsequent discussion, by the time he died, Delhi's hold on western Punjab was far from effective.

In other directions however, he was more successful. After 1225 he could turn his attention to the east

where, since Aibak's death, Delhi's authority had been completely negated. Ali Mardan's tyranny in Lakhnauti had continued unchecked for two years until his exasperated officers put an end to it by murdering him and raising Husamuddin Iwaz once again to chief authority.⁵³ On his accession, which must have occurred shortly after 1211,⁵⁴ Iwaz took the title of Sultan Ghiyasuddin and assumed full sovereign status.⁵⁵ He was a generous and able ruler and undertook a number of public works; one of them, a raised causeway connecting Lakhnauti with Lakhanor and Devkot, proved immensely beneficial in the rains and, in some places, is still traceable.⁵⁶ Iltutmish's pre-occupations left him unmolested.⁵⁷ He found means to annex Bihar and is also said to have raided and exacted tribute from the neighbouring Hindu states of "Jajnagar, Tirhut, Bang, and Kamrud".⁵⁸ The chronicles of the Brahmin dynasty of Mithila however, make no mention of any such raids.⁵⁹ On the south-west also, these expeditions could not have made any appreciable change in the frontier; Anangabhim III (1211-1238), the king of Orissa, in his inscriptions also claims to have vanquished the "*Javanas of Rarh and Varendri*".⁶⁰ On the east, across the Karatoya, border conflicts are all that could have taken place with the Sena kings of East Bengal with no positive advantage to either of the combatants.⁶¹ The exaction of tribute from Kamrup must refer to occasional raids into the northeastern part of the trans-Karatoya region which, at least from the 13th century, seems to have been included within the geographical term of Kamrup.⁶² In north Bihar Iwaz might have exercised some sort of control over part of Bhagalpur district through which passed the highway from Delhi to Lakhnauti.⁶³

As soon as the Mongol threat was lifted, Iltutmish started operations against Iwaz. As a preliminary measure and by a process not recorded in the chronicles, the district of Bihar south of the Ganges was wrested and placed under his own governor.⁶⁴ In 622/1225 he finally advanced along the Ganges. Iwaz brought his forces up the river and planned to intercept him in Bihar. No battle however seems to have taken place for an agreement was eventually concluded under the terms of which Iwaz accepted Iltutmish's suzerainty and offered to pay an indemnity.⁶⁵ He also relinquished his claim on Bihar which Iltutmish now placed under Malik Jani.⁶⁶ Immediately on the king's return, however, Iwaz, who obviously did not mean to keep the agreement, drove out Jani and reasserted independence. Iltutmish thereupon instructed his son, prince Nasiruddin Mahmud, then the governor of Awadh, to watch for an opportunity to dispossess the Khalji king. It came in 624/1226-7 when, taking advantage of his absence on a campaign in the east, Mahmud suddenly appeared before Lakhnauti and seized the city. Iwaz hurriedly returned, gave battle but was defeated and slain.⁶⁷ Lakhnauti thus finally passed under Delhi.

Mahmud ruled the province as his father's deputy until his sudden death, which opened the way for fresh trouble. The circumstances of his death, not detailed by the chronicler, seem to have had an obvious connection with the subsequent rebellion of a man named Balka Khalji.⁶⁸ His identity is difficult to establish and Minhaj gives him obscure and even irreconcilable antecedents.⁶⁹ Unless he can be proved to be identical with Alauddin Daulat Shah b. Maudud, who issued the unique coin described by Thomas,⁷⁰ Balka, possibly a

relation if not the son of Iwaz, should be supposed to have become the leader of the Khalji chiefs, who in their loyalty to the late ruler, considered subordination to Delhi as intolerable. Assuming that the date on Alaud-din Daulat Shah's coin had been correctly read as 627/1229-30, it must have been issued by a man who, on Mahmud's death, assumed regal status and placated Iltutmish by inscribing his name and titles on the obverse and thus acknowledging his suzerainty.⁷¹ To what family and tribe this self-appointed vassal ruler belonged it is immaterial to enquire for the autonomy-loving Khaljis headed by Balka soon ousted him and thus furnished Iltutmish with a pretext for a second invasion of Lakhnauti towards the end of the same year (i.e. ending November 8, 1230).⁷² Balka was defeated and slain. Laknauti and Bihar henceforth became two separate provinces.⁷³

Taking advantage of the dangers besetting the Delhi Sultanate the Rajputs, all these years, made steady progress in recovering their territories. Mention has been made of the loss of Kalinjar to the Chandellas; inscriptions found near Ajaigarh testify to their continuous occupation of the neighbourhood throughout the century.⁷⁴ In Gwalior, also, where Iltutmish held his first appointment, local chroniclers detail a continuous Parihara rule upto 1231;⁷⁵ coins and inscriptions of a prince named Malayavarmadeva, belonging to the same family, have been found in Narwar, Gwalior and Jhansi to prove an uninterrupted occupation from at least 1220 to 1233.⁷⁶ In Rajputana, the Chauhana family of Ranthambhor found it possible to impose its paramountcy over other princes in the north. In an inscription, discovered at Manglana (Jadhpur state) dated in 1215, a local chief-

tain named Jaitrasinha, acknowledges Vallanadeva of Ranthambhor as his overlord, though the mention of "Suratrana Lititimishi of Joginipur" indicates that Iltutmish was still recognised as the suzerain.⁷⁷ Iltutmish's name appears (as Sama-Sorala-deva) in a coin of another prince calling himself Chaharadeva who, seemingly identical with the author of a fragmentary grant, boasts of his Chauhana descent and appears as ruling at Ranthambhor.⁸⁷ This record, like the Manglana inscription, must belong to the early part of Iltutmish's reign for, latterly, Ranthambhor required armed expedition to enforce his suzerainty. An extension of the power of the Chauhanas of Jalor is also testified to by an inscription of Udaisinha's (Udisah of Hasan Nizami) grandson, in which the former is credited with ruling over Nadol, Jalor, Mandor, Bharmer, Ratnapur, Sanchor, Radhadhara, Kher, Ramsin and Bhinmal; and also with having curbed the pride of the *Turushkas*.⁷⁹ In northeastern Rajputana, the Jadon Bhattis established themselves at Kaman, Tijara and Sarhatta (northern Alwar).⁸⁰ Even Ajmer, Bayana and Thangir seem to have been lost, to judge from their inclusion among Iltutmish's conquests.⁸¹

From 1226 he commenced operations to recover the lost territories. In that year he advanced into Rajputana and invested Ranthambhor. It was easily captured and garrisoned.⁸² Next year he marched against Mandor which also fell easily and was in all probability annexed.⁸³ The final victory over Qu-bachah enabled him to make a more concentrated drive against the Hindu states. To this period should be ascribed the reduction of Jalor recorded by Hasan Nizami, who, however, places it immediately after his

accession.⁸⁴ After a close investment Udaisinha was compelled to surrender but was allowed to continue as a tributary vassal.⁸⁵ Rajput records ascribe to Iltutmish also an attack on Nagda, the capital of the Guhelots, from where the reigning prince Jaitrasinha repulsed him with heavy losses.⁸⁶ A similarly unsuccessful attack is also said to have been made on the Chalukyas of Gujrat.⁸⁷ Success however, seems to have attended his efforts in eastern and northern Rajputana where Bayana and Thangir were recovered;⁸⁸ towards the end of his reign, the country round Ajmer, including Lawah, Kasili and Sambhar, appears under his governors.⁸⁹ Offensive action appears to have been continued in Rajputana by his governors also, one of whom is reported to have lost his life in an expedition to Bundi.⁹⁰ Nagaur, in Jodhpur state, which reappears under Delhi in Masud's reign, must also have been recovered at this period. Mention should be made in connection with this offensive in Rajputana of Iltutmish's expedition into Malwah and the plunder of Bhilsa and Ujjain in 632/1234-5.⁹¹ It was little more than a predatory raid, for the Paramara dynasty is known to have suffered no territorial loss on this occasion but continued in independence till the end of the century.⁹²

In 629/1231 Iltutmish besieged Gwalior. The Parihara ruler, called Mangal Deo by Minhaj, (possibly meant for Mañayavarmadeva) after resisting for a whole year, secretly evacuated the fortress. It was occupied the next morning and garrisoned under the command of Rashiduddin.⁹³

Operations south of the Jumna, however, brought less encouraging results. Malik Tayasai, the commandant of Bayana and Gwalior, was

directed in 631/1233-4, to proceed with the Kanouj forces against Kalinjar. The ruler, possibly Trailokyavarma, fled on his approach and Tayasai thereupon freely plundered a number of towns and obtained a vast amount of booty.⁹⁴ Kalinjar however, does not appear to have been recovered. Judging from the Hindu records of the country around, little territorial advantage could have accrued on this occasion to the Delhi forces. Although Tayasai claimed to have captured the raja's standard and kettledrums, he obviously considered it a great military feat to have been able to get away. Mention is made, in connection with this expedition, of a place, called Jamu by Minhaj, which, Cunningham thought, should refer to Bandhogarh in Baghelkhand where the Baghela dynasty had recently established itself and was gathering power.⁹⁵ On his way back Tayasai was attacked in the defiles by a 'Rana Chahir Ajari', doubtless identical with Chahara Deva of the Jajapella dynasty who later supplanted the Pariharas in Narwar.⁹⁶ By great exertion Tayasai was able to extricate his forces and reach Gwalior.

In the Ganges valley also Hindu aggression was sought to be checked. The inclusion, among Iltutmish's conquest not only of Budaun where he held his last post before accession to the throne, but also of Kanouj and Banaras, points to their having been lost to the Hindus in the meantime.⁹⁷ At Budaun the establishment of the Gahadavala family has been mentioned earlier; survival, and a possible recovery of the Rashtrakuta line represented by Lakhanapala, also could not have been altogether an improbability.⁹⁸ In eastern Rohilkhand, the Katehriya Rajputs retained their stronghold at Ahicchatra (modern Aolna), not far

from Budaun; the inclusion of Katehar in the list of Iltutmish's conquests is a clear indication of the range of his operations. It also seems probable that the subjugation of Bahraich and the districts north of the Gogra river was also effected about this time. In Awadh and the Doab also Muslim rule had to be reestablished by force. On his appointment to Awadh prince Nasiruddin Mahmud is said to have waged continuous 'holy wars' against the refractory Hindu tribes and to have overthrown a chief named 'Bartu' (or Prithu) "beneath whose sword about a hundred and twenty thousand Mussalmans had attained martyrdom".⁹⁹ Operations in the Doab, also connected with this 'Bartu', are alluded to in a passage in the *Tabaqat* in which 'the son of the Rai' is said to have been captured by Malik Tamur Khan in course of an expedition to Chandwar.¹⁰⁰ It is doubtful if any appreciable advance could be made into north Bihar; Minhaj, of course, includes Tirhut in Iltutmish's acquisitions but this can mean nothing more tangible than a possibly successful raid.¹⁰¹

Iltutmish died in April 1236 of an illness contracted during his expedition to the northwest.¹⁰² His was a remarkably successful reign. He took up Aibak's unfinished work and against heavy odds and on imperfect foundations, built up a state whose sovereignty required great diplomatic skill to preserve. That he, an ex-slave, could leave the crown to his sons, is a measure of his constructive statesmanship. Great realism, steadfastness and foresight marked his conduct of foreign affairs. Medieval India owed him not a little gratitude for helping her to escape the Mongol fury which had uprooted more powerful and far older empires. His firm and energetic action unified the

kingdom and saved it from initial dismemberment. Against the Rajputs his forward policy achieved great success and yielded results of great moral value ; it constituted an effective answer to the first challenge directed by the Hindus against the newly established Muslim state. Beyond recovering Muizzuddin's conquests he made appreciable advance into Rajputana and the trans-Gangetic tracts and also towards reorganising the Indus valley frontier. A calculating and skilful organiser, to him the Sultanate owed the first outline of its administrative system. He laid the foundations of an absolutist monarchy that was to serve later as the instrument of a military imperialism under the Khaljis. By a clever compromise with religious leaders,¹⁰³ he disarmed moral opposition, while the military class found profit and occupation in his expansionist schemes. Not merely his crown and his dynasty, but also the state obtained its final sanction, and his ambition its crowning fulfilment, when on the 22nd *Rabi*, 1, 626/19th February, 1229, emissaries from the Abbaside Caliph arrived from Baghdad to invest him with the powers of an Islamic king.¹⁰⁴ Aibak's objective was, at last achieved and the Delhi state thus became a full legal entity. To describe Iltutmish as great would no doubt be an overstatement, but he was an unusually able ruler who left his mark on every aspect of the Sultanate's activity. Even long after he was gone and his dynasty supplanted, people fondly looked back to his "prosperous and glorious reign".¹⁰⁵ Aibak outlined the Delhi Sultanate and its sovereign status ; Iltutmish was unquestionably its first king.

NOTES

1. Inscriptions of Trailokyavarma, Paramardideva's successor refer to his expelling the Turks from his kingdom ; *EI*, i, p. 327. In his earliest inscription, dated in 1206, recording the grant of land to an officer whose father had lost his life in fighting the Turks, he is called "Lord of Kalinjar"; *EI*, xvi, p. 273. The fortress is not mentioned again by Minhaj, until a few years later when we hear of expeditions sent against the "Rai of Kalinjar."

2. One of these, Maharana Pratapadavalala of Japila, in an inscription dated V. S. 1279/1223 A. D. discovered in the Mirzapur district, refers to his destruction of the "Javana" ; *EI*, iv, pp. 310-312.

3. Reu : *History of the Rathors (Asutosh Silver Jubilee Volumes iii.)*, p 265.

4. Raverty, *op. cit.* p 531, note 8, argues at great length that the name should really be pronounced as Kabajah, but the above form is confirmed in Hindi script on one of his coins ; *JASB*, 1887, p. 171.

5. He appointed Hasan Arna to the command of Kol ; *Tajul Maasir*, f. 26b. His appointment of Bakhtiyar to the *iqta* of Bihar clearly shows his status.

6. Fakhre Mudabbir : *Tarikh*, p. 28. See also *TA*, i, p. 47. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 83, implies that he was appointed to the viceroyalty as early as 1193.

7. Fakhre Mudabbir : *Tarikh*, p. 30, and 32 ; Minhaj, p. 140.

8. Minhaj, p. 90 and 140 ; *TM*, p 14 ; *Cf. TA*, i, p. 42.

9. *EIM*, 1911-12, p. 2.

10. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 202a ; Minhaj, 141. Rodgers : *JRAS*, 1894, nos. 37-40, ascribed four copper pieces to Aibak ; they bear the appellation *al-Qutbi* ; see on these coins, Wright, p. 69, who thinks they should be ascribed to the Karman mint.

11. For details of Yalduz's overtures to Khiva and Ghor, see Minhaj, pp. 89-96 ; Khwand Amir : *Rauzatus - Safa*, iv, p. 126-17. For Aibak's problems see *Ferishta*, i, p. 63.

12. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 202a. Minhaj, p. 140, also p. 90 ; *Cf. Ferishta*, i, p. 63, who places the event in 603/1207.

13. Minhaj, p. 158 ; *Cf. TA*, i, p. 51.

14. Sheran was soon after killed in a quarrel with his party and was buried near "Maksida and Santosh", near Mahigunj, on the Atrai ; *JASB*, 1875 p. 284, *Cf. Tarikh-i-Alfi*, f. 616a, which states that he was killed in a battle with the Hindu rajas.

15. Minhaj, p. 159.

16. *Ibid*, p. 141 ; *TM*, p. 15 ; *Cf. Mirat-i-Jahan Numa*, f. 53, which places his death in 609/1212, whereas Aibak's latest inscription is dated *Ramzan*, 607/1210.

17. Minhaj, p. 138.

18. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 7b ; Fakhre Mudabbir : *Tarikh*, p. 72. Minhaj states that before taking service under Muizzuddin Aibak had acquired proficiency in literature.

19. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 143b. and 194b.

20. Minhaj, p. 141 ; *TM*, p. 16 ; *TA*, , p. 55. Raverty argues that he was Aibak's adopted son, for which, however, no authentic evidence is

available. See also Haji Dabir, ii, p. 686. Raverty : *op. cit.*, p. 589, note 4, on the supposed evidence of an anonymous work, describing the coins of Delhi sultans, entitled *Tafsil-i-Sikka*, f. 8, states that Aram ruled upto 1215. But Iltutmish's earliest coin was issued in 608/1211 and his inscription is dated *Jamadi I*, 608-1211. See *CCIM*, ii, intr. p. 6. ; *EIM*, 1911-12 p. 3.

21. For his tyrannical rule and insufferable boastfulness see Minhaj p. 159-60. *TA*, i, p. 53, states that he issued coins with the title of sultan Alauddin ; no such coin has been discovered.

22. Minhaj, p. 143.

23. Minhaj, p. 170 ; Haji Dabir, ii, p. 688, says that Iltutmish entered into an alliance with Yalduz ; this is highly improbable unless it refers to his initial acceptance of the regal insignia.

24. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 215-16 ; Minhaj, p. 170.

25. Minhaj, p. 171.

26. *Ibid*, p. 135, 143 and 171. Yalduz's *wazir* who occupied Lahore on this occasion was assassinated at Ghazni just before the Khwarizmi troops took the city in 612/1215.

27. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 230b. *Ferishta*, i, p. 65, states that he even marched towards Thaneshwar.

28. Minhaj, p. 135 ; *Tajul Maasir*, f. 238a, states that the battle was fought at Samana. Yalduz, wounded in the battle, was taken captive and died a prisoner at Budaun.

29. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 241b. *Ferishta* adds that Qubachah tried to occupy Sirhind which finally brought Iltutmish against him ; i, p. 315.

30. Minhaj, p. 171 ; *Tajul Maasir*, f. 245. *Cf. TA*, i, p. 58-9.

31. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 248a. His eldest son Nasiruddin Mahmud, was placed in charge.

32. *Juwaini*, ii, p. 145.

33. *Ibid*, p. 147. For its identification see Cunningham: *Reports*, xiv p. 46-47.

34. After Mahmud's transfer to Hansi, no governor is mentioned as having been appointed to Lahore till 1228. When a Mongol force pursued Mangbarni in 621/1224, it is said to have plundered the Lahore province ; *Juwaini*, ii, p. 112.

35. Minhaj seems to be evasive in mentioning the incident. On page 293 of Raverty's translation, he states that Iltutmish sent a force against Mangbarni ; but on p. 171, text, he says Iltutmish himself led an army against the "Khwarizmshahi trouble which had reached Lahore". This latter statement is copied by Haji Dabir, ii, p. 691.

36. Nessawi, p. 88, however, states that Iltutmish even helped Qubachah with troops, which is highly improbable. Minhaj merely adds that on Iltutmish's approach Mangbarni turned aside.

37. See Chapter IX, *infra*.

38. *Tuhfatul Kiram*, f. 262b. mentions the names of seven "ranas" as paying tribute to Qubachah. Among them, from their names, two appear to have belonged to the Rathor and Solanki Rajputs.

39. A governor was appointed over Bhatinda some time before 1227 ;

Minhaj, p. 232. He is stated to have encroached on Qubachah's territory and occupied Wanjrut (Vijnot in Bahawalpur state) 'in the Multan province?', Raverty : *op. cit.* p. 723 ; The printed text has Gujrat for Wanjrut ; see also *IA*, 1882, p. 1-9.

40. Minhaj, p. 236.

41. Minhaj gives conflicting dates for the event ; p. 114, 624/1227 ; pp. 172 and 236, 625/1228; Nuruddin Auli, the author of the *Jawamiul Hikayat* who was living with Qubachah at this time, confirms the last-mentioned date; f. 3a. See also Haji Dabir, ii, p. 696. *Cf. Ferishta*, I, p. 65, and *TA*, ii, p. 317; also. *Tarikh-i-Masumi*, f. 31a.

42. Minhaj, p. 144.

43. *Ibid*, p. 173 ; see also *TA*, i, p. 57.

44. *Tajul Maasir*, in Elliot, ii, p. 242 ; Minhaj, p. 144.

45. *Ibid*, p. 173 ; Auli : *op. cit.* f. 4a. He died on the 19th *Jamadi II*, 625/May 26th, 1228.

46. Minhaj, p. 173 ; the Sind histories do not mention the event. See Raverty : *op. cit.* p. 615, note ; also Elliot, i, p. 485.

47. *Tajul Maasir* in Elliot, ii, p. 242.

48. Nessawi, p. 92. Baniyan is almost always mentioned with Ghazni and Karman and the "country of the Indus"; Minhaj, pp. 238 and 392; also Raverty, *op. cit.* p. 530, note 7.

49. Sialkot and Hajner are listed in his conquest ; Minhaj, p. 179. For location of Hajner (written Janjer in the text) see chapter IX *infra*. Jullundur is mentioned on p. 210, for the first time.

50. Minhaj, p. 179, where it is included in Iltutmish's conquests; it is called Nardin by Utbi : *Tarikh-i-Yamini*, p. 260 ; For some years the later Hindu-sahiya kings made it their capital. For its location see Raverty : *op. cit.* p. 534, note i; *IGI*, xviii, p. 349 ; also Nazim, p. 91.

51. Minhaj, p. 253.

52. *Ibid*, p. 176 ; *Cf.* Haji Dabir ii, p. 699, who thought that it was directed against Khurasan. See also Chapter IX.

53. Minhaj, p. 160.

54. Ali Mardan, appointed by Aibak soon after his return from Ghazni, is known to have ruled for two years which, counting from before 607 (the year of Aibak's death) would bring us to a little after 608/1211 or 1212. *Cf.* on this point *JASB* (N. S.) iv, p. 154

55. Minhaj, p. 161, His earliest coin is dated 616/1219 ; *JRAS* (N. S.) vi, p. 352.

56. For a description see Abid Ali Khan : *Memoirs of Gour and Punduah*, p. 13 and note 1.

57. *Cf.* Wright, p. 15-16. nos. 49F, 49 H to 49 J, who ascribes one gold and a few silver pieces of Iltutmish to the Bengal mint and thus seems to support Thomas, *JRAS*, vi, p. 348, who held that during these years Iwaz must have acknowledged Iltutmish's suzerainty. The ascription, however, is doubtful ; the word can also be read as Nagaur as is found in one of his 608 issues: Thomas: *Chronicles*, p. 78, no. 59. For Bengal, the word Gour did not come into use until much later; in the chronicles, as well as in the coins, it is always referred to as

Lakhnauti. The first undoubted mention of the Bengal mint is found on a *Tankah* of Raziyah which bears the name of Lakhnauti; Thomas : *Chronicles*, p. 107 no. 90. No other coin is known to bear Gour as a mint name. Besides, it is improbable that Iwaz should have acknowledged Iltutmish when the latter was hardly secure on the throne, and then, as is proved by his coins, to have declared his independence just when the Delhi monarch, freed from all other dangers, was known to be strong enough to enforce his suzerainty.

58. Minhaj, p. 163.

59. For their history, see *JASB*, (N. S.) xi, pp. 406-8; Cunningham : *Reports*, xvi, p. 159.

60. *JASB*, 1898, pp. 317-327 ; 1903, p. 109 ; *EI*, xiii, p. 150; *JRAS*, 1915, p. 505-6.

61. Two grants of Kesava and Viswarupa, successors of Lakhsmanasena, refer to their successful fight with the 'Garga Javanas'; *JASB*, 1896, pp. 9-15; (N. S.) x, pp. 99-104.

62. Barua : *Early history of Kamrup*, p. 224, states that in 1227 Iwaz advanced along the Brahmaputra upto Gauhati whence he was repulsed with heavy losses. This seems to be based on the inadequate evidence of some of his 621 coins found in Gauhati, See also Bhattacharya : *Mughal Northeast Frontier policy*, p. 55. note, and Gait : *History of Assam*, 37.

63. For the use of this route see Minhaj, p. 159.

64. *Ibid*, p. 163 ; Hasan Nizami also seems to refer to this event : Elliot, ii, p. 241.

65. Minhaj, p. 163, 171 : *Alfi*, however, states that the agreement followed a severe engagement ; f. 615. Cf. Salim : *Riyazul-Salatin*, p. 72.

66. Minhaj, p. 189.

67. *Ibid*, p. 164.

68. Minhaj, p. 181.

69. *Ibid*, p. 163. He is called Ikhtiyaruddin Balka, but on p. 174, he is simply called Balka Malik Khalji. In the list of Iltutmish's maliks one 'Daulat Shah Khalji, malik of Lakhnauti, is mentioned but no Balka; it is unlikely that the rebel would be listed here. Raverty increases the confusion, for he found in two old Mss. of the *Tabaqat*, Ikhtiyaruddin Daulat Shah Balka b. Husamuddin Iwaz, Khalji; others mention one Iran Shah Balka Khalji. It seems we are dealing with two persons here and Daulat Shah, and not Balka, is to be identified with Daulat Shah of Thomas' coin. For this suggestion I am indebted to my former pupil Abdul Majid Khan, now a colleague.

70. *JRAS*, (N. S.) vi. p. 362, no. 2; also Wright p. 21, no. 53 A. It has many peculiarities; Iltutmish is given the *Kunyah* of Abdul Fath, whereas all his other coins bear only Abul Muzaffar. Daulat Shah calls himself Shahanshah, unusual for one who acknowledges a suzerain. Cf. however, *DHB*, ii, p. 44, where Balka Khalji is identified with Daulat Shah b. Moudud of Thomas' Coin.

71. See on this point *JASB* (N. S.) iv, p. 154.

72. Minhaj, p. 174. This date is also, like that on the Daulat Shah Coin, doubtful, for Raverty found 628 in some of the older manuscripts; Haji Dabir, ii, p. 698, however, has 627.

73. Minhaj, pp. 231 & 242. Malik Alauddin Jani was appointed to

Lakhnauti while Bihar was placed under Malik Saifuddin Aibak.

74. Cunningham : *Reports*, xxi, pp. 49-52.

75. *Gwalior Namah*, f. 10. See also Cunningham : *Reports*, ii, pp. 378-81.

76. Cunningham : *Reports*, II, p. 315; *Coins of Medieval India*, p. 80-90.
Ojha : *Rajputana*, i, p. 166. *IA*, 1918, p. 241.

77. *IA*, xvi, p. 86. Vallanadeva must be identical with Vallanadeva of the *Hammina maha-kavya*, the son of Govindaraja ; *IA*, 1879, p. 62. The latter, a grandson of Prithviraja of Ajmer, is said to have founded the independence of Ranthambhor principality by the force of his own arms.

78. Thomas : *Chronicles*, p. 70 ; also Cunningham : *Coins of Medieval India*, p. 92. Both however, ascribe it to another Chaharadeva, of Narwar who, in reality, was not a Chauhana and appears later in history. The peculiar Chauhana device of the 'bull and horsemen' and the word *Asawari* on the coin, connect it, at any rate, with the Chaharadeva of the inscription which, although undated, is paleographically ascribed to this period and to this prince ; *EI*, xii, p. 223-24. Chaharadeva, however, does not appear in the list of the *Hammina-maha-kavya*.

79. *EI*, ix p. 72-73.

80. Cunningham : *Reports*, xx, p. 10-11.

81. Minhaj, Raverty's *trans* p. 627.

82. Minhaj, p. 172; the text has Ratanpur, but see Raverty, *trans*, p. 610. Cf. the *Hammina-maha-kavya* in which the event is related differently. The young prince Viranarayana, on his way to wed the Kachwaha princess of Gwalior, was attacked by the forces of 'Jalaluddin, ruler of Joginipur', but the battle proving indecisive, the latter, by promises of reward and friendship, persuaded the prince to visit Delhi where he was perfidiously murdered. His minister, Bhagavata, thereupon retired to Malwah and the fort of Ranthambhor was consequently occupied by Jalaluddin's forces without opposition. Although Jalaluddin is known to have been one of Raziah's official names, in whose reign the fortress was reoccupied by the Chauhanas, yet the account of its capture must refer to Iltutmish's expedition. Bhagavata later recovered the fortress and founded the dynasty whose representative was Ham-mira, for whom the account was admittedly written ; *IA*, 1879, p. 63.

83. Minhaj, p. 182 ; *Tajul Maasir* : Elliot, ii, p. 241, also mentions Mandor.

84. *Tajul Maasir*. f. 200a. Minhaj includes Jalor among Iltutmish's conquests ; p. 179. Cf. *HCIP*, v, p. 88 for the statement that even after Udaisinha's submission to Iltutmish which is placed between 1211 and 1216, the Chauhana prince joined the army of the Baghela king Viradhavala of Gujrat in repulsing Iltutmish when the latter led an expedition thither a few years later.

85. In his inscriptions Udaisinha makes no mention of his conflict with the Turks. His earliest record is dated in 1205 ; *EI*, xii, p. 53.

86. Ojha : *Rajputana*, i, p. 272 ; *IA*, 1928, p. 55. In this expedition Viradhavala of Gujrat is reported to have sent an army to help Jaitra Sinha. This may have occasioned Iltutmish's subsequent expedition to Gujrat.

87. Ojha : *Rajputana*, ii, p. 462.


88. These places are listed in Iltutmish's conquests; Minhaj, p. 179. At Kaman, near Thangir, he built the mosque now known as the Chausat Khamba; see Cunningham : *Reports*, xx, pp. 11 and 56.
89. Minhaj, p. 236.
90. *Ibid*, p. 176.
91. Minhaj, p. 176.
92. Ojha : *Rajputana*, i, p. 201-2.
93. Minhaj, p. 175. Cf. *Gwalior Namah*, f. 11.
94. Minhaj, p. 240.
95. Cunningham : *Reports*, xxi, p. 104; Raverty : *op. cit.* p. 824, note, identified it with Damoh in the Central Provinces, but it is too far off towards the south.
96. *EI*, vii, p. 223-24; Cunningham : *Coins of Medieval India*, p. 91. In both the papers, however, this Chahir Ajari is confused with Naharadeva of Ranthambhor against whom Tayasai's expedition is accordingly stated to have been directed. Chahir Ajari is never mentioned by Minhaj along with Ranthambhor whose Rana is consistently named Nahar Deo; e.g., p. 292, Raverty's translation, p. 818. Cf. on this point, *IA*, 1918, p. 242-43.
97. Minhaj, p. 179. Iltutmish issued a commemorative coin from the 'kharaj' of Kanauj; Wright, no. 52 and p. 71-72.
98. His inscription is ascribed to a period from the end of the 12th century to the beginning of the 13th century; *EI*, i, pp. 61-62. A *Maha samanta* Bharahadeva of the Rashtrakuta line is known to have been ruling some where in the country of *Kanyakubjadesa*; *HCIP*, v, p. 50-51.
99. Minhaj, p. 170. Cf. Barua : *op. cit.* p. 224, and *CHI*, iii, p. 54, wherein this Bartu has been identified with a legendary king of Assam who, it is attempted to prove thereby, opposed Bakhtiyar as well as Iwaz. This is untenable, for Bartu is mentioned only in connection with Awadh. See Ray : *Dynastic History*, i, p. 547, who, plausibly, suggests his connection with the Gahadavala family. 'Bartu' however, may be identified with 'Bharatapala', the great grandfather of the Chauhana prince Ahavamalla, whose minister Kanha was the patron of the Jaina poet Lakkhana, the author of the poetical work in Apabhramsa, *Anuvaya-rayana-paiu* written in 1256 at Raibha where Bharatapala had shifted his capital from Chandwer, near Firozabad in Agra district *HCIP*, v, p. 349-50.
100. Minhaj, p. 247. Notice may be taken in this context of a Sanskrit inscription on a brick found near Jaunpur, and dated V.S. 1273/A. D. 1217, in which certain Hindu bankers record the mortgage of some land. It refers to the current coin under the name of *Shabdoddika dramma* (Shahabuddin's dirhams?) *JASB*, xix, p. 454-6.
101. Minhaj, p. 179. The printed text also mentions Darbhanga as one of his conquests.
102. The date, as given by Minhaj, p. 176, is 20th *Shaban*, 633/30th April, 1236.
103. See *Ferishta*, i, p. 66-7, for his scrupulous performance of religious duties. He affected a great reverence for the *Sufis*; Minhaj, pp. 166-68. Barani, pp. 103-137, makes lengthy reference to his love and regard for those

derveshes who had renounced the world's material attractions. See *Fawadul Fawaid*, f. 65, for an illustration of how this religiosity helped in the fulfilment of his imperialistic schemes. See also, *Zikr-i-Jami-Aulia-i-Dehli*, f. 201a.

104. Minhaj, p. 174.

105. Barani. p. 63-64.





CHAPTER V

DYNASTIC TROUBLES AND REBELLIONS

1236-1265

Within six weeks of the festivities celebrating the Caliphial investiture, news arrived of the death of Iltutmish's crown prince, his eldest son Nasiruddin Mahmud.¹ It nearly stunned him, for all his dynastic plans seemed doomed to frustration. The Sultanate's initial difficulties were by no means over and it could ill-afford the hazards of a dynastic change, for a stable leadership was essential. But he could see no one among his surviving sons competent enough to be entrusted with his responsibilities. Firoz, the eldest among them, was lazy and irresponsible; others were too young. He could detect the necessary courage and alertness in only one of his children, his eldest daughter, Raziah, who, with the requisite training, might prove equal to the task. A queen-regnant was perhaps a novel experiment for India but not to his persianised compatriots whose racial and cultural traditions were familiar with female sovereigns. The *Shariah*, it is true, would take a great deal of ingenuous interpretation to countenance the idea, but Iltutmish could perhaps count on his docile ecclesiastics to overlook this departure from a law that was, in any case, continually being reinterpreted all these centuries.² The real opposition, he apprehended, was to come from his sons and their partisans in the court and in the services. A young woman, besides, was exposed to many dangers; to expect her to hold the crown

against the wishes of her courtiers and officers was foolish optimism. Iltutmish could, no doubt, force them to accept her heir-apparentship, but prudence suggested a more cautious approach. And a timely improvement in Firoz's character, may, after all, solve his problems.

In 625/1228, Firoz had been given his first appointment in Budaun. For the next few years Iltutmish experimented and kept his counsel. While he watched Firoz's conduct of public affairs, he also began to associate Raziah with the administration. A bolder step was to leave her in charge of the capital when, in 629/1231, he set out on the Gwalior expedition.³ The result must have been encouraging, for it decided the question for him. Firoz had not yet shown his worth and further postponement of the matter was injudicious. Immediately on his return he, therefore ordered a proclamation to be drafted appointing Raziah as his successor ; and in so doing, he gave his courtiers an opportunity to voice their opinion. Objection was raised, as he expected, not on legalistic grounds, but for the practical unwisdom of pitting a daughter against a grown up son and his ambitious mother.⁴ Their doubt as to her capacity to hold her own, was, however easily removed, for her talents were widely recognised. A wider publicity was given to her nomination by including her name in a new series of the silver *tankah*.⁵

It was a sound choice, but as time passed, to Iltutmish finality seemed difficult to attain. His incompetence notwithstanding, Firoz had the prodigal's winning grace ; his mother, Shah Turkan, was an adept intriguer and counted supporters among the state-officers. Whether the expected change had shown

itself in Firoz's character, or whether in the courtiers' talk Iltutmish was given cause to read more than mere well-meaning apprehension, the chronicler gives us no clue to ascertain. That Iltutmish was contemplating some concession to him is all that can be gathered from the statement that on his way back from his last expedition in 1236 he brought Firoz with him from Lahore whither he had lately been transferred as, 'since he was the eldest of his surviving sons, the people had their eyes on him'.⁶

Nothing however, is on record, to show that the earlier proclamation was rescinded ; the matter was evidently still unsettled when he died. As Iltutmish's last action concerned Firoz, he had an advantage over his sister. Shah Turkan was quick to act, and on the same night, she had her son crowned and proclaimed as Ruknuddin Firoz.⁷

His accession was technically a supersession of Raziah and was the work of the provincial officers, who had joined the late king on his last expedition. It seemed to have the approval of all the interests in the state with the singular exception of the common citizens of Delhi who do not appear to have taken the customary oath of allegiance. The omission would perhaps have been corrected in course of time, but immediately on the departure of the provincial officers, Firoz confirmed by his conduct, his father's misgivings. He commenced a life of gaiety and pleasure while power passed to his mother. She was a jealous woman and pitilessly persecuted her co-wives and their children. The treasury was emptied to cater for the Sultan's pleasures. This vicious, petticoat rule produced the inevitable reaction, and his own supporters now set about to make amends for their hasty action. Even

✓ the wazir Junaidi left the king to join the governors preparing to march against the capital. Firoz's younger brother, Ghiyasuddin, posted at Awadh, started the rebellion by seizing the Lakhnauti revenue on its way to Delhi and "sacking and plundering" several towns in Hindustan.⁸ Governors of Multan, Lahore, Hansi and Budaun all combined their forces and arrived at Mansurpur. Firoz marched out to oppose them, but his army officers revolted on the way, murdered his personal attendants and returned to the capital.⁹

There, with their acquiescence, events took a turn which was not at all expected by the governors moving on the city. Taking advantage of Firoz's absence, Raziah very cleverly exploited the general discontent against his mother's rule. Clad in a red garment customary for the aggrieved, she showed herself to the populace assembled for the Friday prayers and in the name of Iltutmish appealed for help against the machinations of Shah Turkan.¹⁰ This melodramatic gesture produced an intense feeling of loyalty to Iltutmish's memory and the crowd was seized with a great enthusiasm for giving effect to his proclamation. Isami tells us that she even entered into an agreement with the people : 'she was to be given a chance to prove her abilities and if she did not prove better than men, her head was to be struck off'.¹¹ The army officers lent their weight to the action and by the time Firoz arrived back in the city, Raziah's enthronement was complete and Shah Turkan had been thrown into prison. His own imprisonment and death, following soon after, terminated an inglorious reign of seven months.¹²

✓ In giving the crown to Raziah, the army officers

and the citizens apparently were carrying out Iltutmish's declared wish; but their action, in effect, negated the provincial governors' right, established in the case of Firoz, to have a predominant voice in the king's nomination. For, although Firoz's dethronement satisfied their immediate demand, yet they continued their hostile march towards Delhi. They refused to accept the *fait accompli* not, as their conduct showed, because of Raziah's legal incompetence, but because of the alleged irregularity of the whole procedure. As the highest counsellor of state the wazir also felt ignored and the revolt continued. They arrived and encamped in front of the city and commenced hostilities. Malik Tayasai, whom Raziah appointed to the governorship of Awadh and thus retained on her side, attempted to bring reinforcements but was captured by the insurgents and died in prison.¹³ Her military position was definitely weak but her Machiavellian diplomacy proved a great retriever. She came out of the city and tried to sow dissension among her opponents. Persuading Maliks Salari and Kabir Khan to join her secretly on the assurance that the wazir, Maliks Kochi and Jani were to be imprisoned, she spread the news of this secret compact among the latter who thereupon took fright and fled. They were closely pursued. Jani and Kochi were seized and slain and the wazir died a lonely fugitive in the Sirmur hills.¹⁴

This success stabilized her position, and she now proceeded to organise the government. The *wazarat* went to the *naib wazir*, Khwaja Muhazzabuddin; Saifuddin Aibak, and on his death shortly afterwards, Malik Hasan Ghorî, obtained the command of the army. As a reward for betraying his comrades, Kabir

Khan was given the governorship of Lahore. Malik Tughril-i-Tughan Khan had succeeded to the governorship of Bihar on the transfer of Saifuddin Aibak to Lakhnauti when Malik Jani was removed from that province towards the end of Iltutmish's reign. But on Malik Aibak's death after three years Tughan Khan forcibly siezed Lakhnauti and thus united the two provinces once again in open defiance of the Delhi authority, now rendered ineffective by the disturbances prevailing during Ruknuddin Firoz's reign. He however sent in his submission to Raziah and was raised to the status of a viceroy. Uch was placed under Hindu Khan while Budaun went to Malik Aetigin.¹⁵ In the words of the chronicler "from Debal to Lakhnauti all the *maliks* and *amirs* manifested their obedience and submitted".¹⁶

This recognition of her authority, as the sequel showed, concealed a latent opposition. The officers who had rebelled against Firoz were hardly prepared to submit tamely to a princess who was, after all, their own creation. She was herself aware of the dangerous power of her father's Turkish officers and slaves who monopolised all power in the state. The crown was vindicated when she overthrew the provincial chiefs and in the process arrested the growth of a dangerous constitutional precedent ; it was necessary now to follow it up by restoring the monarchy to its rightful position. For, a dynastic leadership could yield the best results, in the circumstances in which the Turks were placed; only when it commanded absolute power ; in the 13th century India, the monarch's firmness was the only justification for his existence. Courage and unflinching determination was to be her motto ; in strength of character

she was to prove herself "better than man". Details of her measures in this direction have not been recorded but it seems certain that by discarding female attire, and riding out in public and holding open court¹⁷ which her opponents later pretended to consider as scandalous conduct, she intended to emphasise the firmness and vigour of her rule. It is also reasonable to suppose that the 'favour' stated to have been shown to the Abyssinian 'master of the horse', Jamaluddin Yaqut, occurred about this time¹⁸ and was part of her plan to break the Turkish nobles' monopoly of all important offices. For, the *amir-i-akhur*, like the *amir-i-hajib*, carried great privilege and power and seems to have been always held by a Turk. Isami states that ever since Firoz's accession Yaqut had attached himself to Raziah's cause.¹⁹ The favour could thus mean only an increased dependence on his support to counter the '*maliks*'.

By the third year of her reign, in any event, the queen's real aim must have become abundantly clear ; the military aristocracy could read in her actions nothing but a challenge to their domination. It is little wonder therefore that a secret conspiracy became active among the '*amirs* and '*maliks*', stationed at the court and in the neighbouring provinces, with the object not only of deposing her but also of rendering the future sovereign permanently and constitutionally impotent.²⁰ At the head of this conspiracy stood Aetigin, lately governor of Budaun and now the *amir-i-hajib*, whose proximity to the queen was a great advantage ; he was bound by ties of great friendship with Malik Iltuniah, the superintendent of Bhatinda.²¹ But the execution of their plan seemed far more difficult than in the case of Firoz for she commanded

strong support in the city ; her vigilance left no scope for a palace revolution ; and a military siege of the capital stood no better chance of success now, than at the beginning of the reign. It was therefore essential to decoy her to a distant province and there to seize her by overwhelming military power or at any rate, to occupy the capital. Early in 1240 Kabir Khan revolted in Lahore. Direct evidence is lacking, but the coincidence of the subsequent events connects it with the conspirators' general plan. But the queen was prompt to take action. Immediately on receipt of the news she marched out with the available troops and thus forestalled their plan of assembling their forces there. Unaided, Kabir Khan could offer little resistance and was compelled to retreat westwards until at the Chinab, finding his progress barred by the Mongols operating across the river, he halted. As the queen's forces came up, he turned back and surrendered unconditionally.²²

Her energetic action thus foiled the conspirators' first move. Within a fortnight of her return, however, a second rebellion was reported from Bhatinda, where, Aetigin's friend, Iltuniah now staged an open revolt. Determined as she was to crush all opposition at the outset, she allowed herself no rest, but disregarding the heat and inconvenience of the month of *Ramzan*, set out immediately.²³ This time the conspirators seemed to have planned their moves carefully and on her arrival at Bhatinda, those in her retinue vented their wrath on Yaqut and murdered him. By a process nowhere recorded in detail but doubtless facilitated by the removal of one of her main supporters, they subsequently succeeded in seizing the queen and throwing her into prison.²⁴ With the royal forces now away

from Delhi, the citizens could put up little effective resistance to the conspirators who now proceeded to give effect to their political plan. Choice of the next king having already been made, on the receipt of the news of Raziah's capture, the partisans at Delhi raised Iltutmish's third son, Bahram, to the throne. He took the *Julus* name of Muizzuddin and, seated at the red palace, received the homage and felicitation of his supporters. Having arranged for Raziah's continued captivity at the Bhatinda fort under Iltuniah, the leaders of the conspiracy leisurely returned to Delhi to ratify Bahram's accession by formally taking the oath of allegiance.²⁵

Raziah's deposition was in effect a victory of the Turkish military aristocracy—the '*maliks* and *amirs*'. The elevation of Bahram to the throne, as it appears, was conditional on his agreeing to delegate to them all sovereign power; he was only to reign while the oligarchy ruled. This agreement was now given a concrete shape by the creation of a new office, the *naib-i-mamlakat* (deputy of the kingdom) to whom Bahram was made to delegate all his powers by a written proclamation. As the leader of the conspiracy Aetigin was appointed to the post and the wazir, Muhazzabuddin, also a party to the arrangement, occupied a secondary position.²⁶

Aetigin entered into his position with zest and even assumed some of the royal prerogatives, like keeping an elephant and playing the *naubat* at his gate. He also married one of the king's sisters. This flaunting of his privileged position soon made Bahram sick of the whole affair; he could not willingly submit to the encroachment on his prerogatives. Unable to swallow the *naib's* effrontery and seeking a

way out of the arrangement to which he had agreed, obviously, under compulsion, he had the *naib* murdered in his office.²⁷

Iltuniah had obviously been promised a large share in the spoils of the conspirators' victory; but the murder of his friend, Aetigin, destroyed his hopes; for the time being his party was disorganised. To rally it again with the same secrecy and on the same basis seemed to require longer time and greater opportunities than he could hope to possess. It is true, Bahram had permanently estranged his former supporters; two of them, Maliks Salari and Qaraqash, left his court and joined Iltuniah at Bhatinda.²⁸ But a better plan suggested itself. To marry the captive princess and then lay claim with armed force on her throne seemed to assure better returns and easier success. It suited Raziah also. In August of the same year, she accordingly married the former rebel and having adopted the regal insignia, they marched to occupy the capital by force.²⁹ Bahram's regular troops however, proved more than a match for their mercenary forces and sent them flying back to Bhatinda. On the way, near Kaithal, their troops deserted and on the 25th Rabi II, 638/13th December, 1240, while resting under a tree, they were both murdered by Hindu robbers.³⁰

Aetigin's fall was apparently a victory for the Sultan and no new *naib* was appointed. But the new *amir-i-hajib*, Badruddin Sunqar, now assumed dictatorial powers and even issued orders without the king's consent.³¹ The *wazir*, revengeful at being thus superseded, manoeuvred to destroy him and found in the Sultan a willing listener to false accusations against the *amir*. Apprehensive of his own safety and yet ignorant of the *wazir's* machinations, Sunqar tried with some

ecclesiastics of the city to conspire for Bahram's deposition. In one of his secret meetings he invited the *wazir* who took advantage of this chance of wreaking his vengeance, and so betrayed the whole conspiracy. Sunqar was consequently dismissed and banished to Budaun and on his return shortly after, 'without orders' was seized and put to death.³² His accomplices were also similarly punished.

Aetigin's assassination had terminated Bahram's agreement with the '*maliks*'; Sunqar's death now widened the breach still further. The ecclesiastics had also been alienated by the punishment given to some of their members; an indiscreet act on the part of Bahram, leading to the execution of the qazi of Mihir, made determined enemies of them.³³ The *wazir*, a most vile and vindictive man, now sought an opportunity to settle his own accounts with the Sultan. This came soon enough. In 639/1241, a Mongol force besieged Lahore and troops had to be sent out to relieve the city. The *wazir* was sent in their company, but as the army neared Lahore, he frightened the officers by disclosing a secret order purported to have been issued by the Sultan for their seizure and execution. Enraged at this treachery, the army revolted and at once prepared to march back to depose the tyrant. The *Sheikhul Islam*, whom Bahram now sent to allay their fears, was also a party to the plot and so fanned the flame of rebellion. The army accompanied by the *wazir* and the *Sheikhul Islam*, returned to besiege Delhi. It was denuded of troops but the citizens put up a stout defence. In the end, however, the *wazir's* partisans succeeded in raising an insurrection within the city in which, even Minhaj, the chief qazi and possibly a prominent supporter

of Bahram, was severely wounded. Next day the city fell to the rebels and Bahram was taken prisoner and executed.³⁴

In Bahram's fall the crown once again suffered a defeat. Masud, the very young son of Firoz, was raised to the throne with the name of Alauddin, precisely on the same conditions as his uncle. In the government that was formed however, a coalition with different parties is noticeable. For, the *naib's* office was given to Malik Qutbuddin Hasan, a refugee prince of Ghor, and as such outside the rank of the Shamsi slaves;³⁵ Malik Qaraqash Khan, received the *amir-i-hajib's* office, while Kashli Khan, one of the leaders of the anti-Bahram party, was given charge of the extensive province of Nagour, Mandor and Ajmer in Rajputana.³⁶ Minhaj-i-Siraj having resigned from office, the chief *qaziship* went to Imaduddin Shafurqani.³⁷ The entire government was, however, dominated by the *wazir*, the prime author of the last rebellion, and the Turkish *maliks* found their position being increasingly compromised. The *wazir* exercised all power and even assumed regal pretensions;³⁸ the *naib* became a mere figurehead. To secure his domination, he began to exclude the Turkish aristocracy from offices of state. This, however, they were in no mood to accept, and so saved their position by murdering the *wazir*.³⁹ Their power was now unfettered and a more submissive *wazir* was found in Najmuddin Abu Bakr. The coalition being already dissolved, Qaraqash Khan was made to relinquish the *amir-i-hajib's* office which was now given to one of their junior members, named Balban.⁴⁰

The last-mentioned appointment was destined to change the trend of the whole situation. Although

appointed as one of their nominees, Balban soon overshadowed his partymen, and by superior ability, appropriated all power. With the state administration in his control, he diverted the energy of the military aristocracy to campaigns against the Rajputs and the Mongols. For, he realised that absence of military action was largely responsible for the confusion which characterised the preceding reigns. It was this action which made for the comparative tranquility of Masud's reign and its continuance for four years. ✓

The circumstances of his deposition are not stated clearly ; but it is doubtful if the same forces were active on this occasion also. Minhaj's explanation is hardly convincing.⁴¹ His sudden removal , at a time when his forces had scored an important victory over the Mongols, and the quiet accession of his uncle Mahmud (Nasiruddin Mahmud), seem suspicious. The *maliks'* power had been greatly reduced and their party disorganised ; at any rate, we do not hear of a conditional election again. Balban's position and power continued undiminished in the next reign. These facts point to the probability that Masud's deposition resulted from personal ambitions and was a palace affair and that Balban, in league with Mahmud's mother, had a hand in it, a surmise which explains the chronicler's reluctance to give more details.

The new reign, which commenced on the 23rd Muharram, 644/10th June, 1246,⁴² did not affect the state's policy, now firmly in Balban's control. The latter further strengthened his position in 647/1249, by marrying his daughter to the young Sultan.⁴³ Masud's *naib-i-mamlakat* Qutbuddin Hasan, does not appear to have survived him, but the office was not filled until Balban got himself formally appointed to

it in 1249-50.⁴⁴ His younger brother Kashli Khan became the *amir-i-hajib*, while one of his cousins Sher Khan received the important governorship of Lahore and Bhatinda.⁴⁵ The submissive Abu Bakr continued as *wazir* and most probably became one of Balban's partisans. All the key positions being thus held by his men, Balban's domination in the government became unquestioned. To this was to be added the timid and retiring disposition of the king which made it easy for the naib to wield power, an advantage denied to Aetigin.

Because of his weak nature, Mahmud was however, easily persuaded. In 651/1253, under the influence of a party, consisting of the Indian Muslims and certain Turks opposed to Balban, led by a man named Imaduddin Rayhan, the king suddenly issued an order for the dismissal of Balban and his brother from their positions in the court. They were directed to leave Delhi and proceed to their respective assignments (*iqta*).⁴⁶ A new government was formed in which the *wakil-i-dar*, Imaduddin Rayhan, became the *de facto* head, the *wazir* Abu Bakr, possibly because of his leanings to Balban, being replaced by a man named Junaidi. Sher Khan was forced to leave Bhatinda and Multan which were placed under Arslan Khan, a leading member of the new faction; even Minhaj was relieved from office and Shamsuddin, one of Rayhan's nominees, became the chief *qazi*.⁴⁷

Rayhan thus tried to fill all the important offices with his own men and the Turkish element in the state administration was sought to be overshadowed. Political realism demanded of Balban a willing association with this non-Turkish administration, for the situation had vastly changed since the days when Il-

Iltutmish could effectively insist on keeping out native Muslims. But as in the case of Muhazzabuddin's action a decade earlier, the rule of the "upstart Hindi eunuch" was intolerable to the Turks. Disgust ripened into opposition and soon, under the leadership of Balban, into armed action. The majority of the Turkish officers, posted in the province round the capital, joined their forces and in *Ramzan*, 652/1254, marched towards the city to impose their will on the king. Mahmud thereupon was persuaded to set out with the royal troops to oppose them and encamped near Samana, facing the insurgent nobles. Armed engagement seemed imminent and Rayhan endeavoured his best to bring it about. But Mahmud lost heart and eagerly responded to proposals for compromise. Balban's party offered to submit on condition of Rayhan's dismissal. The latter was accordingly transferred to the province of Budaun and thence shortly afterwards to Bahraich. Balban was re-appointed *naib* while his kinsmen and supporters were all reinstated. Minhaj and Abu Bakr both received their posts back.⁴⁸

This brief interruption however, did not affect the governmental policy. A greater emphasis was, instead, laid on the authority of the central government which emerged secure from the struggle, for, by siding, at the end, with the insurgent Turks, the crown assured itself of their unflinching support. Mahmud's reign guaranteed the rule of the Turkish nobility. ✓

Political changes in the capital were bound to affect the hold on the outlying provinces where distance offered a constant temptation to ambitious men to make a bid for independence. The Sultanate had scarcely been integrated into a political unity when Iltutmish's death opened the way to disruption. ✓

This is best illustrated in the history of Lakhnauti.

It was after two expeditions, conducted within a period of eight years, that the Khalji chiefs could be made to acknowledge his authority. To curtail the governor's power he found it necessary to separate the province from Bihar. But the arrangement lasted only till his death. Tughan Khan maintained a show of allegiance to Raziah and Bahram, but his actions showed little subordination. Having quarrelled with the governor of Lakhnauti—probably a separate military division—and occupied it,⁴⁹ towards the end of Bahram's reign he reannexed Bihar.⁵⁰ Early in the next reign he led a conquering expedition to the provinces of Karah, Manikpur, Awadh and even to the districts further north.⁵¹ This was a clear challenge to the central government, for, in Awadh he sought to dispossess the king's representative. Masud's government however, was powerless to intervene, and the governor of Awadh, Tamur Khan, it appears, could summon little armed assistance in defending his charge. Tughan Khan approached the city and was preparing to install himself there when the much-respected Minhaj, then on his way to Lakhnauti, succeeded in persuading him to withdraw.

He was destined to pay dearly for this unauthorised aggression, for Balban's cunning proved as effective as military sanction. Tughan had recently suffered a defeat from the Hindu forces of Jajnagar (Orissa) with whom he had, for sometime past, been carrying on hostilities; the latter now threatened to carry the war into Lakhnauti itself. Unable to meet this threatened invasion singlehanded, he was compelled to appeal to Delhi for aid and Balban

quickly responded. He was ostensibly confirmed in his post and the Awadh governor, Tamur Khan, was detailed to proceed with his forces to his assistance. Tamur Khan's real mission, however, was kept secret; it transpired only when his troops arrived and encamped opposite Lakhnauti. The Hindu forces having in the meantime retired, Tamur Khan picked up a quarrel with Tughan and soon turned it into armed conflict. The latter did his best to defend himself from within the city against what was clearly a siege. At the end, however, he found himself obliged to negotiate and make the province over to Tamur Khan. Delhi's object was thus achieved. Tughan was later compensated with the vacant province of Awadh. By a curious coincidence which evoked some comment, both Tughan and Tamur Khan died at their posts at exactly the same time in 644/1246.⁵²

Lakhnauti's history for the next few years is far from clear. Tamur Khan's immediate successor is not mentioned in the chronicle.⁵³ Yuzbak-i-Tughril Khan, who is next mentioned as having been appointed over Lakhnauti, is known to have previously held Kanouj in succession to prince Jalaluddin; the latter was transferred thither in 646/1248 from Sambhal and Budaun.⁵⁴ Yuzbak subsequently held Awadh from where he came to take charge of Lakhnauti. An inscription at Gangarampur in Dinajpur district, dated 647/1249, however, testifies to the viceroyalty of Jalaluddin Masud Shah Jani who presumably succeeded Tamur Khan.⁵⁵ When Masud's rule terminated cannot be ascertained with precision, but a coin minted at Lakhnauti in the name of Nasiruddin Mahmud and Yuzbak (Yuzbak-i-Tughril Khan) bears a date which cannot be anterior to 650/1252.⁵⁶

Yuzbak soon imbibed Tughan's spirit and tried to follow his example. Following a successful expedition into Jajnagar, he led his troops to Awadh, occupied the city for two weeks and had the Khutba read in his name.⁵⁷ A reported approach of the royal forces from Delhi, however, compelled him to effect a hurried retreat. But he had greater ambitions to fulfil. Taking advantage of the central government's pre-occupations with the rebellions following Rayhan's dismissal, Yuzbak declared his independence, assumed the regal title of Sultan Mughisuddin and struck coins in his name.⁵⁸ The earliest of his coins with the sovereign titles is dated 653/1255.⁵⁹ He does not appear to have reigned long. In a rash expedition which he led for the conquest and occupation of Kamrup, he was taken prisoner by the Hindu forces and executed.⁶⁰ His death must have occurred shortly before 655/1257, for in that year a coin minted at Lakhnauti was issued solely in the name of Mahmud,⁶¹ a clear proof of the restoration of his authority. The next viceroy-designate was Masud Jani whose appointment is chronicled under the year 656/1258,⁶² but he does not appear to have assumed office on this occasion; for, early next year we hear of the despatch from Lakhnauti of a number of elephants by Izzuddin Balban-i-Yuzbaki—possibly one of Yuzbak retainers and the author of the 655 coin mentioned above—who was thereupon confirmed in the *iqta* of Lakhnauti.⁶³ That, on Yuzbak's submission, Masud Jani's appointment was cancelled appears to be the only possible inference. Yuzbaki, however, could not rule for long.

Towards the end of 657/1259 or early in 658/1260, Arslan Khan, the governor of Karrah, suddenly advanced on Lakhnauti and taking advantage of

Yuzbaki's absence on a raid in East Bengal, forcibly seized the capital.⁶⁴ Yuzbaki hurriedly returned but only to be defeated and slain. This unauthorised occupation, in the tradition of Tughan and Yuzbak, was an open defiance, but Mahmud's government at the moment had too many anxieties to be able to take immediate action. Arslan was still ruling in Lakhnauti as a rebel when Minhaj closed his account (end of 1260). From the absence of coins in his name he does not appear to have assumed full sovereignty although he is stated to have never acknowledged Mahmud's authority.⁶⁵ An inscription at Barahdari, Bihar Sharif, dated in 665/1266-67 recording the erection of the tomb of a person named Sultan Shah—possibly an allusion to Arslan Khan himself who died in 18th *Jamadi I* 663/1264⁶⁵—under the orders of his son and successor Tatar Khan, fixes approximately the termination of his rule.⁶⁶

Unlike Bengal, provinces nearer the capital had a comparatively peaceful history. Their proximity however made them more susceptible to events affecting the central government. The rebellions against Firoz, Raziah and Bahram, as described above, gathered momentum in Awadh and the Doab ; aggressions from the semi-autonomous governors of Lakhnauti seemed a recurring feature. The Ganges-Jumuna area being the heart of the Delhi kingdom, problems of its control demanded precedence over all others. With Balban's appointment, continuity of policy and action was assured and Delhi came closer to these provinces than ever before. The almost annual expeditions undertaken by Balban in 'Hindustan' prevented the growth of any rebellious tendency. ✓

From the end of Bahram's reign, the Mongols

proved a far more serious distraction and, as in the days of Iltutmish, Delhi's attention was perforce divided. By 653/1255 they menacingly advanced to complicate the situation in the Punjab and Sind. While Mahmud's government mobilised all its resources to meet them, potential rebels in Awadh found an opportunity to gather strength. The Sultan's step-father, Qutlugh Khan, who held the province, belonged to the anti-Turkish faction which caused Balban's temporary dismissal.⁶⁷ After Rayhan's removal from office Qutlugh became his closest ally and from the adjoining provinces of Awadh and Bahraich they proceeded to negative Mahmud's authority. Assured of their seditious designs Balban decided to remove Rayhan from office and sent Sanjar Sihwistani to take over Bahraich. Qutlugh came to his friend's help, intercepted Sanjar and eventually seized him. The latter, however, managed to escape and, collecting a small force, crossed the Saraju, gave battle to Rayhan and finally slew him.⁶⁸ Shortly afterwards Qutlugh was ordered to take over Bahraich and leave Awadh. He refused to comply and openly revolted; he even succeeded in repelling a force sent to coerce him and killed one of the generals.⁶⁹ Awadh thus threatened to be cut off from Delhi. Balban now personally took the field, whereupon the rebel sought safety in flight to the Himalayan foothills. Balban marched in pursuit but on failing to trace him consoled himself by plundering the neighbouring Hindu tribes and rajas suspected of harbouring the rebel.⁷⁰ Immediately on Balban's withdrawal, early in 654/1256 Qutlugh emerged from his retreat, reoccupied Awadh and even sought to annex Karra and Manikpur.⁷¹ Arslan Khan, who then held the province, however,

succeeded in expelling him and Qutlugh once again retired to seek shelter with the chief of Santurgarh in the Sirmur hills.⁷² The Rana, whom Minhaj calls Ranpal, refused to give him up and Balban was obliged, in 655/1257, to plunder his territory as far as his capital. But the rebel continued to elude capture and lived to aim, as will appear presently, a far more serious blow at Delhi.

In the western province of the Punjab and Sind the central government's authority was equally at a disadvantage, not only because of the distance but also because of the continued Mongol pressure. Mangbarni had failed to organise any effective resistance in Persia and Iraq. The Mongols never caught him, but his gallant stand against terrible odds did no more than outline a singularly heroic character. Ghazni became a Mongol dependency even before his death. The accession of Uktae Khan to the Mongol Khanate was marked by a decision to gradually annex, in the first instance, all the territories upto the Indus and then to extend the operations to the Indian provinces.⁷³ By the end of Raziah's reign the Mongols had reached the Chinab and the governors of the western provinces were hard put to maintain a single-handed resistance; Delhi's failure to send assistance left them little alternative but to evacuate the territory or submit to the invaders. In 639/1241 occurred the first organised attack on Lahore. The local governor appealed for reinforcement but the wazir's intrigues turned the royal army back to the capital. The governor was therefore obliged to flee the besieged city which fell the next morning.⁷⁴ Although the Mongols withdrew shortly afterwards and Lahore was re-occupied, the province henceforth became "the frontier"

where ambitious governors soon found good scope for self-assertion.

Immediately after Masud's accession Kabir Khan, the governor of Multan, rebelled and not only assumed full sovereignty but also forcibly occupied the neighbouring province of Uch.⁷⁵ Delhi was powerless to dispossess him and even suffered his son Abu Bakr to succeed him in 639/1241.⁷⁶ Even Abu Bakr's death shortly afterwards did not improve matters for Delhi, for Hasan Qarlugh, after repeated attempts, now succeeded in installing himself in Multan.⁷⁷ A second Mongol invasion in 1245, however, gave Delhi an opportunity to reassert its authority. On the approach of the Mongols Hasan Qarlugh evacuated Multan and fled to lower Sind; Kabir Khan's descendants,⁷⁸ who held Uch, found themselves powerless to oppose the invaders and urgently appealed to Delhi for help, thus giving a tacit recognition to Mahmud's sovereignty. Balban immediately responded and marched with a strong force, whereupon the Mongols withdrew.⁷⁹ The event thus enabled Delhi to recover control over Sind. Multan was placed under Kashlu Khan while Uch was temporarily left with Kabir Khan's family.⁸⁰ Kashlu Khan was allowed to annex Uch on the understanding that he should relinquish Nagor which he formerly held; the condition however, had to be enforced at the point of sword.⁸¹ In 1249 Hasan Qarlugh returned from lower Sind and renewing his attacks on Multan forced Kashlu Khan to surrender the city. But Qarlugh was not destined to retain possession, for Multan was soon after recovered by Sher Khan, the governor of Bhatinda.⁸² Probably under instructions from Balban, he not only refused to restore

it to Kashlu Khan, but in 649/1251, even dispossessed him of Uch as well.⁸³

Kashlu Khan was compensated with the governorship of Budaun but he nursed a grievance and secretly allied himself with the anti-Balbani faction. As the first step towards Balban's dismissal, with Rayhan and Qutlugh he persuaded Mahmud to dispossess Sher Khan. This appears to have been the motive behind the expedition towards "Uch and Multan" in 650/1252 in which the leading members of the faction were specially instructed to be present with their forces.⁸⁴ Balban was formally dismissed during this expedition, from the camp on the Beas, early in 651/1253. Finding his enemies in power Sher Khan left Sind and retired to Turkestan; the provinces of Uch, Multan and Bhatinda were recovered from his retainers and placed, for the time being, under Arslan Khan, who appears to have ultimately joined Qutlugh's party.⁸⁵ On Rayhan's eventual dismissal and transference to Awadh, Kashlu Khan was restored to his former provinces of Multan and Uch shortly after 653/1255.⁸⁶ Firmly installed there, he now threw off his mask of loyalty and transferred his allegiance to Hulaku, the newly appointed Mongol viceroy of Iran, and even received a Mongol agent.⁸⁷ By this treachery he made a present of the whole of Sind to the Mongols. Mahmud's government was hardly in a position to attempt its recovery, for a direct hostility with the dreaded Mongols was beyond its resources.

Thus secure under Mongol tutelage, Kashlu remembered his old enmity to Balban and planned revenge. Early in 655/1257 he marched his troops along the Beas to the Himalayan foothills in order to effect a junction with Qutlugh Khan, his old friend

and ally whom Balban had failed to trace in the Sirmur hills. They met and their joint army marched towards Delhi.⁸⁸ The threat was serious and required great resourcefulness to meet it. Balban equipped a powerful force and moved out to meet them near Samana. As the two forces prepared for engagement a party of Delhi ecclesiastics sent a secret invitation to Kashlu Khan promising to deliver the city. The news somehow leaked out and reached Balban who immediately instructed the Sultan at Delhi to banish all the conspirators. Unaware of this turn of events and expecting an easy entrance, Kashlu avoided a frontal battle and eluding Balban's forces managed to reach Delhi. There he learnt that his partisans had been expelled and that the citizens were determined to put up a strong defence. It is not known what happened to Qutlugh, for he is not mentioned again, but Kashlu Khan is stated to have given up the project and retired to Uch.⁸⁹ Shortly afterwards he paid a visit to Hulaku in Iraq,⁹⁰ the object being probably to induce him to lend armed assistance for occupation of Delhi. In any case, a Mongol army under Sali Bahadur came towards the end of 655/1257 to take up quarters in Sind.⁹¹ The Mongols however, did not invade Delhi territory; the preparations set on foot by Balban early in 656/1258 culminated only in a military parade outside the city.

When and in what manner Kashlu Khan's rebellion was terminated can never be known satisfactorily, for Minhaj's account closes abruptly. Isami speaks of an expedition to Multan led by Balban against Kashlu Khan (called by his nickname of *Balban-i-zar*) some years after 656/1258 which seems to throw some light on the problem. On the approach of the Delhi

forces Kashlu left his son Muhammad in Multan and himself retired to the Punjab to 'bring that country under his control'. The people of Multan surrendered to Balban whereupon Muhammad fled and joined his father. The latter realised his own weakness and withdrawing from the Punjab took up his quarters in Baniyan. From there he is reported to have twice attempted the recovery of Multan with Mongol assistance.⁹² The proceedings of Sali Bahadur in Sind are equally obscure ; it seems likely that Balban's diplomacy succeeded in effecting a kind of non-aggression pact with Hulaku and that the recovery of Sind was more the result of mutual agreement than military action.⁹³ In any case, when the curtain is again lifted by Barani after six years, we find Balban conferring the Sind viceroyalty, a few years after his accession, on his eldest son and no reference is made to its recent recovery from the Mongols.

NOTES

1. He was buried in the mauseoleum now known as Sultan Ghari, in the village of Malikpur near old Delhi. The inscription recording the erection of the building is dated in 629/1231-32 ; *EIM*, 1909-10, p. 70.

2. For an exhaustive discussion of this question *vis-a-vis* Raziah, see Habiullah : *Sultana Raziah*, in *IHQ*, 1940, pp. 750-772.

3. Ferishta, i, p. 68. See also Isami, p. 126. Iltutmish entrusted her with the Royal seal.

4. Minhaj, p. 185-6.

5. *JASB*, 1896, p. 218, no. 30. Wright, p. 40. no. 161 A, however, ascribes the issue to Raziah herself, and on the evidence of a better preserved specimen, dates it in 625/1237.

6. Minhaj, p. 182.

7. *Idem*. The text has Tuesday, 29th *Shaban*, but this is clearly wrong as Tuesday fell on the 28th. A second version, noted in the footnote, has 'night of the 21st Tuesday'; this accords with Raverty's Mss.

8. *Ibid*, p. 183.

9. Minhaj, p. 183 ; Haji Dabir, ii. p. 708, *Cf. TM*, p. 22-23.

10. Ibn Battuta : *Kitabur Rahlah*, ii, p. 25-26.

11. *Futuhus-Sulatin*, p. 127.

12. Minhaj, p. 184. His coins are dated in 633 and 634 A.H. His reign lasted from 21 *Shaban*, 633, to 11 *Rabi I*, 634/30th April. 1236-13th December, 1236 A. D.
13. *Ibid*, p. 186.
14. Minhaj, p. 185-86, Cf. Raverty, p. 640-41, and note ; the passage describing Raziah's tactics has been wrongly translated.
15. *Ibid*, pp. 197, 249, 253 and 293.
16. *Ibid*. p. 187.
17. Minhaj, p. 188. Isami, p. 129, makes it clear these changes occurred towards the end of her reign. Yahya Sirhindi : *TM*, p. 26, seems to suggest that she was unanimously advised to adopt these manners.
18. Minhaj *idem*, does not date this event but mentions it along with those that happened before 635/1237; Isami p. 129, implies that Yaqut was only confirmed in his post which he held from her father's time ; *TM*, p. 26, however, clearly states that Raziah first appointed him to this post. There is little authority for Ferishta's statement that he was promoted to the rank of *Amirul-Umara* ; i, p. 68.
19. p. 129.
20. All the Turkis , Ghori and Tajik officers were in the conspiracy; see p. 253.
21. Minhaj, p. 188 and 251.
22. *Ibid*, p. 188 ; on p. 235, it is dated 635.
23. She returned on the 19th *Shaban* and started again for Bhatinda, on the 9th *Ramazan*/ 4th April 1240 ; *Ibid*, p. 188. Minhaj adds that some of the amirs at the court were secretly in league with Iltuniah
24. Minhaj, p. 188-89.
25. *Ibid*, p. 189, and 191. Bahram's accession took place on the 27th, *Ramzan* 637/22 April 1240, 18 days after Raziah set out on the Bhatinda expedition. The ceremony of taking the general oath of allegiance took place, after the maliks' return from Bhatinda, on 11th *Shawwal*.
26. Minhaj, p. 191-92 and p. 253. The delegation of power was to be at least for one year, because "of the king's youth".
27. *Ibid*, p. 192, and pp. 253-54. The *wazir* was also attacked on this occasion but he escaped.
28. Minhaj, p. 190.
29. *Ibid*, p. 190 and 253. See also Haji Dabir, ii, p. 704.
30. Minhaj, p. 190 and p. 192; on p. 252, however, he states that Raziah was captured near Kaithal and Iltuniah near Mansurpur and both attained martyrdom the next day, 25th *Rabi I*, 638. The former version, that they were murdered by the Hindus, is supported by Ferishta, i, p. 68, *TA*, i, p. 68, and the *Mirat-i-Jahan* Numa, f. 53. The *TM*, p. 29, states that they were taken prisoner and sent to Delhi where they were put to death under Bahram's orders. It is hardly necessary to refer to Raziah's alleged moral lapse, for the story no longer finds place in sober history. Ibn Battuta's gossip and Ferishta's suggestion are all that can be cited as authority for it, for Minhaj's remark "*qurbati ustad*" can bear no such meaning. The phrase is also used for describing Aibak's relation with his master ; p. 139. *TM*, copies the exact phrase from Minhaj. Haji

Dabir, a very careful and conscientious writer, translates Minhaj's meaning by a phrase which leaves no ambiguity. The value of Ibn Battuta's story can be judged from the following quotation; ii, p. 26 :- "Razia ruled for four years and was in the habit of riding out like men without her veil. Then she was imputed of having connection with one of her Abyssinian slaves. So the people agreed on marrying her to a near relative of hers and the kingdom passed on to her brother Nasiruddin". The printed text of Minhaj, p. 253, contains a couplet which seems to show Minhaj's belief in the truth of the allegation. But the same couplet is found in the *TM.* also and is obviously an interpolation, as Raverty has not found it in the older Mss. On the whole question see *IHQ*, 1940. pp. 769-772. She ruled from II *Rabi I*, 634/13th December, 1236 to 27th *Ramzan* 637/22nd April 1240. Her coins so far discovered bear dates in 634, 635 and 636 A.H.

31. Minhaj, pp. 193 and 255.

32. Minhaj, p. 255.

33. *Ibid*, p. 195. On the instigation of a recuse, named Ayub Turkman, who acquired great respect in Bahram's eyes and who previously had suffered at the hands of Shamsuddin, the *qazi* of Mihir, the Sultan had the latter thrown under the feet of an elephant.

34. Minhaj, p. 196-7. The siege dragged on for more than three months and Minhaj throws the main responsibility on one Fakhraddin Mubarakshah Farrukhi, one of Bahrams's personal attendants who acquired ascendancy in his counsels and refused to listen to proposals for compromise. Bahram reigned from 27 *Ramzan* 637 to 18 *Zilkad*, 638 (22nd April to 20th May, 1242). Only the 638 issues of his dated coins have been discovered so far.

35. *Ibid*, p. 198.

36. *Ibid*, pp. 250 and 261.

37. *Idem*.

38. He assumed the twin prerogatives of the 'elephant and the *Naubat*'.

39. Minhaj, p. 250.

40. *Ibid*, p. 285.

41. After Masud returned from the Uch campaign on the 12th *Zilhaj*, "he fell on evil ways and began to sieze and kill his maliks"; p. 189. It seems strange that this change in his character should have manifested itself so suddenly and that it should have become intolerable within a month after which he was deposed and put to death, on the 21st, *Muharram*; p. 201. The account of Mahmud's secret march at night, disguised as a lady, accompanied by his mother from Bahraich to be crowned at the Delhi palace is highly suggestive of a well planned conspiracy. Coins of Masud dated 639, 640-642 and 644 are known.

42. Minhaj, p. 208.

43. *Ibid*, p. 213. Cf. Ibn Battuta, ii, p. 28, who asserts that Balban was Iltutmish's son-in-law.

44. Minhaj, p. 294.

45. *Ibid*, pp. 277 and 280.

46. Minhaj, pp. 217, 280 and 298.

47. *Ibid*, pp. 217-18; also 298-99.

48. Minhaj, pp. 203-4, 218-20, 300-301. Because of his own dismissal from office Minhaj speaks with great indignation about Rayhan's low origin. The latter was obviously an Indian convert.
49. Minhaj, p. 242-3. The place is designated 'Lakhnauti—Lakhanor', evidently to distinguish the area south of the Ganges in which Lakhanor was situated. The district is not mentioned again and was perhaps permanently united with Lakhnauti.
50. An inscription found at the Baridargah, Bihar Sharif, and dated in 640/1242, as put up under Tughan Khan's orders, ascribes to him almost regal titles and makes no reference to the reigning king of Delhi; *JASB*, 1873, p. 45; Cunningham : *Reports*, xv, p. 45. *EIM*, 1913-4, pp. 16-7.
51. Minhaj, p. 243; see also Raverty; *op. cit.*, p. 737, note 9.
52. Minhaj, pp. 244-46.
53. Cf. Salim : *Riyazus-Salatin*, p. 73, who states that Tamur Khan ruled for ten years and died in 655/1257.
54. Minhaj, p. 212 and p. 262.
55. *EIM*, 1913-14, pp. 19-22.; Cunningham : *Reports*, xv, pp. 45 and 171. He was evidently identical with Kulich Khan Masud Jani, son of Alauddin Jani, mentioned as one of Mahmud's *maliks*; Minhaj, p. 206. He is described as the '*malik*' of Lakhnauti and Karrah'; the last-mentioned place he held subsequently. Salim refers to him under the name of Jalaluddin Khan.
56. *CCIM*, ii, p. 23, no. 140; the coin is disfigured, but besides the names of Mahmud, Yuzbak, and the mint name of Lakhnauti, the word *khamisina* is unmistakable; see also Wright, p. 55, no. 225D.
57. Minhaj, p. 263.
58. *Idem*; Cf. Salim; p. 74, who omits Yuzbak's rule altogether.
59. *JASB*, 1881, p. 61, no. 11 & 12; *CCIM*, ii, p. 146, No. 61.
60. For details see *infra*.
61. Wright, p. 55 no. 225C. *CCIM*, ii, no. 138.
62. Minhaj, p. 225-6.
63. Minhaj, p. 226 and 313.
64. *Ibid*, p. 267, Cf. Salim: *op. cit.* p. 74.
65. Barani, p. 66. Cf. Salim, p. 74, who evidently mistaking Yuzbaki for Arslan, states that the latter sent presents to Delhi in 657/1259.
66. *JASB*, 1874, p. 247. A clearer reading is to be found in *EIM*, 1913-14, pp. 23-25.
67. Minhaj, p. 220.
68. *Ibid*, p. 304.
69. Minhaj, p. 220-21.
70. *Ibid*, p. 306. Balban is reported on this occasion to have penetrated as far as 'Bishenpur and Tirhut'.
71. *Ibid*, p. 221.
72. *Ibid*, p. 266 and 306-1.
73. Minhaj, pp. 382-823, 388, 392-93; see also Howorth : *History of the Mongols*, i, p. 126-127.
74. For details see *infra*.
75. Minhaj, p. 235.

76. *Idem.*

77. *Ibid.* p. 399.

78. Minhaj, p. 287; see also p. 399.

79. *Ibid.* pp. 200, 287 and 399.

80. *Ibid.* p. 269.

81. *Ibid.* p. 270.

82. The date of Hasan Qarlugh's second occupation of Multan is inferential. Sher Khan's recapture of the city is dated in 648/1250. It must have happened after his dispossession from Nagaur which was placed under Kashlu Khan who was at the same time appointed *amir-i-hajib*, in 647; see pp. 214 and 295.

83. Minhaj, p. 271-72. Sher Khan's deputy at Multan, Malik Kurez sent a number of Mongol prisoners to Delhi in 648/1250. See also Haji Dabir, ii, p. 715.

84. Minhaj, pp. 216, 266 and 271; *Cf.* Haji Dabir., ii, p. 723.

85. Minhaj, pp. 218 and 266.

86. He appears in possession of Multan and Uch sometime before 655/1257; Minhaj, 272.

87. *Ibid.* p. 271.

88. *Ibid.* p. 272.

89. Minhaj, pp. 307-310.

90. *Ibid.* p. 273.

91. *Ibid.* p. 225 and 310.

92. *Futuhus-Salatin*, pp. 147-150. For the date see p. 141.

93. For reasons for this surmise see *infra* chapter ix.

CHAPTER VI

HINDU AGGRESSION : 1236-1265

The dominant feature in the period following Iltutmish's death was recovery of Hindu military energy. His work was nearly nullified when military stagnation, consequent upon the disorders described in the preceding pages, afforded an opportunity to the native powers not only to recover their lost territories but even to make an attempt to expel the conquerors. They failed in the latter objective but succeeded in definitely putting a stop to further expansion.

Reference has been made to the beginning of hostilities with the kings of Orissa. Narasinha I, (1238-1264), "the second great king of the eastern Ganga dynasty",¹ sensing the paralysing dissension that had seized the Turkish State, launched a vigorous drive against Lakhnauti and nearly succeeded in taking the city. Frequent raids across the Lakhanor frontier in the past appeared to have produced no retaliatory measure in Orissa, but Narasinha correctly assessed the Turkish strength. Taking advantage of Tughan Khan's failure in his Awadh expedition, the Orissan forces promptly attacked his frontier post in 641/1243.² The action signalised the beginning of concentrated attack by the Hindu power not only in Bengal but on all fronts. Tughan Khan repulsed the attack and invaded Jainagar in turn. He advanced as far as a place, named by the chronicler as "Katasin," probably located in the northeastern part of Narasinha's

dominion.³ There, after a temporary success, Tughan's troops were routed. Retreating pell mell to his capital and with Narasinha's forces in close pursuit, Tughan sent an urgent appeal to Delhi for succour. This however, required time to arrive during which the Orissan army, under the command of one Samanta Rai, crossed the frontier and captured Lakhanor. As the invaders advanced towards Lakhnauti, Tughan could only entrench himself within the city and helplessly watch the Hindus marching unopposed to his capital. In his desperation he offered battle but was easily defeated and compelled to withdraw into the city, which was not closely besieged. A timely news of the approach of the Delhi reinforcements under Tamur Khan, however, saved the situation, for Samanta Rai lost courage, raised the siege and withdrew; but on the way he thoroughly plundered the countryside.⁴

For the first time since Aibak's days a native army invested a Muslim city and returned unmolested. It produced no tangible military result, except, possibly the loss of the Lakhanor frontier station, but it thoroughly demonstrated the Sultanate's weakness. The moral effect was almost magical and within a few years the whole of Hindu India awakened to aggressive military action. ✓

The subsequent course of the war with Orissa has not been chronicled; Tamur Khan and Masud Jani's rule is not known in detail. It seems unreasonable to believe that Orissa assumed a pacific attitude after such a triumph. The frontier town of Lakhanor is not mentioned again; an extension of Narasinha's dominions in Bengal can well be

presumed. Some such development, in any event, led to the renewal of hostilities soon after Yuzbak's appointment, in 1252-53. After two victories on Orissan soil he suffered a defeat. In magnitude it must have been similar to that of Tughan, for like him he appealed to Delhi for assistance. On the arrival of reinforcements he invaded Orissa for the fourth time and pushed as far as Umardan or Amardan—for different variants are found in the text—"the capital of the Rai" and is even stated to have captured his treasure and family.⁵ It is extremely doubtful if this 'victory' proved decisive or resulted in any territorial advantage, for Narasinha also claimed not only to have defeated the "Javanas" but also to have reached the Ganges victoriously after despatching "the Javanas of *Rarh* and *Varendri*".⁶ Besides, Umardan, the place reported to have been captured, can hardly refer to any place in the interior of Orissa, much less to Narasinha's capital; a very plausible suggestion is to look for it in the Arambagh subdivision of the Hooghly district.⁷ Yuzbak's victory at best, must have been gained over some local feudatory on the frontier; a probable recovery of a part of the lost territories on this region cannot be ruled out. It was obviously to commemorate some such local gain, either in territory, or in tribute, that he issued a silver coin in 653/1255, allegedly struck "from the *kharaj* of Arzbadan (Umardan) and 'Nodia'".⁸

After Yuzbak's death no further conflict with Orissa is recorded by the Muslim historians, although the continuance of a state of belligerency should perhaps be presumed. It may be mentioned here that a grant of Narasinha II, dated in 1296 A.D.

states that it was issued while the king was encamped on the Ganges in the course of a 'conquering expedition'.⁹ Apparently the Orissa kings retained their possessions in south west Bengal; with Balban's abandonment of the policy of expansion, Lakhnauti barely managed to exist.

The inclusion of the name of "Nodia" by Yuzbak in the commemorative coin mentioned above, is the only definite evidence of territorial extension after Bakhtiyar's occupation of the Lakhanor-Lakhnauti-Devkot area. Whether after Lakhmanasena's death the Senas permanently retired from south-west Bengal is a moot point; there is certainly no evidence of Muslim occupation of the Bhagirathi region after Bakhtiyar's return from Nadia. Petty princes, independent after Lakshmana's death, ruled in Southern Bengal and an extension of their dominion over Nadia and its neighbourhood, cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, the Ganga kings of Orissa held the greater portion of the *Rarh* country and were as yet in full possession of their power. Their past hostility with the Senas, the contiguity of their possessions with Nadia and the frequent references to their 'reaching the Ganges',—meaning undoubtedly the Bhagirathi—all point to the probability that they took advantage of the Sena weakness and occupied the *Suhma* country. The mention of "Nodia" along with "Arzbadan"—if the latter is really to be identified with Umardan of the chronicle—also seems to suggest that both the places were captured from the same enemy and probably in course of the same war. The mention of revenue (*kharaj*) being collected from Nadia, as also from Arzbadan, should perhaps indicate

direct annexation.

✓ Recorded operations in East Bengal (*Bang* and *Kamrud*) were confined to occasional raids with little territorial advantage. Lakshmanasena's successors, Viswarupa and Kesava, ruling over East and Southwestern Bengal from Vikrampur (Dacca District) defeated and repulsed the "*Garga Javanas*".¹⁰ After Saifuddin Aibak we do not hear of any expeditions to '*Bang*' till the time of Yuzbaki, who, as noticed above, was dispossessed of Lakhnauti while campaigning in the East.

The neighbouring kingdom of Kamrup also proved a strong military power and the elephant-hunting expeditions by the Lakhnauti Governors proved more hazardous than before. Kamrup was an extensive kingdom comprising the country from the Karatoya and northeastern Mymensingh to Gauhati, where the capital seems to have been located. Since Bakhtiyar's ill fated expedition no large-scale attempt had been made to penetrate the Brahmaputra valley. Kamrup thus gathered sufficient strength to deal a crushing blow to any one emulating Bakhtiyar's example. The ambitious Yuzbak fell into this trap. Considering Lakhnauti too small for his ambitions, shortly after 1255, he collected a large force and crossed the Karatoya into Kamrup. He met no resistance, for the king, adopting his traditional strategy, withdrew to the hills and allowed the invader to march unopposed to the capital. Yuzbak there proclaimed himself king of 'Lakhnauti and Kamrup' and instituted the Friday religious services; "the signs of Islam thus became manifest in Kamrup." The Hindu king then sent to offer his submission and requested to be

restored as a tributary vassal promising to continue the "coin and the *khutba* in Yuzbak's name." The latter refused the offer and evidently meant to stay there. Relying on the country's flourishing crops and with a criminal lack of foresight he, however, sold all his grain stock to the agents of the Kamrup king who planned to starve the invaders. A terrible situation therefore confronted Yuzbak when he found the entire harvest destroyed by the flood caused by deliberate cutting of the embankments by the Kamrup forces. Faced with the prospect of utter starvation he thereupon resolved to withdraw. The route through the plains having been rendered impassable by the floods, he had to move along the foot of the Garo and Khasi hills towards Mymensingh. As the army proceeded through the narrow defiles, the Kamrup forces came up in the rear and, assisted by the hill people, literally annihilated the entire army. Yuzbak himself was wounded and taken prisoner and later died of his wounds.¹¹ It was a reverse similar in magnitude to that of Bakhtiyar and further emboldened the north Indian princes to become increasingly aggressive.

Muslim hold on Magadha (South Bihar) was never extensive; only a narrow strip along the Ganges containing the original possession of Uddandapur Vihar, carried the route from Banaras through the Shahabad, Patna, Monghyr and Bhagalpur district. To the south, independent princes surviving the Sena-Gahadvala dominion, held sway. Tibetan records extend the rule of the line of princes calling themselves Pithipatis, whose inscription has been discovered at Janibigha near Bodhgaya, far into the 13th century and describe them as vassals of the

Turks.¹² In Bodhgaya itself are records inscribed by the ruling chiefs of Kama (Kumaon) and Sapadalaksha, whose dates suggest a continuous occupation of the district by the Hindus, upto, at least, the reign of Balban.¹³ It is uncertain if the Mahanayakas of Rhotasgarh, one of whose feudatories is found donating lands near Sasaram in 1197,¹⁴ survived in the 13th century, but extension of Muslim power towards the south, in the first half of the century, is certainly not indicated by the chronicles nor does it seem probable. On the contrary, even the town of Bihar appears to have suffered from Hindu aggression; for early in the reign of Mahmud, the governor, Kuret Khan, is said to have lost his life in repelling what was evidently a siege.¹⁵ By what process Muslim power was re-established in the region is not known; it should in any case, be supposed to have preceded Balban's accession, for in 1265 Bihar was certainly in Muslim control. Recognition of Balban's suzerainty is implied by the inclusion of his name (written Birubana) in a Sanskrit inscription of a resident of Gaya, named Vanaraja, dated in V. S. 1325/1268 A. D. .¹⁶ If credence is to be placed in the bardic annals recounting Rajput attempts in the 13th century to free Gaya and other holy places from the Turks,¹⁷ direct annexation of the district must be presumed, which however, seems highly improbable. Balban's declared policy of defensive consolidation would accord, at best, only with an acknowledgement of his paramountcy, most probably, as the Tibetan account asserts, from the Pithipatis.

As a continuous process, Hindu aggression was most in evidence along the Sultanate's southern frontier.

Itutmish's recovery plan, as it appears, had only a temporary success, for after him, his dominions were subjected to even greater encroachments. Two grants found at Rewah, issued by the Maharana of Kakkaredi, and dated in 1240 and 1241 respectively, acknowledge Trailokyavarama of Kalinjar as the overlord, thus proving an extension of Chandella power to the east.¹⁸ Towards the west Chandellas had already extended their rules upto Lalitpur as is proved by the Tehari grant of Trailokyavarma issued in 1207 A. D. ; their continued occupation of this region is indicated by the discovery of another Chandella inscription at Jhansi dated in 1263 A. D.¹⁹ The Dahi copper plate of Trailokyavarma's successor Viravarma, dated in V. S. 1337/1280, records the donation of some villages to a man who had conquered "the *Turushkas*, the rajas of Nalpur (Narwar), Gopala, ruler of Madhuban (Mathurah) and Hariraja, ruler of Gopagiri (Gwalior)".²⁰ Viravarma, in another of his grants dated in 1254, and his successor Hammiravarma, in that of 1289, call themselves "Lords of Kalinjar."²¹ From the traditions current around Mahoba and Hamirpur, in the northwest of Bundelkhand, this part appears to have been recovered by the Bhar Rajputs who ruled from about 1252 to at least 1280.²² Just south of the Jumna, within less than hundred miles from the '*iqta*' of Karra, a new dynasty rose in what is now Bundelkhand. According to the chronicles of the Baghelas of Rewah, Vyaghra, the founder of the dynasty, made himself master of most of the countries between Kalpi and Chunar, while his son, Karna Deva subsequently added the valley of the Tons river.²³ Most of the countries south of the Jumna thus passed to the Rajputs.

Expeditions undertaken against the Hindu princes in this region had a limited success ; they merely underlined the military problem. Tamur Khan, the governor of Awadh, is described as having led several expeditions to plunder the territory of "Bhatighor", an old name of the Tons valley,²⁴ evidently against the rising Baghela power.²⁵ Malik Kikluk, the governor of Budaun, is also said to have been preparing to lead his forces into Kalinjar and Mahoba when he died of poison.²⁶ In 645/1247 Balban himself led a strong force against a Hindu chief whom Minhaj calls 'Dalaki-wa-Malaki'. He was reported to have established himself in the country between Kalinjar and Karrah and was described as "independent of the Rais of Kalinjar and Malwah and immensely powerful".²⁷ But Balban succeeded only in plundering a portion of his territory and capturing his stronghold ; the chief after a severe resistance, was able to withdraw with all his forces.²⁸

In the neighbourhood of Gwalior, south of the Jumna, an equally strong power established itself in the person of Chaharadeva, who supplanted the Pariharas of Narwar sometime after 1247 and founded the Jajapella dynasty. We have had occasion to refer to his rising power in connection with Malik Tayasai's campaigns towards the end of Iltutmish's reign. The earliest date on his coins found in Gwalior, Jhansi and Narwar, cannot be anterior to 1233.²⁹ His power must have grown rapidly for, soon after his establishment at Narwar, the Muslim chronicler refers to him as "the greatest of all the Rais of Hindusthan and in command of a great army".³⁰ From Narwar he commenced operation against the Muslim garrison of Gwalior. It was obviously to

reinforce the fortress that Raziah, early in her reign, sent an expedition under Tamur Khan,³¹ towards "Gwalior and Malwah". The position, however, soon became untenable and not long afterwards she sent another force to withdraw the military and civil personnel and escort it back to Delhi. Gwalior had thus to be abandoned to Chaharadeva who therein found a securer base for aggressions against the Muslim dominions. In 649/1251 Balban found it necessary to lead a full-scale expedition against the "Rana Chahir Ajari". The extent of his dominions is probably indicated by the mention of "Gwalior, Chanderi, Narwar and Malwah" towards which Balban marched his forces on this occasion.³² Though he gained some success and even managed to capture Narwar and also Gwalior, Chaharadeva's discomfiture proved temporary.³³ For, from the evidence of coins, he certainly ruled in independence upto at least 1259.³⁴ Records of his successors have also been found in Gwalior and Narwar. The last date on the coins of his successor Asalladeva is probably 1279; the last two princes of the dynasty, named Gopala and Ganapati, are known from a number of inscriptions whose dates range from V. S. 1337 to 1355/1280 to 1298.³⁵

The hold on Rajputana was also seriously jeopardised. After Iltutmish's death a concentrated attack was opened on Ranthambhor by the dispossessed Chauhanas under the leadership of Bhagavata. Early in the reign of Raziah Chauhana pressure compelled her to send reinforcements to relieve the garrison. Like Gwalior the fortress was however, found difficult to hold; its fortifications were therefore dismantled and the garrison withdrawn.³⁶ The *Hammira-Maha-Kavya* while referring to this liberation

of Ranthambhor and the foundation therein of the later Chauhana dynasty, adds that Bhagavata entered into an alliance with the "Kharaparas" who are stated to have long been in hostility with the Muslims.³⁷ The extent of the Chauhana dominion at this time is difficult to determine ; the territory called Mewat by the Muslim writers, which is always coupled with Ranthambhor by Minhaj, probably acknowledged Chauhana rule. It is also likely that they exercised suzerainty over the collateral dynasty of Bundi which, according to Tod, was founded a few years earlier.³⁸ In an inscription found in the Kotah state, Jaitra Sinha, the son and successor of Bhagavata, is mentioned as having repeatedly defeated the Paramaras of Malwah and at the end imprisoned the king at Ranthambhor.³⁹ The revival of Chauhana power and the extension of its paramountcy was thus a factor which worked against the continuance of Muslim rule in Rajputana. The Guhelots of Mewar were also rising in power at this time ; in his inscriptions which range in date from 1213 to 1252, Jaitrasinha claims to have defeated the rulers of Malwah, Gujrat, Marwar, and also the *Turushkas*.⁴⁰ Suggestive of the diminishing hold of the Muslims in Rajputana is the fact that we no longer hear of the *iqtas* of Lawah, Kasili and Sambhar which figured not infrequently in the account of Iltutmish's reign.

To curb the growing power of the Chauhanas Balban led an expedition in 646/1248 towards Ranthambhor and Mewat.⁴¹ The chronicle records the destruction of a great number of towns, but Balban was evidently repulsed in his attack on the fortress in course of which one of his leading generals was killed. That he could make little headway against Ranthambhor

on this occasion is proved by the fact that during his banishment from the court to his *iqta* of Nagaur, he is reported to have successfully raided the territories of "Ranthambhor, Bundi and Chitrur (Chitor)". Although the Rai, whom Minhaj calls Bahardeo, opposed him with a large force, Balban is yet credited with returning with immense booty and spoils.⁴³ Such expeditions were continued until his accession; in 657/1258 we are told of a similar expedition against the "infidels of Ranthambhor", who however, do not appear to have suffered any appreciable loss.⁴⁴

Reference has been made in a previous section to the establishment of a branch of the Jadon Bhatti Rajputs of Bayana, in what the chronicle describes as the '*kohpayah* of Mewat', in northern Alwar. These Rajputs, it is generally admitted, were the progenitors of the Mews and the Khanzadahs, who came into prominence early in the 16th century, and who, according to Cunningham, were not converted to Islam until the reign of Firoz Tughluq.⁴⁵ Throughout the 13th century, therefore, the whole of Mewat was held by the Hindu Jadon Bhattis who almost isolated the Muslim stronghold of Bayana. Allying themselves with the Chauhanas and other dynasties in eastern Rajputana they commenced what should be termed a guerilla war against the Muslims. Early in the reign of Bahram, Balban was obliged to send punitive columns from his *iqta* of Riwari (in the Gurgaon district, near Mewat) against the 'Hindu rebels of Kohpayah'.⁴⁶ The frequent mention of Ranthambhor in connection with operations in Mewat⁴⁷ connects the Mewati 'rebellion' with the Chauhanas and makes it ex-

ceedingly probable that the alleged Mewati trouble was but an organised offensive against Delhi. The Rajputs even carried the offensive into the Delhi territory itself. In 655/1256 when Mahmud's government was preoccupied with Qutlugh Khan's rebellion and the Mongol advance, the Mewatis under a man named Malka, made a daring raid on Hansi and carried away cattle which they distributed among the Rajputs living as far as Ranthambhor.⁴⁸ They also raided the districts of 'Harianah (Delhi province), Siwalikh and Bayana'. Towards the end of Mahmud's reign they grew bolder and committed robbery and loot in the capital itself in broad daylight. In 658/1258 Balban led two apparently ineffective expeditions. All he achieved was to plunder a few Mewati villagers, slaying a number of them including Malka.⁴⁹ The opening remarks in Barani's history sufficiently prove the continued intensity of this Rajput aggression. The power of Ranthambhor grew rapidly under Jaitrasinha and his more famous son, the valorous Hammira. In the latter's inscription, Jaitrasinha is credited with having vanquished the kings of Malwa, Amber and also of "Kerkaralagiri".⁵⁰ Hammira asserted his supremacy over Malwah, Chitor, Mewar, Abu, Ajmer, Sambhar and the whole of northern Rajputana.⁵¹ Even the Rawal Samarasinha of Mewar is described as having "lifted the deeply sunk Gurjara land high out of the Turkushka sea".⁵²

✓ In the southwest, the Chauhanas of Jalor also repudiated the vassalage imposed by Iltutmish on Udaisinha. His successor, Chachigadeva, not only asserted his independence but, as appears from inscriptions, assumed a conquering role and wrested

Mandor from the Paramaras; ⁵³ his successors finally annexed their capital at Chandravati, towards the end of the century.⁵⁴ On the extreme west of Rajputana the Bhattis of Jaisalmer effectually blocked the Muslims from getting a foothold in that region.

The authority of Delhi was thus being negatived almost everywhere. Even in Awadh and the Doab, the heart of the kingdom, Hindus found means to assume an aggressive attitude. In 642/1244 the tribes of "Jarali and Datoli" in the Doab, were reported to have infested the highway and forests of Hindusthan.⁵⁶ It took Balban two sanguinary expeditions in 1244 and 1249 to obtain a temporary control over the area.⁵⁷ A Hindu chief captured the fort of Talsandah in the district of Kanouj and a strong force had to be despatched to recover it in 645/1247.⁵⁸ In the trans-Gangetic area, the Katehriyas, from their stronghold at Ahicchatra, frequently raided the districts of Budaun and Sambhal. An expedition led by the governor of Budaun in 1242, in which a number of the 'Katehriya infidels were overthrown', was apparently ineffective, for in 1254 another attempt had to be made on a larger scale.⁵⁹ Led by Balban himself, the Delhi forces on this occasion crossed the Ganges and advanced upto Bijnor and Bardar as far as the Ramganga. The Katehriyas offered sustained resistance and killed one of Balban's officers.⁶⁰ Although the chronicle states that they were punished in an exemplary manner on this occasion, in reality they were far from being effectively reduced. They appeared with even greater strength early in the reign of Balban. The success of Kashlu Khan, the governor of Meerut, who is reported to have reduced a por-

tion of Rohilkhand across the Ganges near Bijnour and to have "overthrown Ranahs and other independent Hindu tribes inhabiting places as far as Rurki and Miapur"⁶¹ could be hardly permanent. The only tangible result of his operations seemed to be the establishment of a military outpost in Amroha, for the first time mentioned as an *iqta* early in the reign of Balban.⁶²

NOTES

1. Bannerji : *History of Orissa*, i, p. 263.

2. Minhaj, p. 243. The author refers to the "Rai of Jainagar" which, scholars generally agree, must mean Orissa. The Muslims called the country by the name of its capital, probably identical with Jajpur, on the Vaitarani, which, till the 18th century, was called Jainagar; *JASB*, 1875, p. 285. Banerji thought Jainagar referred to modern Jajallanagar in the Chattisgarh division of the Central provinces; *History of Orissa*, i, p. 249. On the Mahanadi, however, was a town called Jajatinagar, which might have been persianised into Jainagar; see *EI*, iii, p. 365. It is also mentioned in the *Pavanadutam* of Dhoyi, as the last stage before the wind-messenger reaches the Suhma country (south-central Bengal); *JASB*, 1905 p. 44.

3. Minhaj, p. 244. Raverty's identification of Katasin with Katasinh, on the Mahanadi, would place the eastern frontier of Orissa about 200 miles southwest of Bengal's present frontiers, whereas Orissa is known to have held considerable tracts of southwest Bengal; Banerji: *History of Orissa*, i, p. 264. N. Vasu's identification with the present Raibaniagarh in the Midnapur district seems more plausible; *Vangiya Sahitya Parishat Patrika*, xvi, p. 132, note 1. N. K. Bhattasali, however suggests its identification with Kathasanga, 12 miles south of the Damodar river on the boarder of Bishnupur, Bankura District; *JRAS*, Jan. 1935, p. 109; see also *DHB* ii, p. 48, note 1.

4. Minhaj, p. 244-45.

5. Minhaj, p. 262-63.

6. *JASB*, lxxv, p. 229-37. In a Sanskrit work named *Ekavali*, Narasinha is called the "master of the Javana Kingdom"; see Banerji : *History of Orissa*, p. 267; *Banglar Itihasa*, ii, p. 75.

7. M. Chakravarti, in *JASB*, v, (N.S.), p. 216-17, suggests that it may refer to Mandar or Mandaran, on the borders of Midnapur, a place of considerable antiquity. Throughout the medieval period the fort at Mandaran held great strategic importance and commanded the highway from Burdwan to Orissa. See also Raverty's note. *Trans. Tab. Nas.* p. 763.

8. *CCIM*, ii, p. 146, No. 61.
9. *JASB*, lxv, p. 229; also Vasu, N.N : *Viswakosa*, article on *Gangeya*; Cf. Banerjee : *History of Orissa*, i, p. 273.
10. *JASB*, 1896, pp. 9-15; x, (N.S.), pp. 99-104; also N. G. Majumdar : *Inscriptions of Bengal*, iii, pp. 118 sq.
11. Minhaj, pp. 263-65. On his way to Kamrup Yuzbuk is reported to have crossed the Bagmati; this must refer either to the Karatoya or the Brahmaputra. See note 3, *supra* p. 77. Raverty asserts that the Kamrup capital was at Kamtapur, on the Darlah river, far to the west of Gauhati; *Trans. Tab. Nas.*, p. 764, note. But the capital was not transferred from Gauhati till towards the end of the 13th century. See Barua : *History of Kamrup*, p. 199. Two coins of Yuzbak dated 653 were discovered at Gauhati; *JASB*, 1910, p. 261.
12. Ray : *Dynastic History*, i, p. 939; *IA*, 1875, p. 366; 1919, p. 47; *DHB*, i, pp. 295-61. The date on the Janibigha inscription, recorded in the reign of Jayasena, son of Buddhasena, however, is held to correspond to 1283-4; see also *IA*, 1890, pp. 1-3.
13. Asokacalla, the king of Kama, his brother and his priest figure in these inscriptions which are dated in the years, *La. Sam.* 51, 74, and the year 1813 of the *Nirvana* era which, according to Fleet, should correspond to 1270, A.D.; *EI*, xii, p. 27; *JASB*, v, p. 658; *IA*, x, p. 346; *JASB*, 1913, p. 72-73. For Fleet's calculation see *JASB*, 1909, p. 48-49. Bhandarkar, however, holds that the year 1813 of the *Nirvana* era should correspond to 1175; *EI*, xx, Appendix, p. 199; see also Kielhorn's list : *EI*, v, p. 79, inscr. No. 575. Bhagvanlal Indraji's calculation made it correspond to 1182; *IA*, 1887, p. 341. See also *JASB*, xvii, (S.N.), p. 13. On the assumption that the *La. Sam.* era commenced in 1119-20, H.C. Roy Chowdhury held that year 51 and 74 of the Bodhgaya inscriptions should correspond to 1170-1 and 1193-94 respectively. *Asutosh Silver Jubilee volumes*, iii, part 2, p. 5. This view has not found acceptance by other scholars who hold that the era should be reckoned from about 1200 A.D., the years 51 and 74 thus corresponding to c. 1251 and 1274 A.D. This would agree with Fleet's equation of the year 1813 of the *Nirvana* era with 1270 when Asokachalla, mentioned in all the three inscriptions, was living. On this question see *DHB*, i, p. 233-38; also Majumdar R. C : *New light on the interpretation of "Atita Rajya—Samvat"*, in *J. N. Banerjee Volume*, Calcutta, 1960, pp. 71-5.
14. *EI*, xxii, p. 222.
15. Minhaj, p. 259.
16. Cunningham : *Reports*, iii, p. 27; also Kielhorn's list : *EI*, v, No. 23.
17. *Gaya Gazetteer*, p. 28.
18. *IA*, 1888, p. 230; Cunningham : *Reports*, xxi, p. 142-48; *Dynastic History*, ii, p. 728. A recently discovered inscription proves that the Chandella king Trailokyavarma had imposed his rule over Rewah as early as 1212 A.D.; *EI*, xxv, p. 126.
19. *Annual Report of Indian Epigraphy*, 1946-47 No. 50; *EI*, v, p. 33.

No. 227; *IA*, xix, p. 179, No. 128.

20. Cunningham : *Reports*, xxi, p. 75. The grant is now lost.

21. *EI*, xx, p. 132 and 135.

22. *JASB*, 1881, pp. 32-37. Cf. *JASB*, 1902, p. 99, where, on the authority of a 17th century history of the Bundelas, their rise to power under Bir Bundela is placed in the first half of the 13th century. Bundela rule is stated to have extended from Kalpi to Kalinjar and also over Awadh and the Doab.

23. Cunningham : *Reports*, xxi, p. 104; see also *MAI*, No. 21, p. a12.

24. Cunningham : *op. cit.* xxi, p. 154.

25. Minhaj, p. 247.

26. *Ibid*, p. 257.

27. *Ibid*, p. 291; Cunningham, *op. cit.* xxi, p. 106, identified this person with Dalakeswar and Malakeswar of the Baghela chronicles. Smith tried to read in this the name of the Bhar chieftain, supposed to have been ruling in Etah, Cawnpur, Fatehpur, etc., called Tiloki and Biloki; *JASB*, 1881, p. 34. Ray, thinks that he may be identical with Trailokyavarma of the Chandella dynasty; *Dynastic History*, ii, p. 20-30. See also, Bose N.S. *History of the Chandella*, p. 109.

28. Minhaj, p. 211 and 292.

29. Cunningham: *Coins of Medieval India*, p. 93; Thomas : *Chronicles* p. 70.

30. Minhaj, p. 215-16.

31. *Ibid*, p. 247.

32. *Ibid*, p. 215. Cf. Cunningham : *Coins of Medieval India*, p. 91 and *EI*, vii, p. 223-24, where this Chaharadeva is mixed up with Naharadeva (Nahardeo) who according to Minhaj, ruled in Ranthambhor.

33. Minhaj, pp. 216, 278, and 297.

34. Cunningham : *Coins of Medieval India*, p. 93.

35. *IA*, 1918, p. 241. See Sarkar, D.C. in *IHQ*, Dec. 1956 p. 400, who on the basis of recently discovered inscriptions extends Ganapati's rule upto 1300 A.D.

36. Minhaj, p. 187.

37. *IA*, 1879, p. 63. Raziah is referred to under the name of Jalaluddin, the official name which she used in some of her coins and inscriptions.; see *CCIM*, ii, p. 2 and No. 93; also the Sanskrit inscription at Palam, dated in 1280-81 : *EIM*, 1913, p. 43. Cf. Ray : *op. cit.* ii, p. 1095. The Kharparas seem to be identical with the 'Kharparakas' mentioned as a Hindu army commanded by the governor of the 'Chedi country, under Mahmud, the ruler of Joginipura', in an inscription, dated in 1328, and found near Damoh in the Central provinces; *EI*, xiii, p. 44. For their suggested identification with the Khakaras (Khokars) see *IA*, 1879, p. 64.

38. *Annals*, ii, p. 459; Erskine : *Rajputana Gazetteer*, p. 236-37.

39. Quoted in Ojha : *Rajputana*, i, p. 203.

40. *Vienna Oriental Journal*, xxi; "The Chirwa Inscription"; *IA*, 1928, p. 32; see also *Bhavnagar Inscriptions*, p. 93.

41. Minhaj, p. 213.
42. *Ibid*, p. 293-94.
43. *Ibid*, p. 299; see *IA*, 1928, p. 32 for a reference to this event in an inscription of Jaitra Sinha of Chitor.
44. Minhaj, p. 266. The *Hammira Mahakavya*, however, states that Jaitrasinha paid tribute to the sultan of Delhi. See *HCIP*, v, p. 85.
45. Cunningham : *Reports*, xx, p. ii. Minhaj always refers to the Mewatis as infidels. See also Ojha : *Rajputana*, i, p. 238.
46. Minhaj, p. 285.
47. See for instance, pp. 213 and 292.
48. Minhaj, p. 313.
49. *Ibid*, pp. 314-316.
50. *EI*, xix, p. 45-47.
51. *IA*, 1879, p. 64-65.
52. *IA*, 1887, p. 347.
53. *EI*, xi, pp. 55-73. Udaisinha seems to have reasserted his independence soon after his defeat by Iluttmish; see *Bombay Gazetteer*, I, part I, pp. 474-76.
54. *EI*, ix, p. 87; Ojha : *Rajputana*, i. p. 180.
55. Cf. Tod : *Annals*, i, p. 247, who asserts that a certain Muzaffar Khan, governor of Nagaur, was defeated by Kurramdeo (1251/71). See also *CHI*, iii, p. 531.
56. The place names are doubtful; they are also written Jalali and Deoli. Jalali is near Aligarh. See Raverty's note : *Trans. Tab. Nas.* p. 809. Hodivala prefers to locate them in Itawah district; *Commentary*, in *E & D.* (Aligarh) ii, p. 737-738.
57. Minhaj, pp. 213 and 287.
58. *Ibid*, p. 210. Cunningham identified Talsandah with the village now known as Bilsar, ten miles north of Etah; *Reports*, xi, p. 21-22.
59. Minhaj, p. 256.
60. *Ibid*, p. 218. Cf. Cunningham's identification of Bardar with Panjor in the Patiala state; *Reports*, xiv, p. 70.
61. Minhaj, p. 280.
62. Barani, p. 36.

CHAPTER VII

SECURITY AND CONSOLIDATION:

1265-1287

For nearly twenty years Mahmud reigned but he never ruled. His piety and simplicity may have been overstressed but of his unassertive nature and weak resolution there can be little doubt.¹ His excessive modesty ill-served the king of a conquering race, for a strong will was an essential pre-requisite for Iltutmish's representative. The king's lack of vigour threatened to destroy respect for the crown. A change on the throne became necessary even in his own lifetime but Mahmud escaped his brothers' fate because of the loyal and devoted service of the *naib*, Bahauddin Balban, the Ulugh Khan. Born of the Ilbari sect of the Turks, Balban was sold to slavery early in life and was eventually purchased by Iltutmish. How he rose in state service will have been noted in the foregoing chapters. His complicity in the revolution leading to Mahmud's accession seems more than probable; in the fourth year he established relationship by marrying his daughter to the young king. His promotion thereafter to the rank of Ulugh Khan and the post of *naib-i-mamlakat*, followed as a matter of course. The failure of Rayhan's intrigue improved his position; as the leader of the Turks solidly united to meet the threat of dispossession, he obtained a further lease of power.

This power he, however, exercised purely in the

interests of the crown. He infused vigour into the administration, and if his master's dynasty proved impossible to revitalise and perpetuate, he certainly helped in arresting the monarchy's downward progress. Forces of disintegration were constantly challenged and overcome; Hindu aggression was sought to be firmly resisted and, as will be shown in a subsequent chapter, by a judicious combination of diplomacy and military action, the prevented Mongols from having an easy walk-over. It is true, he substituted the domination of the maliks by that of his own, but despite Barani's introductory remarks, the Delhi Sultanate was demonstrably stronger at the end than it was at the beginning of Mahmud's reign.

How his reign terminated can never be known with certainty, for Minhaj died before the event and Barani's account opens with Balban's accession. The 14th century accounts of Ibn Battuta and Isami hold the latter guilty of poisoning his sovereign.² It is however, difficult to put much credence to the story. Balban had very close relations with the royal family; both Masud and Mahmud were his sons-in-law; his own son, Bughra Khan, was married to the only daughter of Mahmud by a second wife.³ The line of Iltutmish was thus almost merged in his person, for Mahmud is not known to have left any male issue. Even as the *naib*, Barani tells us, he used to have the insignia of royalty.⁴ His accession, in 664/1266,⁵ only formalising a long practised usage, was thus almost in the nature of things and presumably unopposed.

His immediate task was to restore the crown's prestige and inspire respect for its sanctity and power. 2

✓ For, an effective answer to the Hindu and Mongol aggression could only come from an integrated and centralised state, symbolised by a strong, unquestioned monarchy. Iltutmish had only outlined the institution; it was left to Balban to regenerate and raise it to its full stature. Conscious of his lack of an absolute hereditary right to the throne he sought increased personal prestige by claiming descent from the mythical Turkish hero, Afrasiyab⁶. By word and by deed he constantly emphasised the sacredness of the king's person and the awe which he should inspire in the hearts of his people. "Kingship is the embodiment of despotism", he said to his son Bughra Khan.⁷ "The heart of the king is the special repository of God's favour and in this he has no equal among mankind". "It is the king's super-human awe and status," said he on another occasion, "which can ensure the people's obedience"⁸. Such despotism, he realised, exposed the king to great risks of assassination and so he lived constantly attended by bodyguards.⁹ He never wearied of impressing on his sons the crown's sanctity; the king's awe-inspiring grandeur was to reflect the state's power. He re-organised the court etiquette so as to manifest the order and splendour of his kingdom. Even before his accession, when a party of Mongol envoys from Hulaku visited Delhi in 1259-60, Balban carefully planned a splendid and colourful reception; the ambassadors left with a profound respect for the magnificence of the mighty Sultan of Delhi.¹⁰ The regalia of the Seljuq and Khwarizmi kings were faithfully copied and high-salaried, fearsome body-guards were appointed round the king's person to blind the onlookers by

their drawn swords dazzling in the sun. He insisted on the *sijda* and the *paibos* (prostration and kissing the monarch's feet) in the court and surrounded his person by pompous ceremonies "such as was never done by any other king of Delhi".¹¹ Even his private conduct he sought to make an embodiment of kingly dignity. A great convivialist in early life, he gave up drinking on accession and interdicted the use of wine by his courtiers. He firmly refused even to speak to the common people; a rich Delhi merchant offered all his wealth for the honour of one interview with the Sultan; his ambition was never fulfilled. Even to his personal attendants he never showed lightheartedness or betrayed his human feeling.¹² The death of his eldest son broke the old monarch's heart, and he melted in tears; but he disdained to show his weakness and to be seen mourning. He bore himself with coolness among his attendants only to breakdown in heart-rending sobs in the midnight solitude of his apartment. Ruthlessly he thus sacrificed himself to the king in him. Mongol devastations also contributed to the enhancement of his prestige, for, as the only Muslim state not yet submerged under the Mongol flood, Delhi offered honourable asylum to eminent princes and men of letters who shed lustre on Balbān's court. He allotted them quarters named after their country or race. This enhanced his reputation in countries outside India as the saviour of Muslim culture.¹³

To enhance respect for the crown he administered justice with extreme impartiality and the slightest disregard of his authority was attended with a punishment which verged on cruelty. Two

high-ranking officers, the governors of Budaun and Awadh, were given exemplary punishment for reported cruelty to their personal slaves¹⁴; the general who was defeated by Tughril of Bengal, was hanged for his failure to carry out the royal command.¹⁵ To ensure efficient and faithful discharge of duties he improved the system of espionage and placed secret reporters in every department. He took great pains in ascertaining the character and loyalty of the news writer (*barid*) whom he made one of the most potent instruments of his despotism.¹⁶

Balban's despotism was of the extreme kind in which the right of the military aristocracy even to a share, not to speak of domination in the government, could find no place. This absolutism he worked out with singular success, for during his twenty years' deputyship, most of the leaders of the aristocracy—the 'forty'—had either died or been reduced to impotence. With the death of his cousin, Sher Khan,¹⁷ of whose ambition and ability Balban was reported to have been highly apprehensive, he was left with no potential opponent to the execution of his policy. This development of the monarch's absolutism is the central event of his reign; success of his security measures followed as a direct consequence. The chronicler is markedly sparing in giving details of his fairly long reign of twenty years, but his achievements, so far as they have been recorded can be listed under the single heading of 'consolidation'. This included provisions for internal security, involving reforms in the army organisation and also a change of policy towards the unconquered Hindu powers. His foreign policy and defence measures, equally co-ordinated with

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his consolidation plans, we, however, propose to deal with fully in a separate chapter.

To perfect the coercive instrument of his authority, he turned his attention first of all to the army whose organizational deficiency had become noticeable during the last reign. The military personnel was, as a result, greatly increased and officers of proved ability and loyalty were appointed to the commands. He enhanced the soldiers' pay and gave some of them assignment of villages in lieu of cash salary.¹⁸ Soon, however, he found out the disadvantages of this form of payment. In the second or third year of his accession, during an expedition to Lahore, he discovered that about two thousand cavalymen who, since the days of Iltutmish, held villages in the Doab in payment for personal service, had been failing in their duties. Most of the original assignees had either died or grown too old for military service; the rest stayed at home and lived on the assignments with the connivance of the war-office (*diwan-i-arz*). Some even sent proxies, hired men, ill-equipped and utterly unsuited to military work; the heirs of the deceased troopers inherited their assignments and treated them as free gifts, or as rewards for past services. This was a scandalous state of affairs and seriously undermined the army's efficiency. After a thorough enquiry, Balban ordered a resumption of the assignments and payment of compensation to the holders. The aged troopers, in recognition of their past services were given a fixed pension in cash; a similar gratuity was given to the widows and the minor heirs, while the able-bodied were enlisted in the regular army, their salary being made a first charge

on the revenue of the village to be collected by the central exchequer. The resumption order however, evoked loud protests from the assignees; the old men approached Fakhruddin, the *kotwal* of Delhi and a respected friend of the king, and begged him to intercede on their behalf. The *kotwal* played on the feelings of the old monarch and succeeded in having the order concerning the aged holders rescinded. The rest appears to have been enforced.¹⁹ The chronicler leaves us only to infer that cash payment henceforth became the rule for Balban's military personnel. Whether he realised the need for centralising the army like his Khalji successor, is a point on which little direct evidence is forthcoming. The assignment system certainly remained in force; improvement of the provincial army continued to be the governor's concern; cash payment rule could only be enforced when it was accompanied by direct individual recruitment of the army. The aforesaid reforms were, in any case, confined to the central army which was entrusted to the care of Imadul Mulk, the *diwan-i-arz*. The latter enjoyed the king's confidence and was made independent of the wazir's financial control. Imadul Mulk was a capable man; his honesty and scrupulous attention to the details of recruitment, pay and equipment of the troops vitalised the fighting services. Though no fundamental change in the military organisation seems to have been affected, yet the reforms, coupled with the expansion mentioned above, undoubtedly increased the fighting potential of the Sultanate.

Barani gives a graphic description of the unsettled conditions of life and property which prevailed during the latter part of Mahmud's reign.


Even allowing for some calculated exaggeration in the statement, Balban's efforts in the past few years must be regarded as inconclusive. In the Doab and Awadh, roads were poor and infested with robbers who nearly severed all communication with the eastern provinces. Hindu peasants were in perpetual rebellion.²⁰ In the neighbourhood of Delhi dense forests sheltered marauders, while the Mewatis came and plundered the suburbs with impunity. The Katehriya Rajputs also showed no signs of weakness and extended their depredations to Budaun and Amroha.²¹ Since the trans-Gangetic tract had only been partially conquered and most of the Rajput ruling families had sought refuge there from the south, it appears highly probable that the rebellions in those parts were engineered by the dispossessed Rajputs and were of a political nature. In Furrukhabad, where the rebels found strongholds in Patiali and Kampil, the later Gahadavala princes are known to have had their headquarters.

The King's prestige, more than a concern for the people's welfare, demanded a concentrated drive against this anarchy. With the army recently fitted, Balban therefore, made the extirpation of the rebels his first care. He started his work in the immediate vicinity of the capital. For a whole year he was engaged in hunting down the highway robbers and clearing the forests. Having thus destroyed their hiding places, he created a fortress at Gopalgir guarding the city's south western approach against the Mewatis. It was garrisoned with seasoned Afghan troops. Similar posts with Afghan garrisons were established in other corners of the Delhi province.²² The capital was thereby cordoned off and

freed from the Mewati robbers, and for the first time in several years the citizens breathed freely. Next year Balban turned to the Doab and Awadh where life was equally insecure. In order to deal effectively with the rebels he divided the area into a number of military commands. These were made into assignments and placed under energetic officers who were to clear the forests and conduct a relentless drive against the insurgents. The measure produced good result and in a short time order was restored. Brigands were seized and peasants returned to normal obedience and to agriculture. Balban himself remained for a year in the neighbourhood of Kampil and Patiali to clear the highways and build new roads through the forest-clearings. To ensure their safety he erected military posts at Bhojpur, Patiali and Kampil, near Budaun, and placed seasoned Afghan troops in these rebel strongholds. The ancient fortress of Jalali, situated on the route to 'Hindusthan'²³ was also repaired and strongly garrisoned.²⁴ From the inscription on the mosque at Jalali, presumably built on this occasion, this resettlement of the place seems to have taken place in 665/1266-7.²⁵

While Balban was still engaged in these operations news arrived of fresh disturbance by the Katehriyas in Budaun and Amroha. He immediately returned to Delhi, assembled a large force and marching out, ostensibly on a 'hunting expedition, suddenly appeared before Katehar. A body of five thousand archers was detailed to plunder and set fire to the habitat of the insurgents and to slay the adult male population. The punishment was inhumanly severe and calculated to strike terror;

Plate II



Kaiqubad embracing his father

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Barani records how at every village and jungle heaps, of human corpse lay rotting, the stench fouling the air as far as the Ganges. The district was almost depopulated but the measure served its purpose for the time being at least. Adjacent districts were thoroughly terrorised and no further action was found necessary. The country was cleared of forests, roads were built and civil government was introduced. Barani records that from that day the *iqtas* of Baran, Amroha, Sambhal and 'Kanuri' (Katehar?) were rendered safe and permanently freed from trouble.²⁶ The author of the *Tarikh-i-Mubarakshahi* adds that on this occasion Balban extended his operations to the '*kohpayah* of Santur',²⁷ probably necessitated by the insurgents obtaining assistance from the hill-chief who in any case, had shown particular unfriendliness by harbouring rebels in the past.

Internal security having thus been restored, the stage seemed now set for the resumption of the expansionist expeditions into Hindu territories. Iltutmish's efforts had pointed to this policy. The cessation of offensive action following his death had encouraged Hindu aggression; a counter-offensive seemed clearly called for. Balban's experience and realism, however, dictated a different policy. Internal disorders in the recent past had showed up what the pioneer Iltutmish could not have seen, namely, the incomplete nature of the state organization. A dynastic absolute kingship was yet to take firm root in Delhi; the autonomy of the provincial governors tended to nullify central authority; and, the administrative machinery showed signs of improvisation at almost every point.

Annexation of new territories in such circumstances was bound to create problems and involve strains which would be far beyond the organizational capacity of the Sultanate to endure. Even in the administered area itself, the process of conquest and pacification had by no means ended. Armed Hindu resistance still continued to be a major problem and threatened to consume the state's available resources. The Mongol threat, above all, was a powerful deterrent to any action likely to weaken the frontier defences. As will be shown in a later chapter of this book, their military and political pressure pushed the Delhi frontier back to the Beas. Lahore formed the Mongol sphere of influence while Multan and Sind were subject to recurring attacks. Balban strove hard to appease them by exchanging friendly envoys and only as a last resort had recourse to armed defence. Like Iltutmish in the early years of his reign, Balban also thus found his hands tied by defence problems. A new deterrent was the serious shortage of Turkish man-power in India caused by the Mongols severing Delhi's contact with Turkestan. Employment of the available Turkish military personnel simultaneously on two fronts was now possible only by associating men of other races in running the state. To do that would mean undermining the racial basis of the Sultanate to which, as will be explained later, Balban was deeply committed.

To expand his limited man-power and military resources in making additional conquests of dubious value was therefore a course of action whose folly he realised quite early in his reign and explained to those who urged him on to win new territories.

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Sending punitive expeditions as a defence measure or to obtain treasure, he said, was one thing; to invade and seek to permanently occupy a warlike Hindu state requiring the deployment of a large number of loyal officers and troops was an entirely different thing.²⁸ "For me to sieze and occupy other countries would only bring harm to the kingdom". "If protection of the Mussalmans (from the Mongols) were not my first care, I would not stay a single day in the capital but would lead my well-prepared forces to capture the treasure, horses and elephants of the distant Ranas and to the destruction of the enemies of Islam". He remembered the wise counsels of the ancient kings: "strengthen and consolidate your own kingdom, for it is wiser than to seize others that are difficult to hold and would only weaken your own".²⁹ Balban was certainly not a contented pacifist, but defence and conservation of resources received his first attention. Internal consolidation therefore became the keynote of his policy and territorial expansion was formally postponed.

His reign thus stands in clear contrast to those of his predecessors. It is marked not by expansionist expeditions or even rebellions but by comparative peace and security. The chronicler is less engaged in recording military events than in making observations stressing the order and tranquility of the country. By a timely sheathing of the conqueror's sword Balban certainly created the condition-precedent for the Khalji conquests.

His autocracy was absolute; he staked everything in uprooting the slightest defiance of his authority. Towards the end of his reign occurred an incident

which clearly emphasised the ruthlessness with which the king's absolutism was intended to operate. This was a rebellion of the governor of Lakhnauti. In the year of his accession Tatar Khan who succeeded his father, the rebel Arslan, in Lakhnauti, prudently submitted to Balban and as a token of allegiance, sent a number of elephants to Delhi.³⁰ Thereupon he was presumably confirmed in the post. How long he ruled there is not recorded; later accounts state that he was removed from his post by Balban's orders.³¹ The next governor named Tughril, is reported to have been originally one of Balban's slaves. He was a bold and ambitious man and led successful expeditions into the neighbouring Hindu states³² and obtained reputedly enormous wealth. True to the name of '*Balghakpur*' which Lakhnauti had earned in the past,³³ Tughril, feeling confident of his power, eventually asserted independence and withheld the king's share (*Khums*) of the spoils. He finally assumed sovereignty and like Yuzbak took the regal name of Sultan Mughisuddin.³⁴ By liberal distribution of offices and emoluments he won over the people to his side, and counted on the pre-occupation and old age of Balban for uninterfered enjoyment of power.

Tughril apparently possessed a very poor knowledge of his old master's character. On receipt of the news Balban flew into a rage and immediately directed Amin Khan, the governor of Awadh to proceed with his army and bring him to submission.³⁵ Tughril brought up his forces and opposed Amin Khan's progress. In the battle that followed near the Gogra in north Bihar, the royal forces were however completely defeated; some of the Delhi

troops deserted to Tughril, while the rest, retreating, suffered heavy losses at the hands of the Hindu tribes of Awadh. News of this defeat, damaging as it was to the prestige of the reputedly invincible king, upset Balban's equanimity and in violent rage he ordered the defeated officer to be hanged at the Awadh gate.³⁶

A similar fate overtook the army which Balban despatched next year under Tirmithi. Tughril seems to have enormously increased in strength for, according to Yahya Sirhindi, he defeated a third army led by Shahabuddin, Amin Khan's successor in Awadh.³⁷

These successive defeats and the continued defiance of his authority made Balban almost mad with rage. He was now in his eightieth year and the Mongol pressure had by no means subsided. But he decided to lead the fourth expedition personally and thus stake his all to vindicate the crown's authority. And he swore never to return without the rebel's head. Taking with him his second son, Bughra Khan, and having appointed his friend, the kotwal Fakhruddin, to act as the regent during his absence, he set out, determined and well-prepared for a long campaign. He requisitioned troops from the adjoining provinces and at Awadh enlisted, in addition, about two hundred thousand men. The rainy season was approaching, but his iron will would suffer no obstacles.

The old king's courage and ruthless will at least unnerved the rebel. Afraid to offer any frontal resistance he collected his treasure and followers and leaving Lakhnauti, made in all haste for what Barani writes as 'Hajinagar' but which undoubtedly

lay towards the south-east.³⁸ He depended on the climate and the waterlogged soil of the province to wear out the Delhi forces and the king's patience when he hoped to emerge from his retreat and re-occupy the capital. Balban pushed on with utmost speed and occupied the evacuated city. Leaving it in charge of Malik Husamuddin with instructions to keep him informed about affairs in Delhi, he immediately set out in Tughril's pursuit. It led him to East Bengal and on arrival at Sunargaon he is reported to have met the local raja who agreed to co-operate in seizing the rebel.³⁹ Barani calls the Hindu raja by the name of Nauja, who is obviously identifiable with the king of the Deva dynasty, named Danujamadhava Ariraja Dasaratha, one of whose fragmentary grants has been discovered at Vikrampur, Dacca district.⁴⁰ Danuja must have been independent, for according to Yahya Sirhindi, in asking for his co-operation, Balban was obliged to show him respect due to a sovereign prince.⁴¹ On obtaining from him an assurance to prevent Tughril's flight by the rivers flowing through his kingdom, Balban resumed the pursuit and arrived within 140 miles of the 'Hajinagar frontier'.⁴² No trace of the rebel being still found, he detached and sent ahead a part of his force under Bektars and himself followed in the rear. A party of scouts from Bektars's detachment unexpectedly succeeded in locating the rebel's camp on the Hajinagar frontier. Bektars suddenly fell upon Tughril's unsuspecting troops resting beside a tank. They all fled in confusion at the sudden attack and the rebel himself was slain while attempting to flee. The triumphant officer returned to Balban with Tughril's head and received liberal rewards.

On the king's return to Lakhnauti, after rewards and promotions were distributed, an exemplary punishment was meted out to the captured adherents of Tughril; every one, suspected of having the slightest connection with him was hanged on gibbets erected along the two sides of the Lakhnauti bazaar. The deserters from the royal army were also rounded up and kept in chains for a similar punishment at Delhi.⁴³

Having at last re-established his authority, Balban appointed Bughra Khan to the province and, pointing to the corpses hanging from the gibbets and visible from the palace balcony, he warned him of the consequences of rebellion against Delhi. After giving him a final advice as to his duties he set out on his return journey and made a triumphant entry into the capital after three years' absence.⁴⁴ On the supplication of the army qazi, who was prevailed upon by their relatives to intercede, the captives were pardoned and released. Governors and feudatory chiefs all flocked to pay homage to the victorious Sultan whose unconquerable will to assert his absolute authority was brought home to them in such a forceful manner. His eldest son, Muhammad, the viceroy of Multan, Lahore and Dipalpur, also paid him a visit and brought the spoils obtained in expeditions in lower Sind.⁴⁵ He had already been nominated for the succession and was now sent back with further honour and rewards.

Barani remarks that after the suppression of Tughril the Sultan's authority rested securely in the people's heart and peace and order was manifest in every corner of the kingdom.⁴⁶ Balban was thus at

the height of his power and prestige, and the country, for the first time in many years, witnessed a strong government which guaranteed the security of the people's life and property. Against external foes his anxious preparations had borne equally good results. Early in the reign he had led a punitive expedition against the ever turbulent tribesmen of the Salt Range who not only periodically ravaged the settled districts but were in alliance with the Mongol invaders and acted as guides. Lahore, abandoned for all practical purposes since Mahmud's reign, was recovered and rebuilt.⁴⁷ The district was incorporated within the frontier province of Multan and Dipalpur which after Sher Khan's death, was placed in charge of prince Muhammad. A standing force of about seventeen to eighteen thousand horses was set apart for dealing with the Mongols who were, as a result, effectively held on the line of the Beas.⁴⁸ The rest of the State forces, maintained in a high state of efficiency by constant exercise⁴⁹, was also kept ready for the invaders.

Balban lived long enough to reap the fruit of his labours. His achievements, in ensuring peace and order, made such a profound impression on the people that the prosperous reign of Iltutmish was almost forgotten; the Sultanate, in the people's mind, was nearly merged in Balban and his house. It seemed that his dynasty had come to stay. He himself entertained no doubts and never tired of advising his heir-apparent, Muhammad, as to his kingly duties. Barani, Amir Khusrau and Amir Hasan all bestow lavish praise on the prince's mental and moral accomplishments.⁵⁰ He should undoubtedly have proved a capable ruler, but fate had

decided otherwise, and like Iltutmish's eldest son, prince Muhammad was not destined to wear the crown. In a fierce battle with the Mongols, fought during one of their periodical invasions in the Lahore-Dipalpur province, he was slain in February, 1286.⁵¹ The death of his accomplished and favourite son, more than the disaster to his forces, came as a terrible blow to the aged monarch and he never recovered from the shock. His policy, no less than his dynasty, seemed doomed to frustration, for his next son Bughra, was ease-loving, mediocre and shirked responsibilities. Barani gives a touching description of the iron king's grief; he bore it lightly in public but wept bitterly at night.

The consuming grief and anxiety for the future of the state, to the building of which had gone more than fifty years of his life, soon proved too much for his failing health, and sickness at last confined him to bed. He perceived his approaching end and summoned Bughra to stay near his death-bed. Barani describes how the terribly autocratic king entreated his son not to leave him in his last moment. 'He had no other son, and if his grandsons, Kai-khusrau or Kaiqubad, still in their teens, were to succeed, the kingdom would go to ruins'. It was more than a hint; it was a clear request to accept the crown. But the unfeeling, slow-witted son preferred the luxury and the easy life of the distant Lakhnauti. But he dared not disappoint his father openly, and stayed on for three months, at the end of which, when Balban slightly recovered, he quietly left for his eastern appanage. While still on his way he heard of his father's relapse; but to retrace his steps and be prepared to accept the

Delhi crown required courage which he woefully lacked. His cowardice and irresponsibility thus left the old king no other choice but to nominate the 'martyr' prince's son, the young Kaikhusrau, for succession. The prince was inexperienced and admittedly made a poor choice, but, unless he preferred to set aside his own dynasty and consequently the policy it symbolised, Balban found no better alternative.⁵² Kaikhusrau was however brought up under his strict supervision and could, perhaps, be counted upon to imbibe some of his own qualities in preserving the throne, delicately balanced as it was, between so many contending forces. Balban's ultimate reliance was in any event, on his trusted counsellors, his friend the *kotwal* and the *wazir* whom he requested to give all protection and advice that the prince may need. He died within a few days of Kaikhusrau's nomination, about the middle of 1287 A.D.⁵³

✓ "The *maliks* in grief at Balban's death," remarks Barani, "tore their garments and threw dust on their heads as they followed, barefeet, the king's bier to the burial ground at Darul Aman. For forty days they mourned his death and slept on the bare floor".⁵⁴ That the austere and terrible monarch was popular, is hard to believe; respect for his abilities and a fear of his power would be more natural. Enough has perhaps been said to evaluate his contributions to the making of the Delhi Sultanate. In continuing Aibak and Iltutmish's work be applied an energy and calculation that brought forth warm ✓ tributes even from his adversaries. To him, unquestionably, is to be attributed the preservation of the state's integrity at a time when unrestricted ex-

pansion threatened to overstrain its resources. By consolidating the conquered areas, and destroying the forces of anarchy, he fulfilled a historical need, namely, preparing the Sultanate for further territorial expansion as the next stage of its development. Balban's greatest single achievement lay in the revival of the monarchy as the supreme factor in the state. By the centralisation which it involved—although detailed instances are lacking—Balban's work thus definitely shortened the period of administrative improvisations that marked the 13th-century Sultanate. In a large measure he prepared the ground for the Khalji state-system. ✓

In one aspect of his policy however, he showed a lamentable lack of statesmanlike vision. This was his extreme racialism which led him to make the Sultanate an exclusively Turkish concern. He affected a great repugnance to associating with what he called men of "low origin" and could not bear the sight of the native Mussalmans in his government. On one occasion he administered a sharp rebuke to his courtiers for having selected a native Mussalman for a clerical post in Amroha.⁵⁵ His autocracy was intended to emphasize the unchallenged domination of the Turks, although they themselves were conceded very little share in the exercise of sovereign power. It would therefore be wrong to designate Balban's state as an oligarchy, but there seems little doubt that he considered himself more the custodian of Turkish sovereignty than a king of the Mussalmans. In so doing, he admittedly was following his master Iltutmish who is also reported to have felt an equal abhorrence for the Indian Muslim. But what was defensible in Iltutmish's ✓

time was fraught with ruinous consequences in that of Balban. The initial conquest, as has been noted earlier, had the character of a racial movement; its easy success was largely conditioned by the uninterrupted flow of immigrant Turks from beyond the Hindukush. A loose political organisation, held together largely by a common race-sentiment could, and was forced by circumstances to, insist on the preservation of this dominant characteristic. While the overrunning was in progress this sentiment, coupled with the equally potent tie of religion worked wonderfully well. This insistence on racialism proved a great help in focussing opposition to the racial aggression of the Mongols. Most of these factors however, had ceased to be operative by the time Balban commenced his reign. No fresh immigration could reach India from Turkestan on a large scale, while conversion and inter-marriage steadily increased the non-Turkish Mussalmans. Balban himself put an end to continuous territorial expansion and devoted himself to defending the Muslim state from the Hindus and the Mongols. Common interests of safety, which thereby were emphasised, were bound to transcend racial and even religious barriers. Imperceptibly, but with irresistible progress, an integrated Indo-Muslim society was coming into being and the transformation of the Sultanate, from a Turkish to an Indo-Muslim state was well on its way. To resist this process was therefore not only useless but highly unwise. For the steadily-diminishing number of the pure-born Turks it was impossible to maintain predominance. Balban's uncompromising will only gave it an unreal lease of life; his death, consequently, meant the passing of the Turk

as the controller of India's destiny.

This impending change was apparent to all his contemporaries. "Every upstart" said the *kotwal*, while delivering the funeral oration as Balban's coffin was being lowered into the grave, "will now aspire to the throne and ancient families and the old aristocracy will be for ever ruined".⁵⁶ This change, surely as it was coming, was hastened by the new reign surveyed in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. Ibn Battuta, ii, p. 26; Haji Dabir, i, p. 726; *TA*, i, trans. p. 92-93; *Ferishhta*, i, p. 74, summarised in Elphinstone : *History of India*, p. 371.

2. *Kitabur Rahlah*, ii, p. 29; Isami, p. 158; *Wassaf*, f. 254b. The *TM*, p. 39, dates Mahmud's death on the 11th Jamadi I, 664.

3. Barani, p. 23. Haji Dabir, ii, p. 728; Amir Khusrau: *Qiranus-Sadain*, p. 18.

4. Barani, p. 26.

5. All the *Mss.* of Barani's history, as well as the printed text, date Balban's accession in 662/1263. But this is clearly wrong, for the latest of Mahmud's coins is dated 664/1265-66. Balban's coins commence in 664; *CCBM*; the *Sultans of Delhi* p. 26, no. 93; also Wright : *Coinage and Metrology*, nos. 224 and 242 A. *Alfi*, f. 61a, places the accession, two days after Mahmud's death, on the 13th *Jamadi* I, 664/20th Feb. 1266. Cf. also Haji Dabir, ii, p. 725.

6. Barani, p. 102. For an account of the Afrasiyabi Turks, see *JRAS*, 1898, pp. 467-502; Browne : trans. *Chahar Maqala*, notes, p. 22; also Raverty : trans. *Tab. Nas.* pp. 900-910, note.

7. Barani, p. 37; see also pp. 40, 70-71.

8. *Ibid*, p. 34. He may not have actually expressed himself in these words which very probably are Barani's own construction but the ideas condensed and personalised in this form agree with the known facts of Balban's conduct; cf., however, *BSOAS*, 1957, pp. 315-21.

9. See his advice to his heir-apparent to constantly beware of his enemies and to provide against assassination; Barani, p. 80. An earlier reference to this aspect of despotism is contained in the *Adabul-Harb*,

12.

10. Minhaj, pp. 317-19.

11. Barani, p. 30.

12. *Ibid*, p. 33-4.

13. *Ferishhta*, i, p. 75; see also Barani, pp. 30-31 and p. 112.

14. Barani, p. 40. The news writer of Budaun who had failed to

report the governor's conduct in time was also publicly hanged.

15. *Ibid*, p. 74.

16. *Ibid*, p. 44-45.

17. According to Barani, p. 65, he was poisoned to death by Balban's orders. His death is said to have occurred four or five years after Balban's accession.

18. Barani, p. 29.

19. Barani, pp.60,61-64, *TM* and Haji Dabir make no mention of this event. Ferishta i, p. 78 only copies Barani. *Cf. CHI*, iii, p. 77, where the entire measure is stated to have been dropped. The passage, however, does not permit such an interpretation.

20. Barani, p. 56.

21. *Ibid*, p. 57.

22. *TM*, p. 40; see also Ferishta, i, p. 77.

23. Ferishta explains the term Hindusthan as referring to the provinces of 'Jaunpur, Bihar and Bengal'.

24. Jalali is 11 miles east of Aligarh and is reported to occupy the site of an old town named Nilauti; Carlyle : *ASR*, xii, p. 12. See also *IGI* xiv, p. 14-15.

25. *ASR*, 1914-15, pp. 151-52.

26. Barani, p. 59. We however hear of the Katehriyas rising again in the 14th century in the reign of Firoz Tughlaq.

27. *TM*, p. 40.

28. See Minhaj; *TN*, p. 291, for an instance of such treasure-hunting expeditions. In 1247 Ulugh Khan represented to Mahmud that since no Mongol invasion had occurred that year the respite should be utilised in ravaging the territories of the 'Rais and Ranas of Hindusthan' and thereby acquiring booty and the "means to fight the infidels."

29. His arguments are fully elaborated by Barani, pp.50-53 who however puts them in the form of a speech by Balban.

30. *Ibid*, p. 53. *Cf. DHB* ii, p. 56, note 2.

31. Salim : *Riyazus-Salatin*, p. 75. There is confusion with regard to the successor of Tatar Khan. Haji Dabir, ii, p. 733, places Tughril's appointment in 664 but contradicts himself on iii, p. 965, by dating the event again in 657/1258-9. *TM*, p. 40 states that Amin Khan was appointed to succeed Sher Khan (possibly a misprint for Tatar Khan) "the Muqti of Lakhnauti" whose death was reported to Balban while he was busy in erecting the strongholds of Patiali and Bhojpur, on the Ganges; Amin Khan's *naib* Tughril, however, was reported to have usurped all power and dispossessed him. Stewart : *History of Bengal*, p. 69, states, on what authority is not mentioned, that Tatar Khan was confirmed by Balban and ruled in Bengal until his death in 1277. Barani, however, places Tughril's rebellion "15 or 16 years after Balban's accession." The earliest extant coin issued from Lakhnauti in Balban's name is dated 667 (or 669?) 1268-9; *IMC*, ii, No 154; Wright : *Metrology*; p. 59 No. 243A. It might as well have been issued by Tatar Khan, end of whose life or rule need not be assumed on this score, *Cf. DHB* ii, p. 57.

32. Barani, p. 82. Among the states raided by him, Barani mentions one Jainagar or Jainagar (the printed text has Hajinagar); The I.O. Ms. 177, f. 53b, 57b consistently spells it Jainagar. Ferishta has Jainagar; i, p. 79-80. Elliot, iii, p. 112 and 120, rightly held that it could not be Orissa; Stewart: *op. cit.* p. 70, calls it Jainagar-Tipperah. Raverty's identification with Orissa, supported by Banerji : *Banglar Itihasa*, ii, p. 70-71, is obviously untenable. *DHB*, ii pp. 60-66 identifies Jainagar with the tract comprising portions of Birhum, Bankura and Burdwan and Hooghly districts, without adducing any proof or reconciling this view with the known geographical data of Tughril and Balban's movements; instead, the attempt is finally given up with the remark "It is vain to speculate on the route of Tughril's retreat in the absence of any definite information" (p. 66). It makes much of a fortress built by Tughril at a place, named Narkilah by *TM* (p.41), which is identified with Loricol, site of a Portugese fortress 25 miles south of Dacca. It is not mentioned by Barani. If it at all had any connection with Tughril's retreat towards Jainagar its site would point to the south-east rather than to the south-west. For, Balban's arrival at Sunargaon, in his pursuit of Tughril, known to be flying towards Jainagar, and the conclusion of an agreement with the local raja for preventing the rebel's flight along the rivers, would point to a country in the south east of Bengal. Stewart's identification with Tipperah also does not seem satisfactory. The Tipperah chronicles, it is true, refers to a Turushka king of Gour who helped with troops one of the rival claimants to the Tipperah throne sometime towards the end of the 13th century and who conferred the title of Manikya on the ruler named Ratnapha, a title borne by the Tipperah house ever since; *Rajmala*, ed. K. C. Sinha, pp. 29-31; also Long's analysis and abridged translation, in *JASB* 1850, p. 533 sq. One can understand the flight of Tughril, if he is really identified with this Turushka king, to the country where he could expect to be received by the grateful raja; this treatment he could hardly expect from the king of Orissa whose territory he allegedly raided in the recent past. But the *Rajmala* is a later compilation and the Turushka king's identification is not beyond doubt. Besides, the existence of Tipperah as an important state in those days is not borne out by epigraphy or archaeology. Such evidences, on the contrary, have recently been unearthed to reveal the existence, in the Tipperah, Noakhali and the Meghna region, of a flourishing kingdom with its capital at Pattikera, now located near what is called the Mainamati hills near Comilla. Its ancient dynasty is proved by archaeological evidences to have been replaced about the middle of the 13th century, by a line of kings whose names end in Deva. Two kings of this line have so far been known, who not only extended the Pattikera kingdom but also seem to have supplanted the later Senas in Vikrampur and Dacca, for the second king, Danujamadhava Dasaratha-Deva, according to modern epigraphists, is identical with Danuja Rai of Barani (Raja Nauja of Abul Fazal); for this kingdom of Pattikera and the Deva dynasty, see *DHB*; i, pp. 254-259. Whether Tughril's flight was directed towards this Pattikera is a point worth considering. In that case Danuja Rai's readiness to help in seizing the rebel should be regarded

as prompted more by his hostility to him for the recent aggression than a desire to please Balban. Hajinar is probably the correct version, for it can be equated to Jahajnagar, a popular name of the Tipperah-Noakhali tract on the Meghna-Padma confluence. Ferishta, i, p. 79, and Haji Dabir, iii, p. 966, place Tughril's raid on 'Jajnagar', in 671/1272; Stewart : *op. cit.* p. 70, has 1279.

33. Barani, p. 82.

34. Cf. *TM*, p. 41, from which Ferishta seems to copy the statement that Balban fell sick at this time and the rumour of his death spread to Lakhnauti. Tughril thereupon declared his independence and assumed the title of Muizzuddin. See Barani, p. 82-83.

35. Ferishta, i, p. 79, states that Amin Khan was on this occasion appointed governor of Lakhnauti. See also Blochmann: *JASB*, 1874, p. 287, who reproduces Badauni's account; *Muntakhab-ut-Twarikh*, i, p. 127.

36. Barani, p. 84. *TM*, p. 41, states that the general was taken prisoner and was confined by Tughril at Narkilah.

37. *TM*, p. 41-42.

38. Barani, p. 85-86; *TM*, p. 42 states that he fled to Narkilah. See Haji Dabir, iii, p. 967, who calls it Jajnagar.

39. See Rennell; *Memoirs of a map of Hindusthan*, p. 57, for the location of Sunargaon.

40. It has not yet been edited fully; a tentative reading was published in the *Bharatvarsha*; B.S. 1332, part ii, pp. 78-81, from which an account was given in Mazumdar, N.G.; *Inscriptions of Bengal*, iii, p. 181; for two other copper plate grants issued by one Damodara Ariraja Chanur Madhava in 1231 and 1243 A.D. then ruling over Tipperah, Naokhali and Chittagong districts, see *DHB*, i, pp. 253-55.

41. The *TM*, pp. 42-43, gives a confused itinerary of Balban's march; On his marching out from Delhi Tughril fled by the river 'Saru' or 'Sarv' and went to Narkilah; Balban despatched Bektars to pursue him; at that stage the representation of Rai Danuj was received who expressed a desire to see the Sultan provided the latter honoured him by standing up when he arrived; Balban was chary to honour an infidel, but Bektars suggested that he should keep a falcon on his hand and when the Rai arrived, should stand up to let it loose after some bird, so that the significance of the gesture should not be clear to the spectators. The Rai then came and agreed to seize the rebel by every means at his disposal. Then Balban arrived at Lakhnauti and an advance body of scouts unexpectedly came upon Tughril's camp in a jungle.

42. In the *Fathnamah*, composed by Amir Khusrau, who had accompanied the expedition with Bughra Khan to Lakhnauti, Bektar's conquests in Lakhnauti are recounted but no mention is made of Tughril's rebellion. He (Bektars) is described as having been sent for the subjugation of 'Jajnagar' and Awadh. On arrival at the former place he defeated a strong force of the Rai, commanded by Maldeo Rana. He then pushed on to 'Jahanbar' (Add. 16842, f. 513b, has Maha-Benares) the residence of the Rai and even captured the strong fort of 'Asirgaon' (The two B.M.

Mss. have Gaonsunar; Sunargaon is possibly meant) by defeating the Rawats. The Rai, Beerajit Mal, thereupon sued for peace and offered to acknowledge Muslim suzerainty and pay tribute. The offer being accepted, the Rai presented himself to the Sultan and was enrolled as a vassal. Thereafter, the Muslim army, accompanied by the Sultan returned to Delhi, in the 5th *Shawwal*, 680/1281; *Ijaz-i-Khusrawi*, (Lucknow edition) v, pp. 5-14. Place names in this account are difficult to identify; it could hardly refer to the conquest of Orissa. 'Asirgaon' is probably Sunargaon, which soon after appears under Muslim rule. The duration of Danujamadhava's reign is not known but Battashali is inclined to place its termination sometime about 1280; It is probable that Danuja Rai was reduced by Bektars before Tughril could be pursued any further and that the agreement recorded followed this event. Beerajit Mal, in that, event, should be supposed to be the name of Danuj Rai's general. Barani, in any case seems to allude to the annexation of Sunargaon when he records Balban's warning to Bughra (p. 93) that 'whoever among the *muqtis* of Hind, Sind, Malwab, Gujrat, Lakhnauti and Sunargaon revolts against Delhi, he would meet with a fate similar to that of Tughril'. The undoubted occupation of Sunargaon is proved by the issue of a coin, a few years later, by Bughra's son and successor, Kaikaus from the '*Kharaj of Bang*' dated 690/1291; *JASB*, 1922, p. 410.

43. Barani, p. 91-92.

44 This is dated by Amir Khusrau in 1281. It seems to be supported by the evidence of an inscription at a mosque in Garh Mukteswar, U.P. which was completed in *Rabi i*, 682/1283, during the governorship of Bektars al-Sultani, the commander of Balban's vanguard in his Bengal campaign; *EIM*, 1913-14, ins. no. 29.

45. Amir Khusrau : *Ghurraatul-Kamal, dibacha*, quoted by Budauni; *op. cit.* trans. i, p. 216; Barani, p. 69.

46. p. 109.

47. Barani, pp. 59-61.

48. Barani, p. 81. For a detailed discussion of the frontier situation see chapter IX.

49. See Barani, pp. 54-55, how by his frequent hunting expeditions he kept his army in trim.

50. Barani, pp. 67-69.

51. *Ibid*, p. 109; *TM*, pp. 44-45, quotes in full Amir Hasan's account of the prince's fight and resulting death; Budauni: *op. cit.* p. 138 (text), quotes Amir Khusrau's ode. See *TA*, i, p. 88 for an unconfirmed story of how the prince's sad end was supposed to be the result of the displeasure of the contemporary saint Sadruddin of Multan. In a fit of drunkenness the prince is reported to have divorced his wife, a daughter of the house of Ilutmish but subsequently he desired to take her back, for which she had to be married to another and then divorced. The saint was persuaded to agree to taking her in marriage but later the lady refused to return to the prince and consequently the saint refused to divorce her. The prince thereupon flew into a rage and swore to kill Sadruddin, the first thing next morning;

but the Mongol invasion occurred to take him away to his fateful expedition before he had time to execute his plan.

52. Barani, p. 121-22.

53. *TM*, p. 52. Barani gives no date but on p. 127, places Kaiqubad's accession in 685, which is wrong.



CHAPTER VIII

END OF THE MAMLUK DYNASTY
KAIQUBAD AND KAIUMARS: 1287-1290

It is useless to speculate on the possible result of Kaikhusrau's accession, for, immediately after Balban's death, he was sent off to Multan to which he had been appointed to succeed his father.¹ Fakhruddin and his people are reported to have had some private quarrel with the prince Muhammad and so were unwilling, despite Balban's last request, to allow his son to ascend the throne, "lest harm came to them".² Malik Beksariq, the Wazir Hasan Basri, and the dahir, who opposed this arbitrary measure, were imprisoned by the kotwal's party and eventually exiled.³ Bughra Khan's son, Kaiqubad, was then given the title of Muizzuddin and was raised to the throne.⁴

Barani seems to forget his old age when he describes the gay and care free life that marked the young king's reign. The prince, then in his 18th year, had been brought up under the strict care and vigilance of his grandfather. He was gifted with charming manners and accomplishments and possessed a refined taste for poetry and music. During adolescence, the puritannical Balban allowed him no opportunity for tasting the pleasures of life; "he could not glance at a fair face or drain a goblet of wine."⁵ Now suddenly, and quite unexpectedly, in the most critical period of a man's life, he found himself absolute master not only of his own actions but of a

rich and prosperous kingdom. The usual result followed. His pent-up desires and preferences found expression in unbridled indulgence in wine, women and gait. The court became full of buffoons, musicians and dancers. Citizens and courtiers, whose yearning for sensual pleasures remained unsatisfied under the austere Balban, also followed suit and Delhi became a flourishing mart for wine, musicians and dancing girls who flocked from all parts of the kingdom. Pursuit of pleasure became the rule of life and even men of letters and learning were obliged to earn appreciation by paying their quota of poetry, wit, and humour to merry parties. Kaiqubad gave up residing in the old city and built himself a new palace at Kilokhri, a few miles down the Jumna^o. The courtiers also shifted there, and soon the place teemed with new buildings and with people of all descriptions. Barani remarks, perhaps with no little exaggeration, that during the three years of Kaiqubad's rule the people had no other work but to seek merriment and invent newer forms of pleasure. As the personal popularity of the young Sultan increased, governmental measures of the late king became less in evidence. The administration was left to shift for itself and to the successful intriguer.

The description of Kaiqubad's merry parties occupy most of Barani's account of the reign. Behind the gait, however, was the inevitable intriguer. On his accession, following the customary procedure, Kaiqubad confirmed the old officers. Among the promotions was that of the deputy wazir, Khwaja Khatir who received the vacant office of Hasan Basri. Among the new appointments were those of

Malik Tuzaki, the private chamberlain, Malik Jawarji the *Sar-i-Jandar*, and of Malik Qiwamuddin, the chief secretary, the latter receiving the additional post of the deputy chief of the royal household (*naib-i-wakil-i-dar*). An appointment which proved to have the greatest consequence for Kaiqubad, was that of Malik Nizamuddin, the son-in-law of the kotwal Fakhruddin, who became the chief magistrate of the capital (*dad-bak*)⁷.

An ambitious man with an innate aptitude for intrigue, Nizamuddin soon warmed himself in the Sultan's confidence. Although he held only a judicial post, Barani states, he soon made himself into a de facto *naib-i-mamlikat*, and assumed control over all state departments. He possessed the virtues of a shrewd and able administrator and Barani gives him the entire credit for maintenance of law and order during the gay king's rule.⁸ He sent his wife to reside in the palace and to assume control of the Sultan's harem. By virtue of his relation with the kotwal, the most influential man in the city, Nazamuddin wielded undisputed authority and most of the courtiers found it prudent to profess attachment to him.

Barani regrets that such an able administrator should have yielded to the temptation of wearing the crown. To every thinking man, however, a dynastic change was only a matter of time and Nizamuddin's ambition was no crime. Balban's children had proved themselves utterly unworthy of his crown; the state needed strong courageous men, not the timid Bughra Khan or the pleasure loving Kaiqubad. Mongol attacks had been recurring with increased frequency. The need for a

militarist king was more urgent than before and sentimental consideration for dynastic legitimacy could claim no precedence. Nizamuddin probably was no soldier, but the arguments of his father-in-law who tried to dissuade him from his designs, on the ground that "he did not belong to the race of kings" were certainly no justification for the continuance on the throne of an effete dynasty.⁹

Nizamuddin pursued his game with undiminished vigour, and proceeded to weed out his rivals systematically. Kaikhusrau was likely to prove an obstacle; so he was summoned from Multan and murdered on the way at Rhotak under Kaiqubad's order, issued in a fit of drunkenness.¹⁰ This foul deed left no doubt as to Nizamuddin's treacherous design; his unscrupulous nature inspired terror in the heart of every man of note. The *wazir*, Khwaja Khatir, already bereft of his authority as the chief executive officer of the state, was next disgraced. A colony of Mongol converts who had settled in Delhi in Balban's reign, and who were related to many of the influential men of Balban's party, were likewise imprisoned and slain on a trumped-up charge of sedition. Among them were officers of note, including the *sar-i-jandar* and the *amir-i-hajib*; their vacant offices Nizamuddin now filled with more dependable men.¹¹ The Sultan, now completely under the control of Nizamuddin's wife, refused to listen to any complaint against him. The dynastic change thus began to be openly talked about and Kaiqubad's deposition became only a question of time.

Fate, as Barani remarks, however was to provide a different instrument for the execution of this

historical task, for Nizamuddin was not destined to reap the fruit of his labour. In Lakhnauti, Bughra Khan had assumed sovereignty after Balban's death,¹² but, though aiming at separate political existence, he could not remain indifferent to the happenings at Delhi. Some writers even ascribe to him a readiness to press his claim to his father's throne, even if only to counteract Nizamuddin. Kaiqubad's headlong march to self-destruction seems to have at last awakened the family shirker to a sense of his dynastic interests. He had kept himself fully informed of his son's doings and carried on a constant correspondence with Delhi. His letters carried advice, admonition, and warning. But his son, completely under the spell of his nemesis, showed no signs of improvement. At last Bughra decided to see him and asked for an interview. This was granted and a meeting was arranged on the banks of the Sarju river in Awadh¹³. It is difficult to be certain as to Bughra Khan's motives; whether it was solely a filial affection that prompted him to this course is a point on which early writers are not unanimous. Like all others he unmistakably saw the impending doom of his father's dynasty and it is not unlikely that, remembering at last his father's wishes, he wanted to reclaim the throne. This, at least, is the interpretation put to his action by Amir Khusrau and a few later writers¹⁴.

Whatever his real motive, Bughra certainly marched with his army and encamped on the eastern bank of the Sarju. Kaiqubad also started in full military array and after a liesurely march arrived to pitch his camp on the opposite bank. This display of military power may only have been a

precautionary measure but Nizamuddin, instinctively, foresaw the emotional effect on the young king of a meeting with his long separated father, and tried his best to bring about an armed conflict. It was only through the earnest endeavours of some of the loyal adherents of Balban's family that this was averted. Nizamuddin persuaded the king to impose rigid and humiliating ceremonials on Bughra; he was required to cross over and do obeisance to his son, the successor to Balban's throne and the Lord Paramount of India. Following a protracted exchange of arguments and threats, during which the peace-makers were hard put to avert a rupture, paternal affection got the better of Bughra's sense of dignity and he agreed to pay homage to the Sultan of Delhi.¹⁵ The meeting that followed is one of the tenderest episodes in medieval history and has furnished the theme of one of the celebrated poems of Amir Khusrau. Kaiqubad affected a stony dignity and with kingly unconcern looked on as his father, bowing and kissing the ground, approached the throne and prostrated himself at his feet; but at the end he broke down and threw himself at Bughra's feet and in tears, which melted the heart of all the spectators, conducted him to the throne. They remained together for some days, during which Bughra advised his son to mend his ways, to live up to his family traditions and to save himself from the destruction which his conduct was bringing upon him. At the last meeting, in the style of Balban, he instructed him as to the art of administration and, while parting, whispered an advice to get rid of evil counsellors like Nizamuddin¹⁶. After a final exchange of presents, the two parted, the father

however, convinced that he had seen the last of his son, and Kaiqubad, impulsively determined to carry out his father's advice.

For some stages on his return journey he never touched wine or looked at the numerous courtesans who accompanied the party; but at the end, on the advances of a particularly enticing beauty, his half-hearted resolution gave way. Before he reached Kilokhri he was again a drunken debauch and worse than ever¹⁷.

Nizamuddin continued his game. Malik Shahak, Jawarji's successor as the *amir-i-hajib* and the governor of Multan who had lately earned fame and honour in victory over the Mongols, seemed to be increasing in power and so drew his unwelcome attention. The Malik had to flee to the hills in the north where a few of the other nobles, similarly apprehensive, joined him. Being sincerely loyal to the Sultan he returned in obedience to orders, but was immediately imprisoned, and, later, executed¹⁸. A similar treatment was meted out to Tuzaki, the recently appointed army minister and the governor of Baran. But, as Barani remarks, his every move only cleared the path of the Khaljis¹⁹. Before Nizamuddin could execute his final plan, Kaiqubad suddenly remembered his father's advice and ordered him to proceed to Multan to succeed Malik Shahak. Aware of the Sultan's real intentions, he tried to find excuses and delayed departure; whereupon his enemies, divining the Sultan's mind, poisoned him²⁰. His death undoubtedly freed Kaiqubad from imminent assassination, but it also removed the only capable administrator he possessed. The state as a result lost whatever order it had.

The impulsive king never remembered or at least never acted up to the other part of his father's counsel. It was in any case too late, for the effects of unrestrained drinking and debauchery now laid him low with paralysis²¹.

Barani states that after Nizamuddin's death many of the old officers and supporters of Balban's family whom he had kept away, returned and joined the administration. But, he adds, order was never restored; since none of the aspiring officers who now pressed their claim to the highest executive post, was powerful enough to impose his will on the others, the government lost all cohesion and strength. In the palace, Malik Aitamar and Malik Surkha, the new incumbents in the posts of *amir-i-hajib* and *barbak*, held supreme power, and since they had the Sultan in their charge, were in a position to use his name for their actions. In the vacancy caused by the execution of Tuzaki, Kaiqubad had appointed Malik Firoz Khalji, formerly the *sar-i-jandar* and the governor of Samana²². Firoz held the title of Shaista Khan²³ and was a powerful man; not only was the army under his charge, but he was also the head of a very numerous and influential clan scattered all over the kingdom. Between him and the de-facto rulers in the palace, no love was lost and the allegedly non-Turkish origin of Firoz added to the causes of dissension and to the consequent anarchy.

Owing to their long separation from their homeland the Khaljis, who, at least from the 10th century, were known to have dwelt in the Helmand valley and then in Lamghan, were not regarded as Turks by the new immigrants from

Turkestan. Early chroniclers considered them a separate people and hence the Turcophile party of Balban and the citizens of Delhi affected to despise them as non-Turks²⁴. The appointment of Firoz to the important post of army minister (*ariz*) and the resultant advancement of his people, therefore, created great dissatisfaction among those who sought to preserve the exclusively Turkish composition of the government. The jealousy of Surkha and Kachan had also to be reckoned with. As in the case of Rayhan nearly fifty years ago, a move was accordingly initiated under their leadership to eliminate all non-Turkish officers. A list of such men as were to be eliminated was drawn up in secret. The attempt was a logical culmination of Balban's racialism; so prominently had he identified himself with his policy that the preservation of his dynasty was considered essential for its continued application²⁵.

In order to obtain royal sanction to the proposed list of the condemned men which Kaiqubad was physically not in a position to accord, the movers had recourse to an unprecedented step. Without formally deposing the reigning king or forcing him to abdicate, they brought out his three-year old son, Kaiumars, from the harem and crowned him as Shamsuddin in obvious supersession of his father²⁶. A regent for the infant king was appointed from among their own ranks and a re-arrangement of the state-offices on the basis of the new policy followed. The proposed measure was then duly sanctioned and Firoz's name headed the condemned list. For obvious reasons the army minister had not been consulted about the accession, though as a loyal officer,

he acquiesced to the new regime. Though unaware of the real nature of the new arrangement, he was yet highly suspicious of the new officers who did little to conceal their feelings towards him. Surkha undertook to commence enforcing the plan by slaying Firoz. One of the latter's relations, named Ahmad Chap, who was in the service of Kacchan, however, secretly conveyed the news to him. Thus put on his guard, Firoz planned to leave the capital. Anxious to strengthen his party in view of the approaching conflict, he moved his quarters to Ghiyaspur, a few miles from Delhi, and then sent for his relations from Baran on the plea of removing them from the zone of a threatened Mongol invasion. He was joined by a number of other non-Turkish officers similarly black-listed²⁷.

On the day following his removal to Ghiyaspur, Firoz was holding a review of the Kanouj forces when a message from Kaiumars's court reached him demanding his immediate presence. He could at once see through the game and delayed compliance, until Kacchan himself rode up with a more urgent message. Without openly disobeying the royal summons Firoz pointed to the review he was holding and begged to be allowed to finish it. Kacchan was thus constrained to wait, and in the belief that his real motive had not yet been suspected, relaxed in the tent-shade. As soon as Firoz found him off his guard he beckoned to his men who cut off his head and threw the body into the Jumna²⁸.

This action tore off the mask and the two parties now came out in open conflict. Firoz felt it an obvious advantage to be able to invoke the king's authority for his party, and so sent his sons with a

body of troops to fetch Kaiumars from Delhi. They raided the palace and secured the king, and when a party of Turkish officers came in their pursuit, slew most of them and captured, among others, the sons of the *kotwal*²⁷. Kidnapping of their king by the hated Khaljis, however, roused the Delhi citizens to action and they streamed out to force his release. They were dissuaded from the course and turned back by Fakhruddin who feared for the lives of his captive sons. With the king finally in his control, Firoz thus became the master of the situation; even some Turkish officers now tacitly recognised it by joining him³⁰.

Barani does not record the subsequent events of the unfortunate boy-king's reign, some of whose coins have come to light³¹. According to Yahya Sirhindi, he reigned for a little over three months.³² Having finally dispersed his opponents Firoz installed the king in his father's palace at Kilokhri and proceeded to settle the administration on his behalf. He offered the deputyship of the kingdom to Malik Chajju, one of Balban's nephew, and asked for the provinces of Multan, Bhatinda and Dipalpur for himself. Chajju, too proud to receive any office as a gift from the Khalji, refused the offer and preferred the governorship of Karra and Manikpur instead whither he immediately repaired with the surviving members of Balban's family. A similar offer to the kotwal having also been refused³³, Firoz was obliged to accept the regency himself. Kaiqubad in the meantime met with an ignominious end. As he lay motionless on his bed, unattended and in hunger and thirst, a Khalji trooper, sent by Firoz, entered the apartment, rolled him in his bed-

clothes and kicked him off into the Jumna³⁴.

The regency was only a transitional arrangement; the 13th century-Sultanate had, for all practical purposes, come to an end. The inevitable supplanting of Kaiumars has not been sufficiently detailed by Barani;³⁵ the process, however, is not difficult to imagine, nor is it necessary to be sentimental over the affair. The young prince was no better representative of his dynasty whose political traditions were neither renewable nor in accord with the spirit of the times. Firoz only formalised the coming of a new age when he ascended the throne at Kilokhari in March 1290 and proclaimed himself as Sultan Jalaluddin Firoz³⁶.

The revolution was complete, but it took time to normalise the people's lives. Delhi was a stronghold of the Turkish party and Firoz for some months preferred to stay away at Kilokhari. His opponents, however, soon realised the futility of clinging to a retrogressive ideal and gradually came to terms. His unassuming and peaceable nature soon removed the popular dislike for his rule, and the Delhi citizens accepted the new regime by tendering their allegiance. On the invitation of Fakhruddin, the most respected survivor of the vanquished party, Firoz eventually entered Delhi and was seated on the throne of his illustrious master³⁸.

Barani regrets that from that day sovereignty passed from the Turks for ever. This is only partly true. The crown was still worn by a member of that race but Turkish domination passed for ever. Haji Dabir is more correct in his evaluation of the event when he remarks that with Kaiumars ended the line of kings that was started by Muizzuddin

Muhammad b. Sam.³⁸

NOTES

1. Barani, p. 110.
2. Barani, p. 122. He says 'to describe the quarrel in detail would involve the disclosure of domestic secrets.'
3. *TM*, p. 52.
4. Barani, p. 127, and Haji Dabir, ii, p. 738, wrongly date the event in 685/1286, but Amir Khusrau: *Qiranus-Sadain*, p. 27, places Kaiqubad's accession in 686, which date is copied in the *TM*, p. 52; see Elliot, iii, p. 525; for Kaiqubad's earliest coin dated 686, see Wright, p. 63; Balban's coins, however, cease with 685/1286.
5. Barani, p. 128.
6. *Ibid*, p. 130. The place was already growing as a suburb and as early as the reign of Nasiruddin Mahmud, it was known as the '*Shahr-i-Nau*'; Raverty: *Trans. Tab. Nas.* p. 634. For a description of Kaiqubad's palace see Amir Khusrau : *op. cit.* p. 24-44.
7. *TM*, p. 53, Barani, p. 131.
8. Barani, p. 168.
9. Barani, pp. 135-138.
10. *Ibid*, p. 133.
11. Barani, p. 132. *TM*, p. 53 states, the Sultan, six months after his accession, wanted to seize some of the new Mussalman amirs, and accordingly in a darbar held to announce a victory over the Mongols in Multan, Nizamuddin was ready with his retainers. As the *amir-i-hajib*, the *wakil-i-dar* the *naib-i-barbak*, the *sar-i-jandar*, and the *akhurbak* came to offer congratulations they were all seized and with the exception of two who were exiled, all were executed.
12. Barani, p. 139; *TM*, p. 54. No coin of Bughra has yet been discovered.
13. Barani, p. 140.
14. *Qiranus Sadain*, p. 34-35 : *Ibn Battuta : Rahla*, ii, p. 29; *TM*, p. 54. See also *TA*, i, p. 107.
15. See *JASB*, 1860, pp. 225-38, for an abridged translation of the *Qiranus-Sadain* where a full account is given of the messages exchanged. Bughra sent his younger son Kaikaus to Kaiqubad as a hostage while the latter sent his infant son, Kaiumars. For the whole episode see *TM*, pp. 54-55; Barani, pp. 142-156.
16. Barani, p. 156; *Qiranus-Sadain*, pp. 154 and 160.
17. Barani, p. 164. Cf. Ibn Battuta: *Rahlah* ii, p. 29, who erroneously states that Bughra accompanied Kaiqubad to Delhi on this occasion.
18. *TM*, p. 55.
19. Barani, p. 134, pp. 138-39.
20. Barani, p. 170. Isami p. 192-94, says that Nizamuddin once

poisoned the Sultan's drink but the latter detected it and the culprit himself was made to die of this.

21. Barani, p. 171; *TM*, p. 56 says he was afflicted with '*jalij*' and '*laqwah*'; Isami also supports this; p. 194, verse No. 3805.

22. *TM*, p. 56, calls him by his Turkish name of Firoz Yaghrash Khalji; see Isami, p. 195-196, for an unconfirmed story of how, with his brother Firoz (Isami calls him Shahabuddin) came to Delhi and was appointed governor of Babel (?) from where on the instigation of his enemies, Kaiqubad ordered him to be brought in chains to Delhi. On the way a Sufi congratulated him on his future greatness. On arrival at Delhi, the king at once pardoned him, and what is more, gave him the office of *ariz* and the title of *Imadul Mulk*.

23. *TM*, p. 56; Barani, p. 170, writes the title as *Siyasat Khan*.

24. For the origin of the Khaljis as to whose Turkish origin modern scholars are in general agreement, see Raverty : tran. *Tab, Nas.*, p. 548; *JASB*, 1875; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, article on Khalji; *BLSOS*, 1940 pp. 417-34.

25. Haji Dabir ii, p. 750; Barani, p. 181.

26. Ferishta, i, p. 88; Barani, p. 171 skips over a lot of details. *TM*, p. 59, dates this event on 18 *Muharram* 689/31 January, 1290.

27. Details in *TM*, p. 56; Barani, p. 171-72.

28. *TM*, idem; the place where Firoz was holding his review is called Bhukal-pahari, while Barani calls it Baharpur; Haji Dabir, ii, p. 751 and Isami, p. 197, support *TM*.

29. *TM*, p. 57-58, gives a slightly different account; after slaying Kacchan he rode towards Kilokhri palace and drew up his forces in order to occupy it. Malik Chajju and others thereupon brought out the dying Kaiqubad and seated him under a pavilion outside the palace and prepared some loyalist troops to oppose Firoz. He gave out that all they wanted to do was to send Kaiqubad to his father. A part of the loyalist troops having for some unexplained reason withdrawn themselves, Firoz was able to occupy the place and bring out Kaiqubad's infant son from the harem who was then seated on the throne. His offer of the regency to Malik Chajjn and his own ultimate acceptance of the office is said to have followed the death of Kaiqubad, who was left under the pavilion and died on the next day of hunger and thirst. Isami, however, makes it clear that Kaiumars's elevation to the throne took place in his father's life time but is said to have been done by Firoz himself; pp. 199-200.

30. Barani, p. 182; See *TM*, pp. 50-51, for a slightly different account.

31. Wright, p. 66, no. 279. Rodgers: *Lahore Museum Catalogue*, p. 84, no. 4; Brown : *Coins of India*, p. 71. They are all dated 689/1290.

32. *TM*, p. 61.

33. Barani, p. 173; *TM*, p. 59. Haji Dabir, ii, p. 752.

34. Barani, p. 173. For the version of *TM*, respecting this incident, see note above. The above account is confirmed by Isami, p. 200.

35. *TM*, p. 60-61, states that after three months the Turkish nobles headed by Surkha again plotted to get rid of the Khalji regent and free the

king from his control. Firoz got scent of this move and sent an army to the Kilokhri palace to seize the king. Surkha's party opposed the troops but were defeated and Surkha himself was killed. Following this, Firoz rode into the palace, put the king in confinement and himself ascended the throne, in *Rabi* II, 689. The boy king died in prison. The account is partly supported by Isami, pp. 201-203. Kaiumars's death is not recorded; his reign, according to *TM*, extended from 18 *Muharram* 689/31 January, 1290 to *Rabi* II 689/May, 1290.

36. Barani gives the date as 688/1289; p. 175. Haji Dabir iii, p. 753, and *TA*, i, p. 117, only copy this date; but *TM*, p. 61, and Ferishta, i, date the event correctly in 689/1290 which is in accordance with the numismatic evidence. The earliest coin of Firoz, a gold piece, issued possibly on his accession, is dated 689; Wright, p. 83, No. 280.

37. Barani, p. 173, 176-77.

38. *Op. cit.* ii, p. 752.

CHAPTER IX

FOREIGN INVASIONS AND THE WESTERN FRONTIER

The problem of North India's defence is considerably minimised by its natural boundaries. If we exclude the coast line in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, it is only in the northwest that she is really vulnerable.¹ From time immemorial, foreigners have entered through this northwestern passage leading into areas which afford convenient bases for an eventual conquest of the fertile plains. Owing to the peculiar configuration of mountain ranges in this region, an effective defence of this entrance is possible only by a complete military control of the area extending from Kabul, via Ghazni, to Kandahar, the so-called "scientific frontier" of India², controlling, as it does, the approaches to the fertile valleys of the Punjab rivers. For, the more southern entrances through the Bolan and Las Bela regions, lead to the Indian desert, "India's second line of defence".³ The control of the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line, flanked by the Hindukush, is thus not only essential from the point of view of military strategy, but, in an age when the alien conquerors of India were dependent for reinforcement on Central Asia, for political considerations also. Another aspect of this frontier problem was the control of the ever-turbulent hill-tribes, inhabiting the wide mountainous belt of land extending from Kashmir to the seacoast, through which all the principal passes run. In the northern half of the Sind-Sagar Doab, round the chain of hills known

as the Salt Range (Koh-i-Jud), lived, in the early middle ages, a number of warlike and lawless tribes, — the Khokars, Awans and Janjuhas^{3a}, — whose political unstability and periodic depredations on the Jhelum and Chinab valleys added to the enormity of the problem.

To the Moghul emperors of India, the advance upto the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line was a major policy of expansion; to the newly arrived Turks of the 13th century, control of the line to secure communications with their homeland was a vital necessity. As long as the kingdom of Ghor was strong enough to hold its ground in Afghanistan, Delhi was safe and communications uninterrupted. But its inclusion in the Ghoride empire exposed it to the ever changing political forces of Central Asia. In an earlier chapter mention has been made of the great concern which Aibak felt on this score after Muizzuddin's death, and of his policy directed to separating Delhi from Central Asiatic complications. With the absorption of Ghazni in the empire of the Khwarizm Shah, whose eastern frontier touched the Indus⁴, Delhi's security was directly threatened. Shortly afterwards the Mongols changed the whole map of Asia. Mongol outposts were established in Ghazni, Peshawar and other places in Afghanistan, and the Indus nearly disappeared as a political boundary. Delhi's administrative frontier was, as a consequence, pushed back far into what is now modern Punjab. For the rest of the century the Mamluks were thrown on the defensive and their forward policy in this direction aimed only at extending control over the Chinab basin rather than reaching the 'scientific

frontier'. The Indus remained only the cultural boundary of "Hind and Sind"; and the tract east of the river was turned into a kind of no-man's land.

It has been stated elsewhere in this book that Lahore and Multan formed the westernmost provinces of Delhi during the early years of the conquest. The river Chinab roughly marked the boundary line within which was situated the fortress of Sialkot, repaired and garrisoned by Muizzuddin. His expedition against the Khokars and other tribesmen of the Salt Range marked the earliest attempt to reduce the unregulated belt of land across the Jhelum, which was, soon after, overrun by the invasions of Yalduz, first in 612/6 and again in 612. Our available data are unfortunately much too scanty to enable us to trace the changes which these invasions must have caused in the administrative boundary. Yalduz is said to have claimed the Punjab as part of his appanage; during the period of his rule over Ghazni he is even reported to have sent troops on several occasions to occupy Lahore.⁵ Possession of the city was contested not only by Yalduz and Qubachah but also by Iltutmish. The latter's dispute which resulted in Yalduz's defeat and death is said to have originated from the uncertainty of their respective boundaries.⁶ From its position on the Ravi, Lahore could certainly cut off the flanks of an invading army proceeding southwards to Multan; its possession was also necessary for an eventual advance into the Sind Sagar Daob. It is difficult, however, to be precise as to the steps that Iltutmish must have taken in this direction after he organised the Lahore province in 1217; indications are available to show that he contemplated

an advance up to the Indus. It was probably soon after the acquisition of Lahore that Malik Aetigin was put in charge of Kujah and Nandanah in the Salt Range which Minhaj refers to as the frontier⁷. The fact that these places, along with Sialkot, are listed among Iltutmish's conquests, makes it exceedingly probable that these acquisitions were preceded by concentrated operations. They were doubtless garrisoned to serve as operational bases against the hill-tribes.

This process of gradual advance up to the Indus, was, in any case, interrupted by the political upheavals caused by the Mongol eruption. By the year 617/1220, the Khwarizmi empire was no more; from the Jaxartes to the Caspian Sea and from Ghazni to Iraq, Changiz destroyed flourishing cities and great centres of learning. Alauddin Muhammad, the Khwarizm Shah, was driven across his northern provinces to find refuge and eventual death in an island on the Caspian⁸. His crown prince Jalaluddin Mangbarni, expelled from Khurasan, fled southwards to Ghazni. On the way he achieved a brilliant victory over the pursuing Mongols at Barwan but as Changiz himself moved against him from Talkan, he left Ghazni and took the road to the Indian frontier. He was overtaken on the Indus and compelled to turn round and fight in desperation. In the battle his courage and intrepidity evoked warm praise from the great Mongol, but his small force was easily overpowered. As the Mongols closed the escape routes, Mangbarni hastily put his family in a boat and sending them over to be drowned in the Indus waters, flung his horse into the river and crossed over to India⁹.

The exact spot where, in 1221, this first wave of Mongol eruption touched Indian soil is still a matter of speculation.¹⁰ It is certain, however, that it lay not very far from the Salt Range through which, according to most of the early writers, Mangbarni made his way into the Sind Sagar Doab. Fortunately for Delhi, Changiz did not think it necessary to pursue him across the river, but engaged himself in reducing the Ighraki tribesmen who inhabited the northern reaches of the Kabul river and who had furnished contingents to the Khwarizmi forces;¹¹ his sons, Tuli and Chagatai, were sent to reduce Khurasan, Kerman and Ghazni.¹² Changiz lingered near the Indus for three months and is said to have contemplated returning to Qaraqoram through India, by way of "Lakhnauti and Kamrud and through the Qarachal mountains".¹³ He is even reported to have sent envoys to Delhi, soliciting the necessary permission from Iltutmish. Whether the Delhi Sultan could effectively stop the Mongol if he decided to march through in spite of his reported refusal, is highly doubtful. That Changiz yet respected Delhi's sovereignty and in the winter of 1222, marched back through the Hindukush, speaks well of his moderation and his scrupulous observance of international practice.¹⁴

Changiz spared India on this occasion, but with Mangbarni was initiated a series of invasions on the cis-Indus region. Having collected such of his followers as had succeeded in crossing the river, he obtained arms by a night attack on a party of robbers near by, and then defeated a force of about five thousand Hindu troops sent by the chief

of the Salt Range.¹⁵ News of this success reaching Changiz, a force was sent in his pursuit from Ghazni. As the latter crossed the Indus, Mangbarni, anxious to avoid them, turned south towards Lahore. The Mongols, probably unwilling to open hostilities with Delhi, did not pursue him into the Punjab, but contented themselves by plundering a fortress called Malikpur in the vicinity of the Salt Range.¹⁶

Mangbarni advanced three stages towards Delhi and from there sent Ainul Mulk to ask for asylum. The request met with overt refusal on the plea of the country's uncongenial climate.¹⁷ Delhi even appeared as a potential enemy. Mangbarni thereupon turned to his former refuge,—the Mongols having in the meantime retired—and sent a force to plunder the Khokar territory. The expedition proved an eminent success; not only was the Khokar chief defeated but was obliged to give his daughter in marriage and even to lend armed assistance¹⁸.

This alliance immensely strengthened the fugitive's position. He now turned to establishing himself more securely at the expense of Qubachah whose dominion reached as far north as Mianwali district and even included Nandanah.¹⁹ Between him and the Khokars there was long-standing enmity which Mangbarni now exploited in attacking his northern districts. He opened hostilities by capturing Kallurkot and destroying a fortress near by. Qubachah prepared for battle, but before he could commence operations, he was routed in a night attack at Uch by the Khwarizmi general, Uzbek Pai.²⁰ Qubachah fled to Multan and when Mangbarni demanded indemnity and the return of

his wife who had taken shelter at his court, he found himself obliged to make prompt compliance.²¹ The fugitive's stay in India was however, coming to an end. As he was preparing to spend the summer in the Salt Range, news of the approach of another Mongol army in his pursuit compelled him to turn southwards.²² Passing by Multan he demanded money contribution, but Qubachah, now aware of the fugitive's difficulties, refused and prepared for battle. With the Mongols on his trail Mangbarni could hardly afford to fight, and proceeded to Uch where also he met with a similarly hostile reception. Setting fire to the city he then departed towards Sehwan where he compelled Qubachah's governor, Fakhruddin Salari, to submit and deliver the city. After a month's stay at Sehwan, he left to attack Debal and put the ruler, named Chanisar, to flight.²³ An expedition was next sent to Gujrat (Anhilwara) which yielded some booty.²⁴ The Mongols were reported to be nearing Multan; Qubachah's hostility cut him off from his Khokar ally. News then arrived that his brother Ghiyasuddin had made himself unpopular in Iraq and that the army and the people preferred his rule. Mangbarni therefore called a council of his followers to decide on the course of action. Hasan Qarlugh, Uzbek Pai and others advised him to stay on and try to organise an anti-Mongol front with the Sultan of Delhi. But the temptation to rule in Iraq "seized him".²⁵ Leaving Hasan Qarlugh and Uzbek Pai as his representatives in Afghanistan and Sind respectively, Mangbarni finally left India by way of Makran, in 621/1224.²⁶

The effect of his three year's sojourn in the

Plate III



Jalaluddin Mangbarni drying his clothes on the bank of the Indus

western Punjab and Sind was to put heavy pressure on Delhi's administrative frontier which, as a result, gradually receded. The Indus was abolished even as a geographical boundary, for the cis-Indus tracts now became part of the Ghazni territory over which the Mongols, in pursuit of the remnants of the Khawarizmi officers, extended their operations. Even before Mangbarni's departure from lower Sind came the Mongol army under Turtai. Capturing Nandanah, possibly from one of Hasan Qarlugh's officers, Turtai proceeded to Multan where Qubachah had so recently sought shelter. The city was closely besieged and was about to fall when the excessive heat of the place compelled the besiegers to withdraw.²⁷ On their way back they plundered "the territories of Lahore and Multan". It does not appear that they permanently garrisoned the Nandanah fortress or occupied the area. In 623/1226, the district of Sehwan was invaded by a large force consisting of Khalji tribesmen, remnants of the Khwarizmi army whom the Mongols drove from their home in Garmsir. Qubachah, however, succeeded in overpowering them.²⁸

The northwestern frontier region, as a result of these repeated invasions, was thus in a state of utmost confusion. In the north the Salt Range tribes were emboldened to exploit their adversaries' weakness. They not only occupied the whole of the northern Doab but also spread further east and even beyond the Beas²⁹ to menace Lahore which they took the earliest opportunity to sack and plunder. West of the Indus, the area known to the contemporary writers as Baniyan,³⁰ formed part

of Hasan Qarlugh's dominions who precariously held whatever portion he could of his master's appanage of Ghazni. To the south was the territory of Qubachah with a rapidly declining hold on the outlying districts like Schwan and Debal. Between all these was Uzbek Pai, who, till 627/1229, remained in the Sind Sagar Doab and the Punjab and possibly in control of Multan as well.³¹

Iltutmish's annexation of Qubachah's dominions by the year 1228 brought the Delhi kingdom in direct contact with the Mongols operating from what is now modern Afghanistan. With the expulsion from Ghor of the last Khwarizmi officer, Qutbuddin Hasan,³² increased pressure was bound to be felt on the Indus valley; even Hasan Qarlugh had to maintain his existence by a timely submission to his enemy in 628/1230.³³ In Sindh the continued political existence of Uzbek Pai was a standing invitation to the Mongols to extend their operations thither. Even his expulsion, sometime after 1229, by the combined exertions, according to Nessawi,³⁴ of Iltutmish and his own erstwhile colleague Hasan Qarlugh, does not seem to have improved matters, for, by taking over Uch and Multan, Iltutmish became a neighbour of the Mongols.³⁵

The Mongol *quriltai*, convened for the coronation of Uktai Khan in 1229, decided on a reconquest and partial annexation of Khurasan and Afghanistan.³⁶ This resulted in a series of fresh assaults on territories contiguous to the Delhi frontier. In 633/1235-6, the principality of Siestan in western Afghanistan was made to acknowledge Mongol sway;³⁷ across the Helmand, through Beluchistan, Mongol horsemen became active in the Derajat valley leading to

Upper Sind. Simultaneously, a Mongol force pushed through northern Afghanistan³⁸ and commenced operations in the upper Indus. Details of their proceedings in this region are not found on record, but Iltutmish's last expedition, projected towards Baniyan, must be remembered in this connection. It seems to have been intended, in accordance with the agreement implied in his co-operation against Uzbek Pai, to assist the Qarlugh chief.

This renewed pressure from the Mongols, in any case, made Hasan's position untenable in Baniyan, and he accordingly planned to carve out a principality for himself in the districts east of the Indus. In 634/1236, during the confusions prevailing in the reign of Firoz, he made his first attempt on Lower Sind and attacked Uch but was repelled with heavy loss.³⁹ Very soon he was forced to cross the Indus once again, for in 636/1238 the Mongols finally annexed his territory and drove him to seek shelter in the Punjab. He thereupon attempted to renew the friendly relation which he had with Iltutmish and sought to convert this into a fullfledged anti-Mongol alliance. His son visited Raziah's court who, while according to him all the marks of honour, showed a prudent disinclination to court Mongol hostility. From Baran, which she assigned for his expenses, and where she presumably interned him, the disappointed Qarlugh prince fled secretly to rejoin his father who had found temporary shelter with the Khokar allies of his late master.⁴⁰ Raziah's action seems to have pleased the Mongols who, possibly because of her father's anxiety to remain neutral in Changiz's war

with the Khwarizm Shah, respected her frontier and gave no help to the rebel Kabir Khan. From the details of the latter's proceedings who was obliged to halt in his westward flight, this frontier appears to have been marked by the Sodharah (Chinab) beyond which the Mongols barred his progress.

Bahram's reign saw the occurrence of events which were to result in a further constriction of this line. Following Raziah's deposition which the Mongols seem to have construed as terminating the non-aggression pact with Delhi, they decided at last on bringing India within their scheme of conquest. In 639/1241 Bahadur Tair, the commander of the Mongol forces in Herat, Ghor, Ghazni and Tukharistan, crossed the Indus and for the first time appeared before Lahore. The city was ill-prepared to stand a siege and the inhabitants showed a fatal indifference to the danger. In spite of an urgent appeal to Delhi, the machinations of the *wazir* diverted the reinforcements, and the governor, Malik Qaraqash, was obliged to flee the city. A Breach in the defences however finally roused the citizens to action who put up a desperate street-fight but only to delay the eventual occupation.⁴¹ The invaders, however, did not garrison Lahore, but, in order to open the route for an eventual advance on Delhi, practically depopulated the town and destroyed its defences. On their departure the Khokar tribes swarmed into whatever remained of the city and completely gutted it. Qaraqash succeeded in driving them out. Under the next king Masud, the '*iqta*' of Lahore is said to have been placed under Yuzbak-i-Tughril Khan.⁴² But the

city remained deserted and had to be thoroughly rebuilt and repopulated after Balban's accession. From Masud's time the province became the 'frontier' the inner line corresponding roughly to the Ravi. The force that at last was sent out in response to Qaraqash's appeal was despatched towards Lahore "to guard the frontiers."⁴³

In Sind also repercussions of the Mongol offensive seriously jeopardised Delhi's hold. Hasan Qarlugh, now desperately in need of a secure shelter, opened his attacks of Multan. The town was held by Kabir Khan, who had lately revolted against Masud and had forcibly seized Uch also.⁴⁴ After many attempts Hasan succeeded, in 643/1245, in wresting Multan.⁴⁵ Thus, with Uch also in the possession of the rebel Kabir Khan, the whole of Sind was lost. A Mongol invasion, early next year, however, unexpectedly enabled Masud's government to recover a partial control of the province. Mangutah, who succeeded Bahadur Tair in the Afghanistan command, crossed the Indus to chase, as the sequel seems to show, Hasan Qarlugh out of Sind. The latter hastily left Multan and fled down the Panjnad to Sehwan and thence to lower Sind.⁴⁶ The Mongols, guided by Jaspal Sihra, the chief of the Salt Range, then directed their attention to Uch which was evacuated by Kabir Khan. The townsmen put up a brave defence and even inflicted sharp reverses on the besiegers but, at the end, they found single-handed resistance difficult to continue and sent an appeal to Delhi for succour. The *naib* Ulugh Khan (Balban) at once seized this opportunity and speedily marched at the head of a strong force to their assistance. By a flank movement

along the northern bank of the Beas, he threatened to cut off the Mongol's line of retreat through the Upper Sind Sagar Doab.⁴⁷ Sensing this danger, and informed of the great number of the Delhi troops, the latter thereupon raised the siege and withdrew beyond the Indus leaving a large number of captives behind.

Ulugh Khan found no opposition in occupying Uch and also the undefended Multan. Leaving both the towns under the charge of Kashlu Khan,⁴⁸ he moved his forces to the north in order to chastise the hill-tribes for their late depredations on Lahore and also for their assistance to the Mongols. The operation, however, had to be postponed because of the political move at Delhi designed to remove Masud from the throne, which required Ulugh Khan's early return.

Ulugh Khan's exertions however, could change but little the situation in the west. The following year saw another Mongol invasion led by the Nuin, Sali Bahadur, and once again Delhi suzerainty was negatived from over Sind. The invaders proceeded to Multan and by a close siege compelled the deputy governor, Changiz Khan, to open negotiations for peace. The saint Bahauddin Zakariya was sent to ask Shamsuddin Kurt, the vassal ruler of Herat who accompanied the Mongols on this occasion, to intercede for the besieged town and an indemnity of 100,000 dinars was offered.⁴⁹ Agreeing to the terms, Sali raised the siege and marched on to Lahore whose governor had to purchase immunity by a similar contribution,. He even agreed to be a tributary vassal of the Mongols.⁵⁰ The political settlements following Mahmud's accession probably

kept Ulugh Khan busy at Delhi and no reinforcement could at once be sent to the affected regions. His expedition towards the end of the same year, although ostensibly planned to resume operations against the Rana Jaspal Sihra of the Salt Range, yet could not have been entirely unconnected with this Mongol invasion.⁵¹ On reaching the Chinab, he pushed into the hills and is reported to have inflicted prodigious losses on the tribesmen, and to have plundered "as far as the neighbourhood of Nandanah". If the reference to Nandanah meant an attempt to recover the fortress it must have proved unsuccessful, for, although the Delhi forces are said to have reached the Indus on this occasion their operations were evidently confined to the districts east of and adjacent to the Jhelum. Beyond, were the Mongols who "from the ferries of the Jhelum beheld the Mussalman troops serving under Ulugh Khan and fear fell upon their hearts".⁵³ In spite of this allegedly triumphant advance across the Chinab, the tract beyond the Ravi, for all practical purposes was lost and formed the Mongol sphere of influence. Shamuddin's successor, Ruknuddin Kurt of Herat, exercised sway over territories extending up to the Indus river and is even reported to have controlled the highways "as far as the frontiers of Delhi".⁵³ When Lahore is next mentioned in the pages of the *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri* under the year 652/1254, it is described as a Mongol dependency.

In Sind the set-back to Mahmud's authority continued. Shortly after 647/1249 Hasan Qarlugh again appeared before the walls of Multan and Kashlu Khan hastened to its defence from Uch,

In the siege operations the Qarlugh chief was killed but his forces succeeded in occupying the town.⁵⁴ Multan remained in possession of the Qarlughs, until, following Kashlu's futile attempts to regain control, it was recovered, possibly under instructions from Delhi, by Sher Khan, the governor of Bhatinda.⁵⁵ On his trying to recapture it subsequently Kashlu was repulsed and in 648/1250 Sher Khan dispossessed him of Uch also.⁵⁶ To celebrate the return of the districts to Delhi, a number of Mongol captives, sent by the deputy governor of Multan, were ceremoniously paraded in the capital.⁵⁷ But Sind was to prove a highly insecure possession, for distance from Delhi and the proximity of the Mongols frequently strained the governor's loyalty. Between Sher Khan and the 'maliks of the capital' a great deal of estrangement is reported by the chronicler; during the year of Ulugh Khan's banishment from the capital, even armed strife is said to have taken place between them.⁵⁸ Whether Sher's subsequent defection was in any way connected with the general opposition to Rayhan's ascendancy in Mahmud's government, the chronicle gives us no clear indication; it merely states that following a reverse which he suffered on the banks of the Indus, very possibly at the hand of the Mongols, he betook himself to Turkestan and to the court of the Mongol emperor Mangu Khan at Qaraqoram.⁵⁹

Unless he was carried a prisoner by the Mongols, Sher Khan's action must be regarded as open treason against Delhi. Minhaj makes a mystery of his real motive but a similar defection about the same time, of prince Jalaluddin Masud,

brother of the reigning king, and his subsequent proceedings in India, make it tolerably clear.⁶⁰ Masud was appointed in 646/1248 to the provinces of Sambhal and Budaun, but for some unexplained reason, is stated to have suddenly become 'alarmed' and fled, through the Sirmur hills, to Lahore, then, as shown above, under Mongol suzerainty. Ulugh Khan's expedition in the same year "to the upper provinces as far as the waters of the Beas" may have had some connection with Masud's flight.⁶¹ According to Wassaf,⁶² the latter then proceeded to the court of Mangu Khan, where his presence, along with that of Qutlugh Khan and Sunqar (Sherkhan Sunqar) is noticed by Binagiti also—"all the three having fled in fear of Ulugh Khan".⁶³ Obviously, some kind of active support against either Ulugh Khan or the hated Rayhan, then in possession of power, was sought from the Mongol sovereign; Masud probably added his own claim to his father's kingdom. They were all received honourably befitting their ranks. It served the Mongol's purpose to patronise Masud and to install him at least as a vassal ruler over their trans-Indus possessions. He was therefore sent back to Lahore with instructions to obtain the necessary help from Sali Bahadur. The latter accordingly escorted him through the Punjab. Masud was thus enabled to take possession of the districts extending from the Salt Range upto Lahore and including, it is added, Kujah and Sodharah.⁶⁴ From the mention of Hajner, beyond which the escorting Mongols expressed their inability to proceed,⁶⁵ it is possible to fix the boundary of Delhi at this time along the old bed of the Sutlej. It seems not improbable that their unwillingness to cross the frontier

arose from the existence of some kind of truce with the Delhi government.

Shortly after his return, while Sher Khan was still at the Mongol court, Masud is reported to have joined, "from the direction of Lahore", Ulugh Khan's party, assembled at Bhatinda for armed action against Rayhan,⁶⁶ most probably on the proffered assurance of being raised to Mahmud's throne. After the latter's reconciliation with the party, the promise however, could not be implemented and the disappointed prince must have prepared for active hostility. This, at any rate, is the suggestion contained in Minhaj's statement, recording the settlement of the dispute, that "as a result of a party of amirs interposing between the two (the Sultan and his brother).....after vows, pledges and stipulation, the latter presented himself and Lahore became his "*iqta*".⁶⁷

It is unlikely that Masud felt constrained to repudiate his Mongol suzerains; Sher Khan, on his return "with honours" a little later, is stated to have joined him at Lahore. Their relations do not, however, appear to have been happy, a situation which Ulugh Khan must have exploited to win over his cousin and thus, by setting him against the Mongol protegee, to attempt the recovery of Lahore. Sher Khan, in any case, fell out with Masud who thereupon is reported to have "retired unsuccessful" leaving his family to be captured by Sher.⁶⁸ This accorded well with the plans of Mahmud's government with whom Sher Khan was shortly after reconciled. He was even restored to his former possession of Bhatinda from where Arslan Khan, who had repulsed Sher's recent unauthorised attack

on the fortress, was now transferred to Awadh.

Masud's elimination, however, did not mean an immediate extension of Delhi's frontier on the west, for now the Beas, flowing in its own bed before the Sutlej joined it from the east,⁷⁰ is referred to as "the frontier." In 655/1257 the Mewati rebellion could not be dealt with effectively because of the "Mongols having arrived to harass the "frontiers of Delhi", namely, Sindh, Lahore and "the line of the river Beah".⁷¹

The control over Sind remained equally uncertain. Shortly after Sher Khan's withdrawal from Sind and his journeying to the Mongol court in 1253 Uch and Multan were restored to Kashlu Khan. But within a year of his appointment he revolted, transferred his allegiance to Hulaku, and through the agency of Rukunuddin Kurt of Herat, even received a Mongol resident. After the failure of his attack in Delhi, made, as has been mentioned on a previous page, in alliance with Qutluğ Khan in 1257, he betook himself to Hulaku in Khurasan and presumably, sought armed assistance. The latter received him kindly but in accordance with the policy followed in assisting Jalaluddin Masud's installation in the Punjab, did not countenance a full-scale attack on Delhi proper, and even issued strict orders to Sali Bahadur "not to allow a single Mongol horsemen to cross the Delhi border".⁷² Kashlu left his son as a hostage and returned with Sali Bahadur's troops, obviously to protect him against a possible attack by Mahmud's forces.⁷³ On the receipt of the news of their crossing the Indus, Ulugh Khan made great military preparations but on learning that the Mongols had only

destroyed the Multan fortifications and were not intending to cross the 'frontier', he took no further action and disbanded the specially recruited army.⁷⁴

This forbearance on the part both of Delhi and the Mongols suggests an understanding among them, and some kind of agreement to respect each other's territorial suzerainty. Delhi in any case tacitly acquiesced in the transference of the whole of Sind and western Punjab to the Mongols. Ulugh Khan was even constrained to take active steps to avoid hostility with their vassals. Ever since Sher Khan's reappointment in Bhatinda he aimed at reacquiring Multan and Uch and was found to be conducting hostile operations against Kashlu Khan. As this was bound to involve Delhi in hostilities with the Mongols, Ulugh Khan, in 657/1258, had him transferred to Kol, Gwalior, and the adjacent provinces to the east, "in order to avoid strife on the frontier".⁷⁵ Malik Nusrat Khan on whose prudence the government of Delhi could rely, was then placed in charge of the provinces of "Bhatinda, Sunam, Samana, Hajner, and Lakhwal (?) and the frontiers as far the ferries of the river Beah".⁷⁶ The same year, an agent of Ulugh Khan, conveying his assent to the proposal of his son's marriage with a daughter of Hasan Qarlugh's son Nasiruddin, (who had finally settled down in Baniyan as a Mongol vassal), on passing through Kashlu Khan's territories was stopped by Mongol officers. He demanded to be sent to Hulaku in Khurasan, to whom he presented a friendly letter from Delhi containing, it may be presumed, assurance of non-aggression.⁷⁷ Hulaku

appreciated these gestures and next year, 658/1259, Minhaj records the arrival in Delhi of envoys from Hulaku who were received with great honour and ostentation.⁷⁸ No resulting formal agreement, however, is recorded, but Hulaku, we are told, issued strict orders to his commanding officer on this occasion to respect the Delhi frontier.

At the close of Minhaj's account, therefore, Mahmud's government had practically reconciled itself to the loss of Sind and the greater portion of the Punjab beyond the Beas. Kashlu Khan is never heard of again. By what process Multan and Uch were recovered to appear, in Barani's account, as part of Balban's dominions, can only be guessed. This recovery might have been preceded by a series of expeditions to which Isami seems vaguely to refer. An agreed withdrawal of the Mongol forces from Sind resulting from the friendly overtures to Hulaku is also not unlikely.⁷⁹ The reorganization of the Sind province which Balban placed under his eldest son, a few years after his accession, must in any case have been one of his earliest achievements.⁸⁰ The prince led almost annual expeditions across the border capturing Tatar horses and holding the Mongols in check, probably along the Indus waters.

In the Punjab, however, the Mongols proved difficult to dislodge. Barani, writing ninety five-years later, speaks of Sher Khan as being in charge of Bhatinda, Dipalpur and Lahore at the time of Balban's accession; and until he was poisoned by the new king, he is described as having been like "the walls of Gog and Magog to the Mongols", and also to have thoroughly curbed the lawless

“Jats, Khokars, Mandhirs, Bhattis and the Minas”. In his enthusiasm for Sher Khan’s marvellous feats, Barani even ascribes to him the conquest of Ghazni, a statement whose demonstrable inaccuracy should vitiate the rest of the account.⁸¹ In point of fact, these successes against the tribes must be ascribed to the period of Sher Khan’s governorship of Bhatinda and the frontier provinces where he was replaced by Nusrat Khan in 1258. Barani’s reference to his victories over the Mongols would presuppose his retransfer to the province after 1260 and the recovery of the entire area between the Beas and the Ravi. Dipalpur, at any rate, never figures again in the annals of Balban’s reign except only as a frontier area; Lahore is mentioned only once, when, two years after his expedition into the Salt Range undertaken early in the reign, he proceeded thither to rebuild the town and appoint administrative officers.⁸² It neither formed part of the Sind viceroyalty, nor is any governor mentioned by name. When Sher Khan died, ‘four or five years after Balban’s accession and thirty years after Iltutmish’s death’⁸³, Barani mentions the appointment of Tamur Khan to the “frontier *iqtas*” of Sunam and Samana, the rest of Sher’s possessions being given to other officers. “But” he adds “they were no match for the Mongols and they never achieved the successes obtained by Sher Khan”.⁸⁴

Even towards the end of Balban’s reign his western boundary could not have extended much further than the Beas. In the same year in which prince Muhammud was appointed over Sind, Bughra Khan took over the province of Samana and Sunam, evidently in succession to Tamur Khan.

He received special instructions to increase the number and efficiency of his troops so as to be constantly ready for the Mongols. This province remained the frontier for the rest of our period; the following passage from Barani's history will make it abundantly clear : "Often in those days the Mongol horsemen used to cross the Beas and enter the territory (of Delhi). Balban used to despatch Bughra from Samana, Khan-i-Shahid (prince Muhammad) from Multan and Malik Bektars from Delhi (to fight them). They would then march upto the waters of the river Beas and expel the Mongols. In this manner they obtained several victories and as a result, the Mongols never dared approach the river any more".⁸⁵ Defence measures on this region were further improved when Balban decided to transfer Bughra to Lakhnauti. For greater facility of resistance, the province was converted into a military command under Malik Sunj, with smaller military districts placed under officers of proved ability. This Sunam-Samana command detailed to hold the Beas line, was to work under the orders of the viceroy of Sind who, as the officer commanding the frontier force, was made responsible for the defence of the entire north western frontier.⁸⁶

This co-ordination proved effective and the Mongols were held back. Towards the closing year of Balban's reign, they launched a large-scale attack under the leadership of Tamur Khan, the new commander of the Afghanistan forces. From the north they entered the Sind Sagar Doab and after plundering the Lahore and Depalpur region advanced to within three *farsangs* from Multan.⁸⁷

In the battle that followed, prince Muhammad's forces, after an initial success, were routed and the prince was killed, an event which forms the theme of one of Amir Khusrau's famous elegies.⁸⁸ A large number of Muslims were slain and, in the poet's language "in Multan, in every house there was some dead to be wept for".⁸⁹ The defeat, though disastrous for the number of casualties it entailed, was, however, nothing more than a local reverse, for the Mongols did not follow up their victory by an occupation of the area. The hold on Multan remained unaffected and Kaikhusrau found no difficulty in entering on his father's viceroyalty.

At the end of Balban's reign therefore, the boundary of Delhi in the Punjab remained, roughly along the water-parting between the Ravi and Beas; as on his accession, most of the province formed the Mongol sphere of influence. In spite of Kaiqubad's incompetence and the consequent laxity of vigilance, the defence system remained intact and refused to yield further advantage to the invaders. Ferishta,⁹⁰ quoting from two earlier sources which are no longer extant, states that following his forced removal from the throne, Kaikhusrau entered into correspondence with Tamur Khan, the Mongol general, and in the hope of obtaining armed assistance, even paid him a visit at Ghazni. The latter had realised the strength of Balban's frontier force and showed little enthusiasm over the proposal, and the prince, it is added, had to return disappointed. According to Amir Khusrau, Kaikhusrau's successor in Multan reported a victory over the Mongols within six months of Kaiqubad's accession.⁹¹ On the eve of the king's

departure to meet his father in Awadh, news was brought of another Mongol invasion; Tamur Khan had again overrun the territory from Multan to Lahore and had laid waste "the whole country as far as Samana".⁹² Malik Bektars was at once despatched at the head of thirty thousand troops who routed them on the Ravi and took a great number of prisoners.⁹³ He is even said to have pursued the Mongols as far as the Salt Range.⁹⁴

These successes however, only emphasised the strength of Balban's frontier defence; they meant no appreciable advance into the trans-Ravi tract. The end of the Mamluk dynasty thus found the Mongols firmly established over the greater portion of the Punjab and also along the western bank of the lower Indus. As yet they had shown a consistent disinclination—either for military reasons or in view of a political truce—to attack Delhi proper. The Khalji dynasty was to find them get over this restraint and, from their base in the Punjab, launch determined assaults on the capital and, in a series of final all-out efforts, expend their fury.

NOTES

1. The eastern Himalayas and the Assam hills are difficult for any invading army and the few trade routes from Tibet do not lead to the key position necessary for the conquest of North India. The coming of the Tibeto-Mongoloid races into Brahmaputra valley was more a tribal migration than invasion at a given time. It is needless to refer to the exploded myth of Changiz Khan's invasion through the eastern route as recorded by Ferishta, i, p. 70, and reproduced by Stewart: *History of Bengal* p. 62, and Thomas : *Chronicles*, p. 121, note. As Raverty has pointed out long ago, the story arose out of a misreading by Ferishta of what was meant for Jainagar, which a careless scribe could easily turn into Changiz; see Raverty: *op. cit.* p. 665, note 8. On the eastern routes into India see also *IGI*, i, p. 18 and Holdich : *Gates of India*, p. 517.

2. *CHI*, vi, p. 457.

3. Holdich : *op. cit.*, p. 143.

- 3a. *Shahpur Settlement Report*, 1886, pp. 27-28; *Jhelum District Settlement Report* 1874-78, pp. 29-36.
4. Minhaj, Raverty's trans. p. 267. Peshawar was the eastern frontier outpost of Khwarizm when Changiz defeated Mangbarni on the Indus in 618/1221; Nessawi, p. 79.
5. Minhaj, p. 143.
6. Minhaj, p. 171.
7. See note 4, *supra*.
8. For a full account of the Khwarizm Shah's war with Changiz and his subsequent retreat towards the east, see Bartold : *Turkestan*, pp. 403-426. Alauddin Muhammad died in 617/1220.
9. For details of this battle see Juwaini, ii, p. 43; also Howorth; *Mongols*, i, p. 90; Nessawi, p. 83-84. It was fought on the 8th *Shawwal*, 618.
10. See Raverty : *Notes on Afghanistan*, pp. 338 and 448 : trans. *Tab. Nas.*, p. 292-93; Bartold : *Turkestan*, p. 445-46.
11. Minhaj, p. 355. On the Ighrakis, who are stated to have been a sept of the Khaljis see Raverty's notes, trans. *Tab. Nas.* p. 1043.
12. Juwaini, i, p. 108; Howorth : *Mongols*, i, p. 90.
13. Minhaj, p. 355 and 375; Juwaini, i, p. 109.
14. In view of the Mongol's unwillingness, shortly afterwards, to pursue Mangbarni into the Punjab when he turned to seek shelter in Delhi, it is not unlikely that Delhi had entered into some kind of a pact with Changiz. Iltutmish's refusal to shelter the fugitive prince was perhaps in accordance with this agreement.
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far into the Punjab. See Howorth : *Mongols*, i, p. 90; Bartold : *Turkestan*, p. 446; Minhaj, p. 143; en-Nessawi, p. 94; *Tarikh-i-Muhammadi*: Or 137, f. 334a; Juwaini is not consistent in his account of the forces sent into India by Changiz; see for example, i, pp. 108, 110, 112 and ii, p. 144 and 147.

17. Juwaini, ii, p. 145, states that Iluttmish even murdered the envoy.

18. See 14, 1907, p.3, for a traditional account of this marriage current among the Khokars.

19. It was held on his behalf by Qamaruddin Kirmani, who after Mangbarni's victory over the Khokar chief, promptly submitted; Nessawi, p. 86. Qubachah was accused of having killed a Khwarizmi refugee; a young relation of Mangbarni had also been brutally murdered at Kallurkot one of Qubachah's dependencies; Nessawi, p. 88.

20. Juwaini, ii, p. 146. Cf. Nessawi, p. 88.

21. Juwaini, ii, p. 147; Nessawi, p. 90-91, states that after defeating Qubachah, Mangbarni went to 'Nuhaoor' (meant for Lahore?) held by a rebellious son of Qubachah who submitted promptly.

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23. Juwaini, ii, p. 147. Cf. Nessawi, pp. 90-91.

24. Nessawi, ii, p. 148.

25. Nessawi, p. 92.

26. Juwaini, ii, p. 149.

27. Minhaj, p. 143; Juwaini, i, p. 112, writes it as *Biah*, which Elliot tries to identify with Bhera, on the west bank of the Jhelum; ii, p. 392, note, i; see also Cunningham : *Reports*, xiv, p. 37-38. Minhaj, p. 143, dates it in 621/1224. See *Fawadul Fawaid* f. 59 a. for a tradition of how this unexpected deliverance was ascribed to the miraculous power of the saint Qutbuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki.

28. Minhaj, p. 143.

29. Raziah was able to raise, from Bhatinda, a mercenary force consisting mainly of the Khokars.

30. Minhaj, p. 388; for Hasan Qarlugh's coins found in Baniyan and in the Sind Sagar Doab, see Thomas : *Chronicle*, p. 99.

31. He issued coins in his own name and in one, with a Nagari obverse, Thomas read the mint name as Multan; *Chronicle*, no. 85.

32. The event is placed in 620/1223; Minhaj, p. 370.

33. *Ibid*, p. 377.

34. pp. 90 and 217.

35. He appointed governors in Uch and Multan as early as 625/1127; Minhaj pp. 232 and 234.

36. Howorth : *Mongols*, i, p. 126-27.

37. *Tarikh-i-Siestan*, p. 397.

38. *Alfi*, f. 617a.

3a. *Shahpur Settlement Report*, 1886, pp. 27-28; *Jhelum District Settlement Report* 1874-78, pp. 29-36.

4. Minhaj, Raverty's trans. p. 267. Peshawar was the eastern frontier outpost of Khwarizm when Changiz defeated Mangbarni on the Indus in 618/1221; Nessawi, p. 79.

5. Minhaj, p. 143.

6. Minhaj, p. 171.

7. See note 4, *supra*.

8. For a full account of the Khwarizm Shah's war with Changiz and his subsequent retreat towards the east, see Bartold : *Turkestan*, pp. 403-426. Alauddin Muhiammad died in 617/1220.

9. For details of this battle see Juwaini, ii, p. 43; also Howorth; *Mongols*, i, p. 90; Nessawi, p. 83-84. It was fought on the 8th *Shawwal*, 618.

10. See Raverty : *Notes on Afghanistan*, pp. 338 and 448 : trans. *Tab. Nas.*, p. 292-93; Bartold : *Turkestan*, p. 445-46.

11. Minhaj, p. 355. On the Ighrakis, who are stated to have been a sept of the Khaljis see Raverty's notes, *trans. Tab. Nas.* p. 1043.

12. Juwaini, i, p. 108; Howorth : *Mongols*, i, p. 90.

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38. *Alfi*, f. 617a.

39. Minhaj, p. 237.
40. *Ibid*, p. 392.
41. Minhaj, p. 392 sq.
42. *Ibid*, p. 195.
43. *Ibid*, p. 262.
44. *Ibid*, p. 399.
45. *Ibid*, pp. 235 and 287.
46. The Panjnad then flowed east of Multan; *IGI*, xviii, i, p. 35; *JASB*, 1892, p. 157, note; Raverty : *trans. Tab. Nas.* p. 1155, note 6.
47. For details of this strategic move see Minhaj, p. 288-89 and p. 400: also for a detailed discussion of the route and, incidentally of the old river beds of the Punjab rivers, see Raverty : *The Mihran of Sindh*, *JASB*, 1892, pp. 162-66.
48. Minhaj, p. 269.
49. *Rauzatul-Jinnat* : f. 192b. This is based on the *Tarikh Nama-i-Herat* of Saif Haravi (ed. M. Z. Siddiqui, Calcutta 1944) p. 156-57. Minhaj skips over the incident; Cf. Raverty : *trans. Tab. Nas.* p. 677, note and p. 1201, note.
50. *Rauzatul-Jinnat*, *idem*. The governor of Lahore is called Kuretz Khan, possibly identical with Kuretz who was the deputy governor of Multan a few years later under Sher Khan; see Minhaj, p. 277.
51. Minhaj, p. 209, however, states that it was meant to relieve Multan and destroy the "infidels of Chin".
52. *Ibid*, 290.
53. *Rauzatul-Jinnat*, f. 100 b.
54. Minhaj, 270.
55. See Ferishta, i, p. 125; Minhaj, p. 277.
56. Minhaj, pp. 214, 271.
57. *Ibid*, p. 215; see also Haji Dabir, ii, p. 715.
58. In Uch, Multan and Bhatinda which he held, he was replaced by Arslan Khan; this was obviously to exclude the Turkish chiefs of Ulugh Khan's party; Sher Khan, it seems, had to be removed by force; the resulting animosity is alluded to by Minhaj, p. 271. The same allusion seems also to be intended on p. 277, though the language, most probably corrupt here, suggests strife with Ulugh Khan.
59. Minhaj, p. 217, 277; he is contradictory in his statements; see Raverty's notes, *op. cit.* p. 792; *TA*, i, p. 75, Budauni, i, p. 91.
60. Minhaj, p. 212; Raverty's *trans.* p. 684.
61. *Ibid*, p. 292.
62. *Add.* 23517, f. 254b.
63. *Tarikh-i-Binagiti*, quoted by Raverty, p. 1225, note. The Christian missionary Rubrequisius, then staying with Mangu, according to Raverty noticed and even travelled back for some weeks with, "an Indian ambassador".
64. Wassaf : *op. cit. idem*; *Binagiti*, f. 116b. Sudharah, or Sodhrah is probably the town of that name, on the ancient ford of the Chinab river, five miles above Wazirabad; Cunningham : *Reports*, xiv, p. 43.
65. Elliot, iii, p. 37, wondered if Hajner is not a corruption for Ajmer;

but there could be little doubt as to its identify with Janer, midway between Ludhiana and Firozpur, near the old bed of the Sutlej, on the road from Lahore to Kaithal; Cunningham : *Reports*, xiv, p. 67. Rashiduddin, in his *Jamiut-twarikh*, quoting obviously from al-Biruni who however, has Jajjaner (i, p. 206), wrote it as Hajner, and Cunningham noticed, in some Mss. it was actually written Janer. Minhaj lists the place as one of Ilutmish's conquests; the printed text has Janjer, clearly a misreading for Hajner.

66. Minhaj, p. 300.

67. *Ibid*, p. 219; Raverty's *trans.* p. 700.

68. Minhaj, pp. 277-78.

69. *Ibid*, pp. 266, 278.

70. See *JASB*, 1886, p. 322, sq. ; *IA*, 1932, pp. 168-69.

71. Minhaj, 314; Raverty's *trans.* p. 851.

72. *Ibid*, p. 322.

73. Minhaj, p. 273.

74. *Ibid*, pp. 225, 310-11.

75. *Ibid*, p. 278.

76. *Ibid*, p. 274.

77. Minhaj, pp. 320-23.

78. *Ibid*, pp. 317-319.

79. See p.220, *supra*

80. Hulaku's death early in 1265 terminating the non-aggression agreement may have provided the excuse.

81. Barani, p. 65. The tribes mentioned are known to have inhabited northern Rajputana, from Bikaner to Bhatinda; see Cunningham; *Reports* vi, p. 8 and xxiii, p. 223. Sher Khan is reported to have built the Bhatner fortress.

82. Barani, p. 60 and 70.

83. See p.176, *supra*

84. Barani, pp. 65-66.

85. Barani, p. 81; Elliot's translation of the passage is faulty; iii, p. 112. Malik Bektars was subsequently taken along with Bughra Khan to accompany Balban in his Bengal campaign.


86. *Ibid*, p. 75.

87. Barani, p. 109 and Ferishta, i, p. 82, state that the battle was fought between Lahore and Dipalpur but *TM*, p. 45, quoting in full Amir Hasan's description of the event, places the site 'three farsangs from Multan near a garden, on the Lahore waters (Ravi) adjoining (partly enclosed by) the great sheet of the waters of the Dihandah'. The translator of the *TA*, adds in a note that 'Dihandah was the name of a river near Ajodhan, S.W. of Dipalpur; *Trans. Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, i, p. 114.

88. See Mirza: *Life and works of Amir Khusrau*, pp. 56-59, for a translation of the poem which is quoted in full in Budauni : *Muntakhabat twarikh*, i, p. 138.

89. Mirza : *op. cit.* p. 63. The poet himself was taken captive but managed to escape.

90. *Tarikh*, i, p. 84.
91. Amir Khusrau : *Qiranus-Sadain*, p. 48.
92. *Ibid*, p. 49. *TM*, p. 54.
93. Amir Khusrau : *op. cit.*, p. 50.
94. *TM*, p. 54. Yahya adds that on the Delhi force reaching the limits of Lahore, the Mongols fled without battle and were then pursued as far as the foothills (Kohpyah) of 'Jammu'. 'Jud' must be the word meant here.



CHAPTER X

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

The foregoing page will have shown the extent to which the organisers of the Delhi Sultanate had to busy themselves with problems of expansion and defence. These military problems, in fact, lasted nearly the whole of the century. The state, under such circumstances, was bound to resemble the organization of an army in occupation and hence had to be, in the main, military. Its civil functions emerged only gradually and at a converse ratio to the disappearance of security problems. In its original structure, the Sultanate exhibited little planning. The conquerors imported certain institutions from their homeland and from Persia, most of which they found already in use in the Ghaznawid Punjab and which but for the designations, were not unfamiliar to Indian practice. The Mamluks started with the minimum of interference with governmental notions and habits; the change, impelled by the conquest, was not so much administrative as political. In the details of local government and revenue practice, in which, it should be noted, the new regime initially affected the conquered people, the Mamluks are not known to have attempted any noticeable alteration at all. In matters which were more or less exclusive to the conquerors themselves, like the central administration, army and the judicial organization, the reproduction of their own familiar pattern was only natural. Inadequacy of such improvised adminis-

tration was realised only with the passage of time and as the conquerors, losing contact with their home, were thrown solely on Indian life, and as the occupation, spreading to the country side, tended to become permanent. Within their own rank new problems arose, and the changing military situation demanded new adjustments. Yet no administrative planning could be undertaken or executed; improvised solutions were all that the situation would permit. The Mamluk administration was, therefore, mainly a series of experiments and tendencies which did not crystallise into a comprehensive system until a new dynasty came to power.

The appended account of the 13th century Muslim administration is intended to bring out this compromise and provisional nature. The chroniclers, too busy in recording military events, leave large gaps in our knowledge of the institutions and their working; these have to be filled, in a large measure, by reference to the non-Indian setting of such institutions which, as explained above, must have formed the starting point of Indo-Muslim administration.

As the supreme ruler of Islam, the Caliph had long been reduced to a mere shadow. With the ascendancy of the Turks, early in the 9th century commenced the rapid process of his decline; the Buwaihid rulers of Hamadan were the first of a series of dynasties, who, by occupying Baghdad and tolerating the Caliph as a puppet, demonstrated the emergence in the bosom of Islam, of what may perhaps be described as nation-states. The Abbasid family retained its moral leadership and even

sovereignty over portions of Iraq, but only by the courtesy of the Ghaznawid, Seljuq and the Khwarizmi emperors. Besides the rival Caliphate of the Fatimids in Egypt, new principalities arose whose rulers wielded unquestioned sovereignty, thus converting the *Darul Islam* into a multiple state-system. Yet constitutional law was chary to recognise the passing of the Caliph, for it knew of only one temporal sovereign for the indivisible world of Islam. Juristic ingenuity therefore, found a solution by according to the rulers the status of a viceroy to whom, either formally or by implicit acquiescence, power was supposed to have been delegated by the Caliph. Religious belief accorded well with this arrangement and the Caliph's exclusive sovereignty over the Islamic world was thus continued by a legal fiction. What was originally a matter of courtesy, however, became, in course of time, a legal obligation and a formal appointment by the Caliph was considered as conferring extra dignity; even where no direct delegation of power took place, legal scruple demanded an invocation of the Caliph's name in the *khutbah* and *sikka*. From the tenth century the Abbaside Caliphate thus lived on merely as a symbol of Islam's original unity to whom almost every Muslim ruler owed at least a token allegiance.

Muizzuddin's kingdom was thus, on paper, a province of the Caliphial empire, and as such, his early coins, issued in Delhi, bore the name of the reigning Caliph as a matter of course. By receiving a formal investiture from al-Mustansirbillah, Iltutmish made the Delhi Sultanate a direct vassal. None of his successors repeated the process but no

one repudiated the legal vassalage; in coins and in the *khutbah* the Caliph's name continued as the legal sovereign, even long after the last Abbaside yielded up his life to Mongol brutalities. Meanwhile, to the Sultan's name were added appropriate phrases indicating his lieutenantcy. By even inscribing the Caliph's name in Nagari characters on the currency pieces, occasional affirmation was made to the non-Muslims also of the Delhi state being part of a world empire.¹

Theoretically, therefore, the Mamluk king claimed to be no more than a viceroy, but in actual practice his sovereignty was absolute. But for the personal and religious obligations imposed by the *Shariah*, his power knew no limitation. He was the supreme executive and judicial authority and power as well as honour could be held only from him. Like the Caliph, he was the supreme interpreter and enforcer of the *Shariah*. Prudence as well as legal rules, however, suggested recourse to the advice of learned ecclesiastics. But the majority of this class was not above temptation; an unholy alliance with them smoothened the path of the king's despotism. There were on the other hand some practical and hence very real checks on his power. Apart from the consequences of an open violation of religious rules in an age when religion was a much more potent force than can be imagined now, the fear of causing rebellion compelled the king to abide by some accepted rules of conduct. His legislative powers, like those of the Caliph, were greatly limited and, even in strictly secular matters like administration, at least a formal conformity with the principles of the *Shariah* could not be

dispensed with. Though imbued with the Iranian idea of a divinely appointed, almost sacrosanct kingship, yet the Turkish mind still held, though in a diminishing degree, to the racial polity; every clan leader was a potential king. Dynastic legitimacy was not always a guarantee of continued sovereignty. Even capable and strong rulers felt the need of cloaking their despotism by placating legal opinion and affected great reverence for the personal rules of Islam. The Sultan's assumption of such powers was not likely to evoke adverse comment among the Indians, for a Hindu king was also a divinely appointed person and his autocracy was limited only by the practical need to observe the *dharma* and forestall rebellion.

The Sultan was thus the motive force of everything in the realm. His secular duties he performed himself; those pertaining to the application of the personal and religious law of the Muslims were left to an expert divine, the *Sheikhul Islam*².

Next to the Sultan, the chief executive office belonged to the wazir. Primarily he was one of the four departmental heads, the "four pillars of state;" but his rank was a little above the others, for he was the chief minister. The officer, who was usually styled the *Nizamul Mulk*, *Muayyidul Mulk*, *Sadrul Mulk*, or *Ainul Mulk*, was recruited from the writer class (*ahl-i-qalam*) as distinct from the fighters (*ahl-i-saif*)³. Over other ministers he exercised a general supervisory authority; that he was in a position to override other departmental heads seems to be implied by the wazir Muhazzabuddin taking all power out of the hands of the Turks.

Normally, every single act of the wazir was to have the Sultan's prior sanction. He does not appear to have had any judicial functions, but as the chief minister, his supervisory jurisdiction would include the organization and command of the army also⁴; as the finance minister he controlled the military pay office. He even occasionally commanded troops in battle⁵. As the Sultan's chief counsellor, he had access to him at all times. Probably he received a fixed salary for there is no mention of any assignment of revenue in his case; Muhazzabuddin is reported to have appropriated the *iqta* of Kol to himself, but this was considered unauthorised as was also his assumption of two of the royal prerogatives, the '*naubat* and the *elepahnt*'⁶. Qalqashandi, and also Shahabuddin Abbas, referring to the time of Muhammad b. Tughluq, however, speak of official appanages—'a province as large as Iraq'—being enjoyed by the wazir, whose assistants and clerks also are said to have held towns and villages, besides pay, "the worst paid among them receiving 10,000 tankah per year"⁷. Besides the improbability of this being the case in the 13th century, some exaggeration must be attributed to this account. The wazir was assisted by a *naib* (Deputy) who was usually promoted to the higher office.⁸

Although technically the chief minister, his power fell far short of what al-Mawardi describes as the *wazirul-tafwiz* (the wazir with unlimited powers).⁹ The Mamluks appear to have had one wazir at a time, but Minhaj ascribes three to Muizzuddin.¹⁰ Even as a bureaucratic administrator he lost much of his importance after Iltutmish's

death, when the *amir-i-hajib*, the *wakil-i-dar* and finally the *naib-i-mamlakat* superseded him in power. He was then reduced, in practice at least, to a mere departmental head in charge of finance and revenue; the *masnad-i-wazarat* (office of the prime minister) continued to be held by him, but the *diwan-i-wazarat* (finance ministry) was the only department he really controlled and which always formed his own portfolio. Through his fiscal staff he collected land revenue from the unassigned land (*khalisah*), and tribute from the vassal princes. By far the largest amount of his department's routine work was auditing the accounts of the provincial governors and realising the surplus revenue, sometimes even by violent methods.¹¹ He had an army of clerks under him. The audit section of the ministry was run by two officers, the *mushrif-i-mamalik* and *mustawfi-i-mamalik* whose functions correspond to those of the chief accountant and auditor general of the kingdom.¹² The *amil*, *karkun* and *mutasarrif*, comprised his fiscal and clerical staff.¹³ The office work of the *diwan-i-wazarat*, must have been elaborate, even in that early stage of governmental organization, to merit Fakhre Mudabbir's description of the wazir "as ruling over a highly complex department".¹⁴ We hear of Muhammad Tughluq's wazir having four *dabirs* (secretaries) under him each of whom had a staff of 300 clerks.¹⁵ Afif, writing of Firoz Tughluq's time, remarks, "if one wants to describe the work of the *diwan-i-wazarat*, one has to write a book."¹⁶

Next in importance to the wazir was the *ariz-i-mamalik*, the head of the army department (*diwan-i-arz*). He kept the *iqtadar's* (military assignee)

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muster-roll, recruited new troops, and looked after the equipment and efficiency of the fighting forces.¹⁷ He was, besides, the paymaster-general of the army. His *naib* of whom there could be more than one at a time, accompanied the army in campaigns and arranged for provision and transport and took charge of the booty.¹⁸ The *ariz* occasionally held reviews of the fighting services. These were meant, in addition to inspecting the equipment and general smartness, to facilitate the disbursement of pay and also to receive the contingents furnished by the provincial governors. Balban's *ariz*, Imadul Mulk, used to reward the troops out of his own resources and is specially praised for his conscientious discharge of duties.¹⁹ He was given wide powers to increase the rate of soldiers' pay, and was made independent of the wazir's financial control. Barani records his practice of occasionally entertaining his office staff and begging of them not to take bribe from the *muqti's* representatives or to misappropriate any portion of the soldiers' pay, a vice which would thus appear to have been quite common and which by later instances is not proved as having been rooted out. The *ariz* was probably paid in assignments, for Imadul Mulk is said to have granted many villages for public charities out of his own *iqta*.²⁰

The third ministry was the royal chancellery, which Minhaj seems to designate as *diwan-i-ashraf* but which, subsequently and in general practice, was known as the *diwan-i-insha*.²¹ Its function was to draft royal proclamations and despatches and to communicate with the local executive officers. It had a large staff of secretaries, called *dabir*, the

head or *sahib* was usually known as the *sadrul mulk*. The Sultan's private *dabir* was known as the *dabir-i-khas*. His duty was to accompany the king and, besides taking charge of his correspondence, to compile the *fath namah* (victory communique).²³ The *sahib-i-diwan-i-insha* was in close touch with the Sultan and was the keeper of government records.

In Bughra Khan's description of the state in course of his advice to Kaiqubad, the fourth ministry is called *diwan-i-rasalat*²³. Its functions are not outlined but the term *rasalat* suggests foreign and diplomatic correspondence and as such must have been a kind of foreign office, in close touch with ambassadors and envoys sent to and received from foreign potentates.²⁴

Besides these principal departments, there was the *barid-mamalik*, chief news writer of the kingdom under whom were numerous *barids*, posted in towns, bazars and in almost every inhabited locality²⁵. They reported every important incident to the chief who communicated them to the Sultan. Besides reporting on public affairs they also spied on the conduct of the local officials. In effect, the *barid-i-mamalik's* department combined the functions of an exclusive government news organization with those of the secret intelligence service²⁶.

Another equally important department was the *diwan-i-qaza* (judiciary), presided over by the *qazi-i-mamalik* (chief justice of the kingdom) who sometimes also held the office of the *Sheikhul-Islam*, in charge of the ecclesiastical affairs. In the latter capacity he was known as the *sadr-i-jahan*, or *sadrus-sudur*, a designation which the chronicler

Minhaj held on a number of occasions. As the king's advisor on religious affairs he controlled the educational establishments, led the Friday prayers and appointed *khatib* and *imam* to local mosques. He was also the head of the *iẖtisab* organization and controlled the large staff of *muhtasibs* (Municipal Officer and moral censor), placed in every Muslim locality. As the head of the judiciary, the chief *qazi* was responsible for the recruitment and posting of the judicial staff and working of the judicial institutions.

Of lesser importance were the departments of inland shipping and waterways under the *amir-i-bahr*²⁷, and the armoury (*zarrad khana*) under the *shahnah* (superintendent), the last being clearly affiliated to the army ministry²⁸. The treasurer (*khazin*), must have been under the orders of the *wazir*.²⁹

These were the normal institutions of the central government and their working was little affected by political changes. These changes, in so far as they influenced governmental policy, were caused not so much by successions on the throne as by the holding of certain posts in the royal household. As in all despotically ruled states, the king's household was the pivot on which the entire administration turned and functionaries in that household naturally enjoyed great power. One such officer under the Mamluks was the *amir-i-hajib*, also called *malikul-hujjab* and *shariful hujjab*,³⁰ the master of ceremonies. He enforced the court etiquette and acted as the intermediary through whom the Sultan communicated with his officials and the people; no one could gain access to the king

without his permission. He was assisted by a number of *hajibs* or ushers who accompanied the king; his personal attache was called the *khas hajib*. The chief was assisted by a *naib* who was also a high noble. In Barani's time the *amir-i-hajib* seems to have been better known as *barbak*.³¹

Placed as the *amir-i-hajib* was near the Sultan's person, he could wield dictatorial powers specially when the king was weak or young; significantly enough, we do not hear much about the *hajib* and his actions under Aibak, Iltutmish or Balban. The office therefore was the bone of contention between rival factions of courtiers; and a change of government, consequent upon a new faction coming to power, meant changing the incumbents in such offices as that of the *amir-i-hajib*. On Balban's dismissal in 1253, his brother Kashli Khan was also made to relinquish the *hajib's* post : Raziah's *hajib*, Aetigin, by virtue of his position, took the main part in the conspiracy that led to her downfall. Bahram's *hajib*, Badruddin Sunqar, was able to supersede the wazir's authority and even to issue orders without the king's sanction.

Of greater importance, from the point of view of administration, was the *wakil-i-dar*, another household officer. The office is first mentioned in the reign of Mahmud when the upstart Rayhan got himself appointed to this post, but obviously, it must have existed earlier. From Minhaj's statement that on getting the post Rayhan "took into his own hands the direction of the affairs within the hall of the pavilion of majesty,"³³ he would appear to be the administrative head of the king's household establishment, and as such was the successor to the

Ghaznawid *sahib-i-diwan-i-wakalat*.³⁴ Fakhre Mudabbir in outlining his duties and privileges, considers him as the functionary whom every member of the royal household and family was bound to show respect.³⁵ The *Siyasat Namah* refers, among others, to his duty of looking after the education of the children of the royal family.³⁶ The *wakil-i-dar* was thus, in fact, the king's steward, a comptroller of the royal household and so anticipated the Mughal *mir-i-saman*. Like the *amir-i-hajib*, the *wakil* also commanded great potentialities and under weak kings like Mahmud or Kaiqubad, he could play the dictator. He had also a *naib*, but no smaller *wakils*.³⁷

Another officer attached to the court was the *sar-i-jandar*. He commanded the king's body guards called *jandars*, among whom a large group was possibly formed by the younger slaves of the king. The *sar-i-jandar* was a salaried officer³⁸ and a high noble. There was, it appears, more than one *sar-i-jandar* at a time, possibly in command of different groups.³⁹ His primary duty was to guard the king's person and the *jandar* formed an integral part of his retinue. A passage in the *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri* seems to suggest that the *sar-i-jandar* was also entrusted with the custody, punishment and execution of prisoners of war and also of convicted criminals. Malik Aibak was offered this post by Iltutmish, but he excused himself by saying that "the Sultan....commands his slave to take an office of affliction (*musaderah*), while his humble slave is unable to practise bloodshed, torture and extortion and oppression upon Muslims and subjects".⁴⁰

Other household dignitaries were the *amir-i-*

akhur (master of horse) with his *naib*,⁴¹ and the *shahnah-i-pilan* (superintendent of elephants).⁴² The *amir-i-shikar*, in charge of the king's hunting establishment, had a number of subordinates to look after the different hunting animals and birds.⁴³ A number of other functionaries is mentioned in the chronicles, but these held minor posts, more of decorative than administrative value. These were generally given to newly purchased slaves to whom they served as training ground for offices of real responsibility.⁴⁴

A kind of advisory council for the Sultan was formed by the *amir-i-hajib*, his deputy, the *wazir*, the *ariz*, the *wakil-i-dar* and the *kotwal* of Delhi.⁴⁵ There was however no hard and fast rule as to its constitutional functions and much depended on the Sultan's whim. Non-officials also were normally consulted, who together with the officers, were known as the *arkan-i-daulat*; Bughra Khan was specially instructed to follow the advice of these counsellors.⁴⁶ Kaiqubad was urged to refer all problems of government to his cabinet of four ministers composed of the *wazir*, the *ariz* and the heads of the *diwan-i-insha* and *rasalat*.⁴⁷

These offices functioned normally and their influences on the policy of state was indirect and depended mostly on personal factors; the appointment to one or other of the household offices did not necessarily imply the conferment of overriding authority. Such power was however associated with the office of the *naib-i-mamlikat*, a special post created by Turkish ingenuity. As the deputy ruler, his powers even exceeded those allowed to the *wazirul-tafwiz* of al-Mawardi.⁴⁸ The *naib* was

even greater than the regent for, when he functioned to the admitted extent of his powers, he practically superseded the king. The wazir was mainly a bureaucrat and, unless specifically empowered, could have little initiative or independence in matters of policy. But the *naib* controlled all aspects of government and supplied the directive; constitutionally he was meant to exercise sovereign powers and also the King's prerogative. The circumstances in which the office was created prove clearly the super-legal powers that it was intended to possess. It was the work of the Turkish military oligarchy who, after Raziah's deposition, resolved to safeguard their own domination by compelling the king to abdicate his powers. Bahram was made to agree to the appointment of Aetigin as his *naib* "for at least one year" and to place him in control of the entire kingdom "by issuing an order in accordance with all this."⁴⁹ Aetigin's subsequent assumption of the Sultan's prerogative of the '*naubat* and the elephant' would thus appear to have been implicit in his position. After Bahram's fall, the process was repeated and Masud's *naib* wielded exactly the same powers. The personal factor, however, became active on this occasion and the powers theoretically conceded to the *naib* were overshadowed by the superior ability and cunning of Balban, the new *amir-i-hajib*. But when the latter acquired the office himself, the *naib's* powers were fully exercised and for the rest of his reign Mahmud played the role of a constitutionally powerless monarch. It is tempting to speculate whether, given the necessary dynastic and political continuity, the experiment of the *naib* would not have resulted in the evolution, in course of time,

of something like a constitutional monarchy and of a representative prime minister. The method of selecting the wazir, adopted by Mahmud and Masud of Ghazni,⁵⁰ held out a precedent of appointing the nobles' nominees and thus giving them an indirect share in running the government. But dynastic continuity, sufficient to allow the growth of a political convention, never obtained in India. Besides, Balban, the new *naib* was himself a monarchist to the core and his eventual accession to the throne meant a cessation of the experiment.

The *naib's* office was entirely abolished; it was made use of sometimes but it was never allowed all its recognised powers. Even the *wazir* became an unimportant functionary under Balban who dealt directly with every departmental head. His *naib*, the kotwal Fakhruddin, was merely his representative, a proxy, who was left to carry on the routine administration during the king's absence on the Lakhnauti campaign.⁵¹ Even then, he was left with no discretionary powers for every important matter or despatch was to be sent to the Sultan for final orders.⁵² The *naib* appointed for Kaiumars was also far from what Aetigin or Balban was to the reigning king, for he was intended to exercise powers on behalf of the king, not to supersede him;⁵³ it was purely a regency. It was in this capacity of a regent that the *naib* functioned in the Khalji period; as the wielder of sovereign power, to the nullification of that of the king, the officer disappeared from after Balban's accession. He was the last incumbent.

NOTES

1. For some coins of this type see Wright, p. 26. nos. 48, 49.
2. Iltutmish offered this office to Qutubuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki, and on his refusal, gave it to Najmuddin Sughra; *Siarul Arefin*, f. 57a. In 1253 Mahmud appointed Jamaluddin Bustami who, on his death, was succeeded by his son; Minhaj pp. 220 and 226.
3. Fakhre Mudabbir. *Adabul Harb*, f. 56b.
4. Fakhre Mudabbir : *Adabul Harb*. f. 36 & 53b. In the 13th century however, the *wazir* was overshadowed by other officers and generally was anything but the highest executive officer. Under the later Tughluqs he rose in power and really became the prime minister when he personally looked after the equipment of troops and even held reviews; Afif: *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi*, p. 193, 442. Such assumption of interfering authority in other departments must be ruled out under the Mamluks; even his jurisdiction over the military accounts was put an end to by Balban, as will be noticed hereafter, Cf. Qureshi : p. 78-79.
5. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 237a; Minhaj, p. 173.
6. Minhaj, p. 198.
7. *Subhul A'sha*, v, p. 94; English translation by Spies, in *Muslim University Journal*, Aligarh, June 1935, p. 71-2; Elliot: iii, p. 578.
8. For the *naib-wazir's* duties see Barani, p. 454. Instances of promotion are afforded by the careers of Muhazzabuddin and Khaja Khatir; Minhaj, p. 187 and Barani, p. 24.
9. al-Mawardi : *op. cit.* pp. 21-24; see also Khudabukhsh; *Contributions to the History of Islamic Civilization*, pp. 246-248.
10. p. 126.
11. No direct reference is found in the 13th century chronicles to such duties, but instances from Khalji and Tughluq history confirm the above statement. For Ghiyasuddin Tughluq's instructions to his *wazir* regarding the collection of the land revenue, see Barani, p. 429. For a reference to the ministry's audit work under Firoz Tughluq, see Afif, *op. cit.*, p. 414. The ministry sometimes sent out auditors to provincial governments; such auditors were called *Muhasib*. See Amir Khusrav : *Ijaz-i-Khusravi*: f. 106 sq., for the copy of a report sent by the *Muhasib* about the refusal of the *muqti* of Manikpur, in 909/1309, to render his accounts or pay up the surplus due.
12. The *mushrif* is not mentioned as an accountant in the 13th century writings, but Afif speaks of his functions in the ministry as of long standing; *op. cit.* p. 409-410. Firoz Tughluq raised the *mustaufi's* importance and empowered him to interfere with all sections of the *diwan-i-wazarat*; he was finally made the auditor general of the kingdom; Afif: *op. cit.* p. 376. Under the *Mustaufi* was another official called *waquf*, created by Firoz Khalji, to examine the items of expenditure. He also created the post of *nazir* to examine the returns of the *Amil* submitted to the *mushrif*, Afif: *op. cit.* p. 420.

13. Barani, p. 288-89.
14. *Adabul Harb*, f. 36a.
15. Abbas; *Masalikul Absar*, Elliot, iii, p. 578.
16. *Op. cit.* p. 420.
17. Barani, p. 61.
18. *Ibid*, p. 326.
19. *Ibid*, pp. 115-16.
20. *Ibid*, p. 117.
21. Minhaj, p. 185. In Firoz Tughluq's time, the *Mushrif* was the accountant, the chancellor being then known as the *sahib-i-diwan-i-insha* who had lost his cabinet rank; see Afif: *op. cit.* pp. 279 and 409.
22. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 73a, 124b; see also Barani, p. 158.
23. Barani, p. 153, Cf. Qureshi : *op. cit.* p. 84, who propounds a theory that this department dealt with religious affairs and was allied to the *diwan-i-qaza*, the two being usually presided over by the same person. No definite authority for this statement is however cited, nor is any available in the early chronicles. His statement that "the *Diwan-i-Rasalat* dealt with religious affairs; pious foundations, stipends to deserving scholars and men of piety and that it was presided over by the Sadrus Sudur" is based purely on supposition, for the references given do not admit of such on inference. His ingenuous explanation of why the term *rasalat*, applied by the Ghaznavids to the chancellery, was, under the Mamluks, transferred to the ecclesiastical department, hence becomes pointless. The Mamluks in fact made little change in what they found of the Ghaznavid institutions in the Punjab and seem to have followed administrative traditions current in other Muslim countries of Asia. See Nazim: *Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna*, pp. 142-43, for a description of this department's functions under Mahmud of Ghazni.
24. See Fakhre Mudabbir : *Adabul Harb*, f. 57a, for the regulations concerning the despatch of ambassadors.
25. Barani, pp. 24 and 38.
26. See *Siyasat Namah*, pp. 57-58, and 65; Auifi: *Jawamiul-Hakayat*, f. 319.
27. Minhaj, p. 258.
28. *Ibid*, p. 254. In Barani's time it was known as the *Salahkhana* and the officer, called *Sar-i-Salahdar*, had a rank in the army; Barani, p. 24.
29. Minhaj, p. 249.
30. *Ibid*, p. 294; Barani, p. 527-28.
31. Barani, pp. 34, 36 and 61.
32. Minhaj, p. 193.
33. *Ibid*, 298; Raverty's trans. p. 827.
34. Nazim : *op. cit.* p. 147.
35. *Adabul Harb*, f. 42-43.
36. p. 82.
37. Barani, p. 36.
38. Minhaj, p. 237. His salary under Iltutmish was three lakh 'jitals'.
39. See Minhaj, pp. 236 and 252.

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40. *Ibid*, p. 237.
41. Minhaj, p. 247.
42. *Ibid*, p. 256-57.
43. Barani, p. 54.
44. Such offices were those of the *chashnigir* (food taster), *sagi-i-khas* (purveyor of drinks) *dawat-dar* (keeper of the writing case), *bahlah-dar* (?), etc. An *amir-i-majlis* is also mentioned in Iltutmish's reign; Minhaj, p. 238.
45. Barani, p. 36. The kotwal's inclusion was due to his personal qualities and as a close friend of Balban; his office presumably did not warrant his membership.
46. Barani, p. 81.
47. *Ibid*, p. 153.
48. See note 9, above; Cf. Qureshi, p. 77-78, who considers *naib* as only another name for the chief *wazir*, the *wazirut-tafwiz*, but the fact is, that the *naib* functioned side by side with the *wazir* and was therefore an extra-bureaucratic officer.
49. Minhaj, p. 253.
50. On the dismissal of Ahmad b. Hasan al-Maimandi, Mahmud called for nominations from his courtiers; they submitted a list of four names out of which he appointed Hasanak; Masud also followed the same practice; see Baihaqi; *Tarikh-i-Masudi*, pp. 453-54.
51. Barani, p. 86.
52. *Ibid*, p. 87.
53. *Ibid*, p. 181.

CHAPTER XI

PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

From what has been said above in connection with the central government it will have been noticed that the Mamluk state had of necessity to be a decentralised system. It was a loose structure, made up of military commands, and not all of them were set up under one single direction or within a given time. To these commands wide latitude of action had to be conceded, for it was to the single-handed initiative of men like Bakhtiyar that the Turkish state owed its territorial expansion and also preservation from the by-no-means passive Hindu powers. The continuity of the occupation process, spreading, as we have seen, over generations, permitted little governmental planning.

Implicit in such circumstances was, therefore, the nature of provincial administration which functioned under the Mamluks. Limited as the state's manpower was, the setting up of a uniform civil administration over all parts of its dominions was out of the question. Familiarity with the details and problems of day-to-day administration could not be expected of the newly-arrived Turks, even if such officers were available in their ranks and could be spared from military work. Retention of the existing governmental machinery in the form of vassal states and the employment of non—Muslims for such essential civil work, as the assessment and collection of the land-revenue in villages directly within the military area, were thus unavoidable. Direct annex-

ation of territories requiring large civil and military personnel to administer them was mostly sought to be avoided. The ruling class congregated in military stations and capital cities, and non-military Muslim penetration of the rural area was extremely slow and was confined to missionaries. Except the martial classes, and that usually in course of hostilities, and a few traders, the non-Muslim population in the countryside hardly came into governmental contact with the sovereign people whose purpose of administration, in the early years at least, turned on the smooth and regular collection of the land revenue. It is to be noted however, that this character of the administration wore out as the century progressed. *Laissez faire* in local administration was one of the principles whose early abandonment featured the Khalji regime, which thus summed up a tendency that had been progressively making itself felt through out the century.

A study of this earliest form of Indo-Muslim government must therefore begin with a consideration of the status and power of the vassal ruler to whom the paramount power entrusted the ordinary administration over the major part of the kingdom. Very little however can be gleaned on this point from the chronicles in which only his hostile behaviour provided an occasion for mentioning the feudatory chief. The most important condition of his vassalage was, it is certain, the undertaking to pay the tribute regularly. This tribute represented, it may be assumed, both the land-revenue, and perhaps also the *jaziah*, realizable from his dominions. His sovereignty was curtailed to provide for the inclusion, in his coins, the suzerain's name,

whose omission, at any rate, was considered a clear proof of the repudiation of vassalage. In the majority of cases the right of having an independent coinage appears to have been entirely taken away, for among the 13th century coins so far discovered, not many instances are found of such a modified vassalage. The name of Iltutmish (written '*Samasorala-deva*', i.e. Shamsuddin) is included, evidently as a suzerain, in a few coins of a Chauhana prince of Ranthambhor whose name was read by Thomas as Chaharadeva. From an inscription of another prince, Jaitra Singh, dated 1215, acknowledging the overlordship of Vallanadeva of Ranthambhor, but also mentioning Iltutmish of 'Joginipur',¹ it seems that the suzerainty was to be acknowledged in epigraphs also. If the Assam king's offer to have the *Khutba* read in his capital in the name of the Muslim conqueror Yuzbak, in 1255,² can be taken as illustrating the prevailing conditions of vassalage, the vassal was also required to give this symbolic expression to Muslim suzerainty, but this would depend on the existence of a Muslim colony in the Hindu state. In the details of administration, the vassal ruler appears to have enjoyed complete independence, subject, obviously, to his obligation to respect his suzerain's edicts. The privilege of having his own modified coinage probably carried with it the right to levy customs duty on his own frontiers. Ordinarily, the vassal was his own master in the matter of assessment and collection of land-revenue, administration of justice and observance of religious practices. In the matter of revenue assessment, however, the standard set for the administered areas was expected to be followed

in his dominions also, but this could hardly be a condition of vassalage. Much depended on the prestige and strength of the king whose suzerainty had, in fact, to be periodically enforced at the point of sword.

The chronicles generally use the words *iqta* and *wilayat* to indicate a division of the kingdom. The former, which means, literally, a portion, is used much more frequently, seemingly with a technical meaning, on the exact determination of which depends a clear understanding of the nature of the local administration.³ The word *iqta*, meaning an administrative division, appears to have been used early in Central Asian states⁴ from which the Turks borrowed it. It is needless to point out that Raverty's translation of the word as 'fief'-which at once suggests a feudal system in which the tenants-in-chief of the king were virtual sovereigns in their own domains—is misleading. A careful study of the chronicles will show that the so-called 'fief-holders' (*muqtis*) were subject to greater control than the term 'fief' implies. And yet considerable latitude was allowed to them in military affairs, which would be unthinkable for modern bureaucratic governors.

Towards the end of the 12th century, Nizamul Mulk Tusi laid down the following rules for the guidance of the *muqti*.⁵ "They (the *muqtis*) should know that their right over the subjects is only to take the rightful amount of money or perquisite (*mal-i-haqq*) in a peaceful manner.....the life, property and the family of the subject should be immune from any harm, the *muqtis* have no right over them; if the subject desires to make a direct appeal to the Sultan, the *muqti* should not prevent

him. Every *muqti* who violates these laws should be dismissed and punished.....the *muqtis* and *walis* are so many superintendents over them as the king is superintendent over other *muqtis*....After three or four years, the *amils* and the *muqtis* should be transferred so that they may not be too strong." There is no mention, however, of their rights and liabilities in other matters of Government such as army, revenue and justice, but there are instances in Seljuq and also in Khwarizmi history showing that the *muqti* had his own contingents equipped and maintained out of the revenue of his province, the rest of which went to the central government.⁶

This system in many of its details was followed in India, where also such military governorships were fairly well-practised. The *muqti* was appointed by the Sultan, and could be transferred and dismissed at will. Usually he maintained a body of troops consisting of both infantry and horsemen, out of his own provincial revenues, and was responsible not only for the defence of his province, but also for the maintenance of law and order. His troops could be requisitioned by the central government. Although it is not recorded that he, as a rule, despatched the surplus revenue of his province after deducting the expenses of the army and the administration, yet instances are not rare to warrant such a supposition. The *muqti* of Lahore and Multan was directed by Muizzuddin in 1204 A.D. to despatch the arrears of revenue to enable him to make preparation for his campaign in Transoxiana.⁷ According to Barani, Prince Muhammad, Balban's eldest son and viceroy of Sind, used to bring the revenue of his province personally to his father

every year.⁸ If we take instances from the Khalji and Tughlaq period we may cite the instance of Alauddin, the *muqti* of Karra and Awadh, who asked Firoz Khalji for permission to utilise the surplus revenue (*fawazil*) of his province in purchasing horses and employing troops for an advance on Chanderi⁹. That the *muqti* or *wali* was responsible for the accounts of his provincial revenue to the Finance Ministry (*diwan-i-wazarat*) seems clear from the order of Ghiyasuddin Tughluq to his newly appointed officers : "If you desire that you may not be taken to task by the *diwan-i-wazarat*.....you should not be avaricious; take little from the *iqta* and with this defray your expenses and pay your troops and do not take a single farthing from the pay of the troops". A close audit of the account of the *muqti* is also implied in the following passage : "Those (*muqtis*) who embezzle the money and tamper with the accounts and exact more than the specified share from the *iqta*, would be punished with chains and imprisonment".¹⁰

Although there is no record of the amount of his remuneration or salary (*muwajib*) as such, he must have had a definite share out of the revenues. The fact that in several instances¹¹ the *muqti* attempted to extend his province not only by conquering Hindu territories, but also by annexing part or whole of other adjacent *iqtas*, and thus increasing his income, suggests that his salary was probably fixed in proportion to the entire revenue.¹² Except as a punishment, as in the case of Kabir Khan who was recalled from Multan by Iltutmish and placed in charge of the small *iqta* of Pulwal,¹³ or in the case of Kashlu Khan, who on Balban's dismissal from the

court in 651/1253 A.D., was transferred from his extensive *iqta* of Nagaur to Karra,¹⁴ no *muqti* appears to have been transferred from a larger to a smaller *iqta*. It is important to note that, although the *muqti* was assigned a fixed share in the revenue, his financial position was different from that of the assignee (*igtadar*) who had no financial liability to the central exchequer. This is clear from the position of the two thousand Shamsi *igtadars* who were assigned the revenue of the villages as their pay for personal service in the army.¹⁵ To this category also belonged the *iqta* of Bakhtiyar granted to him by the *muqti* of Awadh.¹⁶ Other assignments for services of a non-military character were those made to the *gazis* of the realm as well as to the *amir-i-dad* of the city.

Mention has been made of the *muqti*'s responsibilities for the civil and military administration of the province. As the conquest was in the nature of a military occupation, the maintenance and command of the provincial troops was the primary duty of the *muqti*. He enjoyed considerable freedom of action in the matter of fighting against the Hindus and also against foreign invaders. He was expected to join the royal forces with his contingents whenever required to do so, and failure was considered an act of rebellion. Although every *muqti* was liable to military service, only those in the neighbourhood of Delhi were generally ordered to be present.

From a passage in Barani, the Tughluq central government appears to have fixed the strength, pay, and equipment of the provincial army, which the *muqti* was not allowed to alter,¹⁷ but it is doubtful if this was a continuation of the earlier system.

For the 13th century autonomy would hardly square with this limitation on his action. Before Alauddin's centralization, no such detailed interference with his army administration was in evidence. Balban instructed Bughra Khan, the *muqti* of Samana and Sunam, to double the existing number of the provincial troops by new recruitment and also to raise their pay.¹⁸ He also impressed on him the necessity of keeping himself informed about every detail of his military affairs. "Consider no expense for the army as too much and let your muster-master (*ariz*) engage himself always in maintaining the old and recruiting new troops and keeping himself informed about every expenditure in his department"¹⁹. The strength of the provincial contingent is nowhere indicated but it must have varied according to the revenue of the province. The *muqti* also had his muster-master (*ariz*) who was represented at the central government by his *naib*²⁰.

It does not appear that the judicial organisation of the province was under his control, or that he had any judicial function to perform. Apart from his general duties of maintaining law and order, which incidentally, was ordinarily limited to the chief cities and fortresses, and could be performed by the kotwal appointed by him, duties were confined, besides what has been described above, to the raising of the king's share of the revenue from the peasants and the Hindu chiefs. We have little information respecting the existence of Muslim peasants at this period, but in the cities there were owners of land who were liable to the payment of *kharaj*. Hindus formed the bulk of the peasantry and in most of

the provinces they paid the revenue through their village headmen, called *muqaddam* and *chaudhuri*.²¹ Hindu chiefs were under the *muqti* while others paid directly to the *diwan-i-wazarat*.

The *muqti* was generally a resident in the province but in some cases, particularly in provinces near the capital, there were absentee governors who ruled through deputies (*naibs*), sometimes appointed by the central government.²² Hindu Khan ruled Uch through his *naib* after he returned to court in the reign of Bahram;²³ Balban, who held the office of *amir-i-hajib* and later, that of the *naib-i-mamlikat*, which required his constant presence at the court, must have administered his *iqta* of Hansi and Siwalikh through such a deputy. At his dismissal in 1253 Hansi was placed in charge of the infant son of Mahmud,²⁴ and in this case a *naib* was clearly a necessity. In larger provinces, the *muqti* himself appointed his deputy over important cities and outposts. Probably to this class of deputy governorship should belong the *iqtas* of Narangoi held by Ali Mardan, and Ganguri held by Husamuddin Iwaz in Bengal.²⁵ The *muqti* obviously had power to assign land to his officers as in the case of Bakhtiyar who received a military *iqta* from the governor of Awadh. Balban advised Bughra Khan to give *iqtas* to trusted and loyal officers. That the *muqti* could also make free grant of land like the Sultan, is proved by Minhaj receiving villages from Balban which produced an income of "thirty thousand *jitals*".²⁶

There is little detailed information as to the *muqti's* subordinate staff, but since he was a miniature king, the reproduction of the Sultan's main depart-

ments in his province can perhaps be presumed. At the head of his secretariat stood the *dabir*; he had also a confidential adviser.²⁷ It does not appear that he had any prime minister or wazir, so called; Ainul Mulk Ashari, who is said to have been detailed as wazir to prince Firoz on his appointment to Budaun, was most probably only a tutor or guardian (*atabek*).²⁸ Lesser officers, described as *mutasarrif*, *karkun* and *amil*, formed his administrative and fiscal staff,²⁹ controlled by his own revenue department over which the central *diwan-i-wazarat* could, at best, claim only auditing authority. The incident recorded by Barani of Ilutmish once appointing, on the wazir's recommendation, the clerk (*khawaja*) of the *iqta* of Kanouj, only illustrates a tendency rather than normal practice.³⁰ Over the judiciary and the *barid* organization in the province the *muqti*, however, had little control.

Extensive as the *iqta* system was, it was by no means exclusive. We hear occasionally of *Khalisah* areas, comprising cities and districts, which were governed by *amir* or *shahnah* instead of the *muqti*. Latterly, the term came to have a purely fiscal connotation, but in the 13th century its administrative organization also was different. Raverty translated the term as 'crown-land' but Moreland, more correctly, rendered it as 'reserve area', in which no assignment was given, the *kharaj* being collected directly by the central revenue ministry.³¹ Such an area was Bhatinda in the first half of the century when it was in charge of a *shahnah*.³² Since the revenue was collected by the king's fiscal staff and was all credited to the central exchequer, the superintendent was most probably remunerated by a fixed

salary. Under the same system was the territory in the immediate neighbourhood of Delhi, the area described as the *hawali-i-Delhi* and also known as *Harianah*,³³ for it does not appear as part of any *iqta*. Its administrative officer is nowhere mentioned, but the *diwan-i-wazarat* directly supervised the fiscal staff. Bhatinda was later converted into an ordinary *iqta*.³⁴

Different from the *iqta* organization was also the newly conquered areas and fortresses. Gwalior was always under an amir, evidently a military officer.³⁵ The case of Karra on the Ganges near Allahabad, may be cited as an example of a military division being eventually converted into a civil administrative unit. During Iltutmish's reign it formed the military charge of an amir, but by the time of Mahmud, it had attained the status of an ordinary *iqta*.³⁶

The chronicles mention no smaller administrative unit below the *iqta* as comprising rural areas. Barani occasionally mentions *parganahs* and *faujdar*s, but no adequate evidence is forthcoming to enable us to consider these as representing subdivisional organizations. Early in the next century, we hear of the *shiqq* and the *sada* but to ascribe them inferentially to the Mamluk governmental arrangement would require more contemporary evidence than is at present available.

NOTES

1. For citations, see *supra*. Chapter IV
2. Minhaj, p. 264-5.
3. Both the words are used in a synonymous sense. See Barani, p. 96; also p. 430 where Balban, in advising his son Bughra Khan, *muqti* of

Lakhnauti, drew a distinction between *Iqlimdari* (kingdom) and *Wilayatdari*, the last word having been evidently used for *muqti-ship*; see also Moreland: *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, Appendix B.

4. See, for example, *Siyasat Namah*, p. 28. Ibnul Asir frequently uses it in his account of the Seljuq Kingdom; x (Thornberg) pp. 178, 274; see also Nessawi, p. 79.

5. *Siyasat Namah*, p. 37.

6. Ibnul Asir (Cairo), x, pp. 127, 152, 176, 192: also Gibb, *Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades*, p. 34.

7. *Alfi*, f. 497b. Also *Jamiut-twarikh*, quoted by Raverty, *trans. Tab. Nas.* p. 482, note.

8. Barani, p. 59; see also pp. 108-9.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 220-21.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 431.

11. *E. G. ibid.*, pp. 269, 177.

12. What this proportion was, it is impossible to ascertain. Ghiyas-uddin Tughluq, early in the 14th century, asked his revenue minister not to punish the "*maliks* and *amirs*" if they appropriated "half-tenth or half-eleventh and one-tenth or one-fifteenth of the revenue of the *iqta* or *wilayat*, besides the customary perquisites of the office"; Barani, p. 431. The wording here indicates that while the perquisite, whatever its value may have been, was his usual remuneration, the Tughluq king was prepared to allow the *muqti* an extra percentage at the rate mentioned. Perhaps it was a revival of an earlier practice, suspended by the Khalji centralization. Ibn Battuta observes that Muhammad b. Tughluq's governors receive 1/20 of their revenue as commission. *Rahlah*, Def. et Sang. iii, p. 117.

13. Minhaj, p. 234.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 270.

15. Barani, p. 61-63. This was their *mawajib*. Cf. Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 27.

16. Minhaj, p. 147; the *muqti* of Budaun had previously paid him in cash.

17. Barani, p. 431.

18. Barani, p. 80.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 101-2.

20. Barani, p. 116.

21. Barani, p. 106.

22. *E. g.* the *naib* of Kanouj was appointed by Iltutmish; Barani, p. 38.

23. Minhaj, p. 399.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 157-58.

26. Minhaj, pp. 214 and 295.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 243; he was actually called *kathkuda*; see also *Ijaz-i-Khusravi*, f. 106 b.

28. Minhaj, p. 174.

29. For the mention of a *mushrif* under the *muqti* of Kol., see *Fawadul Fawaid*, ff. 56-5. The salary of these subordinate officers was paid in cash.

but those attached to the revenue work appear to have been allowed a commission of $1\frac{1}{2}$ or 1 p.c. of the collected revenue; Barani, p. 430.

30. Barani, p. 36. Balban also is reported to have appointed the *mulasarraf* of Amroha, *ibid*, f. 38.

31. Moreland : *op. cit.* p. 29.

32. Minhaj, pp. 188, 250, 251.

33. See Moreland : *op. cit.* p. 23, for its approximate boundary. For Harianah, see *EIM*, 1913-14, p. 38.

34. Minhaj, p. 277.

35. Ilutunish's first appointment was as the amir of Gwalior; Minhaj, p. 169. Among the officers appointed there on its reconquest in 1231, there is no *muqti* mentioned, but only the *amir-i-dad*, *Kotwal* and the *gazi*; *ibid*, p. 175. Malik Tyasai, when he held charge of the fortress, was called *shahnah* and not *muqti*; *ibid*, p. 240.

36. Minhaj, p. 177 and 217; also see Raverty's note, p. 626.

CHAPTER XII

THE FIGHTING FORCES

Contemporary writers lay great emphasis on the need for maintaining a strong and efficient army, for a state can never function without a coercive instrument.¹ Originally, the army was, perhaps, composed of every able-bodied man who immigrated to India, but there soon grew up the idea of a division of labour. As the conquerors gradually assumed the duties of civil government, a functional division of society took place and fighting became more or less a profession. While potentially all Muslims were members of the state's fighting forces, normally, professional soldiers in the state's employ manned the army. These seem to have consisted of four classes: (i) the regular soldiers under the Sultan's direct control and in permanent employment; (ii) the troops permanently maintained by the provincial governors on the same footing as those of the king; (iii) special recruits in times of war and expeditions, and (iv) volunteers, ordinarily Muslims, who were expected to bear their own arms and enrol, for no pay but a share in the booty, for participating in what was called a *jihad*.

Although no direct reference is found to the existence, under the king's direct control, of what may be called a standing army, sufficient indications are yet found to warrant the inference that the central government did possess a body of regular

troops.² We however, know very little about its character and composition. The king's bodyguards, the *jandars*, it may be assumed, must have formed its nucleus. These *jandars* not only acted as a police force, in so far as the maintenance of order around the person and for that matter, the court and the palace of the king was concerned, but also joined in battles. They were largely drawn from the king's personal slaves, though their leader, the *sar-i-jandar*, was usually, a free-born noble.³ Their number naturally depended on the will of the ruler, but it must have been fairly strong; the Muizzi and Qutbi *jandars* gave no inconsiderable trouble to Iltutmish when he assumed the crown at Delhi. Minhaj seems to designate the standing army as the *hashm-i-qalb*, or *qalb-i-sultani*;⁴ the *jandars* would obviously form a brigade of the centre army,⁵ which appears to have been always stationed at Delhi. In Mahmud's reign, this force was occasionally brought out of the city for military exercise and parade.⁶ Whether the garrisons, placed in important fortresses or localities near the capital also were drawn from this centre army or from the province in which they were situated, is a moot point.⁷ This army, along with the *jandars*, was directly under the management of the *ariz-i-mamalik* who was responsible for its recruitment, efficiency and payment. Its numerical strength is unascertainable; it contained both cavalry and infantry and the two thousand Shamsi *iqtadars* certainly formed part of its cavalry section.⁹

The provincial troops, being maintained out of the public revenues was technically a part of the standing army, but in a decentralised state like that

of the Mamluks, authority over them was necessarily limited. In practice, the provincial force was the *muqti's* own; details of its maintenance was his own concern and the *ariz-i-mamalik* could exercise little interference. The latter's jurisdiction over them commenced only when the specified quota was called up from the province; he was then to hold a review of the contingents sent, check their number and equipment by comparing the muster roll of the respective province and to call for explanations for any discrepancy from the representative of the *muqti's* army department. The provincial troops were presumably listed in the *ariz-i-mamlik's* army list, but the period covered by the Mamluk Sultanate affords no instance of the central government's attempt to regulate its number, rate of pay or other incidence of its employment and control. Nor is there any concrete evidence, as in the reign of Sher Shah Sur, of periodical transfer of troops from one province to another.

From the few recorded instances, the provincial army however, seems to have been modelled organizationally on the king's regular troops. It also consisted of a permanent centre corps and also of temporary recruits.⁹ The *muqti's ariz* looked after its maintenance and pay and through the representative stationed at the capital, (the *naib-i-ariz*), presented the contingents.¹⁰ The permanently employed troops at the centre and in the provinces were probably known as the *wajhi* (regulars), a term which, in any case is applied to them during the Tughluq period.¹¹

Reference to special recruits for temporary work is not frequent, but recorded instances imply that

such enrolment was an established practice. In 1241, when the Mongols besieged Lahore, the *sadrus-sudur*, Minhaj-i-Siraj, was directed by the king to deliver an exhortation urging the people to enrol in the army for fighting the infidels.¹² In 1258 again, he delivered a similar lecture "with the object of stimulating to holy warfare and the merit of fighting against the infidels".¹³ It is perhaps safe to guess that such recruitments were confined to Muslims only. Even for expeditions against powerful rebels, such emergency recruitments were resorted to. On his way to Lakhnauti, Balban held a *levee en masse* in Awadh and enrolled, it is said, about two hundred thousand men as archers, carriers, and also as horsemen and infantry. In this case, it is reasonable to assume, that not all of this two hundred thousand men was meant for combatant work and that a proportion, doubtless, came from the non-Muslims. The employment of Hindu mercenaries for special campaigns should also be considered in this connection; Raziah, when she marched with her husband Iltuniah to recover the throne, is reported to have headed an army composed mainly of mercenaries from the Khokar and Jat tribes of the Punjab.

Our information is much too little as to the existence of a reserve volunteer militia. Fakhre Mudabbir, writing early in the reign of Iltutmish, describes a military review and mentions a body of infantry "who have voluntarily joined the forces and who should present themselves individually to the *ariz* and be enrolled in a separate list in charge of the *naqib* "trumpeter".¹⁴ Barani also mentions a class of soldiers who supplied their own arms and

horse and joined the regular army.¹⁵ In 1259, when Hulaku's envoys were received in Delhi, the royal army, including the contingents from the provinces, numbering about two hundred thousand infantry and fifty thousand horsemen, was, for the purpose of military display, supplemented by a huge number of volunteers from among the citizens who appeared in their own arms and horses and were drawn up alongside the regulars.¹⁶

There never was any permanent commander-in-chief in peace time; the sultan was the supreme commander of the defence forces. The *ariz*, both of the centre and of the province, performed, it must be supposed, the duties of a modern war office; promotions, training and discipline were also his routine function.¹⁷ In the provinces, the *muqti* would be the chief of staff, though Barani suggests that the *ariz* even selected the troops for campaigns.¹⁸ Only once, in the reign of Raziah, we hear of the appointment of a *naib-i-lashkar*, placed presumably over the central standing army, to whom the queen delegated her command of the fighting forces.¹⁹ The office obviously was a temporary one, and is not heard of again after her deposition. The sultans usually led the expeditions in person though the conduct of operations was left to specially commissioned officers.

With the exception of the volunteer militia, the soldiers received fixed remuneration either in cash, called *mawajib*, or in assignments, called *iqta*. The standing army of the centre, at least an important section of it, was paid in assignment, as is evidenced by the case of the Shamsi *iqta*dars who had been given villages in the Doab. Captains and even

petty officers were also paid in similar assignments of revenue.²⁰ The income in such assignments (*iqta*) came from the land revenue realised from the peasant-cultivators. An instance of paying troops even in cultivable lands is furnished by Balban who settled Afghan soldiers as garrison in Gopalgir, Kampil, Patiali, Bhojpur and Jalali.²¹ They drew their sustenance from the lands which they were to till and cultivate. From the nature of conditions involved in such form of payment these men were supposedly borne on the army list as hereditary soldiers. The bulk of the regular troops, however, was paid in cash from the *diwan-i-arz*; irregular and mercenary soldiers, it must be supposed, were always paid in cash. It is difficult to ascertain whether individual payments was the rule; the anxiety of Imadul Mulk to see that no deductions were made from the soldier's pay by his office staff would presuppose that individual cash payment was the normal practice, at least in the case of the central army. But since recruitment does not appear to have been made singly but through the troop leaders, it is doubtful if direct payment of salary was always practicable or desired. Alauddin Khalji's branding regulations (*daqh* and *huliyah*) in any case, were designed to diminish the chances of fraud practised by the troop leaders and even *muqtis* in drawing the soldiers' pay under false representations. Out of his *mawajib*, the cavalryman was to provide for his own equipment and horse and keep the latter in good trim. Approval of his horse and arm was necessary before his pay could be drawn. Besides his *mawajib*, each trooper received a share of the booty (*ghanimah*)

captured in the battle in which he participated; this was probably considered a war-bonus.

Instances from the Mamluk period throw insufficient light on army divisions and their composition. Barani mentions *amirs* in command of fifty, hundred and thousand soldiers (*amir-i-panjah*, *sadah*, and *hazarah*).²² Amir Khusrau, describing Kaiqubad's retinue during his journey to meet his father, implies that a *malik* commanded something like twenty thousand soldiers.²³ If Bughra Khan's description of the Turkish hierarchy can be taken as applying to the army groupings as practised in his time in India, it would suggest a unit of ten under a *sar-i-khail* rising by decimal progressions through the divisions of *sipahsalar*, *amir* and *malik* to the supreme command of a *khan*.²⁴ This would not be far from what we hear of the army groupings in the time of Muhammad b. Tughluq.²⁵

The *Adabul Harb* gives a description of the battle array; on two sides of the *qalb* or *muqaddama* (vanguard) were drawn up the *maisara* (left wing) and the *maimana* (right wing), while a picked body of troops formed the *khalf* or rear, to be thrown in battle later, and only as a tactical move or as a last resort.²⁶ A special corps, called *sariya*, (Minhaj seems to refer to it under the name of *tilaya* ²⁷ is also mentioned as being composed of four hundred light cavalry, commanded by an *amir*. It was employed for work requiring swift movements and for reconnaissance.²⁸

NOTES

1. See Bughra Khan's advice to Kaiqubad; Barani, p. 102. Fakhre Mudabbir *Adabul Harb* f. 79a.

2. See Minhaj, p. 113; Fakhre Mudabbir, *Tarikh*, p. 33.
3. Muizzuddin of Ghor, was himself a *Sar-i-Jandar* to his brother Ghiyasuddin; Minhaj, p. 115.
4. Cf. Raverty's note on p. 634-35 of his translation of the *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*, wherein he contends that "this centre was not the centre division of a *corps d'armee* under the regular military organisation stationed at Delhi, but refers to the contingents which formed the centre of the Delhi forces when in the field; these contingents were furnished by numerous feudatories.... whose fiefs lay in the immediate vicinity of the capital and whose contingents could be summoned to the King's standard at a very short notice". This conclusion appears untenable in view of the fact that the *qalb* is always found associated with the Sultan and Delhi and that whenever any provincial contingent from far or near was required to join it is usually mentioned in the account. That the *qalb* should not be identified with the provincial contingents is clearly proved by the fact that when confronting the rebel Kashlu Khan in 1256, Balban kept his own troops and those of Sher Khan, the Governor of Bhatinda, separate from the *qalb-i-sultani* and other troops from the capital over whom he placed Kashli Khan; Minhaj, p. 308. It is inconceivable that in normal times the king was left with no troops at all. In the same year when Delhi was besieged by Kashlu and Qutlugh Khan, the citizens prepared for defence since "the royal troops were absent from the city"; *ibid*, p. 224. Barani, pp. 57-58, also mentions the *hashm-i-qalb* whom Balban took with him in his expedition against the Katehriyas; the *hashm-i-hazrat*, mentioned on p. 115, also seems to refer to the same force.
5. The personal slaves of Ruknuddin Firoz, *bandegan-i-khas*, are said to have been serving in the *qalb* when they deserted him and murdered his attendants: Minhaj, p. 183.
6. *Ibid*, p. 225.
7. Qureshi; *op. cit.* p. 133, however, implies that the garrison, kept in the provinces, formed part of the central army; he calls this latter *hashm-i-atraf*; on what authority, it is not mentioned.
8. Barani, p. 61.
9. See Minhaj, p. 257. An indication of the numerical strength of the provincial troops can probably be had from Barani's statement that Malik Baqbaq, the Muqti of Badaon, possessed four thousand horsemen in his "*jagir*" p. 40.
10. Barani, p. 116;
11. See for example Afif, pp. 296, 369-70.
12. Minhaj, p. 195.
13. *Ibid*, p. 310.
14. *Adabul Harb*, f. 109b.
15. p. 86.
16. Minhaj, p. 317.
17. See *Adabul Harb*, p. 46-47 for regulations concerning the maintenance of discipline among the soldiers.
18. p. 60-61.

19. Minhaj, p. 187.
20. Barani, p. 80.
21. *Ibid*, p. 57-58.
22. Pp. 35 and 495.
23. *Qiranus-Sadain*, p. 40.
24. Barani, p. 145.
25. Qalqashandi : *Subhul Asha*, v, pp. 91-92; also Elliot, iii, p. 576.
26. f. 113-14; it gives an interesting reproduction of the dispositions of Hindu and Muslim battle-forces. See also Minhaj, p. 120.
27. P. 288.
28. *Adabul Harb*, f. 116b.

CHAPTER XIII

LAW AND THE JUDICIARY

Administration of justice is one of the king's primary functions. The chroniclers deal at great length with the Sultan's responsibilities for upholding and maintaining the *Shariah*,¹ which was the basic law in a Muslim-ruled country. But it is obvious that the non-Muslim, living in the country, could not be subjected, at least in their social relations, to the Canon law. Jurists have accordingly recognised a practical distinction between what they call *tashrii* and *ghair tashrii* law.² There could be little doubt that the Muslims in their social and personal affairs were guided exclusively by the *tashrii* law, but we know practically nothing about the law which was applied to the non-Muslim *zimmi*s. In such matters as inheritance, sale or transfer of land, marriage etc., presumably the customary law was followed, embodying, as it did, the principles of the local, tribal or the sacred Hindu code.³ The principle followed by the Delhi Sultanate, at any rate, was minimum interference with the social affairs of the *zimmi*. In matrimonial cases for instance, the jurisdiction of the Muslim *qazi* was to be exercised only when the parties asked for it; and even then, he was to recognise such practices as are regarded valid in the party's religion.⁴ In crimes which constitute offence in every law and where ethics was the sole determinant, the *zimmi* probably stood in the same footing as the Muslim,⁵ though it

is doubtful if the Muslim penal law was applied with the same rigour and exactitude as is enjoined by the *faqih*.

The question is, however, purely speculative so far as our period is concerned, for the conquest was not so thorough as to affect the social system of the native people. Numerous Hindu chiefs were allowed to retain their principalities where established legal practice was little disturbed. In the districts directly under Muslim administration, the Hindus lived in villages and came in little contact with the application of Muslim law. The ancient system of local government was hardly touched by conquest and the village or caste *panchayet* was left to carry on its traditional functions so long as they did not clash with the *qazi's* jurisdiction.⁶ In crimes occurring within the village, the headman (*muqaddam*) acted both as the committing and trying magistrate. A hint to the appointment of Hindu officers, presumably for administering justice and maintaining order among the natives, is contained in a passage of the *Tajul Maasir*, where, in describing Aibak's conquest and settlement of Asni in 1193, Hasan Nizami refers to his posting of "*Ranahs*" in every side for the administration of the people and the territory.⁷ To leave the newly conquered territory for the time being under native officers and to recognise the established customs was the only natural course to adopt, and was even resorted to by the Arabs in Sind.⁸ Barani mentions a body of conventional and customary law, which he calls *zabitah*, followed by the government in dealing with the Hindu subjects.⁹

A Muslim king is not only expected to provide

for the dispensation of justice but also to hear and decide cases himself.¹⁰ The king therefore tried both original and appeal cases, for he was the highest court of justice.¹¹ In cases arising out of the violation or application of the religious side of the *Shariah*, he was assisted by the *mufti* and the *sadrus-sudur* while in cases of a secular nature he sat with the *qaziul-quzat* (chief justice). He also held summary trial of criminal offences.¹²

Unlike other branches of government, the judiciary from the very beginning appears to have been a centralised department. The Sultan himself appointed *qazis* to different provinces and localities, doubtless on the recommendation of the *qaziul-quzat*.¹³ He is also known to have controlled the appointment of the *amir-i-dad* of the principal cities and also to have issued orders for their dismissal and transfer.¹⁴ The *muqti* was expected to enforce the *qazi's* decision when necessary.¹⁵

Below the king, the *qaziul-quzat* was the highest judicial officer. He lived at the capital and decided cases in collaboration with the *amir-i-dad*. Minhaj-i-Siraj who held the office on three occasions, was also the head of the ecclesiastical department and was generally known by this latter office, namely, the *sadr-i-jahan*,¹⁶ which seems to have always been held thereafter by the *qaziul-quzat*.¹⁷ The two offices, however, were kept separate, and Minhaj always mentions them separately.¹⁸ The *qaziul-quzat* only supervised and controlled the lower judges in the provinces and also heard appeals; as an appellate judge he probably sat with the king. No detail of any case decided by him has however come down to us; it is perhaps reasonable to suppose that

he was assisted by a *mufti* (legal interpreter). A later account ascribes to Minhaj the legalisation of 'Sima' (religious music) to which objection was raised by the orthodox *ulema*.¹⁹ This, however, must have been done in his capacity as the *sadrus-sudur*. If we could argue back from the instances of Khalji and Tughluq periods,²⁰ the chief *qazi* would also appear to be the sultan's legal advisor in all matters of the *Shariah*, both religious and secular. In addition to the post of the *qaziul-quzat* and the *sadrus-sudur*, Minhaj also held the post of chief *khatib* and was for sometime, the *qazi* of Gwalior.²¹

Among judicial officers in a large city like Delhi, besides a number of *qazis* dealing with cases coming under the purview of the *tashrii* law, we hear also of the *amir-i-dad* laterly known as *dadbak*. He, it seems, was the chief city magistrate, for his designation suggests his association with the detection and redress of crimes. He apprehended criminals and also tried cases with the assistance of the *qazi*. His court, called the *masnad-i-mazalim wa adl*,²² closely corresponds to the *diwan-i-mazalim* of the Abbaside government of Baghdad and also, in some respects, to the *wilayatul-mazalim* of al-Mawardi.²³ The latter assigns to him such functions as checking the arbitrary exaction of taxes, supervising and controlling the *amins* (officers incharge of surveying and keeping a register of Muslim property). He was also to see that the head of every department dealt fairly and uninterferingly with the employees. It is not certain if the *amir-i-dad* of Delhi also performed these functions. Minhaj has the following statement to make respecting the *amir-i-dad* with whom he worked for several years. "It must be

about eighteen years since the *masnad-i-mazalim wa adl* has been adorned by his (Saifuddin Ajami) dignity, and during the whole period he had followed the path of justice and equity and has been obedient to the *Shariah*. The writer of this work, upon two occasions, for nearly eight years, is seated on the same bench with that just *malik*... in the capital city; and the author has seen that the whole of his acts, procedure and expositions have been conformable with faith and *sunnah*. By the dignity of his punishment and the majesty of his justice, the multitude of contumacious persons round about the capital and the gangs of evil doers and robbers, having drawn back the hand of violence...are quiescent in the court of fear and terror".²⁴ The *amir-i-dad* would thus appear to be a judge of criminal cases and also charged with punishing convicted criminals. His was also possibly a tribunal for trying officers accused of oppression and malpractices. He also enforced the *qazi's* decisions and helped the *muhtasib* in applying his regulations.²⁵ The *amir-i-dad* had his provincial representatives and and, as their head, was called the *amir-i-dad-i-mamalik*.²⁶ He had also an assistant, called *naib-i-dadbak*.²⁷

In towns, the police work was the responsibility of the *kotwal* who maintained law and order and even helped in military defence. Originally he was a military officer, the commandant of the fortified town, but with the expansion of civil administration he gradually became mainly a police officer. He had undoubtedly a police force under him but we do not hear of anything like the *Shurtah* of the Abbasides; whether the city constables were called *guzarban* as in the Mughal period, the chronicle gives us no

indication. Another officer, doing something of the police work by supervising the markets, checking dishonest dealings and enforcing price regulations and punishing hoarders and profiteers, was called the *rais-i-bazar*.²⁸ His duties would require the assistance of a staff to go round the markets and inflict summary punishment. An important officer having also something to do with the enforcement of law and order was the *muhtasib*.²⁹ He was primarily a member of the judicial staff and acted as a kind of prosecutor in offences against religious law. But he was also to supervise the markets, check weights and measures and punish adulteration of food-stuffs and the sale of wine. Writers of legal treatises ascribe to him duties corresponding to those of a modern inspector of educational institutions and also such municipal work as sanitation and maintenance of roads.³⁰ He was empowered to inflict summary punishment with the help of his subordinate staff.³¹ He was, however, no judge, and cases requiring exposition of law or the ascertainment of fact had to be taken to the *qazi*. The *muhtasib's* was a separate organization, though allied to that of the *qaziul-quzat* who almost invariably, was also the chief *muhtasib*. From Firoz Tughluq's reference to a tax called *ihisabi*, the officer seems to have been entitled to a fee which probably went to pay for his remuneration.³²

A separate judicial organization existed for the army. In military camps a *qazi-i-lashkar* was appointed who possibly administered some sort of martial law. This office had become very important in Barani's time and only able and

honest men, well versed in the *Shariah* were appointed to it.³³ In the Khalji period the *amir-i-dad* was also a member of the military court;³⁴ this was perhaps a normal practice.

The members of the judicial services all received remuneration. The payment however, seems to have been made at least in the case of the higher officers, not in cash but in revenue assignment.³⁵ From Minhaj's account of the *amir-i-dad*, Saifuddin Ajami quoted above, it appears that the revenue of some specified *iqtas* was permanently attached to this office. Such *iqtas* however were changed from time to time; Saifuddin was allowed the revenue in succession, of Pulwal, Kamah, Baran, Kasra(?) and again of Baran, in Mahmud's reign.³⁶ It is probable that the *qaziul-quzat* was also paid in this manner.

Minhaj has an interesting passage which throws some light on the court procedure. Speaking about Saifuddin he remarks. "During this period since he has been the *amir-i-dad* of the kingdom of Delhi, the customary fees at the rate of ten or fifteen per cent. which other chief justices before him have imposed, he has not extorted, nor has he had any concern with such, neither has he considered such to be right".³⁷ This fee seems identical with the *dadbaki* which Firoz Tugluq considered as illegal and formally abolished, an event which would imply its continuance as a normal practice.³⁸

NOTES

1. Barani, p. 43, 81-83; *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, f. 11a.
2. Baillie; *Digest of Muhammedan Law*, p. 174.
3. Cf. Husain; *Administration of Justice in Muslim India*, p. 15, who

suggests, on no specified authority, that Pundits and Brahmins assisted the *qazi* in deciding cases involving Hindu personal law. See also Ahmad : *Administration of Justice in Medieval India*, p. 115.

4. Baillie : *op. cit.* p. 178-79.
5. Rahim : *Muhammedan Jurisprudence*, p. 59.
6. The Hanafi school of law recognises such non-Muslim judges to try cases among the *zimmis*, though the government is not held bound to enforce their decisions. See al-Mawardi : *op. cit.* p. 62.
7. f. 125b.
8. See *Chachnama* : Elliot, i, pp. 160, 182-185.
9. *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, f. 126a.
10. *Siyasat Namah*, pp. 11 and 40.
11. Barani, p. 40, mentions Balban's practice of hearing and deciding cases himself.
12. See *Siarul Arefin*, f. 189 b, for a case of this nature tried by Iltutmish with the assistance of the ecclesiastics. See also Barani, p. 40-41.
13. Minhaj, p. 175.
14. *Ibid*, pp. 176, 213, and 214, See *Zikr-i-jami-aulia-i-Delhi*, f. 108b, for an instance of the Sultan even appointing the *qazi* of an obscure little town named Kothi-wala, near Multan.
15. See *Siyasat Namah*, p. 38, for the relation of the *qazi* with the local governor.
16. Minhaj, p. 219.
17. See Barani's list of the grandees of the realm before the account of every Sultan.
18. *E.g.* pp. 195, 215, 220.
19. Abdul Huq : *Akhbarul Akhbar*, or, 221, f. 37a.
20. Barani, p. 293, for Alaaddin's asking for the opinion of *qazi* Mughuddin respecting his governmental measures. See also Afif, p. 129, for a similar question by Firoz Tughluq to the *qazi* respecting his right to levy a water tax.
21. Minhaj, pp. 193 and 223.
22. *Ibid*, p. 275.
23. *Ahkamus-Sultaniyah*, p. 76. See also *Siyasat Namah*, pp. 28-30 where similar duties are prescribed for the *qazi*.
24. Minhaj, p. 275; Raverty's translation p. 789.
25. Qureshi : *op. cit.* p. 153, citing Fakhre Mudabbir : *Adabul Harb*, states that the *amir-i-dad* also controlled the *kotwal* and the *muhtasib*. The chronicles at least do not contain this suggestion.
26. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 67b, and 178; Minhaj, pp. 175, 276.
27. Barani, p. 24.
28. *Adabul Harb*, f. 47a; Barani, p. 34.
29. Barani, p. 73.
30. The *muhtasib's* multifarious duties, municipal, religious and police, are clearly set forth in Ibnul Ukhuua; *Maalimul Qurba fi Ahkamil Hisba*, an 11th century treatise, edited with an abridged translation, by Levy.

E. G. W. Gibb Memorial Volumes, London, 1938.

31. *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, f. 8; See also *Siyasat Namah*, p. 41-42.

32. See Qureshi : *op. cit.* p. 229.

33. Barani, p. 47; see also p. 108.

34. *Ibid*, pp. 358, 361.

35. In the Tughluq period, the judges all appear as a salaried staff, but this may be due to the Khalji centralization and the effect of substitution of the assignment system by cash payment as was done in other departments.

36. Minhaj, p. 276.

37. *Ibid*, p. 285; Raverty's translation, p. 790. The printed text is defective here.

38. *Futuh-i-Firozshahi* ed. Rashid, p. 5; Elliot, iii, p. 377.

CHAPTER XIV

FINANCE AND CURRENCY

Mention of fiscal affairs in the contemporary accounts is extremely rare. It is undoubted, however, that the four taxes allowed by the *Shariah* furnished the Sultanate's basic income. These were: (i) the tax on agricultural produce, called *kharaj* and *ushr*;¹ (ii) poll-tax on the *zimmis* called *jaziah*; (iii) $\frac{1}{5}$ of the booty captured in battle from the infidels, called *Khums*, and (iv) income-tax on the Muslims, called *zakat*. The last item, although collected by the state, could be spent only on certain specified items.² In the land revenue the distinction between *kharaj* and *ushr*,—the latter being a tax of $\frac{1}{10}$ th of the produce of land held by a Muslim or watered by natural means,—could not be maintained when non-Muslims began to accept Islam in large numbers and were allowed to retain their lands, so that, at an early date in the history of Islam, the *kharaj* had come to be applied both on Muslim and non-Muslim holders.³ Further, it is doubtful if these taxes were realised in India with the same scrupulous regard to the legal rules as is expected; under the Mamluk sultans, at any rate, the land revenue is almost always referred to as the *kharaj*. Aibak, on his accession, is reported to have reintroduced the distinction between *kharaj* and *ushr*, for on the property (*milk*) of the Muslim citizens of Lahore he fixed the tax at $\frac{1}{10}$ and in some cases even $\frac{1}{20}$, instead of the existing $\frac{1}{5}$, which the narrator considered illegal.⁴ But later instances

do not prove its continued application; Barani records the imposition of *kharaj* on the land of one Sirajuddin, early in Balban's reign.⁵ Even the schedule of rates, as laid down by the lawyers, was not always adhered to, as is evident from Balban's advice to Bughra Khan "to adopt the middle course in exacting *kharaj* from the subjects and not to take too much or too little from them."⁶ Obviously, expediency was the sole criterion; Alauddin Khalji's reforms in the matter of land revenue with a view to forestall rebellion and fill his treasury by fixing the state-demand at 1/2 of the gross produce, are well-known. This *kharaj* was collected by the king's *diwan-i-wazarat* directly from the peasants only in the *khalisah* areas. In the provinces, the *muqti's* revenue department supervised the collection and rendered an account together with the surplus to the central exchequer. With this revenue should also be classed the amount realised as tribute from the vassal rulers, which was in reality only a composition for the *kharaj* realised from the peasants of the state concerned.⁷

Curiously enough, the earlier chronicles omit all mention of the imposition of *jaziah* on the conquered Hindus.⁸ This need not, however, mean that the poll-tax was not levied, but there seem good reasons to believe that the term *jaziah* was not used exclusively in the sense of a capitation tax as is understood today or was interpreted by later writers.⁹ The earliest use of the tax in this sense was by Firoz Khalji who admits his having imposed it on the Hindus;¹⁰ in actual practice, it does not always seem to have been enforced in all its essential details. A significant instance comes, from

the reign of Firoz Tughluq who records his services to Islam and the *Shariah*, in, among other acts, realising the *jaziah* from the Brahmins who had hitherto been exempted from this tax.¹¹ He also talks of his having abolished the *jaziah* on those who embraced Islam as a mark of special favour, which would suggest that even Muslim converts before him were required to pay this tax.¹²

In the realisation of the *khums* also, similar departure from the rules of law are noticeable. This is proved, again, by Firoz Tughluq's remarks that before him the government practice in Delhi was to retain $\frac{4}{5}$ of the booty (*ghanimah*) and distribute only $\frac{1}{5}$ to the participating soldiers, which was just the reverse of what the law prescribes.¹³ In 1259, Ulugh Khan returned from the Mewati expedition with, among others, sixty bags each containing 30,000 *tankahs*, captured from the rebels, all of which was conveyed to the treasury.¹⁴ The state appropriated the spoils taken even from Muslim opponents. Qubachah's treasures were all appropriated for the treasury by the victorious wazir of Iltutmish; Balban also confiscated the rebel Tughril's treasure.¹⁵ In the 13th century, when expeditions and raids were the order of the day, this items must have brought in enormous wealth; in 1233 Malik Tayasaj's raid into Chandella and Jajapella territories yielded, in the $\frac{1}{5}$ alone, something like twenty five lakh *tankahs*.¹⁶

No clear evidence has come down to us to show the manner in which the *zakat* was collected; in fact, there is hardly any mention of it in the contemporary writings. Its highly religious character and the forbidding specifications as to its disbursement,¹⁷ raise

a suspicion that at least in the Mamluk state strict application of the law in this matter was probably not made; Firoz Tughluq's reign, at any rate, provides the earliest records of its collection.¹⁸ It may have been collected whenever possible to defray the cost of the religious endowments and pension to the *ulema* and of the ecclesiastical establishments. Early in Muhammad Tughluq's reign, mention is found of a duty collected on the merchandise crossing the frontier at a rate calculated on the basis of *zakat*.¹⁹ It was in effect only a customs duty and most probably credited to the general revenues. That the income from this source was meant to be so treated is evident from the fact that it was levied on non-Muslims also for whom the rate was doubled.²⁰

The existence of transit duties and tolls is indicated in the narrative of Balban's envoy journeying to Baniyan who carried a number of slaves for defraying, out of their sale-proceeds, his expenses.²¹ There must have been other taxes also; those abolished by Firoz Tughluq must have been, in one form or another, part of the Sultanate's normal income.²² The *Shariah* allows the ruler to claim all underground treasure and mines. The *amir-i-bahr*'s duties probably included the collection of ferry dues and tolls on the waterways.

Very little can be added respecting finance administration to what has been said above under the *diwan-i-wazarat*. Only once in the *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri* we come across the word *baitul mal*; whether it meant the existence of a separate treasury for the *zakat*, is not clear from the context.²³ For revenue in the sense of state income the term *khazanah* is

generally used. As the government was controlled by the sultan's household establishment, the public revenue could be squandered in the pursuit of his pleasure; for there does not appear, as yet, the existence of a privy purse for the king. Ruknuddin Firoz emptied the treasury on the caterers of pleasure; Kaiqubad, after his return from Awadh, is said to have spent all the surplus revenues, so assiduously collected by Nizamuddin, on his dancing girls.²⁴

Regarding the Mamluk coinage the masterly studies of Edward Thomas and Nelson Wright must remain works of lasting value. All that can be done here is to give a summary of their investigations and discuss a few incidental points.

As Thomas remarked, the Turkish conquerors did not at once introduce a new monetary system, but adapted the existing one to their use. The older currency of mixed metal, known as *dehliwala*, was continued with variations that were slow and very gradual. The design and device of the Hindu coin were retained, more or less, uniformly on the Muslim currency issues. It was Balban, more than sixty years after the conquest of Delhi, who finally replaced the Hindu device of the "bull and horseman" with the sovereign's name inscribed in Devanagri characters.²⁵ In the early years of the occupation, this mixed metal *dehliwala* was therefore the ordinary money. Minhaj, however, almost always uses the term *jital*, the new name which, some years later, came to be applied to a debased adaptation of the *dehliwala*.²⁶ This *jital* henceforth became the normal billon issue and the *dehliwala* went out of use. Pieces

of this type were also coined by Yalduz and the Qarlugh princes during their brief rule in India.²⁷

In gold coinage also, distinctive features of the new regime did not become regular until the reign of Mahmud. Of the three known pieces of Muizzuddin two are mere imitations of the Gahadavala issues, with even the figure of the goddess Lakshmi reproduced exactly, the only identifying element being the sovereign's name inscribed in *Indian* characters.²⁸ Even the third one, a unique piece and obviously based on the Islamic *dinar* type current in his northern dominions²⁹ and meant to be a commemorative issue, bears a *Devnagri* legend and the figure of a horseman, much in the tradition of the Chauhana coins.³⁰ Gold pieces of this latter type were struck by Iltutmish in 608, 614, and 616, but except the Arabic legend, the *kalimah* and the caliph's names, they bear little resemblance to the Ghazni *dinar*.³¹ Presumably because of the lack of a weight standard for which the native silver currency does not appear to have supplied a recognised model, the gold coin did not become regular until half a century later³² when, the silver coinage having in the meantime come into general use, it became possible to fit the gold piece into the currency scheme.

The copper issues of the period also roughly correspond to the weight standard of the older *dehliwala*;³³ they seem to have been known as *adl*.³⁴

It is for the introduction of a basic silver coinage that Iltutmish's reign is considered as marking the commencement of Indo-Muslim monetary system. This coin, the ancestor of the modern

rupee, was the *tankah*, an Indian term indicating a weight of silver, whose earliest use to signify a currency piece is found in a bilingual silver *dirham* of Mahmud of Ghazni, struck at Mahmudpur (Lahore) in 1027.³⁵ But the Delhi *tankah* was not a *dirham* to which, except in form and legend, it bore no intrinsic relationship. For, what made the *tankah* exclusively Indian, is, besides the name, the weight standard which, as Thomas had shown, followed the indigenous practice. The Mamluk *tankah*, meant to be divisible by the 32-*rati purana*, to which weight the older *dehliwala* approximated, was planned to contain 1 *tola* or 96 *ratis* of silver, this being equal, according to Messrs Wright and Nevill, not to 175 as Thomas thought, but to 172.8 grains. The subsequent gold *tankah* also was adjusted to this standard weight, of which Muizzuddin's above mentioned Indian *dinar* was perhaps an anticipation.

With the adoption of the Arabic legend, doubtless borrowed from the *dinar*, including the *kalimah* and the sovereign's titles, the *tankah* became the standard monetary unit of the Delhi Sultanate. The inclusion of the reigning Caliph's name on the obverse completed the experimental process, which, judging from the published specimens, was begun as early as 614/1217.³⁶ The first appearance of the Caliph's name on the obverse of a clearly dated coin, hitherto containing only the *kalimah*, was on the issue of 622/1225, which also contains an elaboration of the sultan's title indicating his closer association with the "commander of the Faithful".³⁷ From 628/1230-1, appears the name of the Caliph al-Mustansir, for in that year Iltutmish received

his long expected investiture, an event most probably commemorated by the undated issue which bears only the *kalimah* and the Caliph's name.³⁸ The legend that was thus finally evolved is represented by No. 31 of Thomas which, with slight variations, continued to be the model of his successor's *tankah*.

In tracing the evolution of the *tankah* Thomas, and also Wright, seem to have confined themselves to the Delhi series, thus taking no notice of the contributions of the Bengal mint. The silver issues of Ghiyasuddin Iwaz, king of Lakhnauti, dated in 616/1219, on the other hand, bear close resemblance, in design and form of the legend, to Iltutmish's final piece of 632/1234.³⁹ His subsequent issues, notably those of 619/1221, and 620/1222, not only include the Caliph al-Nasir's name, but also approximate in weight to the 172-grains standard.⁴⁰ They contain, in addition to Iwaz's expanded sovereign titles, also date of the month and year,—a singular feature, which Thomas interpreted as a commemoration of his receipt of investiture from the Caliph.⁴¹

To Iltutmish however, should belong the sole credit of absorbing the existing billon pieces, under the new name of *jital*, as a lower denominational coin to whose weight-scheme, as has been noted above, the *tankah* was adjusted. The *jital* seems deliberately to have been given a lower silver content than its older model; an assay of some specimens revealed approximately 3.6 grains or 2 *ratis* of silver, instead of the 7.8 grains of the *dehli-wala*.⁴² This enables us to fix its intrinsic value which must have governed its relation with the

tankah. On the evidence of an assay carried out by Thomas, Wright and Nevill thought a *jital* was valued at $1/12$ th of a *tankah*.⁴³ This they have subsequently modified in favour of $1/48$, which was, in any case, the *jital's* exchange value in north India towards the end of the 13th century.⁴⁴ On this view, the small silver pieces of Mahmud,⁴⁵ Balban,⁴⁶ and Kaiqubad,⁴⁷ with an average weight of 14.4 grains and called *masha* by Wright, would have the same value as four *jitals*; they might, in fact have been intended for a four-*jital* piece. From Balban's reign appear a series of bilingual mixed metal pieces whose silver content, being less than that of a *dehliwala*, but more than that of a *jital*, was probably meant to give it an intermediate place in the monetary scale. Wright suggests that its token value represented a two-*jital* piece or $1/24$ of a *tankah*.⁴⁸ It would thus not only fit into, but would also furnish corroborative evidence of, the 48-*jital tankah* scheme. Iltutmish's billon currency furnishes an example of what Wright thinks is a three-*jital* piece, i.e. $1/16$ th of a *tankah*, the ancestor of the modern *anna*.⁴⁹ The same value is also indicated by one of Kaiqubad's *jitals* which, containing an average of 8 grains silver per coin seems to have been meant for the token value of $1/16$ th of a *tankah*.⁵⁰

About the exact value of the copper coin in relation to *jital* and the *tankah*, our knowledge is largely inferential. In the first place, we do not know its exact denomination; some of them, as noted earlier, bear the inscription '*adl*', but this term is found subsequently in billon and silver issues also.⁵¹ Shahabuddin Abbas, writing early

in the 14th century and referring to Muhammad b. Tughluq's currency, calls his copper coins *fals*, four of which, he adds, exchanged for a *jital*.⁵² In the second place the actual weight of the copper issues, which varies from 71 to 12 grains,⁵³ does not give us any clue as to their intrinsic proportional value. On the other hand if Messrs Wright and Nevill are right in holding as they do, that the exchange value of copper to silver was 80:1 (that is, 288 grains of copper exchanged for a *jital* containing 3.6 grains or 2 *ratīs* of silver then, the intrinsic value of the copper coin calculated in silver, would determine its relation to the higher coins in Delhi transactions. A coin containing 14.4 grains of silver, for example, would thus exchange for 16 copper pieces of 72 grains each, and for 96, in the case of the smaller issues of 12 grains each. In other words, four 72-grains copper coins would be equivalent to one *jital* and would thus accord with Shahabuddin's statement respecting the exchange value of the *fals*, thus showing that there was little fluctuation in the value of the currency pieces from the 13th century.

Some of Iltutmish's *adls* are however found to weigh as little as 8 grains; these, according to Wright, could have borne no token relationship with the higher coins, they being valued at their intrinsic metallic worth. A classification of the weight in the different copper issues may lead to the discovery of a sub-divisional gradation similar to what is found in the silver *tankah*. Some of the recorded specimens weighing 49, 36, 24, 18 and 12 grains⁵⁴ would, indeed, seem to fall readily into a sub-divisional scheme of $\frac{2}{3}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{4}$ and $\frac{1}{6}$ of the

72-grains (40 *ratī*) copper *fals*. In silver, the existence of such a gradation is proved by the small pieces of Iltutmish, Mahmud, Balban and Kaiqubad.⁵⁵ The variations in their weight can easily be classified, according to the revised 172-grains *tankah* standard, into 86.4, 57.6, 28.8, and 14.4 grains. This would give them a value of $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{6}$ and $\frac{1}{12}$ respectively of the *tankah*. A similar gradation in the gold coin is also indicated by the discovery of a gold piece of Mubarak Khalji weighing 55.7 grains.⁵⁶ On the basis of Nevill and Wright's conclusion that the ratio of gold to silver was $\frac{1}{10}$, a gold *tankah* (*tankah-i-talai*) would exchange for ten silver pieces of equal weight.

Earlier coins bear no mint name; two of Muizzuddin's copper issues, however, seem to indicate their place of origin but the reading is doubtful.⁵⁷ Iltutmish appears to have started the practice of inscribing the mint name on his *tankah*. One of his rare silver coins bears the vague name of Biladul Hind;⁵⁸ another, dated 616/1219, has been read as mentioning Gour, but the word looks more like Nagaur.⁵⁹ The earliest appearance of Delhi as a mint is on a *tankah* of 628/1230-1.⁶⁰ The reading of Lakhnauti on another of his silver pieces, dated 633/1235, is however, disputable.⁶¹ A suppositious copper issue of the same monarch bears the name of Multan.⁶² The earliest undoubted mention of Lakhnauti occurs in a *tankah* of Raziah,⁶³ dated 634/1236. Balban seems to have established a number of new mints; one of his copper pieces was minted at the 'Khitta' Sultanpur.⁶⁴ A silver *tankah* of his mentions a mint which has been tentatively read as 'Khitta' Alwar.⁶⁵

The Mamluk currency showed expert planning and adjustment. It was skilfully incorporated into the Indian weight-standard and made large concessions to the people's notions and circumstances. As a measure of the ability of the Delhi financiers it would be observed, that the relative value of the currency pieces remained steady throughout the century. The following table, summarising the points discussed above, will show that the silver *tankah* was the central coin which ruled all other metal denominations, although, as Nevill and Wright point out, the monetary standard was tri-metallic, the intrinsic metal value of the pieces governing their token relationship with each other.

2, 36-gr. copper pieces	= 1 <i>fals</i> or <i>adl</i>
4 <i>fals</i>	= 1 billon <i>jital</i>
48 <i>jital</i>	= 1 silver <i>tankah</i> of 172.8 gr.
10 silver <i>tankah</i>	= 1 gold <i>tankah</i>
1 silver <i>tankah</i>	= 2, 86.4-gr. $\frac{1}{2}$ - <i>tankah</i> pieces
	= 3, 57.6-gr. four- <i>masha</i> coins
	= 6, double- <i>mashas</i>
	= 12, <i>mashas</i> (14.4 gr. silver)
	= 16, three- <i>jital</i> pieces
	= 24, double- <i>jitals</i>
	= 192, <i>fals</i>
	= 288, 48-gr. copper coins
	= 384, half- <i>fals</i>

NOTES

1. For the rules governing the application of *kharaj* and *ushr*, see Abu Yusuf: *Kitabul Kharaj*, pp. 35-39; Agnides: *Muslim Theories of Finance* pp. 362, 425.

2. See Rahim: *Muhammedan Jurisprudence*, p. 385.

3. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, article on *Kharaj*; also al-Mawardi : *Akhkamus-Sultaniyah*, p. 138.
4. Fakhre Mudabbir : *Tarikh*, pp. 33-34.
5. Barani, p. 194.
6. Barani, p. 100.
7. The Persian word *peshkash*, used in the sense of a nominal tribute and present by writers in the Mughal period, is not found in the early chronicles where the words *kharaj* and *malguzari* are used in connection with the submission of the Hindu princes; see e.g., *Tajul Maasir*, ff. 469, 255a; see also *Ijaz-i-Khusravi*, p. 416a.
8. Among works written in India it is mentioned first in the *Adabul Harb* f. 157b-158a but the term is evidently used to denote taxes levied both on the Hindu and Muslim peoples.
9. Juwaini, writing towards the end of the 13th century, uses both *jazia* and *kharaj* to mean tribute; ii, p. 89. Barani, also on two occasions, calls the land revenue *jazia*; p. 574.
10. Barani, p. 218.
11. Afif : *op. cit.* p. 38. Even Firoz did not impose the customary four rates of the tax as described in the *Adabul Harb*, f. 158a. Cf. Afif's details of Firoz's tax; p. 383.
12. *Futuh-i-Firozshahi*, ed. Rashid, p. 16.
13. *Ibid*, f. 300b; Rashid, p. 6.
14. Minhaj, p. 315.
15. Elliot; ii, p. 242. Barani, p. 92.
16. Minhaj, p. 240.
17. See Aghnides; *op. cit.*; pp. 298-338, for details of the regulations.
18. The *Fiqh-i-Firozshahi*, an anonymously compiled work on legal practices in Firoz Tughluq's time, mentions a separate treasury for the *zakat*; cited in Qureshi; p. 93. But it is not mentioned in his *Fatuh*.
19. Ibn Battuta : *Kitabur Rahla*; Def. Sang, iii, p. 112-113.
20. See Aghnides : *op. cit.* p. 318.
21. Minhaj, p. 321.
22. For these taxes see Qureshi : p. 228-9; other taxes of a similar nature are to be found in Afif; pp. 374-77.
23. Minhaj, p. 182.
24. *Idem*; Barani, p. 164.
25. Only one billon issue of Balban has been found to bear the older device; *JASB*, 1894, p. 64, no. 1.
26. Thomas's view that the *jital* was merely a continuation of the *dehliwala*, has been found to require modification, since the *jital* contained a lesser amount of silver and was possibly intended to have a lower exchange value; see Wright, p. 72-73. For the *jital* in Central Asia, see *JASB* 1924, p. N. 33.
27. Wright, p. 90; Rodgers, p. 42.
28. Thomas; *Chronicle*, p. 19-20; Wright, p. 6, nos. 4 and 5.
29. See Lane Poole : *BMC*, no. 6, for the northern *dinar*.
30. Wright, p. 6, no. 3a.

31. *Ibid*, p. 15. Nos. 49 F. and 49 G. Apart from these Chauhana features, these gold coins weigh only 70.6 grains, whereas the Ghazni *dinars* weigh 118 to 134 grains.
32. *Cf. NC*, 1885, p. 216, for a gold coin, originally ascribed, to Raziah, but which was later found to be a forged issue; *NC*, 1921, p. 342.
33. The conventional weight of 32-*rati* or 16 grains was the ideal to which both the Muslim and Hindu copper and billon issues aimed at; see Thomas, p. 4. For a similarity in variations of weight in both the Hindu and Muslim copper pieces see *Supp. CCIM*, i, p. 61-62; ii, pp. 80-89, 100-106.
34. See Wright for such copper coins bearing on the reverse the word *adl*.
35. Thomas : *Chronicle*, pp. 47-48.
36. Wright, p. 16, no. 49H.
37. *Ibid*, p. 17, no. 49L.
38. Thomas : *Chronicle* No. 28; Wright, p. 18, No. 50 c.
39. *JRAS* (N.S.), vi, p. 352, no. 4, see also Wright, p. 20, no. 51.
40. *CCIM*, ii, p. 145, no. 3.
41. *JRAS* (N.S.), vi, p. 357. The fact that the same month is repeated in the issue of 617, 619 and 620 indicating an anniversary, makes the supposition almost a certainty. The month is *Rabi II*; one issue is dated 20th *Rabi II*. The issue of 616 is dated 19th *Safar*, while that of 621 mentions *Jamadi II*; *cf.*, however *JNSI*, xvi, 1954, pt. ii, p. 243-252, where Thomas's interpretation is disputed but no satisfactory explanation of the dates is given.
42. Wright, p. 71-73.
43. *JASB*, xx, 1924, *Numismatic Supplement*, xxxviii, no. 248.
44. Wright, p. 79.
45. *JASB*, 1894, p. 68, no. 21; Rodgers : iv *Supp.* no. 15.
46. Rodgers : iv, *Supp.* no. 20.
47. Wright, no. 262A.
48. p. 80-81.
49. *Ibid*, p. 28, no. 91.
50. *Ibid*, p. 81, no. 263.
51. Thomas : *Chronicle*, nos. 124 and 180.
52. Quoted in Wright, p. 161.
53. *CCIM*, ii, pp. 33, 35, nos. 145-46 and 158-59.
54. Wright No. 261 (Kaiqubad, 49. 1 grs.); 249 (Balban 55 grs.); 131 Iltutmish, 178 grs.); 239 (Mahmud, 12.4 grs.); 256 (Balban 12.5 and 10.3 grs.). The weight seems to indicate only an approximate division; allowance should also be made for wear.
55. *JASB*, 1916, p. 129, no. 1 : 1890, p. 68, no. 21, 1883, Rodgers *supp.* iii, No. 20; 1916, p. 113, No. 3.
56. *NC* 1924, p. 346.
57. Wright, p. iii, no. 35A and 36. Suggested readings are Anwala (Aolna) and Ujjain.
58. *NC*, *op. cit.* p. 340.

59. Wright, No. 49F; *JRAS* (N.S.), vi, p. 348; on this point see also note 57, p. 108 *supra*.
60. Wright, No. 50 F.
61. *JASB*, 1881, p. 67, *CCIM*, ii, p. 21, no. 38; also, intro. p. 6. Wright p. 20, No. 52A.
62. *CCIM*, ii, p. 25, no 82.
63. Thomas : *Chronicle*, p. 107, no. 90, Wright, p. 41, no. 161B.
64. *JASB*, 1904, p. 66; also 1910, p. 566, no. 1.
65. *NC*, 1924, (v. series, i), p. 343.

CHAPTER XV

SOCIETY AND CULTURE

It is perhaps safe to hold that Persians, Afghans and Turks, with a sprinkling of Arabs, formed the upper class of Muslim society in the first century of Muslim rule over north India. Conversion from Indian tribes, not inconsiderable in number, swelled the rank and file, but except in Sind, from where some converts are mentioned in early Arab accounts as having reached positions of honour and distinction in Arabian letters and society,¹ they do not seem, by the available evidence, to have been accorded positions of equality. Drawn as they were, as yet, mostly from the lower classes of the Indian people,—if traditions respecting the early Muslim missionaries are to be believed—, they could hardly hope to be admitted into the aristocracy of the conquerors or to a share of their privileges. The most jealous guardian of this aristocracy was the Turk whose military power enabled him to reserve the leadership for his own race. As he overran the North Indian river valleys, fame and increased resources heightened his superiority-complex; this was encouraged by his success in withstanding the Mongol storm when all other peoples went down. There was substance in Balban's claim that not less than fifteen sovereign princes from Muslim Asia had found asylum in his kingdom. Unquestionably, the Indian Turk had proved himself the leader of the eastern world.

of Islam.

But among the least effects of the Mongol eruption was a vast shake-up and mixing of the different races composing the Islamic peoples. In India, its resultant forces went, in no small measure, to the evolution of a homogeneous Muslim society. In the second generation from Muizzuddin, the Turk was isolated from his homeland and was compelled to fight with his back to the wall. Countless refugees poured from Khurasan and even Iraq and from beyond the Hindukush to swell his rank and the solidarity of Muslims fighting against a powerful infidel had to become a real and overriding sentiment. In this prolonged war-emergency, native converts and even non-Muslims proved indispensable; the former even found opportunities to learn the conqueror's ways and even to make a bid for political power. Despite Balban's rantings against 'low-born non-Turks' the employment, as his *ariz*, of Imadul Mulk Rawat,—of obvious Indian parentage—seems to have been unavoidable. More significant is Barani's reference to the Mongol converts who had settled in Delhi and had close family ties with leading Turkish nobles and held high position in Kaiqubad's court. Intermarriage with the natives and with the refugees imperceptibly but inevitably diluted the Turk's blood and also, though in a slower manner, his cultural ideas. The Khalji state, more broadbased than that of the Mamluk, was only a political expression of these social forces.

Two broad divisions of Muslim society seem to have persisted from the very beginning. This was the *ahl-i-saif* and the *ahl-i-qalam*, men of the

sword and men of the pen, the latter, judging from the recorded types, being almost wholly confined, in the first one or two generations, to non-Turkish foreigners. From them were drawn recruits for the clerical services, the *katib*, the *dabir*, the *wazir*. In the lower ranks of the revenue staff should be placed the native lettered class, both Hindu and Muslim. By far the most influential section of the *ahl-i-qalam* were of course the ecclesiastics—theologians and litterateurs—who, along with the *umara*, formed the first two estates of Muslim society. Although not so strictly organised as the Christian episcopacy they were yet, informally, a well-knit group, intensely conscious of their importance and jealous of their high privileges. They manned the judicial and ecclesiastical services and wherever there was a mosque, —and every Muslim locality must have one—, the *imam*, the *khatib*, the *muhtasib* and the *mufti* represented an interest which received state recognition. They necessarily controlled the educational establishments and thus put a premium on unorthodox thought and learning calculated to undermine their positions. The authority of the *sadrus-sudur* who officially presided over this class, thus embraced all the lettered Muslims except the group known as the *mashaikh*, the mystic saints whose independence and other-worldiness could never suit the literal-minded theologian. Between the two sections, there was little mutual admiration; the theologians' unconcealed anxiety to please the secular authority often brought forth bitter condemnation from the saints. Because of their popular appeal the latter, however, demanded attention; the official class, including even the king,

were obliged to treat them with due deference. Firoz Khalji's reign affords an instance, in the incident of the mystic Sidi Maula, of how these men could constitute political danger, for their appeal transcended racial and credal barriers.

Among the 'fighters' (*ahl-i-saif*) who supplied executive and military personnel, military rank naturally determined social position. This rank seems to have been graded into *khan*, *malik*, *amir*, *sipahsalar*, and *sar-i-khail*. In the form these titles are mentioned in the chronicle they appear to be a reproduction of the Turkish tribal arrangement in which the family and not the individual was the unit of society. In the first quarter of the century when tribal loyalties were still fresh the extension of this heirarchical organization to India may perhaps be assumed. But as non-Turks, mostly Iranians, increased the number of the fighter class, this order of society would inevitably undergo a process of transformation. The Turk had nothing comparable to the *mawālī* system of the Arab by which each tribe preserved its separate entity when the *Ajami*, in large numbers, entered the fold of Islam and threatened to disrupt the tribal basis of society. In India non-Turkish slaves were attached to families and acquired their traditions but the free-born converts and immigrant Muslims could not be given a place at the bottom of the social ladder.

It is of course hardly to be expected that these factors would lead to the emergence, at this period, of the very modern idea of the individual being the unit of society; punishment of the offender's family which is instanced by some of the 13th century-

rulers would not accord with such a notion. The family still remained the unit but its grouping under the *sar-i-khail* disappeared. The process must have been slow and its completion cannot be dated; Barani, writing in the fourteenth century still uses the generic term of *khail-khanah*. In any event, as indicative of social rank the *sar-i-khail* finds no further mention in the chronicles. The several cases of promotion recorded in the *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri* do not even include the *sipahsalar*; the *amir*, *malik* and the *khan* seem to include the entire personnel of the *ahl-i-saif*. Only in the case of Aibak his rank of *sipahsalar* is mentioned,² and is included among his titles in one of the epigraphic records of his reign. Subsequently, it appears to have lost rank and came to occupy the lowest position; even in the officer cadre of the army, early in the 14th century, Shahabudin Abbas, in describing the Tughluq army organization, assigns to it the smallest command and pay.³

The practice of regarding the *amir* as the first rank to be held by the aspirant to military aristocracy, which became normal in the latter 13th century, seems to have had even earlier beginning. Nizamul Mulk, writing in the 12th century, in describing the system of training for the slaves, mentions the *amir* as the first responsible office the newly trained slave was to occupy.⁴ He adds that this system was becoming obsolete in his time; but not so in the Mamluk Sultanate. Ghazi Malik's admission into the military aristocracy began with his promotion to the rank of *amir*.⁵ It was also Iltutmish's first commission. In fact every slave seems to have acquired this rank before he received

an executive post.⁶ Since the days when Subuktigin and Mahmud of Ghazni expressed their sovereignty by this title alone the *amir*, like the *sipahsalar*, had lost rank and by the time of the Tughluqs was only a captain in charge of a hundred troopers. Whether the possible elevation of the principal non-Turkish refugees straightway to the rank of *malik* in the 13th century had anything to do with the *amir's* degradation cannot be stated with certainty, but the Mamluk chronicles undoubtedly show a surfeit of the first-mentioned dignitary; an Indian Muslim is also described as *malik*.⁷ The higher rank of *khan* was held as a rule by grown-up princes of the royal family and such of the Turkish *maliks* as were specially honoured by the king. If the lists of Minhaj and Barani are any guide, no non-Turk, not even the Khalji's could ever hold this rank. It was presumably part of the distinctions enjoyed by governors of important provinces. Its absence from the titles of Aibak and Iltutmish is perhaps to be explained by their opportune elevation to the throne; only Balban served a long period of apprenticeship and passed through this grade. The highest status below that of the king was conferred by the title of *Ulugh Khan* (great khan), naturally held by only one person at a time. Balban, possibly in imitation of the Mongol terminology, preferred to call it *Qaan* which he bestowed on his heir apparent, a shrewd move to forestall the recurrence of the process of his own usurpation.

The third element, '*awam-o-khalq*', is less easy to distinguish. As the Muslim society was mainly urban at this period it must have included all the indeterminate city crowd, the artisan, the shop-

keeper, the clerk and the petty-trader. The big merchants, since they are never mentioned separately, would also have to be grouped with this class, but wealthy, much travelled and accomplished merchants, the '*tajir* and *malikuttujjar*', found it easy to be admitted to the nobility. An important section was formed by the slaves owned by the king and the nobility, who, before promotion to the rank of *amir*, were employed in various domestic and technical jobs. They contributed the largest quota to the staff of the different *karkhanahs* and the city's craftsmen included not a few of them. A town's population would also include non-Muslims; although direct evidence is lacking, it will not be far from truth to consider them as contributing the largest number to the city's trading community. In point of fact the influence born of wealth which the Hindu bankers and traders enjoyed would entitle them even to a position of aristocracy; indeed, Barani complains that they even outdid the Muslims in pomp and material comforts.⁸

Judging from Minhaj's account of the Muizzis and Shamsi *maliks*, very few of the immigrant Turks were born in Islam; most of them came as slaves sold in childhood to Persian merchants. Along with those settled in the Islamic countries and driven to India by the Mongols they were converted to Sunni Islam, the religion of the Ghaznavid, the Seljuq, the Khwarizmi and the Shansabani dynasties. Politically, it was dangerous to countenance the Shiah sect whose faith involved allegiance to the enemy of the Abbasids, for the latter's moral sanction gave the Delhi sultan his strongest support. Moderate as well as extreme shiahs were

all denounced as heretics and contemptuously designated as *mulahidah* and *rawafiz*. The *qaramitah*, also called '*batini*', came in for special persecution which throughout the eastern Caliphate was intensified after the destruction of the Fatemid dynasty. Their headquarters in Alamut, in Northern Iran, became the object of a series of attacks in which both the Khwarizmis and Shansabanis claimed notable success. Being persecuted everywhere they became a secret society and terrorised the sunni through their fanatic adherents called (*fidais*) who became experts in using the assassin's knife.

Only in the Arab-ruled province of the Indus valley where Turkish orthodoxy was comparatively late in arriving, a section of the extreme shiah, the '*qaramitah*'—a sect of the Ismailis—found a lodgement in the 9th century. They succeeded in making proselytes from the Hindu and Muslim population and winning political power in Upper Sind. In Multan and Mansura for more than two centuries political and religious allegiance was owed to the Fatemid Caliph of Egypt.⁹ Mahmud of Ghazni obtained only a temporary success for orthodoxy by installing a sunni ruler over Multan, for Muizzuddin had to fight hard in order to overthrow the *qaramitah* ruler. The final extension of Delhi's sovereignty put an end to their political power in the Indus valley but the sect was not exterminated. From Minhaj's account they even appear to have spread east and south and found followers in Gujrat and even in the Doab. Muizzuddin's death at their hands made the Mamluk state bitterly hostile to them; even the Mongol eruption failed to assuage this bitterness. Ilutmish's final acceptance of Abbasid suzerainty

confirmed the shiahs in their enmity to the Turkish rulers. While the *ulema* denounced them as unclean heretics they, on their part, openly arraigned the latter for their worldly greed and compromising religiosity. Towards the end of Raziah's reign under the leadership of a person named Nur Turk¹⁰ they conspired to seize power. Collecting the sect from all parts of India and fully armed he raised a great insurrection in the Jami Masjid and commenced a slaughter of the orthodox worshippers. It was a serious rising and took military force to quell it. Although suppressed on this occasion the sect could hardly be expected to die out; Barani's frequent condemnation of the '*mulahidah*' heretics would postulate their continuance as a somewhat noticeable religious group.¹¹ Under the Mamluks, nevertheless, shiism made little progress in Hindusthan; it had to wait till the conversion of the Il-Khans of Persia once again gave it a political sanction.

Muslim society in the 13th century-India, therefore, predominately belonged to the sunni persuasion. With its rigid simplicity sunni Islam also suited the Turkish mind which showed a singular incapacity for the esoteric religion of the shiah. With the theologians imported from abroad and also trained in India, the Mamluk set about to preserve the orthodoxy of their own faith and that of their compeers. The Mongols drove a large section of Iranian Muslims; whatever their original predilections might have been, the refugees exhibited a remarkable conformity in India. The Shansabanis belonged to the Karramiah sect of sunni Muslims,¹² but the Mamluks held to the system of Abu Hanifa.

Not quite apart from the sunnis and yet forming a distinctly important group was the mystic fraternity of the *sufis*. The 13th century was remarkable for the great number of Muslim mystics who, men of great learning, lived away from the society of townsmen. Although not recluses in the real sense of the term and often householders, they were yet genuinely indifferent to material comforts. While not formally rejecting orthodoxy, but, on the contrary, mindful of its observances, they held to an ethical religion and strove after mystic communion with the Godhead. Except for certain religious exercises designed to bring about a particular mystic experience, like the *sima*, (music intended to rouse the mind to a condition of ecstasy), they were indistinguishable in normal life from the orthodox, and many of them carried on ordinary vocations. The fraternity, grouped round the '*murshid*' (guide) was thus open to the orthodox Muslims also, initiation requiring nothing more than practising the graded exercises in the seclusion of one's home. Miracles were usually believed of them and the uninitiated masses felt drawn to their unassuming piety. Even the formalist *ulema* reverently attended their '*khanqah*' and felt honoured when admitted to the circle of the select disciples. They scorned the advances of the official class and many lived in proud poverty. Of the many such mystic orders that arose in India and are active even now, the period under review saw the introduction and exclusive prevalence, each in its own area, of two of the most important, namely the Chishtia and the Suhrawardia, respectively by Muinuddin at Ajmer and Bahauddin Zakariya at Multan. While the

latter remained confined to the Indus valley, the Chistia order spread to the whole of Hindusthan and Punjab and counted among its potential adherents almost every notable Muslim of the age. Muinuddin died at Ajmer in 1235 and his tomb has since become a renowned place of pilgrimage, even for the laity. So are the tombs of his chief disciples, Qutbuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki (died in 1235) at Delhi, Fariduddin Shakaragunj (died in 1256), at Pakpattan, Nizamuddin Budauni (died 1325) at Delhi, every one of whom left a large number of equally honoured disciples. In Sind, the influence of Bahauddin's successors, Sadruddin, Jalaluddin and Ruknuddin, was equally great, the last named person's tomb being one of the finest extant specimens of Muslim architecture in Multan. Devotion to the *sufi* and his mystic cult thus formed an important feature of Muslim religious life under the Mamluks,. Barani's account lists a large number of such '*sufis*' and '*walis*' who, as a measure of their importance, have special chapters devoted to them by Ferishta and the historians of the Mughal period.

Whether one agrees or not with the view that Indian Vedantism was largely responsible for its growth, it is undeniable that the mysticism of the *sufi* furnished Islam's philosophical point of contact with Hinduism. It is through such contacts, fostered by the simplicity and broad humanism of the *sufi* that Islam obtained its largest number of free converts and it is in this sense that he is considered a missionary. On the behest of the *murshid*, he travelled to distant countries and settled down with a true missionary zeal amongst unfamiliar and even hostile people. An instance is afforded by

Jalaluddin Tabrezi, one of Muinuddin's companions, who took up his residence under the Sena king of Bengal. In Gujrat, then under Hindu rule, a *sufi* established his headquarters;¹³ Muinuddin himself is reported to have arrived in Ajmer several years before Muizzuddin's invasion.¹⁴ In the *sufi's* pantheistic outlook and engrossment with the soul which transcended the formalism of religion, the spiritualist Hindu recognised a familiar cult; his humility, tolerance and humanism held out a powerful appeal. Islam's social values and the material prospects it then held out finally made this appeal irresistible, specially to those suffering from Brahminical caste-tyranny.

No evidence is forthcoming at this period to enable us to make any precise statement as to the mutual borrowings of popular Islam and Hinduism. The examples afforded by the Tughluq chronicles of definitely Hindu practices and Hindu inspired sects among the Muslims, may have had an earlier beginning. That Indian converts would retain some of their Hindu notions and practices needs little proof. The worship of the saint and his shrine, which gradually increased and became a source of great social evil in latter times, is a phenomenon which undoubtedly had its origin in the 13th century reverence for the *sufi*, but in whose wide incidence the Hindu predilection of worshipping local and tribal gods must have had no little share. To what extent the higher intellects of the two people reacted to each other's ideas is, however, a question whose answer the 13th century could be hardly expected to provide.

With its highly unsettled conditions the Mamluk

Sultanate could boast of no great cultural activity. More than a century was to elapse before Muslim letters found its bearings in the new environment and exhibited, under the Tughluqs, a vigorous, creative spirit. What was produced in the 13th century had necessarily trans-Indian tradition behind it; Indian ideas and life could enter but little in the Muslim's intellectual make up. Even so, it is possible to cite at least one literary work by a Muslim which, on the ground of its theme, form, treatment, and language, has been considered to have been derived exclusively from the Sanskrit literary tradition of India. This is a poetical romance of the 'Rasa' type in the *Apabhramsa* language named *Sandesarasaka*, by one Abdur Rahman, son of Mir Hasan who lived in the 12th century in Multan and who was well versed in Sanskrit and Prakrit literature.¹⁵ This however anticipates that Indianisation of Muslim letters to which the great Amir Khusrau, himself of foreign parentage, was to make the most notable contribution. The use of Hindi poetical imagery and themes, his admiration and addition to India's music, and his spirited defence of Indian cultural values, are only a few of the services of this versatile poet, the first great creative writer of Muslim India.¹⁶ The spirit of the greatest medieval Muslim savant al-Beruni breathes through his writings, but while the latter's pleading for study and appreciation of Indian philosophy and sciences evoked little response from his contemporaries, Khusrau's genius held out a living example in the domain of *belles lettres* which caught on and went to enrich the culture-content of medieval India.

Military preoccupations notwithstanding, the Mamluk ruler however, showed great awareness to the enduring virtues of literature; indeed, the pen no less than the sword was an integral component of his mental life. Some of it was no doubt inspired by practical needs; religious administration demanded works on theology and law, while politics needed chronicles and treatises on statecraft. But a devotion to poetry, literary history and essay proves more than mere utilitarian outlook. It is true that the Mamluks were only the inheritors of this tradition and that the Mongol scourge brought in a large number of foreign writers to Delhi; but in the development of what may be called a culture-state they must have had a large share. Under every ruler Barani gives a long list of poets, theologians, lawyers, historians and masters of the epistolary art. Among prose writers the Delhi state could boast of such eminent names as that of the literary historian Nuruddin Muhammad Afi, the historian and political theorist Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah, and the chroniclers Hasan Nizami and Minhaj Juzjani. Ziauddin Barani himself had more versatility than that of a mere historian; a later account ascribes to him, besides works on history, also treatises on statecraft, law, scriptural commentaries and religious prayer books.¹⁷ Poetry was a universally practised art and ability to compose verses was almost an essential complement to literary education. It is hardly necessary to single out names among the hosts of poets maintained on the state's pension list or in the company of every prince and noble. Nor is it possible to distinguish the poet from the essayist, the historian from the

theologian, for those were the days of encyclopaedic accomplishment. Balban's court was specially rich not only in eminent divines and poets but also in physicians and astronomers who in their special branches "had no equals". Badruddin Damashqi and Husamuddin Marikla are honoured names in the annals of medicine; Hamiduddin Mutriz was as much well versed in mathematics and astronomy as in the healing art.¹⁸ The crown of the 13th century poets was Khusrau who with his friend Amir Hasan Sijzi, an equally accomplished writer, made even the Iranians jealous of the classic excellence of Indo-Persian poetry. Amir Khusrau himself speaks appreciatively of yet another of his contemporaries named Rukn Muhmerah of Budaun.¹⁹

Translation from Hindu works does not appear to have found a place in the literary interest of the time until Firoz Tughluq's reign when we find for the first time a number of Sanskrit works rendered into Persian. But a singular exception is provided by an Arabic translation of a Sanskrit work on *Joga* named *Amritakunda*, made with the help of a converted Hindu *Jogi* from Kamrup named Bhujar Brahmin, by Ruknuddin Samarqandi, the *imam* and chief *qazi* of Lakhnauti during the rule of Ali Mardan Khalji in Bengal.²⁰

It is hardly necessary to stress that such diffusion of and devotion to literature presupposes a high level of general education and the existence of widely patronised educational establishments. Among the first institutions established in any newly occupied place was a *madrasah*, while every mosque housed a primary school. There were privately run schools as well as state-financed semi-

naries. Iltutmish founded a richly endowed college at Delhi named after his eldest son Nasiruddin; another was at Multan called the *Firozi madrasah*.²¹ The Khalji conquerors in Bengal established similar institutions. Barani speaks of a large number of eminent professors teaching in colleges all over the kingdom.²² Under the Tughluqs, the capital alone is said to have possessed a thousand *madrasas* and two thousand *maktabs* (attached to mosques)²³ a statement which gives a comparative indication of the state of affairs under their Mamluk predecessors.

Of cultivation of the arts, contemporary writings furnish little definite evidence. Architecture occupied their whole interest; in its decorative scheme, as evidenced by the surviving monuments, mural painting entered but little. Stray references to ornamental figures, both animate and inanimate, painted on walls or engraved or embroidered on furniture, flags, tents, saddles and arms,²⁴ on the other hand, lead us to assume that the visual arts also reached high excellence under the Mamluks. Whether the portraits of the sultans as found in the Mughal miniature albums were copied from earlier originals must remain a matter of speculation. Firoz Tughluq at any rate interdicted the practice of decorating the wall by coloured representation of living objects. The feeling for colour found concrete expression in the '*unwan*' of manuscripts produced for the nobles and royalties. Calligraphy was a widely diffused art which, when transferred to stone and paper, can embody almost as sensuous a beauty as that of the plastic arts. Music has an irresistible appeal and despite the supposed legal

ban it formed an essential part of festivities. With music went dancing, but one should hardly expect at this period that these two arts were cultivated for anything approaching intellectual satisfaction. With increased dependence on Indian performers, the Muslims, it is reasonable to presume, rapidly acquired a taste for the Indian form of these arts and the intermingling, notably in music, had a highly enriching effect. Amir Khusrau was an accomplished musician himself; he not only set some of his poems to Indian tunes but is the reputed inventor of new *ragas*.²⁵

In manners and customs a rapid de-Turkisation is observable. It did not take the Tughrils, Ughul Baks, Aetigins etc. long to shed their Turkish mannerism and adopt Persian and even Indianised Muslim names. One can suppose the compatriots of Aibak and Iltutmish speaking ordinarily in Turki, but against the ever expanding Persian it could have had only a shortlived vogue; no literary work in Turki, in any case, is known to have been produced in India. It is true Balban's emphasis on Turki racialism would imply a revival of Turkish cultural elements. The long continued device of the Turki horsemen on the currency pieces seems to point to the same direction. For the first time in Barani we find some of the state functionaries referred to in their Turkish designations.²⁶ But Balban was too deeply committed to Persianism to bring about a real revival of Turki customs. His monarchical ideals were those of the ancient kings of Iran whose precepts and examples gave form and content to his autocracy; he could think of no illustrious names for his grandsons but

Kaikhusräu, Kaikaus, Kaiqubad and Kaiumars. Turkestan obviously could not heighten the cultural glory of his court; Persian was the only channel through which he could reach the intellectual world of Islam and thus buttress his claim to the championship of civilisation against Mongol barbarism. For the eastern Muslims it was impossible to get away from Persian influence; in India it was to exercise an abiding tyranny.

But to escape the environmental influence was equally difficult; the Indian Turk was not even circumstantially equipped to attempt it. Significant of the new trend is the adoption by high born Muslims, even of pure Turkish descent, of such Indian names as Chajju, Kachchan, Hamidraja, etc.²⁷ Chewing the betel leaf, a peculiarly Indian habit, found its way early among the nobles and Barani notes the excessive addition to it of Balban's *ariz*.²⁸ Under the Tughluqs, Ibn Battuta noticed another Indian custom of offering the '*bira*' of pan to the bride as a part of the marriage ceremony.²⁹ In daily conversation Indian terms inevitably seemed to find a place; Barani consistently uses the Hindi word '*barshkal*' for the rainy season.³⁰ Firoz Tughluq earned piety and gratitude by providing funds to pay for the marriage dowry of Muslim orphan girls;³¹ it is difficult to interpret this dowry as anything but a Hindu-inspired custom, for Muslim law knows of no money payable by the bride. Among the new converts from Hinduism caste prejudices tended to find new applications. In Delhi the existence of separate graveyards for Muslims of different professions is noted with regret by the saint Nasiruddin Chirag-i-Delhi,³²

In recreation and amusements a taste for chess (*shatranj*) and gambling (*qammarbazi*) was probably an earlier acquisition. So was also the out-door game of *chaughan*, a kind of polo. The royalty combined amusement with military exercise in hunting excursions. Wine was almost an indispensable constituent of gaiety; holding of convivial parties with friends (*nadims*) was considered almost a royal convention. Balban is said to have given up wine altogether after his accession; it was clearly inspired by political expediency as in the case of Alauddin, rather than anxiety to observe the law, for the lawyers themselves were scarce disinclined to allow the monarch some latitude in this matter.³³ Music and dancing girls were another means of diversion which, as time went on, became indispensable like wine, and from private amusement, became a conventional court practice. The employment of professional performers and courtesans seems to be a development inspired by Indian practices, for in central Asia and even in the Arabian countries, free-born professional musician of the female sex was a rare social phenomenon. The Indian courtesan and nautch-girl was not paralleled by the trained '*jariya*'.

An enquiry into the wealth-producing activities under the Mamluks yields little satisfying result, for these seem to have least interested the contemporary writers. To what extent and in what manner commerce and industry were fostered or the regime affected the country's economy, are questions whose answer must necessarily contain a fair amount of conjecture. We hear of merchants dealing in horses, slaves and in clothes, big importers

and exporters, who appear to have nearly always been Iranian and Arabian Muslims.³⁴ The Turk also dealt in horses imported from southern Turkistan (*Khita*) and had been a familiar figure in the Hindu mercantile world. The Mamluk state had no seaport and the sea-borne trade, filtering through to the Delhi markets, would touch only indirectly the land-locked kingdom's economic life. The *Tabaqat-i-Akbari* mentions, under Ala-uddin Khalji, an officer called the *tajerbegi*, but it is perhaps too early to expect the militarist Mamluks to make a conscious effort to increase or even to regulate foreign commerce.³⁵

This is not intended to mean that trade had no place in the economic life. On the contrary the government earned not a little income from the tax on traders and shopkeepers and also from transit duty on mercantile commodities. The luxury living of the nobility undoubtedly quickened the demand for consumer's goods and the middle men as well as the craftsmen did good business. In Alauddin's reign we hear more about the traders on whom he sought to impose his economic regulations. Under Balban is mentioned an *amir-i-bazar*.³⁶ Firoz Tughluq's list of the taxes he abolished would give us an idea of the variety of sellers who supplied the growing needs of the urban populations.³⁷ The army department had no commissariat service and was dependent for provisions on the grain merchants who accompanied the campaigning force. We hear of no regular slave markets as in other Islamic countries, but the human merchandise was a recognised means of making money and was even used as a

side business by members of the *ulema*.³⁸ A highly profitable business was money-lending, confined almost exclusively to Hindus whose mounting rate of interest, enforced by the state, enabled them to impoverish the profligate nobles.³⁹ Amir Hasan mentions Muslim traders from Lahore (*saudagar*) in Bahram's reign journeying to do business with the Hindus of Gujrat and making huge profits therefrom.⁴⁰

With regard to industry it is reasonable to hold that the Hindu craft-guilds and professional castes functioned also in Muslim administered territories. In manufacture, India's self-sufficiency and exporting role seemed little disturbed by the conquest. To provide for the nobleman's luxury kept the craftsmen busy. The king's various needs not only kept the wheel of industry moving but even caused the setting up of state manufactories (*karkhanah*). We hear of these early in the 14th century but their earlier beginning cannot be ruled out.⁴¹ The builder and stone worker, the tent-maker and the saddler, the perfumer and the oil-man, the upholsterer and cloth-maker, the metal worker and armourer, all were in great demand. Manufactured articles, to whose excellence Amir Khusrau pays warm tribute,⁴² found ready buyers and the city markets never had a dull moment. If rising price of the manufactured article is any indication of the demands made on industry, the Khalji control would prove the flourishing condition of the craftsmen in the 13th century. The majority of these were Hindu; a small percentage came from the lower class Muslims, mostly Indian converts.

The main-stay of the state's economy was, of

Lahore and who, unable to pay the revenue, had to compound for it by performing a miracle.⁴⁵ Another is, as noted already, the account of Balban's settlement of Afghan soldiers on the land to garrison the fortresses on the newly opened highways through Hindustan. To these should of course be added the converts from the rural Hindu population who, in all likelihood, unless forcibly ejected by the caste fraternity, retained their holdings. A peasant was a valuable asset and unless he elected to choose some urban calling, the feudatory prince or the paramount ruler would endeavour to keep him to his profession. But the interest of the Muslim ruling class in land was undeniably the revenue. Either as a *muqti* or as an *iqtadar* he derived his income from the revenue payable by the peasant cultivator. Even the *ahl-i-qalam* held such assignment.⁴⁶

It is unnecessary to enter into the vexed question of who was the legal owner of the land; in practice the sovereign demanded of the peasant along with a share of his produce, an unfailing devotion to agriculture. The king felt entitled to eject him if he neglected his duty.⁴⁷ The century affords no concrete evidence of irrigation and other facilities provided to the peasant by the tax-receiver; probably the urgency of military and political problems was all absorbing. But tanks excavated and caravansarais built by the Mamluks point to an attitude of benevolence which was not restricted to the urban population. Ghiyasuddin Tughluq is noted for his active interest in increasing rural prosperity;⁴⁸ his was clearly the application of a formerly conceived idea.

NOTES

1. *Islamic Culture*, 1937, pp. 177-78.
2. Fakhre Mudabbir : *Tarikh*, p. 22.
3. Elliot, iii, p. 578.
4. *Siyasat Namah*, ed. Khalkhali, pp. 74-75.
5. *Rahlah*, Def. et Sangh, iii, p. 201-2.
6. See Minhaj, for the careers, among others, of Tajuddin Sanjar Gakkhan, Tughril Tughan Khan, Qaraqash Khan, Iltutmish and Badrud-din Sunqar. For the prevalence of this system among the Turks even of Egypt, see *Ency. Islam*, article on Mamluks.
7. Kamal Mahiar; Barani, p. 126. See also Muizzuddin's 'Firman', (*App. A*) for Ajaipal being called Malik Muhammad Qaddaraz.
8. *Fatawai-Jahandari*, f. 120a.
9. See Elliot; i, p. 491, for supporting evidence of the Sumra rulers of lower Sind being in political and religious affiliation with the Fatemids. For Ismaili success in Sind and Gujrat, see also Arnold : *Preaching of Islam*, pp. 274-277.
10. Minhaj, p. 189-90.
11. See for example, pp. 15, 43, 98 and 437. Not every section of the Muslims joined in the denunciation; on the contrary their leading servants were regarded with respect as proved by a remark of Nizamuddin Aulia respecting the saintliness of Nur Turk; *Fawadul Fawaid*, f. 102b.
12. Minhaj, p. 77-78. Muizzuddin is said to have subsequently joined the 'Hanafi' school in deference to the wishes of the citizens of Ghazni which he ruled. His brother latterly became a Shafei. On the Karramia sect, see Shahristani: *Kitabul Milal Wal Nihal*, ed. Cureton, London 1846, pp. 79-85; *Ency. Islam*, article on Karramiya.
13. Titus : *Indian Islam*, p. 122-23.
14. See note 28, ch. xvi, *infra*.
15. *Ed.*, Muni, Jinavijaya, and Bhayani, H.C.; *Singhee Jain series*. Bombay, 1945. see also *HCIP*, v. p. 350.
16. See Mirza; *Life and Works of Amir Khusrau*, for details; also Habib: *Hazrat Amir Khusrau*, p. 5.
17. *Mallubut-Talibin*, cited in Etche : *op. cit.* entry No. 655.
18. Barani, p. 112.
19. Quoted in Qureshi, p. 169, note 9; see also Budauni, i, p. 70 for quotations from his work.
20. *Hauz-al-Hayat, la version Arabe de l' Amratkund*, par Yusuf Hussain, in *Journal Asiatique*, ccxxiii, 1928, pp. 300-344. A manuscript in Leyden, Or. 723 (3), uses the title '*al-Mirat al-Maani fi idrak al Alam al-insani*'; see *IC*, April, 1947, pp. 190-191. This in fact is the title of a second Arabic version prepared by the famous spanish mystic Ibnul Arabi (d. 1240); Brockelmann: *GAL*, i, p. 446. On Ruknuddin Samarqandi, who was known as Ibn-e-Umaid and died in 1218, see Haji Khalifa, ii, p. 414. A persian version was prepared from Ibnul Arabi's translation early in the 16th century at the instance of the Shattari saint Muhammad Ghous of Gwalior,

by his disciple Muhammad b. Khatiruddin under the title of *Bahrul Hayat*; this has been published in 1310 A.H. from Madras. Mirza Mohsin Fani, the author of *Dabistan al-Mazahib*, draws extensively from this Persian version in his account of the Indian *Jogis*. A 17th century illustrated manuscript of this Persian version is in the Chester Beatty library, Dublin; Arnold : *Catalogue of Mughal Miniatures in the Library of Chester Beatty*, London i, p.80-82, iii, plate 98; see also Ethe : *Catalogue of Persian manuscripts in the India office library*, no. 2002.

21. Minhaj was himself the principal of the Nasiri Madrasah for a number of years, p. 188.
22. pp. 110-11.
23. *Masalikul Absar*; Elliot: iii, p. 578.
24. *Futuh-i-Firozshahi*, Elliot : iii, pp. 381-82; see Afif, pp. 290, 374.
25. Faqirullah : *Rag-darpan*, quoted in Shibli Nomani : *Sherul Ajam* p. 137.
26. e.g., *Barbek*, *Dadbak*, *Qirbeg*, *Ilagchi*, etc; Barani, p. 126.
27. Barani, pp. 170, 173; *TA*, trans. i, p. 140.
28. p. 116-117.
29. *Rahlah*, Def. et. Sang. iii, p. 277.
30. See for example, p. 86 : *Fatawai-Jahandari*, ff. 116a, 117. For the use of the Indian term *khala* (bed stead), see Barani, p. 117.
31. Afif, pp. 350-52.
32. Cited by Habib in *E & D (Aligarh) op. cit.* p. 59.
33. See Afif, pp. 145-147, for an incident about the pious Firoz and the author's attempt to gloss over it.
34. Minhaj, pp. 138, 159, 167-68.
35. *Trans.* i, p. 154.
36. Barani, p. 33-34; he seems to have possessed some official status and is also called *Rais-i-Bazar*, like Alauddin Khalji's controller of markets.
37. For a list see Qureshi, *op. cit.* p. 228-29; it includes also those mentioned by Afif.
38. See *Fawadul Fawaid*, f. 8a for an incident in which a saintly Afghan, joining the prayers behind such an Imam, admonished him for his mental preoccupations with this business during the prayers.
39. See Barani, p. 120.
40. *Fawadul Fawaid*, f. 63b.
41. Abbas : *Masalikul-Absar*; Elliot, iii, p. 578.
42. Quoted in Qureshi, p. 211, note 4.
43. Barani, p. 100. See also p. 574.
44. For the agrarian practices in pre-Muslim India see Ghoshal : *Agrarian System of Ancient India*. The systems of assignment, group-assessment and collection, which feature the Muslim revenue practice in India, were all known to the Indian peasants and were thus only a continuation of earlier practices.
45. *Siarul Arefin*, f. 17a.
46. See Minhaj, p. 214, for his *iqta*; also p. 195.
47. Barani, p. 430; also p. 574.
48. Barani, p. 442.

CHAPTER XVI

THE PROTECTED PEOPLE (ZIMMI)

That religion contributed little to the motive force of the Shansabani conquest is scarcely an arguable point. Muizzuddin's first adversary on Indian soil was not an 'infidel' but a monarch with a more orthodox adherence to Islamic law than himself.¹ While he destroyed the Muslim ruler of Lahore he tolerated the continuance of Hindu rule in Ajmer, Gwalior and Delhi; his lieutenant was prepared to allow the Chandella king to hold his dominions. Muizzuddin, according to a later account, even entered into alliance with the Hindu ruler of Jammu against Khusrau Malik.² Numerous Hindu princes retained power and internal autonomy. To suggest that the Muslim Turks commenced their rule by an indiscriminate destruction of life, property and religion,³ is to exhibit a gross misreading of their history. Such references as are found in the contemporary accounts of the destruction of temples must be examined not only against the background of war operations but also against the chronicler's habit of exaggeration. Hasan Nizami, for example, speaks in righteous satisfaction, of the destruction of all the temples in Kalinjar,⁴ but, as a matter of fact, most of the pre-Muslim temples there or at Mahoba and Khajuraho are still intact.⁵ Similar statements are also to be found in the accounts of the conquest of Banaras, Kalpi, Delhi and Ajmer.⁶ There is however no doubt that some temples

did suffer damage and even wilful destruction. Minhaj mentions the destruction of the Mahakal temple of Ujjain by Iltutmish and his conversion of Vighrahapala's college at Ajmer into a mosque.⁷ The Quwwatul Islam mosque at Delhi was admittedly built out of materials of Hindu temples;⁸ so was also Iltutmish's mosque at Budaun.⁹

But to ascribe every damaged temple and monastery to Muslim action is to overlook the possibility of natural decay and also of intolerance of rival Hindu sects. A large number of Jaina temples at Dabhoi and Cambay, near Anhilwara in Gujrat, for example, were plundered by the Paramara king Subhatavarman of Malwah, between 1193 and 1210 A.D. King Harsha of the second Lohara dynasty of Kashmir (1089-1101) plundered a number of Hindu temples for replenishing his treasury.¹⁰ For the most part, however such damage as can be attributed to the Muslims resulted from military operations; where it did not, the motive is to be sought, not in the conqueror's religious zeal, but in his greed for precious metals. For, it is well known that a Hindu temple in those day and even now, contained fabulous amount of precious metals; in its inviolable sanctuary was deposited the treasure both of the people and the princes. India was a fabled country of gold; in point of fact, her export trade in manufactured goods enabled her to receive more of this metal than she sent out. The financial success of Mahmud's campaigns rested, it was believed, on his systematic spoliation of the temples, and the story of the bejewelled idol of Somnath and the gold contained in its hollow, had passed into a universally believed tradition. And ma-

terial wealth, not so much an enthusiasm for religion, which in any case sat lightly on him, irresistibly attracted the Turk, the child of the desolate central Asian steppe. It is not without significance that after the overthrow of the Gahadavala king, Muizzuddin's army marched to occupy, not the capital Kanouj, but Banaras and Asni where the fallen king's treasure was known to have been deposited. It was by the amount of wealth rather than his success in glorifying Islam that Muizzuddin's achievements were estimated by the chronicler.¹¹

In the chronicler's exultant descriptions there was more than mere religious zeal. Exaggerated report of destruction of "temples and the establishment of the abode of God" had a definite propaganda value; it facilitated recruitment in central Asia by holding out prospects both of religious glory and of worldly riches. The pompously phrased *fathnamah*, prepared more with an eye to effect than accuracy, served a similar purpose and, when broadcast among the potential adventurers, brought in an uninterrupted flow of fighting personnel.

The conquered non-Muslim was, in fact, never disarmed and the invaders' limited number made any attempt at extending their religious ideals a highly hazardous task. Even peaceful settlement of the Muslim in the interior required armed aid. We have no account of this Muslim penetration into the country side, but local traditions seem to have preserved the outline of this process. The following story current round the village of Newal, near Kanouj, is perhaps typical of the attitude of majority of the Hindus in the early years of the conquest. "Syed Alauddin came from Kanouj to Newal and

wished to settle at Bangarmau, (modern name of the village). But the raja, named Nal, ordered him to go away and sent his servant to drive him out. On this, the saint Alauddin cursed him and the place immediately turned upside down." Alauddin then took up his residence at the place where he died in 1302 as is recorded in the inscription on his tomb.¹² Ghiyasuddin Tughluq bestowed some land on a certain person but the grantee was helpless against the Hindus who refused to let him settle there and had to resort to strategem to take possession.¹³ Private individuals, at great risks and often unaided by the state, colonised the rural areas and had to overcome stiff Hindu opposition.¹⁴

Bulk of the conquered people still lived under their own rulers and in full enjoyment of religious liberty. Only the demand for tribute reminded them of the Muslim conquest and it is extremely doubtful if they were or could be effectively called upon to pay, in addition to the land-revenue compounded as tribute, the capitation tax as well. Even in the directly administered area, as mentioned above, important exemptions were, as a rule, granted in the incidence of the *jazia*. Despite the ruler's professions for suppressing '*shirk*', the native's religion and ways of life were never normally meant to be interfered with. Nor was it a practicable proposition. Even the militant Islamists had to admit the impossibility of eradicating idolatory and heresy from India.¹⁵ Barani put it in the mouth of Balban that a complete extirpation of idol-worship must remain only an unattainable ideal.¹⁶

As a rule, non-Muslims enjoyed a large measure of liberty of worship and their temples retained their former sanctity. In a town, on the road from Bareilly to Mathura, Cunningham noticed an old temple, built not later than 1000 A.D. with dated records of pilgrimage, and for the years 1241-1290 he found not less than fifteen such inscriptions.¹⁷ In Multan, the famous temple of Aditya was re-erected after its destruction by the Qaramitah rulers and was kept in a flourishing condition to as late as the 17th century.¹⁸ That town, it is to be remembered, was not only an important provincial capital but, because of its association with renowned *sufis* and for its predominantly Muslim population, was also known as the '*Qubbatul Islam*' (dome of Islam). Liberty of religious worship even was extended to the building of new temples. A fragmentary inscription found in the Purana Qila of Delhi and written in Persian and Sanskrit, records the endowment of twelve bighas of land to a temple erected and dedicated to Sri Krishna.¹⁹ More conclusive is the evidence furnished by Firoz Tughluq of the erection of new temples in the neighbourhood of Delhi during his predecessors' rule. "The Hindus and idol worshippers... had erected now temples in the city and environs". "In the village of Maliah there is a tank where they had built idol temples, and on certain days the Hindus were accustomed to proceed on horseback, wearing arms ... They assembled in thousands and performed idol-worship. This abuse had been so overlooked that the bazaar people took out all sorts of provisions, set up stalls and sold their goods".²⁰

Firoz admits that similar idol-houses had been erected and regularly worshipped in the villages of Salihpur and Kohana.²¹ In Etah have been discovered three images of the Jaina sect with dated records of their installation in the year V.S. 1335/1278 A.D..²² The following admission by Firoz Khalji would clearly prove the religious freedom the Hindus enjoyed even in the capital. "Every day the Hindus ... pass below my palace beating cymbals and blowing conch-shells to perform idol-worship on the banks of the Jumna ... While my name is being read in the *khutbah* as the defender of Islam, these enemies of God and His prophet, under my very eyes, are proudly displaying their riches and live ostentatiously among the Muslims of my capital. They beat their drums and other musical instruments and perpetuate their pagan practices."²³

It would of course be an overstatement to suggest that the Mamluk king maintained a perfectly impartial attitude towards Hinduism; the state's indifference to the people's religion is a principle that even in the twentieth century is not universally practised. But the Turk was a materialist; he served his religion only to the extent upto which his material interest carried him. Alauddin Khalji's famous reply to qazi Mughisuddin that he judged his actions solely by the criterion of expediency, typifies also the Mamluk king's attitude. It was a matter of policy for Balban to talk of exterminating the enemies of the religion of Muhammad, for in actual practice, as Barani tells us, he looked only to the state's interest.²⁴

Guided solely by this political interest the Turk commenced his rule by a judicious compromise

with the 'infidel' and his habits. The Mamluk coinage is perhaps the best illustration of this compromise. The reproduction of the figure of the goddess in Muizzuddin's gold issue indicates the extent to which the conquerors were prepared to compromise their religious ideas with the demands of state. In agrarian practice the conquest meant no sharp cleavage with the past and the services of the ancient village officers were retained and utilised. The Brahmin still enjoyed sanctity and was, as has been noticed above, allowed to retain his privileged position and exemptions in the matter of payment of the poll-tax. The Hindu's social practices, even when they were repugnant to the laws of humanity, were permitted. The amount of civil liberty enjoyed by him is indicated by Ibn Battuta's account of widow-burning, a practice which the state merely tried to regulate by requiring the party to obtain a written permit from the local executive officer who sent his men to ensure that no force was employed on the woman.²⁵

Proselytization seems to have little interested the rulers. They were preoccupied with great problems of security and large scale conversions effected by official force would have resulted in an unwelcome falling off of the revenues. Even in the propagandist writings of the early chroniclers who exultingly describe the great number of "infidels sent to hell" and "the purgation of idolatry", not a single reference is found to forced conversions.²⁶ Ferishta mentions the conversion of the Khokar tribe brought about by Muizzuddin's promise of preferential treatment; but this cannot be substantiated, for the tribe is invariably described by the

contemporary writers as "infidels" to even as late as 1246.²⁷ Firoz Tughluq stands almost alone in utilising the state's authority for the propagation of orthodox Islam, for the spread of the faith has a different story and did not always receive state co-operation. It is the story of the saints who relied on their own efforts and scorned the king's sanction in presenting Islam to the *zimmi* in its most acceptable form.²⁸ They worked singlehanded among the lower class and against stiff opposition from the Brahmins and other higher classes of the Hindu society; even when they lived in Muslim administered areas they commanded little of the state's sanction. In Narnaul, in the Patiala state, a missionary named Muhammad was murdered by the local Hindus who rose in a body and massacred all the Mussalmans of the place.²⁹ Of the method of these preachers Amir Hasan's anecdotes relating to Nizamuddin Budauni seem to give us an idea. A Mussalman one day brought a certain Hindu to the saint and introduced him as his brother. On being asked whether the Hindu was inclined towards Islam, the Mussalman replied that he hoped the august look of the saint might have the desired effect on him. Nizamuddin remarked "this people will hardly yield to force or persuasion; only a sympathetic intercourse might incline them to Islam".³⁰

Of the economic and social status of the *zimmi* who lived in Muslim towns the quotation from Firoz Khalji's speech will have given a fair idea. There is little supporting evidence for the statement recently made that Hindu pilgrimage was sought to be banned by the imposition of a tax,²¹ or that public worship of idols was, as a rule, forbidden,

In only one sphere the *zimmi's* freedom, it may be reasonably assumed, was affected; he was not allowed to make converts from among the Muslims for, in Islam, the law of apostacy is severe. But this would be only a theoretical restriction, for except in the case of lower class converts who, in any case, tend to drift back to their original religious habits, Brahminical Hinduism is not a proselytising religion. Of the Hindu's economic affluence we have testimony in the writings of Barani himself. During the gay reign of Kaiqubad the Hindu wine brewers of Kol and Meerut plied a lucrative trade in the city. The Multani money-lenders who held almost every Muslim noble as his debtor enjoyed great social prestige.³² Barani complained that in the city of Delhi the Hindus lived in palaces and displayed rich dress and fine horses; they even employed "Mussalman servants to run in front of their mounts; even Muslims beg at their doors, and within the city, the capital of the Muslim Sultanate, the infidels are addressed in such honourable terms as *rai*, *ranah*, *thakur*, *shaha*, *mehta* and *pundit*".³³ Referring possibly to Muhammad b. Tughluq's reign in which the Hindus were specially patronised by the king, Barani further complains of "the idolators and *mushriks*, called *khariji*, and *zimmi*, who are given rich dresses, horses, and flags and are raised to high offices of state".³⁴

Of the Hindus being appointed to such offices in the 13th century contemporary writings afford not many instances, but such as have escaped the chroniclers are sufficiently revealing. That Hindu mercenaries formed part of the army perhaps needs little proof. In an inscription written in Sanskrit

found in Batiagarh, Madhya Pradesh, reference is found to the employment, under the Muslim governor "Jallal Khoja" of the Chedi country on behalf of the king of Joginipura, of the "Kharpara" army, identifiable with a local Hindu militia mentioned in earlier Hindu inscriptions of the locality.³⁵ Under this Jallal Khoja are mentioned Hindu officers, and the inscription, which is dated in 1328, records the construction, by these local officers, of a garden, 'gomatha' and a well for local needs. An auditor sent by the revenue ministry of Alauddin Khalji to check the accounts of the governor of Manikpur, complaints, in a letter to the *mustaufi*, of the disobedient manners of a high Hindu official named Buchand who, in conspiracy with the governor, had tampered with the local accounts and misappropriated the surplus revenue.³⁶ The exclusive racialism which actuated the Mamluks to reserve the governmental posts for the Turks would allow, it is true, not much scope to the Hindu for appointment in the administration, but nevertheless we come across such names as that of Rajani, Hathiya, and Birnathan in the annals of the later Mamluks, holding not insignificant posts in the capital; the last named was the *kotwal*, possibly of Delhi, early in Firoz Khalji's reign.³⁷

Evidences suggest that the Hindu, at least in the capital and its neighbourhood, suffered from no great disability; His wealth would indeed give him high social prestige. Matrimonial relations apart,³⁸ the Muslim eventually was bound to get over his exclusiveness and the latter half of the century saw him adopting some of the Hindu's ways. Among the city population social intercourse must have

been fairly close. Amir Khusrau, perhaps, illustrates the new Muslim attitude when he takes pride in his being a born 'Hindu' and declares in no ambiguous terms the superiority of India over all other countries.³⁹ We hear of Hindu *jogis* and Muslim mystics freely mixing to discuss religious and social problems; Amir Hasan has preserved for us an account of one such discussion in which Faridduddin Shakargunj took part.⁴⁰ The incident, recorded of Firoz Tughluq's reign, of Muslim men and women visiting the house of a certain Hindu of Delhi who initiated them into pagan religious practices, implies a social intercourse that must have had its beginning in the later part of the 13th century.⁴¹ This contact was, as is generally conceded, the basic factor in the evolution of the Urdu language whose earliest poetic specimens are to be found in the writings of Amir Khusrau.⁴² A similar mixing of the two peoples produced the Indo-Muslim architecture whose initial phase is represented by the buildings erected by the Mamluk Sultans.

The best evidence of the *zimmi's* position should however be his own writings. These are almost non-existent except the records of his hostile military contact. What he thought of his own position under the new regime we can only guess. Initially for a conquered people it is only natural, as al-Biruni found early in the 11th century,⁴³ to have a feeling of inveterate enmity towards those whose process of conquest had unavoidably to be attended with a certain measure of destruction of life and property, and above, all, social values. That the innate exclusiveness of Hinduism would only aggravate this feeling and that the Hindu

would, in proud isolation, retire within his caste restrictions, is understandable; to consider the conqueror as an unclean, fearsome *mleccha* is the only manner in which a beaten people could retaliate. But the measure of the conqueror's success lies in the extent to which he is able to assuage this bitterness and ultimately to win the native's sympathy and support. Of this, unfortunately, we have not many dependable records, records of the ordinary native's estimate of the Muslim ruler and his administration as we have of latter periods and of other provincial kingdoms. The ruling class at any rate did their best not to create any further bitterness but the protracted nature of the conquest could have hardly made for success in this attempt. To a modern citizen, the *jazia* would be undoubtedly an insufferable humiliation but argument is possible as to whether this was so to the people of the early middle ages.⁴⁴ The Brahmins' protest to Firoz Tughluq was based more on its financial burden than on its implied insult.⁴⁵ A remarkable inscription of Balban's reign, put up in Sanskrit by a Hindu individual, however, depicts the Muslim king in a pleasing light. Although allowance should be made for the conventional phraseology of a Sanskrit panegyrist composing a dedicatory inscription in a Muslim dominion, yet the sentiments have an unmistakable sincerity and genuine respect. In the Palam inscription, which is dated in 1280-1, the king of Joginipura is compared, in the goodness of his administration, with Vishnu who "has retired from the care of the world (entrusting it to the king) and gone to sleep in the ocean of milk"; the king

"has ensured peace and security to all and throughout his contented realm... everywhere the earth bears the beauty of sylvan spring".⁴⁶ In another inscription, dated in the reign of Alauddin Khalji, at Jodhpur, the Hindu writer pays tribute to the king's just and efficient government through whose "god-like valour the earth was rid of all tyranny and impurities".⁴⁷ A literary work of a slightly later period, that of the famous poet Vidyapati, speaks appreciatively of the *Turushka* king's generosity and sense of justice.⁴⁸

It appears necessary, in connection with the position of the non-Muslims, to dispel the impression that a superficial reading of some of the early chronicles is apt to create. Reference has been made to the writers' habit of straining after effect. Hasan Nizami is merely poetic; so is Amir Khusrau. But Barani deliberately inflicts his own fanaticism on the reigns he describes. He wrote his account, it should be remembered, from the reactionary point of view of the 14th century, when under Firoz, militant, narrow Islamism, for the first time found state support. It is mostly his personal opinion representing a very small but articulate section of Muslims that he puts forth as the religious views of Balban and Iltutmish. While he tries to persuade his readers that Balban was intensely orthodox and a great legalist, he cannot help admitting that in matters of state the sultan never cared for the dictates of the *shariah*. In his *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, Barani formulates his own views on government and these are remarkably similar to those which Balban and Iltutmish are stated to have held; in almost identical language he

pleads for the extermination of the idolaterous Hindus and Muslim heretics which, from his *Tarikh*, would appear as accomplished facts.⁴⁹ How intolerant was his outlook will be seen from the manner in which he urges the complete annihilation of the Muslim philosophers and free-thinkers with the same fervour and zeal as expended in the case of the 'infidels' and *mushriks*: "How can piety and righteousness be established when philosophers, and heretics (*bad-mazhaban*), who prefer Greek rationalism to the *sunnah* and the *shariah*, and who disbelieve the physical existence of heaven and hell, are allowed to openly spread their doctrines? How can the religion of God triumph when these people, the enemies of God and His prophet, live in the capital with dignity and ostentation and are not afraid to express their views"?⁵⁰ It is a singular misfortune from which the history of Islam has suffered in all ages and in many countries, that the historians almost always belonged to the small reactionary group of men who, being the only lettered class, were in a position to inflict their own prejudices on posterity.⁵¹

NOTES

1. He, with his brother, belonged to the Karramiah sect while the Ghaznawids were followers of Abu Hanifa; Minhaj, p. 77.
2. *Rajdarashani*, f. 45b.
3. Cf. Titus: *Indian Islam*, pp. 15-35.
4. *Tajul Maasir*, f. 175b.
5. Cunningham: *Reports*, xxi, pp. 25, 58-59, and 71-79.
6. *Tajul Maasir*, ff. 69b, 123a, 126b; Fakhre Mudabbir: *Tarikh*, p. 24.
7. p. 176.
8. See the inscription, *EIM*, 1911-12, p. 13.
9. Cunningham: *Reports*, xi, p. 1.

10. *HCIP*, v. pp. 70 and 99.
11. Minhaj, p. 124-25.
12. Cunningham : *Reports*, xi, p. 94 : Elliot : *Chronicles of Unao*, p. 88.
13. *Bahraich Gazetteer*, p. 120-21.
14. See Elliot : *Chronicles of Unao*, pp. 94-95.
15. See Barani, p. 41 for a speech by Syed Mubarak Ghaznawi, a leading divine in Iltutmish's court, on what he considered to be the duties of a Muslim King.
16. *Ibid*, p. 72 and 74-75.
17. *Reports*, i, p. 206.
18. It was visited and described in 1666 by the French traveller Thevenot; Cunningham : *Reports*, v, pp. 114-119.
19. *ASR*, 1909-10, p. 131.
20. *Fatuhāt-i-Firozshahi*, *Rashid*, p. 9-10.
21. *Futuhāt*, op. cit. p. 10.
22. *ASR*, 1923-24, p. 92.
23. Barani, p. 217.
24. *Ibid*, pp. 41-42.
25. *Rahlah*, ii, p. 16.
26. See for example *Tajul Maasir*, ff. 126, 162, 175, the conquest of Kol, and the raid into Anhilwara, where "fifty thousand infidels were put to the sword"; in Kalinjar "fifty thousand came into the collar of slavery". Cf. on this last incident, Ferishta, i, p. 63 who states that they were all converted to Islam; but Hasan Nizami is explicit in stating that they were allowed to evacuate the fortress and go free; f. 174b.
27. See for example Fakhre Mudabbir : *Tarikh*, p. 28; Minhaj speaks of operations against them in 1204 as a holy war; p. 124. In 1246, they are again referred to as infidels; p. 290. On this point cf. Arnold : *Preaching of Islam*, p. 258 and Vaidya : *Downfall of Hindu India*, iii, p. 130. See also *App. C*.
28. On the missionary activities of the saints, see Arnold : *Preaching of Islam*, pp. 280-82. Fariduddin Shakargunj is said to have converted quite a number of tribes in the Punjab. A saint named Sakhi Sarwar is universally venerated in Jullundhur and Hoshiarpur districts; his tomb is at Dera Ghazi Khan; see *Jhang District Settlement Report*, 1874, p. 33; *Montgomery District Settlement Report*, 1878, pp. 44, 46. *Hoshiarpur Settlement Report*, 1879, pp. 31-32; *Jullundhur Settlement Report*, 1892, p. 30. See also *Akhbarul Akhiar*, pp. 22-24, for the account of Muinuddin Chishti's activities in Ajmer; his conversions before the conquest are recounted in *Or.* 1756, ff. 66-67, and 69a. See also *Or.* 1746, f. 29a, for his conversion of the first batch of Hindus in Delhi. For the account of Jalaluddin Tabrezi in Bengal see *Siarul Arefin*, f. 193. He died in 1245 and his tomb at Maldah has since become a universally venerated shrine. See also the interesting Sanskrit work called *Shekasubhodaya*, Eng. introduction. The saint is described as visiting Lakshmana Sena's court who, impressed by his character, gave him some lands; one of the king's courtiers accepted Islam.
29. *Akhbarul Akhiar*, p. 47.

30. *Fawadul Fawaid*, f. 94b.
31. Sharma : *Religious policy of the Mughal Emperors*, p. 26.
32. Barani, pp. 120, 157.
33. *Fatwawa-i-Jahandari*, f. 120a.
34. *Ibid*, 120b.
35. *EI*, xii, p. 44; *JRAS*, 1897, p. 893.
36. *Ijaz-i-Khusrawi*, ff. 107b-110a.
37. *TM*, p. 57; Barani, p. 210.
38. An early instance is the marriage of Mangbarni with the Khokar princess; Juwaini, ii, p. 145.
39. See Mirza : *Life and Works of Amir Khusrau*, pp. 182-85.
40. *Fawadul Fawaid*, f. 125a.
41. Afif, p. 370.
42. See Muhammad Husain Azad : *Ab-i-Hayat*, pp. 70-77, for some of his Hindi writings; See also Mirza: *op. cit.* page 227-28; also *Khusrau Ki Hindi Kavita*. Indication of the mutual borrowings in language is furnished by Minhaj using the Indian month of *Asar*; p. 252. The Persian terms of *Pil* and *Dibir* seem to have been used by the Hindus; see *JDL*, xvi, p. 35.
43. *Alberuni's India*, tr. by E. Sachau, i, p. 22.
44. If the *Turuskadanda* is interpreted as meaning a poll tax on the Turks living in the Gahadavala kingdom the tax must have been familiar to the Indians. Some kind of poll-tax was realised in the Byzantine empire also; see *Ency. Islam* article on *Jaziah*.
45. Afif, pp. 382-84.
46. *EIM*, 1913-14, pp. 35-45.
47. *EI*, xii, p. 23.
48. *Purusha Pariksha*, Grierson's introduction, cited in Qureshi, *op. cit.* p. 213.
49. Cf. *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi*, pp. 42 and 72 with his *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, ff. 118-20.
50. *Ibid*, f. 120a.
51. On this point see 'Re-evaluation of the literary sources of pre-Mughal history in *Islamic Culture*, 1941, p. 207-16.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE SULTANATE IN RETROSPECT

The rapidity with which the Turks overran the whole of north India within a period of less than 15 years was phenomenal. In the eastern provinces the easy establishment of Muizzuddin's rule has an apparent explanation, for there, from the dawn of history, incursions from Central Asia had heavily diluted the people's racial and religious consciousness; the Ghaznawid and Shansabani attacks encountered little beyond mere political opposition. But in Hindustan, which had known not many foreign invasions and dynasties, powerful kingdoms were overthrown with equal ease; even the Hindushahiyas of Waihind under Anandpal and Triclochanpal, offered more sustained opposition to Mahmud of Ghazni. That defeat in a single battle should have been final and irreparable appears all the more strange when we remember the limited number of the conquerors and the distance from their homeland. On a careful analysis of the situation in India the course of events, however appears almost inevitable.

The Hindu kingdoms, it has been observed in an earlier part of this book, engaged in ceaseless warfare among themselves almost as a pastime. The Chauhana, the Chandella, the Gahadavala, and also the Sena rulers, fought for paramountcy and territorial aggrandisement at each other's cost, and so one's discomfiture at the hands of a foreign

enemy was considered another's advantage. Victory in such wars did not lead to any increase of fighting potential, for, usually, all that the victor demanded was a recognition of his paramountcy; and the vanquished felt at liberty to join any of the belligerents in the next war. Thus, instead of gaining any positive advantage they merely frittered away their resources. How great was this waste in men can be estimated when we remember that the Hindu soldier was drawn almost exclusively from one class of the population. Among themselves, the Rajput kings were generally evenly matched in fighting strength but against a foreigner, not bound by any professional caste-rules, they could bring forth an equal number of men only by straining their entire fighting personnel. Owing to their unshakable belief in numerical superiority they usually brought out their entire army and thus staked everything on the fortunes of a single battle. Their sense of honour forbade retreat; soldiers were either taken prisoner or perished in battle. A single defeat thus became a lasting catastrophe.

In individual fighting qualities the Rajput nearly surpassed the Turk, but he was a poor organiser. The feudatories fought more for individual glory than for wider issues of the contest. Only the king could hold the mutually jealous and ambitious troop-leaders together and when he fell in battle, all was lost. In fighting methods also, the Rajput showed a singularly unprogressive military talent. He depended on the weight of numbers rather than on mobility and tactics. A solid, almost unwieldy phalanx, arranged according to a stereotyped formation was his usual battle-array, with archers

carried on elephants and also on foot drawn up in front. His mass frontal attacks were weighty and difficult to stand, but his cavalry could accomplish little in the serried ranks. The elephant was considered a mighty arm, and, accordingly, the field of battle had to be a level ground, for uneven soil would place it at a disadvantage. Such a ground however, was precisely where the Turk could put his cavalry to the best use, for, enclosed, mountainous terrain hampered its freedom of manoeuvre; Muizzuddin's defeat and Aibak's hesitation at Kayadra below Abu, in front of the Chalukya forces, are cases in point. The Turk initially possessed no elephant; he charged with the cavalry whose impetuosity broke the Hindu phalanx and would often turn the elephants against their own ranks. The Rajput made little provision against an attack from the flank or rear; as the cavalry broke through his lines and put the archers out of action, a body of lightly armed horse wheeling round the flank at the crucial moment decided the contest.

A defeat in such circumstances is scarcely surprising. Hope of further resistance lay in the fortresses and in organising countrywide opposition by the people. The former method, however, has one disadvantage. Being purely defensive in nature, leaving the conqueror, as it does, free to exploit the countryside and therefore able to organise repeated attacks, it could have only temporary value. Rarely did the Hindu princes take the offensive, but they bestirred themselves only when the enemy appeared before the stronghold. What a forward policy could achieve is shown by the Mher and Chalukya forces when

they defeated Aibak and sent him flying for refuge in Ajmer. Another example is afforded by the siege of Lakhnauti by Narasinha of Orissa. Ejection of the invader was possible only by the sustained and united application of such offensive policy. But unity of purpose never inspired the Rajput; towards the end of the century the Chauhanas achieved notable success by continued offensive, but they fought only for military glory; they gloried equally in defeating the Baghelas of Gujrat and the Paramaras of Malwa.

In a country of incessant wars the bulk of the people tend to become callous to the fortunes of battles or dynasties. National consciousness, as a compelling factor leading to sustained work, was as lacking in the people as in their rulers; they looked on with equal unconcern as their king humbled another king or went down before an invader. No common tie bound the people with the ruling dynasty; a foreign invasion meant only one of the many incessant dynastic changes that left the people no better or no worse off.

This indifference on the face of a Muslim enemy seems to have had other causes also. As a Muslim the Turk was a new comer to Hindustan but racially he was not. As a pagan kinsman of the Hunas and the Sakas he had many centuries contact with India. He had come as a trader and as a settler. His language, manners and social distinctions, much of which he retained even after his conversion to Islam, added to the complexity of medieval Hindu society but they also prepared the way for his eventual appearance in the role of a conqueror. To the people of north India the Turk's

lightly-borne Islam could not conceal the familiar visitor, in whom some of the Rajputs could even see a distant kinsman.¹ Hindu India therefore contained elements whose intensity of opposition to the invaders was liable to be qualified by racial sympathies.

A resuscitated Brahmanism, which characterised the religious history of Rajput India, gave a militant aspect to Hindu society but at the same time, by its persecutions, alienated the Buddhists. They were outcasted and driven out from all parts of India to find refuge in Nepal. We have no direct evidence, as we have for the Arab occupation of Sind, but it is highly probable that the despised Buddhist and the lower classes of the country viewed with no great sorrow the disaster that befell the Brahminical dynasties. For Eastern India at least, we have the later Tibetan account of Lama Taranath referring to the "several (Buddhist) *Bhikshus* (priests) who, in the time of Lavangsenā (Lakhsmanasena), becoming messengers, caused the king of the *Turushkas* named Moon 'who ruled over Antarbēdi between the Ganga and Jamna... to bring their armies to Magadha, who having come there, plundered the country, destroyed Odantapuri and Vikramasila and killed many ordained monks." This reaction seems to have been caused by the policy of the Senas "from the beginning of whose reign even in Magadha *Tirthikas* (Brahmins) *Mlecchas* and *Tajikas* became increased to more" and thus undermined the power of the Buddhist church strongly attached to the Pala dynasty whose remaining strength in Magadha the Senas sought to destroy.²

Like all foreign invaders the Turks followed a

line that was calculated to offer the least resistance and yet enable them to live on the land. Their first push carried them into the Madhya Pradesh the Himalayan regions, Southern Rajputana and even Assam. But they succeeded in establishing a durable hold only on a narrow belt of land along the Ganges and the Jumna while the Indus and its branches outlined their dominion in the northwest. The hold on Rajputana was never strong and towards the end of the century they were practically thrown out of the country. The Turkish dominion thus embraced a very small part of north India but it contained the most fertile regions, which explains the foreigners' continued ability to resist the determined hostility of the Hindu states and also of the all-conquering Mongols.

Within this restricted area, the conquest took nearly a whole century to consolidate. Petty Hindu chiefs defied the Delhi government; Muslim colonization was vigorously resisted, and the fighting classes were easily led to revolt by any enterprising chiefs, Hindu or Muslim. The organization of the administration was far from complete at the end of the century, though the military nature of the occupation disappeared as the first immigrants were replaced by those born in India and speaking Indian vernaculars and having an interest in the country. The Mongols did a great deal in indianising the Turks, for India became their last refuge and this they defended with the tenacity of a people defending their homeland. If the Sultanate was originally an alien imposition it soon became thoroughly Indian in purpose, struggling, as India has struggled many a time in her history,

against a barbaric invader. The Turkish Muslims in resisting the Mongols were guarding India's gate and, like the Hindushahiyas and the Chauhanas, could claim the gratitude of the Indian princes.

The state that the conquest brought into being was of a peculiar composition. In its outlook tribal polity combined with the divinely appointed monarchy. To the Indian this was a little peculiar, for according to the Hindu political theory a king ruled either by divine choice or by a contractual delegation of powers; in either case, in effect, he became a person above the society.³ But to the Turk the kingdom was a joint property and every one had a proprietary share in it. In this any *khan*⁴ was eligible for the throne if he could satisfy other conditions, for example, of fitness, and legitimacy; Kashlu Khan's attempt to assume the crown provides an illustration of the fact that this was actually practised. Because the Turks were losing their share in the administration of their kingdom the *wazir* Muhazzabuddin was murdered. In fact the racial character of the Mamluk state arose from this deep rooted political idea. How materially this share in the kingdom helped the individual members of the race is seen from a passage in the contemporary writing of Fakhruddin Mubarakshah. "Even a poor householder, who did not possess a single slave, became" as a result of Muizzuddin's great conquest, "the owner of numerous slaves, horses and camels; a man who originally owned only one horse, became a *sipahsalar* and possessed a kettle-drum, standard, *naubat*, all of his own".⁵

There was however, another aspect to this polity. By the time the Turks came to live and rule in

India, they had been largely influenced by the political and cultural ideals of Persia. They turned to the ancient kings like Jamshed, Khusrau and Bahram for guidance in political affairs rather than to the Muslim law. Autocracy, the keynote of Persia's political system, thus found its devotees in Delhi; the elective *imam* was nearly forgotten and, in his place, the sultan ruled by a right that could never be questioned. He was God's chosen and appointed by him to rule over mankind. Absolute obedience to him was tantamount to obedience to God.⁶ If the person of the sultan was not infallible, his office was certainly above all human failings. All the people were his slaves and he, the master of their person and property. Early in the 13th century a writer defined the people's position *vis-a-vis* the king. "It was not open to the Muslims to exercise their right of choosing the *imam*; they were simply to carry out his order even if he was a negro or a slave and mutilated in form".⁷ Obedience to his orders was a *farz*, and the sultan, if not a God himself, was "the shadow of God on earth".⁸ His person was consequently regarded as sacred and whenever the chronicler has any occasion to refer to him, the term 'sacred' or 'august' is invariably used.⁹ Barani even describes Firoz Tughluq as a God in human form and compares his court to that of "Allah attended by Gabriel and other angels".¹⁰

In this sacredness, however, the king's children did not share, and to that extent the theory of divine monarchy was imperfectly practised in India. The son of the reigning king, even his heir apparent, was only one of his courtiers.¹¹ The sultan's

authority was unquestionable but the right of his descendant to a similar authority was not necessarily conceded. In other words, the monarch's unquestioned right to obedience could not be made inherent in his dynasty but had to be acquired in every individual case. The absence of a law of primogeniture was another qualifying factor in the development of a dynastic absolutist kingship, for the *shariah* allots an equal share to all the sons. A Muslim king's rightful heirs were usually many and in a position to assert their claims; even nomination by the deceased monarch could hardly decide the choice. Succession became still more complicated by the fact that slaves also were regarded as the master's heirs, though, usually, the descendants of his body were conceded priority. Despite the crown's almost superhuman status, its undefined methods of transfer thus tended to hamper its perpetuation.

This clearly un-Islamic sovereignty was not confined to the theorists but found concrete expression in the court etiquette and in the sultan's absolutism. We have referred to Balban's court ceremonials and to the *zaminbos* and *paibos* system on whose unfailing observance he laid great emphasis; these were a recognised feature even in the time of his predecessors. Such assumption of divine honours did not always go unprotested; a leading ecclesiastic in Iluttmish's court condemned, in no ambiguous terms, all these practices which, he said, clearly amounted to '*shirk*' (denial of God's unity). But that such protests could always be circumvented is shown by the fact that the same divine was prepared to accord sanction to these

practices only if the king tried to act up to what he called the four essential duties of '*dinpanahi*' (preservation of the Faith) one of which was suppression of heresy.¹²

On the face of it such absolutism was irreconcilable with the tribal polity mentioned above. A strong man like Iltutmish, who owed his accession to the fact of his being the most influential of the Turkish chiefs after Aibak, was able to resist the assertion of the latter principle. His militarist policy helped him to divert the energy of his compariots, and all opposition was, for the time being, hushed, when eminent princes came flying from the Mongols to find refuge in his kingdom. The Caliphial investiture clothed his autocracy with legal sanction and he was able to reserve the monarchy for his family. But to continue his dynasty after his death required the constant support of a party. This he sought to create through his slaves who thus introduced a third political factor and gave a characteristic name to the period. A slave was potentially more loyal to his master than his sons.¹³ As Lanepoole has observed, the slave was a surer investment than a son whose claim to inheritance was not based on efficiency.¹⁴ A large progeny was not favourable to a king's interests, while a number of tried and efficient slaves having no other interest than to serve the master's family, was a sure asset.¹⁵ Iltutmish had no illusions about the capacity of his sons and the only way to counteract the opposite tendency seemed to lie in organising his personal retainers into a party who would stand by his family and thereby uphold his absolutist monarchy. Like the Muizzi and

Qutbi slaves, the Shamsi slaves were thus allowed to form themselves into a political group which, after his death, received the collective name of the "*Forty*".¹⁶ By absorbing or destroying the adherents of former kings they were enabled to reign supreme after his death; in the language of Barani, "they divided the kingdom amongst themselves".¹⁷

Thus there came into being a curious political phenomenon, a party of bondsmen pledged to support the power of the master's family who considered the state a vast household in which outsiders could have no place. The Sultanate was converted into a kind of household polity. On behalf of their master's heir they managed the state and considered themselves the sole custodians of Iltutmish's tradition. His degenerate successors could at any time have been supplanted, as indeed they were by Balban; but so long as the party remained, personal jealousy and fear of raking up general hostility among other Turks, compelled the *Forty* to keep, even though as puppets, Iltutmish's children on the throne. For their sole *raison d'être* was loyalty to his family. This household party thus contributed in no small measure to the growth of monarchy, for it kept alive a dynasty. But almost equally, it affected the state's natural evolution, for under this system the state could derive strength and support, not from the general body of the people, nor even of the Turks, but only from a few, though influential, retainers of the founder of the dynasty. It also circumscribed the Crown.

With Balban's appointment as the *naib*, however, this phase in the state's evolution began to wane,

for, although Mahmud's elevation was calculated to ensure the continuance of this household system, in actual practice, it marked the beginning of its end. Balban shared Iltutmish's political ideals but not his belief in the effectiveness of buttressing the crown's absolutism by household slaves. Nor did he favour Raziah's methods of counter-balancing the 'Forty' by non-Turkish supporters. During his long tenure of the *niyabat* he completely broke the party and restored the Crown's power. His own accession to Mahmud's throne confirmed the final dissolution of the Shamsi party. In its place, he aimed at creating a broader basis for the state in the person of the whole body of the Turkish immigrants. In so doing, he no doubt emphasised the clannish character of the Sultanate but the unprecedentedly autocratic powers which he assumed for the crown, prevented its growth into a rival political force. The new party consisting of all the Turks necessarily shared in Balban's ideals and was irrevocably committed to upholding his dynasty as representing the racial despotism. Clannish loyalties were thus skilfully harnessed to the service of absolutist monarchy. How this racialism proved unworkable and led to a revolution has been noticed in the relevant chapter, but the monarchy came out unscathed from the disorder, to be utilised by the Khaljis to usher in a new phase in the Sultanate's development.

A word may be said about the slave-king, a self-contradictory term. In Islam the potentialities of a slave are many, for except in name, he suffered little visible social disability. A bondsman or a free man wearing a crown was, besides, not a

peculiarly Muslim phenomenon; Byzantine history affords a number of instances. But correctly, the Turkish wearers of the crown in 13th century India can hardly be designated as slaves, for every one of them died a free man. Aibak alone was technically a slave when he assumed power at Lahore; but he lost no time in obtaining manumission from his master's heir, Ghiyasuddin Mahmud.¹⁸ Iltutmish obtained his freedom quite early, even before Aibak had obtained his own.¹⁹ Freedom undoubtedly was an asset, though not the main qualification, and there were formalist lawyers whom it was prudent to satisfy, for it was they who should be expected to proclaim the ruler's name from the pulpit as 'the defender of the Faith' and 'the Lord Protector of Muslims'. In the ceremony of oath taking on Iltutmish's accession, before the assembled people had sworn allegiance, the lawyers, we are told by Ibn Battuta, entered the monarch's presence and sat down. The Sultan knew what they wanted to speak about, and so he raised the corner of the carpet on which he was sitting, and presented to them the deed of his manumission. The *qazis* and the lawyers read it and then took the oath of allegiance".²⁰ We have no explicit mention of Balban's manumission but it is more than probable that his close family ties with the ruling house had procured his freedom.

The chronicles tend to give us an impression that the Sultanate was a truly Islamic state, constantly striving to make its policy conformable to the *shariah*. That it was scarcely so in actual practice, will have been gathered from the last few chapters. We have noticed the un-Islamic character of the

kingship; Barani admits that '*duniyadari*', of which kingship is the highest perfection, is absolutely opposed to '*dindari*'.²¹ After tracing the process by which the pagan institution of monarchy had crept into Islam, he concludes that sovereignty is never possible without practising non-Islamic customs.²² Conscientious ecclesiastics might delude themselves that the sultan really existed for protecting the faith and upholding the *shariah*; but it requires little stressing that the decisive factor in his actions was the law of force and expediency. In summing up his account of the origin and nature of kingship Barani remarks, "the meaning of kingship is power (*istila*), whether obtained by lawful means or by force; even the older pagan law of dynastic legitimacy finds no place in the present kingship".²³ The *shariah*, in ordinary practice, was no more respected than any other law. Barani admits that capital punishment of Muslims which, he adds, was contrary to the Sacred Law, was necessary for the exigencies of better government.²⁴ Similarly, the law of inheritance, the strict distinction between *halal* and *haram*, and many other well-known injunctions were violated; the ecclesiastics protested but were constrained to find excuse. The well-known prohibition of the *shariah* regarding the taking and giving of interest on monetary transaction was openly disregarded; Amir Khusrau mentions the rate of interest at one *jital* per month for the principal sum of one *tankah*²⁵ which, when agreed upon by the parties on a written bond, had a legal sanction and was enforced by the *qazi*.²⁶ Of the four conditions which Barani advises the king to bear in mind when

issuing decrees (*zabitah*), one is, that if any of the proposed ordinances is found contrary to the *shariah*, it need not be withdrawn but, as an evil necessity, is to be retained not longer than is necessary.²⁷

Even the majority of the *ulema*, the guardians of the sacred law, was utterly materialistic in outlook and opportunist in conduct. They entered into an unholy alliance with the secular authorities and by distorting the rules of the *shariah*, found sanction for the sultan's pagan practices. Even traditions from the Prophet were concocted to give the king's despotism a moral backing. They held out that the sultan's office was only slightly inferior to that of the Prophet and his sanctity almost equal to that of God.²⁸ To suit the sultan's convenience his religious duties were sought to be confined to such matters as leading the prayers, making endowment for the *ulema* and religious establishments and dispensing justice, while the most flagrant breaches of the *shariah* rules like drinking, non-observance of the fast etc. were condoned.²⁹ The *ulema* even authorised him to appropriate the people's wealth whenever he desired.³⁰

The *ulema* had thus become utterly servile and corrupt. The abject flattery with which both Minhaj and Barani refer to their respective patrons and the eulogies showered on them have a disgusting obsequiousness. They even lacked the elementary moral virtues. Balban complained of their want of truthfulness and courage, while Amir Khusrau considered them a gang of ignorant hypocrites, conceited and detestably selfish.³¹ This amorality was infectious and even appears to

have spread to the common people. Amir Hasan narrates an incident of some Muslim traders from Lahore unscrupulously defrauding the Hindus of Gujrat.³² It is tempting to ascribe true Islam to the sultans of the past, but its calculated distortion to serve material ends is not a peculiarly modern phenomenon. Of earnest, saintly men there were, of course, no dearth. The Muslim mystic provides the best example. But clearly, his was not the power which determined the complexion of society and politics.

NOTES

1. On the Turkish immigrants in India, see Bagchi : *Role of Central Asian Nomads in the History of India*, in *JGIS*, x, pp. 133-34.
2. *JASB* 1898, i, p. 218q; also S. C. Sarkar : *Some Tibetan references to Muslim advance into Bihar and Bengal* in *PIHRC*, 1942. On the lower class Hindus welcoming the egalitarian society of the Turkish conquerors, see Habib, in Elliot (Aligarh) *introduction*, pp. 54-59.
3. See Bhandarkar : *Some Aspects of Indian Polity*, pp. 125-168; also Ghoshal : *Hindu Political theories*, pp. 170-89, 269-78.
4. Even in Ibn Battuta's time the *khan* was the highest dignitary below the king; *Rahlah*, i, p. 170.
5. Fakhre Mudabbir: *Tarikh*, p. 20.
6. *Ibid*, p. 12.
7. *Ibid*, p. 13; see also *Adabul Harb*, f. 3b.
8. Fakhre Mudabbir; *Tarikh*, p. 13. Also Minhaj, p. 205.
9. e.g. Minhaj, pp. 167, 176.
10. Barani, p. 578; *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, f. 199a.
11. Iltutmish's sons are listed among his courtiers; Minhaj, p. 177. So are those of Balban and Firoz Khalji; Barani, pp. 24 and 176.
12. Barani, p. 41; *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, f. 45a; see also Amir Khusrau: *Kulliyat*, f. 221; also Barani, p. 142.
13. See Muizzuddin's reply to his courtier who once expressed regret at the king having no son, Minhaj, p. 132.
14. *Medieval India*, p. 64.
15. See Barani, p. 150 how Balban explained to his heir-apparent the dangers of having a large family.
16. Barani, p. 26; Barani and Minhaj's account however include more than forty names among Iltutmish's slaves.

17. Barani, p. 25.
18. Alfi, f. 529b. According to Minhaj both Aibak and Yalduz were manumitted together in about 605/1208; p. 89-90.
19. On the recommendation of Muizzuddin himself Aibak gave him-freedom in 601/1205; Minhaj, p. 170.
20. *Rahlah*, ii, p. 25.
21. *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, f. 159a.
22. *Ibid*, f. 100a.
23. *Ibid*, ff. 214a and 225a.
24. *Ibid*, f. 147a, also Barani, p. 511.
25. *Kulliyat*, p. 312; See also *Matlaul Anwar*, p. 150, for the existence of Muslim moneylenders.
26. *Ferishta*, i, p. 95.
27. *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, f. 159a.
28. An example is the saying "if there were no sultan the people would devour each other"; see Fakhre Mudabbir: *Tarikh*, pp. 12-13.
29. *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*, f. 11a. Barani tries to prove the great piety of Mahmud of Ghazhi by saying that he never drank so heavily as to be unable to say his prayers.
30. *Fiqh-i-Firozshahi*, (I.O. 2987), f. 191-2.
31. Barani, p. 94; *Matlaul-Anwar*, p. 69.
32. *Fawadul Fawaid*, f. 63b.

CHAPTER XVIII

ARCHITECTURAL MONUMENTS

By the 12th century Muslims had evolved distinctive architectural conventions and forms to suit their religious and social needs. In the process, they had drawn freely on the technical and artistic experience of the Byzantines and the Persians and also, particularly in the East, of the Buddhists. With the ascendancy of the Seljuq Turks certain forms derived from their nomadic ways of living also found their way into Muslim architectural designs. Except in Syria, where the building tradition was stone based, all these assimilations were carried on in brick. Unlike stone, this material lends itself more easily to surface decoration either by patterned brick coursing or stucco moulding. Since figural motive was interdicted by religion, decorative design become abstract and colourful, and even when using plant forms, it retained its ultimate two-dimensionality.

The immigrant Turks inherited this evolving tradition of brick architecture. In India however, they found an entirely different tradition, based on sculptured and dressed stone. Hindu architecture seemed to have developed less as a solution to the engineering problem of covering open spaces than as a challenge to the artistic and technical skill of the stone cutter and the sculptor. It was meant to serve a religious system of formal imagery and symbolism whose atmosphere of exclusiveness required small shrines, remote and almost forbiddingly dark, within

a mass of pillared and bracketed corridors and anti-chambers.

The constructional principle of Hindu architecture was not suited to the erection of wide and lofty halls required for Muslim congregational prayers. A simple horizontal and vertical arrangement of pillars and architraves was particularly inadequate for roofing large spaces. A more convenient and more durable method, imparting the desired monumentality without excessively weighing upon the understructure, was the dome which, both in its hemispherical and conical forms, had been widely adapted to the architecture of Muslim religious and funerary buildings. A necessary adjunct of this lofty prayer hall was the *ma'azina*, an elevated structure from which Muslims have to be called to prayer five times a day. For this purpose the idea of the high tower had been evolved quite early in Muslim history. Starting from the Syrian square and Mesopotemian spiral (*malviyah*) types, the tower, called *al-manar* (Persian--*minar*), had, in course of four centuries and through its progress towards the east, variously assumed circular, fluted, and star-shaped forms. Its emphatic height also allowed the *ma'azina* tower to be combined with the idea of victory or memorial column, although the practice of erecting separate victory towers as such do not appear to have ever become quite universal in Muslim society.

It is, however, wrong to claim these architectural forms as a particularly Muslim importation into India, for she was no stranger to either of them. A form of elevated roofing, barrel-shaped, pyramidal or even hemispherical in appearance, was used, though

not so extensively, in the Jaina and Hindu architecture, particularly of Gujrat and Western India, whose surviving remains go back to the 10-11th centuries.¹ Even more familiar both in North and South India, was the free-standing tower, (*stambha* or *lat*), used either for light posts (*dvipadana*) or temple features (*Manstamba* or *Kirtistambha*) or victory pillars (*Jayastambha*).² Nor can the funerary chamber or mausoleum be supposed to be entirely unknown to Indian soil.³

What the Turkish Muslim introduced to India's building art was, therefore, not so much new forms as new techniques and structural elements, and a largeness of conception. The archuate system of construction together with the use of rubble and mortar as cementing agent was destined to free the Indian builders from the limitation of the trabeate system, thus allowing for greater control over design and material. Instead of being conceived of as a monolithic structure more or less designed to be a background for sculptured decoration, the building came to exist on its own right with its own scale of values. Space became as much an integral part of architectural composition as the structural elements. From the complex, introspective and concentric temples, religious edifices of the new regime thus became light, outward looking and expansive. With its monumental elevation, accented entrance-facade, and simplified skyline, the mosque symbolised a proclamation of the message which Hindu architecture seemed to conceal, like a secret to be discovered, within the dark recesses of the temple sanctuary.

On the other hand, the superiority of India's

craftsmen, particularly in ornamenting the stone surface, was unquestioned. They had a long tradition of figural sculpture with its emphasis on linear rythm and three-dimensionality. The Muslims could never hope to better their skill in carving designs on stone. In the detailed execution of their building schemes the Hindu builder and craftsmen was therefore indispensable, and so he continued to play vital part in the formative stage of Indo-Muslim architecture. In the process of working out the controlling elements like plan, structural design and decorative scheme, the Hindu craftsmen had to rely mostly on his own interpretation of the details and was thus enabled to introduce many designs and motifs from his own repertory, and even certain building notions. Some of these were eventually discarded or suitably modified but some were assimilated and so remained as integral elements. The *ogee* curve of the arch, for instance, as Percy Brown shows,⁴ has an Indian lineage going back, in form, to the sun-window of the Buddhist *chaitya* hall, and was first used for the screen in Aibak's mosque at Delhi. The form did not disappear with the introduction of the true or voussoir system of arching, but was adapted to it, as can be seen from its appearance in the later Muslim architecture of Gujrat, Mandu, Jaunpur and other provinces. The ornamental design carved along the border of the arches of Aibak's screen—an obvious adaptation of the Hindu serpent-and-creeper-motif freely worked into a flowing spiral pattern—was discarded later, but the rythm and sensitive delicacy of Hindu plastic relief found newer application in graceful lettering, geometric and abstract floral pattern with which the Muslims preferred to decorate

the surface. More noticeable is the adoption, as in the Tughluq, Syed and Lodi monuments, of such Hindu architectural elements as the *amalaka* and the *kalasha* of the temple spires (*shikhara*) for the finial of the domes.

The Mamluk buildings illustrate the gradual working of all this process. The first building erected by them on Indian soil was, significantly enough, a mosque, whose lighted and wide spaces sharply contrast the dark narrow and mysterious temple. The congregational mosque at Delhi named, purposefully, as the *Quaatul Islam* (Might of Islam), was commenced by Aibak in 592/1195 within 2 years of its conquest. It was admittedly built out of Hindu materials, all the columns, shafts and capitals being taken from the temples in the neighbourhood;⁵ the chronicler mentions that materials of 27 temples were utilised for this building. The dressed stones were hurriedly adapted to the requirements of a cloistered prayer hall orientated towards the west with an open court in the centre, the sculptured figures on the stones being either defaced or concealed by turning them upside down. In this improvization was symbolised the whole Mamluk history. The mosque was also raised on the plinth of a temple so that as Marshal has remarked, save for the *mihrab*, the building has little to indicate its Islamic character, for its construction also was on the Hindu trabeate principle, the short pyramidal and circular domes having been only reset in the same manner in different positions. In order to modify this Hindu appearance, two years after its completion Aibak added a screen in front of the western cloister, a characteristic element of the mosque design as inherited by the Turks.


But even in this, details of construction and ornament had to follow native ideas. The graceful lettering of Quranic verses cut in bold relief on the facade of this arched screen, can hardly conceal the fact of the ogee curved arches having been constructed on the trabeate principle. The skilled hand of the Hindu craftsman with his traditional design is apparent in the pattern of the decoration bordering the Arabic lettering. The mosque at Ajmer erected by Aibak soon after its conquest, and known as the *Arhai din ka Jhonpra* was also built out of materials obtained from demolished temples and so contain equally noticeable Hindu features. But its planning betray more deliberation than that of its counterpart at Delhi. In the provision of an elevated and covered entrance on the eastern side of the colonnaded court and in the remains of the little fluted projections at each end one can see the planner's desire to conceal its improvised nature.

A more deliberately muslim structure and marking a further stage in the evolution of Indo-Muslim architecture was the Qutb Minar, planned and commenced by Aibak sometime before 1199 and completed by Iltutmish. In its purpose and constructional details it represents a deliberate introduction of a specifically Muslim idea as developed in Iran. Although free standing tower or pillar was not entirely unknown to India, the ancestry of the Qutb Minar must be connected with the mosque towers, derived ultimately from the church towers of Christian Syria⁶, and whose earliest free standing example is perhaps the square tower at the Qasr-al Khair ash-Sharqi, in the Syrian desert, built by the Umayyad caliph Hisham (724-743).⁷ When built with the more

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Plate IV



Jam Minaret : balconies

pliable brick, this mosque attachment or *ma'azina* tended to assume a circular form. From its earliest surviving prototype, namely the Malviyah tower in the great mosque of Samarrabuilt by the Abbaside caliph Mutawakkil (847-861), this circular type travelled towards the east through Iran where it came to combine also the idea of funerary chamber, and commemoration tower.⁸ In so doing, it tended to assume shapes and forms whose easternmost examples are the brick built towers of Mahmud and Masud III at Ghazni, with a cylindrical upper story on a stellate lower course.⁹ This design has a close similarity not only to the minaret at Shirvan¹⁰ but also to the almost contemporary Jaina *stambhas* in South India,¹¹ which is perhaps explainable by the connection which the Ghaznavid empire had with the sites of Buddhist and Jaina religious monuments. The Seljuq variants of the minaret, built in the 12th century in Khorasan, however, tend to assume a sharply tapering outline and, while using inscriptional bands as decorative panelling on the surface as in the Ghaznavid types, they begin to have over each story balcony-like terraces resting on corbelled cluster of squinches.¹² It has been suggested that this characteristic form is an importation from Turkestan where, as in a minaret at Jar Kurgan of late 11th or early 12th century origin, not only this conspicuous taper occurs, but, besides having the framed bands of kufic inscriptions, the storied shaft has flutings and squinch arches also at each stage, features which thus connect it with the Qutb Minar.¹³ The recent discovery by the French Archaeological mission in Afghanistan of the Ghoride minaret at Jam, the modern site of Firozkoh, has,

however, put the Qutb Minar in a clearer historical and stylistic perspective. This monument, inscribed with the regal titles of Ghiyasuddin Muhammad b. Sam (1163-1202), is a brick structure on an octagonal base, the tapering circular shaft with the present height of sixty meters being divided into three stories, each opening on to a balcony resting on corbelled masonry brackets and crowned by a lantern or pavilion.¹⁴ Inside, a flight of steps spiralling round a central shaft leads to the upper balcony. The inscriptional bands, which interlink and form friezes and hexagonal patterns, contain no readable date, but there is no doubt that it was built for Muizzuddin's elder brother before 1202 A.D.¹⁵ Although it does not appear to have been meant as a *ma'azina*, for no remains of any mosque have been traced in the narrow river-bank side,¹⁶ its outline directly evokes the Qutb Minar founded only 3 years before the death of Ghiyasuddin who, it should be remembered, was the *dejure* sovereign of the Shansabani empire. If the Jam minaret differs from the Qutb, it is only in the material and in exterior decoration—the surface of the former being round and decorated with Kufic and Naskh lettering and vine-leaf roundels in stucco and blue faience—obviously following the Iranian scheme. The Delhi Minar, on the other hand, carries out the same idea in red sandstone. The preference for fluted and angular surface, doubtless facilitated by the stone material, only underlines the continuity of experimentation, in this case with the designs derived, for instance, from the flutings on the Jar Kurgan minaret and the wedge shaped or angular projections on the tomb tower of Rayy (built 1139.)¹⁷ or the stellate outline of the lower story of the Ghazni

towers. The stalactite corbelling of the balconies, which must have evoked to the Indian workmen the cusped tracery of their temple ceilings, has, in any case; a clear resemblance to the remains of the corbelled balcony of the Jam minaret, which because of the masonry construction, has failed to withstand the ravages of the elements. Unlike the Jam monument however, the Qutb Minar in its final form represented a double function, that of a *ma'azina* and a victory tower,¹⁸ an appropriation, perhaps by Iltutmish, of the idea conceived by Aibak and his master, of monumentalising the victory of Muslim forces.¹⁹

The tendency betrayed by the Qutb Minar is more pronounced in the buildings erected from after 1225 by his successor Iltutmish. At Delhi he extended the Quwatul Islam mosque by enclosing it within a larger rectangle and putting up a corresponding screen in front of the extended sanctuary. From the existing remains of this extension, of which the screen is the most conspicuous, a marked increase in Islamic elements is observable. The arches, although still constructed on the Indian principle, have shed their *ogee* curve and have assumed, as Percy Brown points out, a more pointed shape, and the rich carvings of the surface decoration, having lost the freedom and plasticity of the ornaments on Aibak's screen, adopt the Muslim conventional patterns of calligraphic lettering and abstract design. To the *Arhai-din-ka Jhonpra* also Iltutmish made some addition, notably by raising a similar screen of arches in front of the western colonnade. Here also a conscious application of Muslim constructional and decorative schemes is evident, the facade, topped by little fluted minarets, being filled, not with the modelled adaptation of

indigenous designs, but, as in his Delhi screen, with the abstract patterns of Muslim inspiration. The arches also follow the trend of his Delhi prototype and a multifoil design is introduced for the first time in Indian architecture.

Like the Qutb Minar another specifically Muslim idea given architectural form for the first time in India, was the mausoleum he built over the remains of his eldest son and crown prince, Nasiruddin Mahmud, who died in 1229. Situated in an isolated spot a few miles from Delhi and locally known as Sultan Ghari, this structure, raised on a square plinth and enclosed within stone walls with circular bastions and an impressive portal, is however, Islamic only in its conception. Its constructional details, particularly the pillars, capitals, architraves and corbelled pyramidal roofs are decidedly of Hindu extraction. Except the foliated *mihrab* or prayer niche, faced with boldly inscribed Quranic inscriptions, all its architectural features and materials with their carved motifs are so demonstratively Hindu in character, that doubts have been expressed as to its Muslim origin.²⁰ Iltutmish's inscription on the gateway²¹ should however dispel such doubts, but the fact remains that as a funerary monument it has marked difference in its planning from that of any of the subsequent structures, of this kind. This is evident in the manner in which the tomb is placed in an octagonal underground chamber.²² This arrangement, not to be seen in India till the 17th century, appears to be an extension of the practice met with in some of the Seljuq tomb towers of the 12th century,²³ which have a basement story to receive the body with only a memorial stone in the chamber above to mark the

position.


That the same arrangement was not adopted for his own mausoleum, built around 1235 outside the north west corner of the Quuatul Islam mosque, stresses, once again, the experimental process. Notwithstanding its dominant Muslim effect, the building, the earliest example of a planned square hall with a domical roof since fallen, is essentially Hindu in constructional details, the arches, including the squinches, introduced for the first time in India to change the square base to the circular diameter of the corbelled dome, are constructed on the native principle of oversailing courses of stone slabs.²⁴ It is mainly surface ornamentation in which the new trend finds expression. The carved inscriptional and formal decorations in its interior walls, draw nothing from the native repertoire. But the effect of the sculptured designs covering the entire surface from floor to ceiling, although executed with delicacy, is one of unrestrained georgeousness not dissimilar to that of the Hindu temples. It would seem as if the craftsmen, directed to use exclusively the *naskh*, *kufic* and *tughra* lettering and geometrical patterns were bewildered by the variety and monotony of the interlinked and repetitive curves, loops and angles.

The continued application of the Muslim structural and decorative features and the growing independence from the native building technique must have been facilitated, at least in Delhi, by the Mongol conquests which made the Mamluk capital a refuge for men of learning and technical skill uprooted from the western lands of Islam. Marking in any case a further advance in the acclimatization of Muslim

architectural ideas is the little domed mausoleum containing the sepulchres of Balban and his eldest son Prince Muhammad, built sometime after 1286, in the area known in those days as *Darul Aman*. It is now in a ruined condition and was rather unpretentious when intact. But it is significant not only for the balanced use of Muslim *motifs* but for the first appearance of the true arch constructed on the voussoir principle in place of the trabeate type in earlier buildings.²⁵

Other buildings of the period, erected in the provincial cities follow more or less the same lines of development. Most of them, however, have been repaired and restored so many times subsequently, that their original details have almost entirely disappeared. This is the case with Iltutmish's mosque at Budaun, built in 1223, Balban's mosque at Jalali, built in 1266, and the tomb of Bahauddin Zakariya at Multan (died 1262) believed to have been built by the saint himself. The Ukha Mandir at Bayana was originally a Hindu temple converted into a mosque but has since been reconverted into a temple. At Multan is the tomb of another saint named Shamsuddin, locally known as Shams-i-Tabrez, which was built by his grandson, but which has received, from devotees, extensive renovations. Only the comparatively insignificant tomb of another saint at Multan, called Shadna Shahid, (killed in 1288) has preserved its original fabric, though in a very denuded form. The lofty gateway at Nagaur, known as the *Atarkin-kadawaza*, has retained its original surface decorations; they are similar to those on Iltutmish's screen at Ajmer and so should be ascribed to that period. Muhammud b. Tughluq however, is known to have

Plate V



Sultan Chahi. Delhi

extensively renovated the original structure. The minar of Balban at Kol (Aligarh) erected during Mahmud's reign, but wantonly destroyed by the British district officer in 1861,²⁶ was, in point of time and also of style, the second of its kind in India, and possibly meant to serve as a pillar of victory.

NOTES

1. E.g. the Vinala temple in Mt. Abu, or the Sun temple of Modhera in Gujrat. Fergusson: *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, II, pp. 37-40, 56-57; Brown, *Indian Architecture*, I, p. 120-21

2. For 10-11th century examples in Gujrat & Rajputana, see Brown, I, p. 123 and Plates; see also Fergusson *op. cit.*, I, p. 347-48, II, p. 81-83.

3. The Buddhist *stupa* was originally meant to enshrine some personal relics or physical remains of the Buddhist saints although not to entomb the body. For a number of unique tomb-monuments of Jaina saints in Mudabidri, south Kanara, Mysore, see Fergusson, II, p. 79-80; Brown I, p. 132. It should be noted however that the better known funerary memorials or cenotaphs of the ruling families found in Rajputana all belong to the Muslim period and were doubtless inspired by Muslim examples; see Fergusson, II p. 164-69.

4. Brown, II, p. 11, Pls. IV, XXX & XLIV.

5. Thomas : *Chronicles*, p. 22-3, gives a reading of this inscription.

6. Creswell: *Short Account of Early Muslim Architecture* p. 111.

7. Creswell, *op. cit.* p. 116.

8. Examples of tomb towers built in the 11th-12th century are at Gurgan (Gunbad-i-Qabus, dated 1006) and at Rayy (built in 1139); both are single story round towers with a conical top, but the latter has wedge-shaped projections along the sides and a cluster of squinch arches round the neck. The tower of Kishmar, so remarkably similar to the Qutb Minar in its angular and fluted exterior, is of an uncertain date, and on the basis of its close resemblance with the dated tomb-tower of Radakan east (d.1283), Pope considers it to belong to the 14th century. Pope: *Survey of Persian Art*, II, p. 1023. For the above monuments see Pope: IV, Pls. 337, 346, and 347 B.

9. Fergusson *op. cit.* II, p. 192, illustration; for inscriptions, *JASB*, 1843, pp. 77-78.

10. Pope; *op. cit.*, II, p. 928-29.

11. Fergusson, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

12. E.g. minaret at Bistam, d.1120 and at Sarban, Isfahan, built in late 12th century. Pope: *op. cit.*, IV, Pl. 360 B & 362 B.

13. Cohn-Weiner : *Turan*, Pl. IV-XI, cited in Pope, *op. cit.*, II, p. 1027, note 1 and 2. A sketch of the Jar Kurgan minar, after Cohn-weiner, is in Pope, *op. cit.*

14. Andre Maricq, and Gaston Wiet : *Le Minaret de Djam*. Paris, 1957, p. 20.
15. *Ibid*, p. 27-28.
16. *Ibid*, p. 18-19. see also p. 65; Maricq noticed that the spiral stairway inside the minar leads from below the surface, suggesting a tunnelled flight of steps, which, according to the local tradition, connected the minar with the palace. This underground passage is now blocked with rubbish.
17. Pope, *op. cit.*, IV, Pl. 346.
18. See also the words "*Jayastambha*", "*Kirtistambha*" in Devnagari characters on some stones used in the Qutb Minar, evidently inscribed by the workmen, J.A. Page: *An historical memoir on the Qutb, MASI*, no. 22 (1926) p. 41, no. 20, p. 42, no. 21.
19. The suggestion, first made by Max Van Berchem and recently supported by Andre Maricq that the minar was originally intended by Aibak to be his tomb-tower and not a *ma'azina*, but that on his death, after completion of the first story, it was converted by Iltutmish into a tower, rests on its close similarity to the tomb-tower of Kishmar in Khurasan which he supposed was built in the same epoch. But date of the Kishmar tower is uncertain. Pope dates it in the 14th century; see note 8 above. A serious objection to this hypothesis is the fact that in the Qutb Minar the structural positioning of the spiral stairway which occupies the centre of the inner space in the first story appears to be part of the original plan and not an after thought, thus leaving no space for the tomb, whereas in Kishmar and in all the other tomb-towers the grave occupies the centre. Most of the *ma'azina* of the Seljuq period stood on the north eastern corner of the mosque (Pope, *op. cit.*, II, p. 1029) whereas the Qutb is on the south eastern. This fact may not be without significance, but it may be pointed out that the old city was mostly on the south of the Quatutl Islam mosque.
20. Cunningham: *Reports*, p. 60; see also Carr Stephen : *Archaeology and monumental remains of Delhi*, 1876, p. 73.
21. *EIM*, 1911-12 p. 23. It is dated in 629/1231.
22. For a detailed description of the monument, see *Ancient India*: no. 3, (Jan. 1947) p. 4-10 and plates. Brown, *op. cit.*, II, p. 14, thinks that the platform forming the roof of the underground chamber must have been designed to support a super-structure, probably a pavilion of pyramidal roof resting on marble pillars which have all disappeared now.
23. E.g. Gunbad-i- Surkh, c. 1147, Gunbad-i-Kabud, c. 1196; see Pope, *op. cit.*, II, p. 1026.
24. Brown, *op. cit.*, II, p. 15.
25. Stephen, Carr : *op. cit.*, p. 79-80; Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
26. see Thomas : *Chronicles*, p. 129, for a *facsimile* of the inscription dated in 652 which refers only to the building and not to any mosque.

APPENDIX A

BARAN "FARMAN" OF MUIZZUDDIN MUHAMMAD B. SAM

At my request, Mr. Hasan Barani, advocate of Bulandshahr, U. P. kindly sent the following note, in 1944 pending the full publication of the document in his possession which, he, assured me would be done at an early date.

"It is dated 588 A.H. evidently soon after the conquest of Delhi. It refers to the capture of Baran (Bulandshahr) by Muhammad Ghori's forces on their way to Budaun and bears the conqueror's *tughra*."

"It confers the qaziship of Baran on Nuruddin, and endows land on Ajaipal Lanba, Chowdhury of Baran who with his retainers and followers, had embraced Islam and had helped in the conquest. He was named Malik Muhammad Qad Daraz after his conversion."

On my further enquiry he sent these details :

"The charter at the top bears the *tughra* of Muizzuddin and also mentions his father's name as Sam.

Chandrasen is mentioned as an ancestor of Chowdhury Ajaipal.

The position conferred on qazi Nuruddin is *hukumat wa riyasat-i-mansab-i-sadarat*, and his subordinates are referred to as *wali*, *muqti*, *karkun*, and *gumashia*.

The charter relates only to the surrender of Ajaipal and the settlement of land on him and also to the appointment of qazi Nuruddin. It does not recount the full story of the capture of Baran".

As far as I know, this document has not been published as yet. Until it is possible to examine it in detail, its genuineness cannot be asserted beyond dispute.

APPENDIX B

SITE OF MUIZZUDDIN'S BATTLE WITH PRITHVIRAJA.

Minhaj calls it Tarain (printed text. p. 118). A slight change in the dots over the first letter would make it Narain in Persian script, and both Ferishta and Nizamuddin Bakshi adopt the latter reading. They however, add that it was "near Tarain in the district of Sarsuti" (*Khitta-i-Sarsuti*); Ferishta says that 'Narain' was also known as Tarawari. On the basis of this latter statement Elphinstone (*History of India*, p. 355) places the battlefield between Karnal and Thaneswar, evidently identifying Tarain with Azimabad-Tarawari, 14 miles south of Thaneswar. This is accepted in the *Punjab Gazetteer*, (1, p. 318), and by Vaidya (*Downfall of Hindu India*, iii, p. 333) and Raverty, (trans. *Tab.Nas.* p. 459 note 7) as well as Ganguly (*HCIP*, v. p. 110).

This identification, however, is untenable. Yahya Sirhindi, (*TM* p. 8) makes it clear that it was within the '*Khitta*' Sarsuti. If Sarsuti is modern Sirsa, it should evidently be looked for somewhere on the west. It is hardly likely that Muizzuddin would advance so far into Chauhana territory either from Sirhind or from Bhatinda, (according to whether 'Tabarhindah' is to be taken to refer to either of these two places) to meet the fresh troops of Prithviraja whom he seemed to be anxious to avoid on this occasion. Thaneswar is about 80 miles south of Sirhind and 100 miles east, southeast of Bhatinda. We know that he was on the point of starting on his way back to Ghazni after capturing Bhatinda, when the Rajputs came up and he was forced to give battle. After defeating him Prithviraja immediately invested Bhatinda. This would suggest that the battle was fought near the fortress and very possibly to its south. After the second battle fought at the same place Prithviraja, we are told, was captured as he was flying, near the "limits of Sarsuti" (*hudud*), which is about 100 miles west of Thaneswar or even of Karnal. He would naturally take the shortest route for flight to his capital. This route from Bhatinda passes through Sirsa, whereas to place the battlefield near Thaneswar would mean that he was making a long detour towards the west while flying, to pass through Sirsa where, as we know, he was eventually captured. Cunningham's suggestion (*Reports*, xiv, p. 68-69) about the location of Tarain between Bhatinda and Sirsa is more plausible. He identifies it with a village called Torawana, 27 miles from Bhatinda and 20 miles from Sirsa, which clearly would fit the details of the event.

APPENDIX C

CONVERSION OF THE KHOKARS

Among the tribes who rose against Muizzuddin in 1206 in the western Punjab was the Khokar, whom Briggs (*trans. Ferishta* I, p. 183-4) identified with the Gakkar; this was also done in the *JASB*, (1871, p. 67). The Gakkar however do not come into prominence until the reign of Babur. The error was corrected in the *IA* (1907, p. 1-7) and also in Rose; *Glossary of the Punjab Tribes and Castes*, (II, p. 54). Raverty also questioned the identification in his *Notes on Afghanistan*, pp. 367-8.

Ferishta, I, p. 59-60, in describing the process of the Khokar's conversion to Islam by Muizzuddin, speaks of their former custom of polyandry and female infanticide. This has been unreservedly accepted in the *IA* (1907) as an authenticated detail of the early history "of the essentially Punjab tribe, the Khokars". Raverty, in his *Notes* rightly questioned the story of their conversion but *CHI* (III, p.47) still adheres to it. The fact is, that Ferishta, who based his account demonstrably on Ibnul Asir, (XII, p. 98) has confused the Khokars under discussion with another trans-Indus tribe inhabiting "the districts of Sankuran and Makran." This tribe or people, whom Ibnul Asir calls the Tirahiah, were also a source of constant trouble to the Mussalmans of Peshawar since the days of Subuktigin. They also rose in rebellion in 1205-6 but were effectively quelled by Yalduz, the Governor of the district. It is this tribe to whom Ibnul Asir ascribes the practices of polyandry and female infanticide and whom Muizzuddin succeeded in converting. Ferishta also mentions the Tirahiah, (p. 60) but wrongly asserts that both the Tirahiah and the Khokar were converted during the campaigns of 1205-6 and adds that upto 1018/1609 they continued to remain Muslims. Ibnul Asir however, speaks of the conversion only of the Tirahiah; the Khokars are invariably described both by Hasan Nizami and Minhaj as infidels. Could Tirahiah be a misreading for the *Shah*, mentioned by Fakhre Mudabbir as one of the tribes who joined the Khokar rebellion? The 'Shahan', in any case, seems to be the persianised name of the present Sehi tribe listed in Rose: *Glossary of the Punjab Tribes and Castes*, III, p. 394.

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